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ABSTRACT 
This thesis. entitled 'ETHNICI1Y AS IDENTI1Y AND ETHNICI1Y POLITICALLY 
MOBILISED: SYMBOLS OF MOBILISATION IN INKATHA'. presents two major 
contributions. The first is a discussion of ethnicl1y that not only draws the distinction 
between the phenomenon in its mobilised poUtical form. on the one hand. and on the 
other ethniclty as soc1alldentity'presenting ute stories through which indivlduals Uve 
part of their social existences. but also follows through the theoreUcal and poUey 
impUcaUons. The implicaUons of this distincUon suggest ways in which the issue of 
-ethnicity can be approached within attempts to avoid the con1llctual dimension. The 
second is a study of the manner in which poUtical moblllsation of Zulu ethnicity has 
occurred. especially during the 19708 and 1980s. through the Inkatha movement. The 
case study effectively illustrates the manner in which poUticised ethnicity functions. in 
deftnlng a rtgld interpretation that allows Uttle flux and movement within. and from 
and into the ethnic camp. 
The author integrates the theoretical discUBSlon of the issue of ethniclty and ethnic 
social identities with com~tive and emplrlcal material drawn nationally and 
internationally as well as from the extensive cue study of the mobilisation practices of 
the Inkatha movement and its leadership. In the theoretical approach the complex 
nature of all identities. and of ethnlclty speclftcally, is stressed, arguing for the 
multiple experiences of what is presented as homogeneous within ethnic mobilisation. 
Ethnic identities are gendered, and subject to the effects of class, age, and 'race' 
dlstlnctions. Ethnidty is, furthermore, much more fle:x1ble than would appear to be 
the case from such mobilisation. It is in this flexibility that an approach to resoMng 
'ethnic conflict' Ues. 
Within ethnic mobWsaUon the stress in the interpe11aUons adclres8ed at ethnic 
subjects is on rtgldity, lnfie:x1bWty, and single and centrallsed interpretaUons. These 
elements are illustrated through the case study of Inkatha operating from within the 
previous KwaZulu bantustan. Themes and approaches within the discourse of 
mobUisaUon employed to mobWse a regional populaUon into Inkatha are examined. 
and set against the background and effects of social, poUUcal and economic factors. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis owes much to the publ1c discussions that occurred around the pubUshed 
versions of sections of the present work (this thesls). Reviews. conferences and 
seminars produced more comment than can possibly be individually acknowledged 
here. The students who regtstered for the courses that I taught are also owed a debt of 
gratitude. as are research asslstants (especially those involved in malntalnlng the 
Natal Room). 
People who must be thanked by name are Georgina HamUton. Cathy Campbell and 
Cherryl Walker. co-authors. colleagues and friends. with whom I have partlclpated In 
projects around the Issue of Identities in contemporary South Africa and shared and 
received many Ideas; Glenn Moss. first and foremost friend. but also fellow student for 
several years. colleague. and editor at Ravan Press; Charles Meth. always a keen 
companion on hiking trips that either hindered the earller completion ofthls (and his) 
thesis. or were an essential element in ensuring the mental and physical health on 
which It ftnally rests (probably both); my supervisor Art Sitas. for being an lnunlnent 
presence down the passage. and for some perceptive comments at the end. Flnally. to 
the members of the 'Capital Re8ding Group' (present and past). without whose 
regular intellectual sUmulaUon this work would have been much the poorer. 
The whole thesis. as It appears here. unless speclftcally indicated to the contrary in 
the text. Is the ortglnal work of the author. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The need for a 'politlcs of diverli11¥ and a soc1e~ that recogntses a plurall~ of 
Identltles in the politlcal terrain. has been acknowledged by many contemporary 
theorists often operating from very different politlcal and theoretlcal perspectlves (for 
example. LlJphart. 1979. 1993: Wrtgbt. 1985: Laclau. 1993: 1993a). This need arises. 
in part. out of the 'untversalisms' that had collapsed with the fragmentatlon of the 
Sovlet Union and other eastern European countries (cfLaclau. 1993&: 1993b: 
Aronson. 1991). What is being undertaken less frequently. or with much less 
confidence. at least from a Left perspectlve. are attempts to construct such a society. 
theoretlcally or in consistent polley-making. partly (I would suggest) because of the 
d1fIlcul~ that lies in establishing a new 'grand narratlve·. that would allow for 
non-confllctual dtversi~ (Gutman. 1992). It is a brave person, indeed. who enters this 
field. so domtnated by the horrors of what is the apparent inevitable consequence of 
plurall~ rampant - a field that sees not the 'massive foes' (captured in Ronald 
Reagan's perceptlon of the USSR as the 'EvU Empire') of the Cold War. but the many 
'micro' battles of Hot Wars. where size and internatlonally perceived 1mportance has 
less to do with numbers krued than with geo-pol1tlcallocatlon on the map of the 'new 
world order'. 
This field, graphically demonstrated through the pictures and words brought to our 
attentlon by internatlonal and local media showtng the total fragmentatlon of societles 
(ctvU and state) such as in Somalia. the new horror of'ethnlc cleanslng' in YugoslaVia. 
the genocidal 'war' in Rwanda. the separatISt strufgle in Chechnya, and the 1nabW~ to 
recogntse the rtgbt of opposltlon that characterised both the apartheid past and much 
of the translUonal present in South Africa (see, for example, report on 
IDASA-supported study, Sunday Tribune, 4 Dec 94), presents a minefield to any 
analyst and theorist. 
Are these the inevitable horrors of d1versl~ checked and unrecognised, or can It be 
that the carnage and confrontatlon Is, at least in part. due to the privUegtng of 
pol1tlc1sed ethn1cI~, the misrecogn1Uon of Identlty? For that Is the other 
'common-sense' of post-modem pluralism. that all would be welltf diversity was given 
free reign within the model and terra1n of natlonal self-determtnatlon. 
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However, it Is essential that suggestions be made for possible resolution of the 
apparent strong connection between Violence and diversity. of the tension between 
'multi-culturallsm' and confUctual demands or extreme separatism. Such a task Is 
even more pressing In South Africa where the polltics of Identity. and actual and 
threatened Violence that calls on identity polltics. has achieved a higher place on the 
agenda of social change than has the polltics of class or of gender. There was. 
however. within the Violence in South Africa a common acceptance that change 
towards democratisation would occur (even If only ultlmately) through a process of 
negotiation. 
It is to address the central issue of diversity that I have reworked some of my previous 
unpubllshed and pubUshed work on the subject of etbn1city. and speclftcally on the . 
mobWsatory project by cultural brokers using the notion of ·Zuluness·. and to which I 
have added considerable new material. In this thesis I examine ethn1city and etbn1c 
soclalldentities. arguIng for a deflnltion and an approach that can be applled to 
proVide comparative perspectiVe under a wide range of cirCUmstances. Importantly. I 
argue for the separation of ethn1city as soclalldentity. on the one hand. and. on the 
other. etbn1clty as factor in the poUtical mobllisation of people. I propose that a 
successful polltics of diversity. or a theory of dltference. is not possible unless this 
theoretical and emptrlcal distinction ls maintained, and the impllcations drawn out. 
This thesis is. however. not simply an adaptation of already Written materlal to the 
speclflc demands of formalised and micro-scale academic recognition. The revision. 
rethink and extenstve re-worldng has inevitably benefited from the comments - many 
of them constructiVely and critically taking issue with what I had offered for publlc 
evaluation - made in reviews. semlnars. letters, and many informal dlscusslons. The 
thesis has also been expanded into areas that were wi-developed. or had not received 
any attention at all in the earller versions. Finally. it has had to respond to a rapidly 
changlng context. both locally and lnternationally, Hopefully it has been improved by 
these interventions, and hopefully, although With much less conViction. noting the 
form, it remains within the arena of debate. 
The material has been organised as follows: in chapter one. this lntroductfon. I 
explaln the inter-relationship of the elements of the task at hand. Chapter two consists 
of a theoretical and comparative discussion of ethntct.ty. assessing whether sufficient 
content can be gtven to the notion to make it useful in understandlng the dynamics of 
soclalidentity formation. It also starts extendlng the exploration of the dltference 
between ethnicity as soclalldentity in everyday Ufe of indiViduals. and ethniclty as 
moblUslng Ideology. Chapter three examtnes the distinction betw~ ethnic 
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mob1l1satlon and the symbols employed in such mob1l1stng actlon. on the one hand. 
and. on the other. ethnicity as one of many socialidentltles in everyday Ufe. In 
additlon I note the heterogeneity of ethnic. and other. socialidentltles. In the next 
chapter. chapter four. I discuss Zulu ethnicity in its mob1l1sed form and the symbols 
employed to give image to it. and its existence within poUtical practice. The developing 
contestation. between political organisations. over the claim to all or part of the notion 
of 'Zuluness'. is noted. I place the discussion within an historical context that is 
contoured by class struggle. Finally, in the concluding section. chapter five. I suggest 
the impUcations of the material to the project of creating a poUtics of diversity. a 
democratic practice that Is conscious of and informed. but not shaped and rtgldly 
cast. by the complex boundaries of Identity. I explore whether the notion of democratic 
citIZenship can meet the demands of social diversUy within a common poUtical 
practice. 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
ThIs study traces a journey from the early-1970s to the mid-1990s by following a 
thread that gave continuity to the poUticaI and other social relations within the regton 
of NatallKwaZulu (what Is now. since May 1994. the proVInce of KwaZulu-Natal. or 
KZN) • the thread is that of ethnic mob1l1satlon. It Is a journey through a landscape 
that was. for decades already. and that sUll remains. painted in the common sense of 
the existence of ethn1c1ty. of the 'Zulu nation'. However. common sense is frequently 
common non·~se. or only part sense. 
Our understanding of ethn1city Is far from adequate. That mtght sound strange being 
said ill a country that Is only just starting to move beyond a formal poUey that rested 
fundamentally on ethnic fragmentation for 30 years: and continued to rest even after 
the process of negotiations was launched - not a single bantustan. or ethnic 
'homeland'. had been dissolved until just before the elections In Apr1l 1994. despite 
the much-vaunted demise of apartheid post-February 1990; and st11llnforms social 
thought in post-elect1on South Africa. One of the costly mistakes made by the African 
National Congress in the transitional period after 1990. was In not inslsttng on the 
prior re-incorporation of all bantustans before the negotiation process was launched 
through the Convention for a Democratlc South Africa (CODESA) One (see Mare. 
1993a. for a discusston of this Issue). Such an omission allowed an even greater 
degree of ethnic identification to flOUrish than would have been the case. and to be 
fired In the heat generated by the issue dUring the negotiation process. 
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However, It Is precisely apartheid, in Its form of 'separate development', of ' cultural 
plurallsm' and 'cultural national1sms', of 'peoples' and 'nations', that closed the door 
on many sertous invesugations of a phenome~on that Is not s1mply contained by 
aparthe1d, that Is not unique to Mrtca. and that Is not an anachroniSm in the modem 
world. Apartheid largely tainted ethnicity for local researchers, except to examine the 
phenomenon as the obvious tool that 'they' 'used' to divide 'the people' (an 
unexamined notion that stlll exists problematically on the polltical terraln). The major 
problem With that approach Is that it 1mpUes that many mllllons of fellow South 
Mrtcans, who llved and Uve their llves as ethnic subjects, along With the many other 
identit1es that shape dally interact10n and social percept1ons, are fools, duped by the 
manipulators, 80 many sheep. I do not accept that. A varlation of this perception 
underlles the equally obvious attempts to manipulate symbols of ethnic mobilisation 
to counter already ex1sUng ethnically-based organisations and practices. The struggle 
over the symbol of the Zulu king. in the pertod after the April 1994 election, between 
the Mrlcan National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party is a case in point: as is 
that over the manner in which some Afrikaners are struggling to be defined and 
provided With a polltical home. 
A brtef summary of changlng academic and polltical perceptions of 'race' and ethnidty 
is necessary. It Is a summary, and incomplete treatment because it Is not essential to 
this study, which takes a different (and more theoret1cal) route, and because llttle 
secondary matertalis lmmedlately available. What is clear is that a comprehenstve 
study of the place of 'race', nationalism and ethnicity, as well as other non-class 
issues, Within the concerns of soclology (and related dIsdpllnes) in South Africa. is 
necessary. Such a study would contextual1se the early contrlbutions by people such as 
Van den Bergh, whose CanevUle: the soctal structure of a South J\frfcan town (1964) 
examined the 'ubiquitous factor of "race" (which) in South Africa Is no less real for its 
irrationality' in a small town in Natal. He noted that whlle much work had been done 
on the economic, polltical and legal aspects of South African 'race relations', other 
aspects such as 'racial atUtudes and etiquette are stllliargely uncharted' (1964:6): Leo 
Kuper, who With fellow sociologists HUstan Watts and R Davies publlshed an even 
earller study of Durban: a study in racial ecology (1958), and subsequently wrote on 
plurallsm (Kuper and Smith, 1969), 'race' and class (1974), and ethnic relations and 
confllct (1977), to name but a few: Monica WUson and Archle MafeJe's study of the 
Langa township (1963); John Rex's many writings on 'race' and etbnlclty (for example, 
Rex and Moore, 1967, and Rex. 1973, dedicated to Nelson Mandela); Dlckle-Clark, 
and his study of coloured people in Durban (1964): Meer (1969) on the 'Indian 
community'; and many others. Such a study would, in addition, deal With the place of 
issues such as class, 'race', gender and etbnldty Withln teachlng and research 
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programmes: the effects of European marxist debates on the concerns and 
approaches of local academics; the effects of the approaches of the UberaUon alllance 
to analyses of South African socle~ (such as the SA Communist party's 'colon1al1sm of 
a special ~. approach); and the changes within, as well as resistance to, the 
repressive apartheid socle~ that affected intellectual development. Webster's (1991) 
review of sociology at the Untversi~ of the Witwatersrand provides an example of such 
an overview, as do the contrlbuUons by anthropologists to the Annual Review cd 
Anthropology (see Pauw, 1980; Gordon and Spiegel, 1993), and historians (see, for 
example" BozzoU and DeUus, 1990, especially 1990:31, and references in note 74 to 
ethnlci~). 
Simon Bekker disappoints in this task in his overview of ethnic studies in South 
Africa. despite the claims and sarcasUc comments made in the introducUon by 
Lawrence Schlemmer, and despite the task Bekker set hlmself(I993). Where Bekker. 
and Schlemmer, are correct 1s in noUng the lack of serious analyses of ethnic1~ within 
South African left scholarship (see my own earUer comment on thls lacuna -
1992: 1-2). Dubow (1992:209) slmllarly noted that the 'general amnesia about the 
place of racist 1deas in Western thought. .. has been exacerbated (in South Africa) by 
materlalist scholarship's fear of "idealism"'. Hls comments apply even more to 
ethnicl~. 
Durlng, and even before. the 1950s and the 19608 debates around ethnicl~ within 
South Africa were dominated by those who operated within an apartheid framework, 
or who provided the justlftcaUon for the poUey (for a dl8cuss1on of the earUer period 
see Dubow, 1987; 1992). Dunbar Moodie. for example, traces the complex sb1ftB and 
lapses between 'race' thlnklng and poUey formulaUon, on the one hand, and 'poslUve 
apartheid' based on an ethnic approach. with several 'naUons' haVing to co-c:xlst in 
South Africa. on the other (~ 1980:276-7). A powerful figure within theae debates was 
Dr WWM E1selen who. before he became Hendrlk Verwoerd's secretary of naUve 
affairs. had been a lecturer and then professor of anthropology (Moodle, 1980:272). 
He argued vigorously for 'dJfference' rather than for a hierarchy of cultures; for the 
preservaUon of ethnic values and pracUces (especlaJly of language) rather than their 
destrucUon through asslm1l&Uon: 
'The future wl1l teach us whether the Bantu have a sufDclent ethnically 
conscious stratum to persist and Win for their languages a ftrm and 
abiding place in South Africa. From our side we can do much to 
encourage these Peoples in the1r struggle for cultural ex1stence if we 
try to understand and respect their language and culture', 
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wrote Elselen as early as 1934 (quoted Moodie, 1980:273). That argument was to 
inform 'positive apartheid', as discussed below. 
John Sharp characterised the apartheid 'vision' as involving: 
a particular interpretation of the terms 'ethnic group' and 'nation'. It 
held that ethnic groups differed from each other by virtue of objective 
cultural differences. The members of an ethnic group spoke one 
language. held to a distinctive set of practices, and shared a common 
system of beUefs ( I 988a:79). 
Such an approach, of ethnic deftnltion from above, as part of a poUey almed at 
remoVing all effective power from the majority, excluded from poUtical power at the 
centre, had to rely on notions of Identity that were slmpUstic, fixed and easily 
categorised and stipulated in IdenUftcation documents. Gordon and Spiegel noted the 
way In which anthropologists Within the Verenlgtng van Pifrlkaanse Volkekundlges 
emphasized 'the boundedness of cultures, focuse(d) on ethnic difference and (were) 
generally motivated by an Ideal of volksdtens (service to one's people .... ) for 
malntenance of ethnic purity' (1993:84-85; see also the discussion of volkekunde and 
Its Unks with raclsm and apartheid in Gordon, 1991). Tblrteen years earUer Pauw had 
slmllarly drawn attention to the spUt between Vollcekunde, With Its 'organlsmlc' 
approach, and soclal anthropology with Its soclologlcal approach (1980:316-7). He 
did, however, note attempts to brtng the cultural and soclal anthropologlsts closer 
together, for example through the efforts of Hammond· Tooke. professor of social 
anthropology at the University of the Witwatersrand. Pauw refers to Hammond·Tooke 
when he noted an approach that did not fix the boundaries between people, but saw 
them as often 'vague. with many indlvlduals or groups haVing only a margtna1 relation 
to one or more ethnic or cultural units, and with units tendlng to change. merge or 
regroup' (Pauw. 1980:319; Hammond·Tooke. 1970; also see West. 1979). 
In their later dlsc1pUnary overview for the Annual Revtew of Anthropology. Gordon 
and Spiegel noted the strengths as well as the dangers within an opposltional 
anthropology that saw the South African situation under apartheid as unique: The 
strengths Include a pralseworthy development of an expose tradition with roots in 
llberal scholarsblp and using ethnography to focus on people made lnvlslble by 
apartheid'; but also dangerous, 'particularly when the object of ethnography becomes 
Indictment and challenge only and excludes Increaslng knowledge and theoretical 
development' (1993:89). The same, once again, could be said for soclology. 
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Eddie Webster ( 1991) examined the teaching of sociology at the Unlversi1¥ of the 
Witwatersrand since 1937. He noted the development of the discipUne from a service . 
function. teaching on social pathologies for other departments (such as Social Work). 
and later. ~th the introduction ofindustrlal Sociology in 1968. for business. to a 
critical sociology concerned With the operation of capltal1sm and the state. The areas 
of 'race' and ethnicl1¥ (as well as gender studies) lagged behind. as illustrated by the 
numbers of papers dealing With ·these Issues presented at the Association of 
SociologiSts of Southern Africa (ASSA) conferenceS between 1979 and 1988: class. 
'race' and gender together were dealt With in about 25 papers (ethnicity Is not even 
mentioned). wh1le education accounted for 42. health for about 36. labour studies 34. 
and state and polltics about 30 (Webster. 1991:72). 
Webster noted that wh1le during the 19808 'the search for relevance has preoccupied 
the members of ASSA (the progressive sociological associaUonJ •.. Most str1k1ng ts the 
absence of courses on ethnic and race relations in departments of sociology 
underl1n1ng the fallure of many marxist academlcs to come to terms adequately With 
national oppression and racism' (1991:73). In the field ofindustrlal sociology. too. 
during this period. the dominance of speclftc kinds of labour process studies led to 'a 
neglect of non -class workplace relaUons ... • (Webster. 1991:73). I would argue that this 
Is st1ll true in large part. although less so than during the 19705 and early-I980s. 
Ethnicl1¥ makes Its appearance in left discourse. but then as something that Is 
acknowledged to be powerfully there. but only because It has displaced. for the 
moment. class discourses and organtsaUonal strength Within the sttuaUon being 
studied. a version of false consciousness (see the dlscuss10n of such approaches in 
Segal. 1991). What has not been ach1eved adequately In the South African context Is a 
synthesis of social Identity theoty (not necessar1ly that developed Within social 
psychology) Into materialist analysts. Much work remains to be done. and probably 
will as these Issues promlse to rematn at the centre of pollUcal contllct. 
Il;8tion-butldlng efforts. and demands for parttculartsUc recognttion In South Africa 
(see Mare. 1995: 19958. for discussion of the pouucs ofreoogn1Uon in post-elecUon 
South Mrtca). There have been three large conferences in South Mrlca since 1993 
dealing With the Issue of ethnicl1¥ and IdenUtarlan poUUcal claims. the most recent in 
1995 on coloured demands In the Western Cape proVince (see Mare and Wrtgbt. 1994. 
for a diSCUSSion of two of the conferences. In Pletermar1tzburg and In Grahamstown). 
The pervasiveness of apartheid as rac1al discrlmlnaUon and oppression. and as ethnic 
fragmentation. has meant that serious examination of ethniclty has been rare among 
left Intellectuals. although It had not 'virtually disappeared' as suggested by Bekker 
(1993:3; see. for example. SPP. vol 4. 1983; and the discussion by Gordon and 
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Spiegel. 1993). in any case warned otT by the cUftlcult¥ (or even lmposib1llty) offindlng 
a necessary relationship between etbnlc1ty (a set of ideas. amongst others. through 
which we live our lives) and the 'economic base' of societ¥; between an ideology. a way 
of making sense of the world. and the central relationships that arlse from the way in 
which goods are produced and distrlbuted (for a discussion of this issue in relation to 
analyses of South Afrlcan societ¥ see. for example. Norval. 1994). 
The strength of structural marxism in South Afrlca during the 19705 and early-1980s. 
wblle generating very useful research and analysis. stood in the way of giving ethnicity 
and 'race' (both as 'race' thlnklng. as well as racism). and gender a place within 
materlallst analysis of this soclet¥. Gordon and Spiegel located th~ shaping power of 
the Ideas of neo-marxism both internationally and locally: 
This genre was endorsed by social anthro~logy. sociology. and 
historiography in the 19705 and 19805 because lts metropolitan 
development coinclded with a local search for new means to challenge 
the prevalllng liberal wisdoms that apartheld was the result of white 
atutudes and prejudice. Arguing that apartheid was the result of 
structural features of local capltalism. neo-Marxist analysts also 
provlded a new emblem of opposltion to apartheid ( 1993:90). 
Once the attempt to reduce all other socletal relations and actions to an unmed1ated 
causal relationship to the economic base. or even the recognition of any such 
necessary connection. has been abandoned. alternative and fruitful avenues for 
investigation are opened up. My own separatlon from the restraints of the preva1llng 
left ldiom came through the early work by Laclau (1977. 1977a) and by John Saul 
(1979) on popullsm and fascism. and on tI1baltsm. respectively. SImultaneously. strict 
disclplinary boundaries have to be abandoned. Such an approach informs this thesls. 
Several years ago I wrote. in a paper on populism (Mare. 1984). that that 
investigation ended where soclal psychology should enter. It was only in 1992 that I 
could start to combine some of the lnslghts otTered by debates within psychological 
socIalldenUty theory with the analysis that owed more to poliUcal sociology (especlally 
that within the study of and debates over ldeology). The new task. the first ldeas of 
which are contalned in this thesis. is to leave the now fairly unproduCUve field of 
social psychology and its investigations of identity. and explore what sociolcer has to 
otTer to the study of identities (a prollferation of idenUty studies no doubt trtggered in 
part by the theoretical challenges and extreme clalms of post-modernlsm. but even 
more so by the slmultaneous fragmentaUon and globallsaUon of the world during the 
last two decades of the twenUeth century) (see. for example. Hall. 1993. for an 
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overview of the direction). Hall argued that If the 'character of change 1n 
late-modernity' 1s globallsation. it not only draws people 1nto common experiences 
(mediated by the media and experlenced through the spread of cap1tallsm. but also 
decentres and dlslocates. deIJWldlng new approaches to 1dentity formation and 
notions of the 1ndtvldual (1993:277-9). Thls theals 1& sltuated withln these debates. 
but located In the spec1ftc form deIJWlded by local poUtical contestation. Decentrlng 
and dlslocation. as well as the locallmpact of global1sation. deIJWld that soclal 
scientists here test and. If necessary. adapt theoretical approaches to the question of 
1dentity formation and reformation. 
The pubUshed work on whlch thls thesis Is based (especially Mar~. 1992) dealt with 
the 'soc1ally structured content of Identity'. Identlfted by Campbell (1992:2) as havlng 
rece1ved 'Inadequate attention' from soclal1dentity theorists. They had 'tended to focus 
their research and writing In two areas, namely the process and structure of soclal 
1dentity formation'. Process refers to 'the cognitive mechanisms underlying Identity 
formation': structure to 'social Identity theory's account of the organisation of the 
self-concept In terms of a loose association of group memberships': and content to '(a) 
those particular group m~shlps available to 1ndMduals 1n socially and 
hlstorlcally spec1flc situations. and (b) soclally and hlstorlcally spec1ftc characterlstics 
of these group membersh1ps' (Campbell. 1992:2). 
Without dlrectly referring to the lmportant work by other lIOClal scientists and 
hlstorlans who have argued a s1m1lar need to locate analyses of etbnlc1ty wlthln their 
spec1flc hlstorlcal contexts, Campbell finds herself wlthln a school of thought that 
dentes the a-hlstorlcal approach to thls phenomenon (see. for example. Mm and 
Wrlght. 1994: Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds). 1984: etc). 
Wlthln thls thesis the case study materlal on the mobWsation of an ethn1c group Is 
located within an hlstorlcal context. and the growth and decUne, as well as the 
struggles over. ethn1c identities. are perlodlsed. 
Thls 18 an Interdlsclpltnary study. an attempt to amalgamate 1n a necessary manner 
the areas of theory and study withln the dlsc1pUne of soclology (and then especially of 
political sociology), social psychology. poUtical sc1ence and hlstory. I dld It because It 
Is only possible truly to reach towards an exploration and explanation of social 
dynamics through crossing the llmlts of dlsc1pllnary boundaries. The study owes 
much to the areas or dlsclpUnes wlthln whlch I received my own academic tralnlng. 
namely comparative Uterature: poUtical science; development studies: aoclology: and 
then the insights of social psychology, mediated through Jo1nt research with colleagues 
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at the University of Natal (Durban). I will refer later to the comparative and theoretical 
insights offered by recent sociology and sociologists. such as Pierre Bourdieu. 
Methodologically I have employed several approaches. all informed by an attempt to 
understand how subjects are interpellated by the 'hailers' of ethnic mobll1sation. 
These appeals to ethnic Identification have been set against the historical background 
against and within which the calls for recognition and action are made. the structural 
conditions that shape the appeals and the responses. and the pubUc. and hence 
observ~ble. actions of those who are the recipients of such appeals. It should be 
obvious that no single methodologtcal approach was possible. The results of the test of 
their sultab1llty over time. since my Interest in these issues was first stirred. has been 
the usefulness of the analyses generated. measured against both social understanding 
and predictive ab1llty. These results have been gratifying. 
Most of the material on the moblllsing calls made within the Inkatha movement has I 
closely followed discourse analysis. through the examination of speeches. letters. and \ 
documents located in my own collection (now the Natal Room at the University of 
Natal. Durban). These documents are essential in establ1shing the content of the 
interpellations directed at an ethnic community. Not only are they heard by an 
audience directly present at meetings (of which Buthelezi has held hundreds. if not 
thousands). but. in addition. they have been widely reported. Sitas. in an interesting. if 
somewhat romantic, analysis and description of 'worker gatherings and 
performance-genres in Natal·. provides an approach that may usefully be appUed to 
Inkatha meetings. He noted the manner in which 'their (the working class audiences ) 
cultural formations and their soclopol1tical histories have precoded a series of rules .•. 
that influence how people participate in mass events' (1992a:97). He wrote that what 
dominates in these meetings of oral communication is 'the ritual affirmation of 
Identity. comradeship and defiance ... and/or ... the discussion. argument and 
resolution of issues' (1992a:98). It is especially the former. the 'ritual affirmation of 
identity ... '. that serves in the use that Buthelezi makes of oral communication. and 
that therefore makes analysis of his addresses so Important. It Is worth noting that 
Sitas. while covertng the 1980s. does not refer at all to Buthelezl's frequent use of oral 
performances With their own supporting spectacle. even if Just in contrast; nor to the 
rich analysis that Is possible of the 'cultural formations' and 'soclopol1tical histories' of 
those who attend his meetings and respond to his calls. This Is regretably. and oddly. 
a much neglected field of Investigation as It offers a rich range of uses of. and 
responses to. oral communication. It is an acknowledged gap in my own work as well. 
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As this study largely focuses on the mobilisation of ethnic identi~ I use the term 
'discourse', 'as a means of descrlbing ideologies that attain something of a Ufe of their 
own, and as a means of draw1ng the analysis Into questions of symbols, language, and 
meaning' (BozzoU, 1991 :2, and 1991 :244, note 7). BozzoU's primary concern, wtth 
'hegemony', 'ideology', and 'consciousness', are also relevant here, but the first and the 
last less so: 'consciousness' was at issue In a later study (see Campbell et aI, 1993). 
Whlle m1ll1ons of the population of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) are ill1terate, pubUcity for 
Buthelez1's views has not been restricted to a largely sympathetic press (during the 
main period under review), but in addition received extensive coverage over Radio . 
Zulu, a powerful med1um in the region. Buthelez1's awareness of the lmportance of 
med1a in the process of mass mob1l1saUon has been illustrated by his wUllngness, at 
certa1n times even eagerness, to appear on television and radio (nationally and 
internationally), the various pubUcations that have been issued by Inkatha over the 
years. the Wide distribution of printed copies of hls speeches (in both Zulu and 
Engl1sh), and the acquislUon of the nanga newspaper from the Argus group's Natal 
Newspapers, and even attempts to supplement Radio Zulu wtth Its own radio station 
in the 19708 (this attempt was flnnly rejected by the National Party government). What 
has, unfortunately. not been possible consistently to examlne Is the 'show' and display 
of ethnic mobll1satlon (use of'trad!tlonal' dress: colours: spectacle: celebrations: etc). 
Wetherell and Potter (1992:2) noted that the 
study of discourse. •. focuses, above all, on quintessenUally 
psychological activities - activities of JUSUflcatlon, rationalization, 
categorization, attrlbutlon, maklng sense, naming. blamlng and 
Identtfylng. DIscourse studies link those activities with couecttve 
forms oj social action. and thus have the potentitJI to Integrate 
psychologtoal concerns with social analysis (emphasis added). 
That potenUalIs tentaUvely advanced in this study, as it has prOVided extremely useful 
approaches In teaching programmes that have been lnltlated in the Inter-disc1pllnary 
or cross-disclpl1nary courses In the Centre for Industrial and Labour Studies at the 
Unlversl~ of Natal. Such teach1ng has, for example, drawn on soclology, anthropology, 
poUtical studies and social psychology In approach1ng the issue of confliCts between 
groups (national and ethnic) on the gold mines In South AfrIca. 
Another consideration in the study by Wetherell and Potter also appUes to the study of 
ethnlclty and ethnic mobilisation undertaken for this thesis, namely their emphasis on 
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'how fonns of discourse insUtute. sol1d1fy. change. create and reproduce social 
formations' ( 1992:3). 
The docwnents have all been examined for consistency. change. method and symbols. 
Fortunately a very large amount of material reflecting the changtng mobWsing 
disCourse employed by the Inkatha president chlef Mangosuthu G Buthelezl and other 
leaders. Is accessible. Wh1le sensltivtty had to be shown to the audience Buthelezl or 
the king (Goodw111 ZwellthlnU. or other leaders. were addressing. and whlle 
acknowledging that Buthelez1 somet1mes departs from the written speeches both in 
Engllsh and in Zulu. the hundreds of speeches and other documents consulted 
Indicate a conslstency that allows for generalisation. perlocl1satton. and analysis. 
Furthermore. the volumes of the transcripts of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) . 
Debates (KlADs) served as a further check on the vtews and manner of presentation 
of Inkatha. The amount of material avatlable allowed longttudtna1 study over more 
than 20 years for this thesls. 
Such dlscourse analysts cannot be undertaken separately from the historical and 
Immediate context within w~h the appeals have been made. Contextual1sation 
demanded a measure of famWar1ty with the history of the region. gained largely 
through secondary sources and discussion with historians of the time period under 
review and of the region. In addltion I consulted material on the social conditlons. 
demography. and other oplnlons and analysts of the soctal dynamics of the region 
during the period 1970 to 1995 (see the bibUography for an indlcation of avallable 
material). 
My approach. In large part gained through the years involved in comparative Uterature 
study. has always been comparatlve • for slmllarttles and for contrasts and 
contradictions that have to be explalned. Such comparative approaches have shaped 
this study as well. especially to the degree that tt allowed me to find a deftnltlonal 
approach to ethnlctty that facWtates general and internatlonallY relevant comments to 
be made on the phenomenon. and to conflnn an approach that demands the speclflc 
examination of the form that each example of ethnic mobWsation takes (see chapter 
two). 
A much more extenslve analysis of the moblUsing dlscourse that I have drawn on Is 
possible (see the posslbWties as illustrated in Wetherell and Potter·s. 1992. 
examination of the 'language of racism' in New Zealand). and should be undertaken. 
There are other themes and approaches Immediately avallable in the material that was 
consulted for this study. but not explored here. 
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Finally, this is also a work of theory located within an approach that questions the 
apparently fixed and unchang1ng presentations of the social world, and examines 
these versions as, In the flnallnstance, Interpretations and constructions of soctal 
reality that are always In flux and reconstruction. Such construction and 
reconstruction does not make them any less 'real' as they come to form the basis of 
the 'stories' that seIVe to guide indiViduals through soc1allnteractlon. While I remain 
guided by the critical foundation I received within a marxist paradlgm, I was 
Influenced by the more satisfactory approach of such theorists as Ernesto Laclau in 
his earller work. a direction that offered fruitful pointers because of my own concern 




ETHNICITY - WHAT IS IT? 
EthnlcUy as explanation. or ethnlclty in need of explanation? I will deal malnly with 
the latter. which will then clarify the status of the former. The term 'ethnlcity' is 
frequently used as though it has a largely unproblematic status. Such a 
'common-sense' approach to the notion is not llmlted to popular use (media. in 
cultural and fashion descriptions. tourism. etc). but is also to be found in academtc 
discourse. At a conference on ethnlclty and violence held at the University of Nata! 
(Ptetermarltzburg) in 1992 it was noticeable how many of the participants. despite 
different conceptualisations. did not feel it necessary to define or discuss their 
understanding of this central term in their presentations (see Mare and Wright. 1994). 
However. a survey of the llterature makes it clear that there are several fundamentally 
different approaches to the concept. I will return to some of these below. 
If we understand what ethniclty 1s we can start making sense of why people act in 
terms of this soctally constructed soclalldentity. We have to understand the ortglns 
and the maintenance of ethnic Identities. the place of Identity in everyday ltfe; we have 
to understand Identities to make sense of how they are used in mobWstng groups of 
people to action. and to grasp what intense meaning Is sometimes attached to being a 
member of an ethnic group. sufficlent to engage in the most extreme and violent 
action~ It 1s. especlally. the violence associated with ethnlclty that has captured media 
attention Internationally. 
The noveUst and documenter of social and artlstlc ltfe. John Berger. recently wrote 
that 
If every event which occurred could be gtven a name. there would be 
no need for stories. As thlngs are here. Ufe outstrips our vocabulary. 
A word Is mtsstngso the story has to be told (1991:77). 
An ethnic Identity can be seen to be a story. not simply a name. which can never fully 
encompass the complexity of a way of deallng with the present through a sense of 
Identity that Is rooted in the past. Maybe the word that Is mtsstng. in this story of 
ethnic Identity. Is 'progress'. a bellef that the future opens up new and exciting 
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possiblllties, a better world. Instead ethnic identities call on stories of what has been, 
what appears to be known, what we have some certainty about in an uncertain world. 
These stories need not even be told - as Hofmeyr (1993:4-5) noted about the absence 
of a 'performance life' of certain oral 'historical narratives'. However, people do l1ve 
with stories of the . past: 
... many 'traditional' societies foster a non-formal and loosely 
lnst1tutlonallsed view of-the past which is extremely dlfIlcult to 
capture, uhwltt1ng1.y burdened as we are in the academy by a more 
contemporary, hlghly instltutionallsed, text-bound, Unear and 
chronological understanding of history (Hofmeyr, 1993:4). 
My concern in this thesis is, however, primarily wlth a slmUar 'text-bound', often 
'Unear and chronological' view of the 'the past' in the strateg1es of moblllsation 
employed by ethnic entrepreneurs, as distinct from the un-performed stories of the 
past that are held by individuals in their stories of soclall1fe (for a reference to the 
latter, see Campbell et al, 1993). 
Stories, in this sense, whether of the past. of modes of behaviour, of organising 
delties, or whatever, are no trlvlal matter. Whether they are 'true' or not is also not 
lmmed1ately at lssue - that they are adequate and accepted to be adequate to make 
sense of events and behaviour is what matters. It is not even asked that they be free of 
contradiction, either internally or by other stories functioning at other moments or 
compatible with other people's stories around the same events. Re11gton is a case in 
point of such stories that are able to bear the extreme contradictions between 
themselves and other soclalldentities in the life of anyone person or soclal group. 
However, stories also refer to the manner In which people are addressedl1nterpellated 
to 'make sense' of the world, and not Just the stories we 'already always have' about 
our own worlds. I will examine this as well, and especially the stories that are told 
about why people belong together, what makes them different from others, why they 
are in con1llct with others, and what their collective histories are (raclallaed, ethnic or 
nationallst). Here we are deal1ng with those who fabricate, reinforce, redefine and 
reinvent ethnicities - those who have been called the 'cultural brokers', 'ethnic 
entrepreneurs' in society (the 'big polltical-story manufacturers'). Such manufacturers 
of stories have to be dlstlngulshed from the many ways in which socialisation occurs 
in an un-self conscious manner, the ways in which people are born into an ethnic 
world, a world already there, whether that world be large or small. At times, however, 
this dl~ction is anything but clear because we do not ever Just receive an easlly 
dlstlngulshable story from 'outside' - these stories resonate with agreement. with 
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adaptation. with our biographies. We are not passive recipients. nor are our worlds 
shaped ab initio by the dealers in Imagtned communities (I will return to this point 
below). 
It is in literature that the two approaches frequently overlap. The novelist Is both an 
'entrepreneur' and a confirmer of what Is there; both a manufacturer and also an 
essential part of the subtle soclallsation into Identities. FazU Iskander, in his novel 
Sandro of Chegem, wishes both to engage In 'Ironic mockery of another people's way 
of life ... the most peaceful form of ethnic prejudlce', and 'to reveal, to the best of my 
abll1ties, the stgnlftcance of the epic existence of the little nation' (lskander, 1993: 
foreword). A few years after having read this novel for the first time the Abkhaz1an 
'little nation' once again achieved media mention and my notice" even at the tip of 
Africa. in reports of their st:n1fgle for self-determination against Georgtan authorities 
(see, for example, Natal Mercury, 17 Jul 89). 
However, ethniclty does not only refer to a common or social Identity for people. It Is 
also a term that Is used to explain occurrences. As such It Is the name that has been 
attached to many events and general conflict in the recent past in South Africa and in 
eastern Europe. Thla short-hand, especlally in the press, in statements from some 
politiclans, or in popular conversation, has been of two main kinds. Flrstly,lt has 
been welcomed as a descrlptive and explanatory term. In thls sense events appear to 
confirm what the users had always suspected or predicted. namely that people are 
fundamentally grouped ethnically and that such Ident1ftcation serves to explain a 
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range of actions, especially confllct. Ethniclty Is then most frequently seen as a ---=::-
prlmordlalldentity, which has to be recognised in political structures. 
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Secondly, the term Is used but only to reject It out of hand, which sometimes 
happened in response to the unth1nk1ng attrlbution of all political, inter-group 
violence during the 1980s to ethniclty ('there Is no such thing as etbnlclty that 
motivates actions'; 'It Is simply white journaUsta showing their raclsm'; 'It Is all the 
fault of apartheid and w1ll go away with majority rule'). What has been remarkably 
absent Is any regular dlscusslon of what Is meant by this term that Is used so freely in 
the media and In public pronouncements both by Its critics and Its supporters. It Is 
certainly not because there Is total agreement on what It means, and not on what we 
attribute to ethniclty as cause - not in Its every-day usage, nor, most certalnly, In the 
academic world. 
Ethniclty' and 'ethnic conflict' has become part of our day-tt>day 'common-sense' 
anguage and thought. much like 'trlballsm', 'race', 'the fam1ly', 'community', 'the 
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people'. or even 'democracy' - everybody 'knows' what they mean and think when they 
use the terms to make sense of the world and their place Within it. and they tmaglne . 
that all others use it in the same way. 'Common-sense' usually means that there is 
Uttle consistency beneath the apparent clari1¥, and that even contradictory ideas can 
be held simultaneously. 'Common-sense' frequently refers to that which we have not 
properly challenged in terms of Its valid11¥ in the quest to understand our Uves or 
soc1e1¥: often it Is simply 'received Wisdom', uncritically accepted. 'Commonsense 
thinking obscures reality', wrote Rick Turner (1980) in his defence of utopian th1nk1ng 
and the need to go beyond what 18 lmmed1ately around us, constantly to challenge and 
question. There 18 a lot of common-sense th1nk1ng about ethnici1¥ as well, as there Is 
about 'race'. That cannot be afforded. We, as social scientists, have to explore the 
ortglns, challenge the accepted, tnvestlgate what is valid to people's Uves, present 
alternatiVes in the reconstruction of South Africa - in Edward SaId's evocative phrase, 
to 'consider ..• (the stabW1¥ of the 'victors and rulers'] as a state of emergency' 
(l994a:26). 
The relative absence of clarlftcation is even more astonishing when we consider the 
context of large-scale kllllng and destruction Within which the term 'ethn1c1~' 80 
readUy functions 88 an explanatory tool: when we consider the explanatory power that 
18 being attributed to the phenomenon of'inter-ethn1c confl1ct·. in South Africa and in 
contemporary eastern Europe, as well as in many other parts of the world. To give an 
extrem~ recent example: Journal1st Andrew Roberts set the 'untmagtnably war-like' 
Zulus against the ANC (Natal Witness, 21 Jan 92). The unexplalned existence of the 
'Zulus'. With a range of sttrrtng attributes. served. for this Journallst. to explaln the 
Violence and to allow him to warn agatnst 'a clvll war so brutal that blacks of all tribes 
would look back to apartheid With nostalgla' (echoing RW Johnson tn The 
Independent on SundtJy, 14 Oct 90). 
What is ethnicity? 
If the culture of the nation (in our case of the ethnic group] 18 only so 
much wool. then the eyes over which it is pulled must belong to 
sheep. And 80 everything disappears, except the posslbW1¥ of farming 
(~atrlck Wright. 1985:5). 
The term 'ethniclty'. to refer to the 'character or quall1¥ of an ethnic group' (Mann (ed). 
1983:114), dates back as recently as 1941 (see Sollors. 1986:23). IUs one of several 
usages tn the English language of words that have been derived from the Greek ethnos 
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('a people'). In other words, it refers to the common character of a group of 
individuals. So, for example, 'ethnarch' is defined as 'a governor of a people or 
province' in The Shorter OJf{ord English Dlctionary. The same ( 1944) edition does not 
contain the word 'ethnlcity'. 
An important distinction Is maintained in this thesis between 'ethnicl1¥' and 'ethnic 
identi1¥'. 'Ethnlcity' refers to the concept. the abstraction, one of the categorisations 
'imposed' by social scientists and theoreticians to make sense of the dlversl1¥ of social 
Identities that are to be found in soclalllfe. 'Ethnic ldenti1¥', on the other hand, refers 
to social identities, Ie Identities shared in their basics with others, that are based on 
stories that are characterised by the deflnltional attributes Isolated through and in the 
categorisation of etbn1cl1¥ (see below). Ethnic Identities are frequently garbled in their 
presentation, and are part of multiple Identities - they could not be other as It Is 
ind1v1duals who are the bearers of ethnic Identities and, most frequently, which are 
expressed in the actions and trivia of everyday llfe, the rituals of being. and not as 
self-consciOUS awareness and considered statement. 
To understand the manner in which the concept ethnlcity Is to be used in th1s thesis It 
is. therefore. necessary to say what Is meant by ethnic group - what is that 'character 
or quallty' that such a social group possesses? We also have to have clar11¥ on the 
sociological use of the terms 'group' and 'category'. It wlll become clear that It Is 
important to avoid defln1tional confusion, because that can lead to analyUc. polley and 
strategic co~lon. If the 'name' is used. then at least let us use It in a slmllar way or 
be aware that we dlffer. How can polley options or a polltical approach be dlacussed if 
we use the term in an uncritical manner and find that we are not even aware of the 
dlfferent usages and their impllcaUons? 
By a category Is meant the 1abe1l1ng of a number of people, or things. 'on the basts of 
a particular characteristic they share ••. they do not necessar1ly attach any particular 
importance to the common characteristic they share' (Giddens. 1989:275; Mann. edt 
1983:34). A category of people is created by an outside observer and the 'members' of 
the category may very well have no idea of slmllar11¥ or awareness that they have been 
so allocated. For example, we can refer to Income, educat10nal or occupational 
categories. I may even place all people With green eyes in the same category if I should 
be examln1ng whether eye colour makes certain people more prone to a spec1ftc eye 
d1sease. 
A group of people. on the other hand. Is aware of and accepts (and may defend) 
belonging together and being categorised as slmUar - 'a distinct unit with an overall 
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soc1alldenUty' (Giddens, 1989:275). Members ofa group accept their 
Inter-relaUonship, even though they may not all know each other member of the 
group. Supporters of the same soccer team ~t a match accept being part of a group, 
and will frequently act together. even though very few share close bonds of friendship 
or are even acquainted. They are an ' ed unity' (Anderson. 1983), at least 
while they watch the game. The dtsttncUon drawn between group and category is not 
maintained so strictly by all theorists referred to. However. it will be clear what is 
meant when deviation occurs. 
If we take the example of a category of green-eyed people given above we might very 
well find that people so categorised. if commonly oppressed, discr1m1nated against. or 
treated differently In general, might become a group, acting In concert to defend 
themselves against others. or to improve their lot. They might become 'green-eye 
conscious' In response to say eye tests that are routtnely done on them before they 
gain employment. They might even start creating a history that gtves credence to their 
'groupness'. It is an absurd example (except if we think of some responses to the AIDS 
epidemic). but some of the attempts to gtve ethnic consciousness to groups are equally 
far-fetched and self-conscious. and can be dated with a measure of accuracy. despite 
the often wtld claims by the group for distant points of shared ortgtn. 
Why do people belong to groups? There are many reasons. but the most obvious is 
that humanity evolved sodally - the isolated individual 18 so rare that It becomes 
newsworthy when such a person 18 found. From the ftrst bands that came together 
and remained together for purposes of hunting and protection. through the slow 
evolution of ever more complex soc1allnteractlon In which language played a central 
part. to the multitude of local and globallnter-relatlonshlps that characterlse modern 
sodety. humanity has formed groups ofvarlous siZes and for different goals and to 
serve different needs. FamWes. homesteads. hunting groups. work teams. poUtical 
parties, reUg1ous, femlnlst. and naUonal groups. proUferate. SomeUDles competing for 
allegtance. someUDles meeting different needs In the same or overlapping 
membership. someUmes conferring power. and someUDles stripping of power. 
producing and reproducing. consuming. etc. soc1al groups. more than the individual. 
characterise sodety. With each group 'membership' goes a shared. to varlous degrees. 
sodalidenUty. 
Hogg and Abrams wrote that. 'belongtng to a group ... confers soctal Identity. or a 
shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave' (1988:7). I 
wish to qualify this claim made by the social psychologists. Belongtng to a group may 
reinforce notions of 'groupness' that are not necessarUy 'conferred' by group 
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belongtng. Soc1al1saUon IntD soclalidenUUes is much more complex than 'conferring' 
through belongtng. For example. Stuart Hall (1992:284). in discussing the 
contribuUon that sociology has made tD our understanding of the 'indiVidual'. wrote 
that: 
(Sociology) located the indiVidual in group processes and the 
collecUve norms which. it argued. underpin any contract between 
indlvtdual subjects. It therefore developed an alternaUve (tD 
psychology's approach) account of how indiViduals are fonned 
subjectively through their membership of. and participat10n in. wider 
social relaUonships; and. conversely. how processes and structures 
are sustained by the roles which indiViduals play In them. ThIs 
'internallzing' of the outside In the subject. and 'external1z1ng' of the 
inside through action in the soclal world ( •.• ). is the primary 
sociological accoJlllt of the modem subject. and Is encapsulated in the 
theory of soclalizat1on. 
This two-way process of Ident1~ format1on Is more useful in capturing the 
contribut1on that indiVidual agents make to soc1alldent1~ format1on (for a fascinating 
soclal anthropological account of soc1al1satlons of the self into socle~. see Cohen. 
1994:chapters three and four). 
The relevance that Bourdieu might have for theories of soc1alldent1~ lies In his 
concept of 'habitus' ('system of endurtng disposlt1ons·. stories created through 
soclal1saUon) which he illustrates as follows: 
the effect of the habitus is that agents who are eqUipped with It wlll 
behave In a certatn way In certain circumstances. That being said. this 
tendency to act In a regular manner whlch. when Its prlnclple la 
explicltly constituted. can act as the basis of a forecast (the 
specialized eqUivalent of the pract1cal anucipations of ordinary 
experience). Is not based on an expliclt rule or law. This means that 
the modes of behaViour created by the habitus do not have the fine 
regular1~ of the modes of behaViour deduced from a legts1auve . 
princlple: the habitus goes hand in gloue with vagueness and 
indeterminacy. As a generaUve spontanel~ which asserts Itself in an 
1mprovtaed confrontat1on with ever-renewed situations. It obeys a 
practicallogtc. that of vagueness. of the more-or-less. whlch defines 
one's ordinary relation to the world (1990:77-78. emphasis orlglnal). 
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The range of self-conscIous choices about action Is not llmltless. As Calhoun explained 
it. 'It was crucial to grasp. Bor~eu argued. that agents dld not generally adopt the 
theoretical atutude of seeing action as a cholc.e among all objective posslbWties; they 
usually saw only one or a few posslbWties' (1993:74). Calhoun continued: 
It was necessary (for Bordleul that a theory of practice give a good 
account of the llmlts of awareness involved in lived experience. 
including both mlsrecogn1tlon and nonrecognition. as well as show 
the kind of genutne knowledge which was involved. often 
nondlscurslvely.in practice (1993:74-75). 
Paul Connerton. in his book on the soclal remembering of socleties. noted one way in 
which the options of social agents are llmlted. when he wrote that '(m)any forms of 
habitual sk1lled remembering ffiustrate a keeping of the past in mlnd that. Without 
ever averting to its historical orlgln, nevertheless re-enacts the past in our present 
conduct' (1989:72). We carry the past With us. in the memories ofbehavtour (our own 
and that expected of others) (see Hofmeyr. 1993). 
The more risky the situation. the more habitus gives way to 'codlfted ritual : 
Codlftcation mlnlmlZes amblgU1~ and vagueness. in particular in 
interactions. It is particularly indispensable and Just effiCient in 
sltuations in which the risks of colliSion. confilct and acCident. hazard 
and chance (a word Which. as Coumot used to say. designates the 
encounter between two independent causal series). are particularly 
important. The encounter between two very distant groups is the 
encounter between two independent causal series. Between people of 
the same group. equipped With the same habitus. and thus 
spontaneously orchestrated. everything goes Without saying. even 
confilcts; they can be understood Without people haVing to spell 
things out. and so on (Bourdieu. 1990:80). 
Bourdieu says that what Is lost in h1ghly codlfled socletles is a 'certain charm'. In my 
argument this may indicate another way to refer to the distinction between 
politiclsed/mobWsed Identities Is the loss of 'charm .. ofspontanelt;y. of habitus that 
characterise soclalldentities: 
Codlfication makes things slmple. clear communlcable; It makes 
possible controlled consensus on meaning. a homologeln: you are 
sure of g1vtng the same sense to the words. This Is the deftnltion of 
the llngulstic code according to Saussure: that which enables the 
emltter and the receiver to associate the same word With the same 
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sense and the same sense with the same sound (Bourdieu, 
1990:82-83). 
I would argue that the task, and the measure of success, of the moblllser of Identities 
(Such as ethnlcl1¥) ols the extent to whlch 'controlled consensus' has been achleved, the 
extent to whlch external cocUfication of what is a range of 'blographlcal' varlants of a 
socialldenti1¥ has taken place through lnterpellation. 
I know that I have taken an aspect of Bourdieu's approach to social action by agents, 
as well as the notions of habitus and codlftcation, lnto areas where he does not use 
them hlmself. However, I would argue that such an extension, as brtef as It Is here, Is 
legitimate and adds to an understanding of soclalldenti1¥ theory and soclal action. 
aHogg and Abrams noted that 'whlle a socle1¥ Is made up of lndivlduals, It Is patterned 
to relatively distinct groups and categories, and people's vlews, oplnlons, and 
, practices are acquired from those groups to whlch they belong'. Furthermore, 
dlvlduals wlth their unlque life experiences 'potentially have a repertoire of many 
dltferent ldentttles to draw upon' (1988: 19, empbasls added). The stories we draw on 
to shape our acUons and perceptions are not only those of ethnlcl1¥. In fact. ethnicl1¥ 
need not necessarlly be one of the several Identities In that 'repertolre'. I would, 
however, qualify the 'rational choice' approach of Hogg and Abrams lmpUed by the 
phrase 'repertolre of many dlfferent Identities to draw upon', and rather assoclate 
myself with Calhoun's presentation of the llmltations that Bourdleu places on such 
choice, wlthout golng lnto further detall on these restrictions here. 
These authors (Hogg and Abrams) argued, within an approach known as social 
Identity theory (focualng prlmarlly on lnter-group theory), or social categortsatlDn 
theory (wlth a focus on lntra-group theory) (see Campbell, 1992:15, also for other 
dlfferences°between the two approaches), that the process of categorisaUon (referred 
to above) 'slmpllftes perception', it structures ln1ln1te varte1¥ lnto manageable 
proportions. Slmllarlties are stressed within categories (or groups) whlle dlfferences 
with other categories/groups are accentuated. Accentuation within the categorization 
process Is select1ve, leading to stereo1¥Plc perceptions; leading. In other words, to 'the 
perception or Judgement of all members of a social category or group as sharlng some 
characteristics whlch disttngulsh them from others' (Hogg and Abrams, 1988:20; 
Giddens, 1989:247-8). Robert MUes (1989:70) uses the term 'slgnlftcation' to refer to 
the slmllar process of'selecUon: from an avallable range of objects, features and 
pr~, only certain ones are chosen to convey additional meanings'. Miles added 
that '(s)lgnlftcaUon Is therefore a central moment In the process of representation, that 
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Is. the process of depicting the social world and soclal processes. of creating a sense 
of how things "really areM (1989:70). Stereotypical th1nk1ng is usually 'rIgld and 
m-informed', slmllar to the term 'common-sense' that I used earller, and demands the 
same warning agatnst its effect of 'obscuring reality'. 
A process that clarlfles group boundaries and strengthens socialidenUUes is that of 
social comparison, with a 'tendency to max1m1ze intergroup dlstincUveness - to 
cWrerenUate between the groups as much as possible on as many dimensions as 
possible ... especially on those dimensions which renect favourably upon tngroup' 
(Hogg and Abrams, 1988:23). I would add that the 'tendency to max1mlze' should be 
treated as Just that. a tendency, and that we should also acknowledge and examine the 
dissoluUon of groups, and the porous and flexible boundaries that exist. espec1ally 
when socialidenUUes exist outside of their mobWsed form. Reference to the 'tendency 
to maxlmlze. •• disUncUveness' mJght take our attenUon away from the flutdity of 
idenUty formaUon, to the continuous process that Is involved (more of which below). 
One of the most obvious ways of slgnlfy1ng distincUveness lles in dress and 1 
ornamentaUon - whether thls.be the colourful dress of many religious sects. the . 'fl 
rebelllous extremes of punk or other youth trends. or the khaki of the Afrlkaner ---rr' 
Weerstandsbeweglng (AWB). Inkatha and especially, but not exclusively, Its leadership, 
draws heavlly on dress to slgnlfy group boundaries, group cohesion, and historical 
continutty and soclal memory. At events such as tzlmbtzo (gatherings of the naUon) 
and Shaka Day celebrations Buthelez1. the king. amakhosl (the chiefs), and many 
others would appear in 'tradiUonal dress'. More recently (1995) such "Zulu dress' has 
also been worn in the KwaZulu-Natal provlnclal parllament. The ANC and other 
groups contesung Inkatha·s mobWsaUon have also. at urnes, displayed their 
acceptance. and contestaUon. of Zuluness in this manner. 
Another point from soclalldenUty theory that Is of relevance to my discussion of 
ethniclty, and that llnks to the Idea of a 'repertoire of IdenUUes' to 'call up' (noUng, 
however, the quallflcaUon introduced above) Is the dlstincUon that Hogg and Abrams 
make between the soctal and the personal dimensions of an indlvidual's self-concept 
(see figure below). 
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1denIIty: 
LJkM: tepid beer, pubI. 
~,home" 
cade. doga. Royal famIIV 
of X ofY of Bach 
I 
~ mother at tea tm., 
dMNI rnore~moMV, 
.. ~ devoted, baby .... for 
~broIher 
Figure 1 : The Structure of Self 
(see Hogg and Abrams, 1988:24) 
Hogg and Abrams argue that self-concept Is not experienced as an enUrety, but as 
'relatively dlscrete self-images which are dependent on "context"'. WhIch of these 
'self-tmages' or 'identificaUons' are held to be appropriate depends on time, place, 
circumstance - to discuss 8OC1alidenUUes we are dlscusstng htstory and the lIOCial 
context. as well as &elf-concept ('mother', tn common with other mothers. but also 
'mother of this cblld', the biographical dtmension). It Is, therefore. clear how the self is 
both 'enduring and stable', and at the same ume changtng as responses to outside 
factors are demanded (and the idenUV isitse1f a product of 'the outslde'). We are 
frequently surprised by the contradictory, or unexpected, roles that people can 
assume. SeparaUon through ume and context can allow these to 'co-ex1st', usually 
unproblemaUcally: an arUculaUng principle can bring together what would otherwise 
be incompaUble, such as 'Ood's wtll'. 
The socta11dentificaUon of 'Zuluness', for example. does not determtne a constant set 
of responses and tnterpretaUons from the same tndlvldual (nor, I may add, does It 
tnclude the same set of self-descripUons for each and every member of the Zulu ethnic 
group). At Urnes, however, this 'Zuluness' becomes the dominant idenUV as Its 
relevance to a range of addiUonal, and previously possibly excluded, sttuat10ns is 
argued Ideologically. It may then serve not only to 'confer soclalidenUV ••• who one is 
and how one should behave' (Hogg and Abrams, 1988) during moments of aftlnnaUon 
of a culturalldenUV, but be extended to pollUcal behaviour and even afIUlaUons in the 
workplace and other such 'inappropriate' overlaps (see chapter four). 
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The most fundamental reason for social Ufe has always been. and st1llis. production 
for material existence - people have to work in groups in order to survive. whether it 
be in hunting groups. cattle herding. in agriculture. in the complex labour processes 
demanded of assembly lines. or the information industry. However. while many other 
reasons for social groupings relate directly to the way ·in which society is structured 
around production (in our case the system of capitalism). there are motivations. 
needs. and aoc1al units that are only obliquely connected or maybe only given a 
spec1ftc 'ideal' form by the economic relationships of soc1e1¥ (such as 'the famlly·). The 
relationship between a range of social interactions and the need for producUve 
cooperation between people to ensure the survival of all was easier to determine in 
less complex. because more precarious. socieUes. There was less distance between 
rites and rituals and ensuring that life continued. between cultural practices and the 
survival of the group. than there is under capitalism. 
I do not. however. wish to argue for an unstructured multiplici1¥ of identities. a 
grab-bag of stories. These identities are made available in speclftc configurations 
under capital1sm. 88 they are under any other major mode of production. such 88 
feudalism or socialism. and their speclftc relaUonsh1ps to the dominant structuring 
relations within any society need to be examined. 
In modern society those relationships. when they exist. are often mediated - there is a 
bigger space that lies. even if sometimes only apparently. outside of production. 
beyond the cl~ly defined area of 'work', of the economy. We even have a clear spaUal 
distance, in most lnstances, between work and UVing quarters. between production 
and reproduction, or, rather, between what is accepted 88 'work' and 'home' (the 
social construction of what is 'work' becomes especially clear when we exam1ne 
domesUc labour and what 'housewives' do). 
Some addltionaltmportant reasons for group formaUon are: to struggle against 
structurally determined lnequallties in SOCiety. The most Important here would be the 
example of trade unions: organised groups with membership. fees. meetings and 
constitutions, formed to advance the interests of workers in relation to their 
employers. Revolutionary movements. organised to overthrow the experienced 
oppression or exploitation by an Wegttlmate regtme. would also falllnto this category. 
Social movements characterise the contemporary world, and may be defined 88 'a 
collective attempt to further a common lnterest. or secure a common goal, through 
collective action outside the sphere of estabUshed lnstltutions' (Giddens. 1989:624). 
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In addition. groups may form around the attribution of certain characteristics to 
perceived physical!biologtcal d11ferences - for example. in response to sexism (where 
gender is presented as showing 'different qu~ties inherent in women and men' and 
where these 'supposed differences explain and jusUfy the differential and inferior 
treatment of women' (Mlles, 1989:88)). The women's movement may also be seen as a 
social movement generally. Racism would be another case, where, on the basis of 
some visible (somatic) characteristics. the people so identlfted are 'attributed with 
additional, negatiVely evaluated characterisUcs •• .' (Mlles, 1989:79). The attribution 
need not.1ead to group formation, but may well do so if a 'race consciousness' 
develops. In the former example, femln1sm also reflects group formation following on 
negative characterisation of women (sexism). 
Groups may form for reasons of social psychological (and 'splrltua1'), rather than 
physical and economiC. 'security' - achieved through the 'certainties' of rellg10us faith, 
through "belonglng' to a family, or nation, or ethnic group. Patrick Wright quotes 
Sartre on "being French', on shaping and sharing the values' of that society: 
'Belonglng' ""is to renew a taelt social contract with all members of that society. At one 
stroke the vague contingency of our existence vanishes and gives way to the necessity 
of an existence by right"' (Wright. 1985:91). The sociologtst Emlle Durkhelm spoke of 
the 'moral reawakening' of the indivldualin the group, which 'cannot be achieved . 
except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, 
being closely united with one another, reaftlrm in common their common 
sentiments .. .' (quoted Moodie, 1980:18). Connerton (1989:72), too, noted that t(w)e 
preserve versions of the past by representing it to ourselves in words and images. 
Commemorative ceremonies are pre-emlnent instances of this. They keep the past in 
mind by a depietive representation of past events'. 
Karl Marx stressed the social aspect of existence, beyond the obvious social 
interactions with nature for purposes of survival: 
Activity and enjoyment are social both In their content and In their 
mode of existence; they are social activity and they are social 
enjoyment. .. The human significance of nature is only available to 
social man (sic); for only to social man is nature available as a bond 
with other men. as the basts of his own existence for others and theirs 
for him, and as the vital element in human reality ... (1844); 
and later (in 1857-58) he rejects the notion of individuals producing in Isolation as 
something as absurd as the development of language would be without social 
interaction: 
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Man (sic) is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon polttikon. not 
only a social animal. but an animal which can develop into an 
indivtdual only in society (both quotaUons from McLellan. 1977:90 
and 346). 
What are the character1st1cs of an ethnic group that one belongs to? The moSt 
important are those of cultural afftn1ty (language. dress. rituals. values. and so on); a 
sense of common historical ortgtn. a unique 'past' (whether it be from common 
ancestors, under a common ruler, from the same territory, etc); and that the ethnic 
identity is different from those of other groups (whether these 'others' feel that their 
identities are impOrtant. or even whether they exist or not - the 'Epdurskies' in FazU 
Iskander's novel 'are the mystery of ethnic preJudice'. (1993:vU»: 
The Abkhazlans have a very complicated attitude towards the 
Endurskles (we are told by old Khabug's mule]. The main thing is that 
no one knows how they got to Abkhazia. but everyone is sure they're 
here to gradually destroy the Abkhazlans (1993:215). 
In other words, an ethnic group can only be a group amongst other people who do not 
belong. and depends for its existence on the existence of other groupings. An ethnic 
group is cl1st1nct from other groups, but does not imply a necessarily antagonlst1c 
.relaUonship. I wUl take each of these three characteristics in turn. 
Cultural distinctiveness 
Small groups can rely on the knowledge of all indiVidual members for their aolidartty. 
That Is not the case With large groups - here the 'communlty " the sense of those who 
belong. is 'lmag1ned', in the words of Benedict Anderaon (1983). It is not possible to 
know all other members of what Is felt to be a nation. And yet Indlvldual members feel 
a social aftlnlty With this communlty of personal strangers. The same holds for 
ethnlcity. 
What becomes important then are ce.rta1n symbols of that communlty, aspects that 
make It Visible, that are felt to be obVious, 'common-sense' signs that show that people 
belong together With those who are In every other way strangers, and that continually 
reinforce that sense ofbelongtng together. The symbols for that bond are most 
commonly cultural aspects of life: the language In which we express ourselves, the 
reUglon we belong to, the dress that we assoctate With our cultural hlstory~ the 
festivals. and even the values that are associated, or that we associate with the group -
such as French passion. German precision. Zulu mWtary prowess. It is on these 
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stmllarities. especially that of a common language. that assumptions of sameness 
beyond the immediate symbols are based. 
In addition some physical characteristics rruiy also playa part. such as was found 
with some Puerto Rican youth in America. where '(t)he people who want to be white' 
are despised (see Bourgois. 1993:29; slmUar examples are to be found in South 
Mrica); or with present self-deflnltions of some Afrikaners or of Boere in South Africa. 
where skin colour serves as a cultural symbol. as It did with the moblllsation of 
Mrtkaner ethnicl1¥ earlier in the century. 
In an article deallng with the notion of ethnlc1ty In the GocVather book and fllms. 
Thomas Ferraro noted that the 
rhetoric of solidarity works to organIze lin his case the Corleone 
syndicate] because of its hold over the tmagtnations and passiOns of 
leaders and those in the common ranks allke .•. (E)thn1c symbols 
function in lieu of formal structures precisely because of their 
trans-uUlitar1an. emotional appeal (1989: 184. emphasis ortglnal). 
No matter Its ortgln. the emotional appeal stresses security and famWarl1¥ (and even 
'famlly'). These people draw together into the ethnic group despite the frequent 
absence of other expected stmUarities. and despite other solidarities (such as class or 
gender). The cultural symbols form the 'symbolic apparatus' (Abner Cohen's term • 
see. for example. Cohen. 1981) of ethnici1¥. 
These symbols of community can be added to. inVented and reinterpreted aver Ume. 
Dunbar Moodie wrote. for example. that the notion of 'culture' changed as the 
Mrikaner Identi1¥ took form - It 'shifted from emphasis on the creative arts to a more 
technical and ethnic sense that llmlted "culture" to the c1vll-relJgtous conception of 
traditional forms of Afrikaner life' (1980: 107). 'Invention of tradition', too, plays an 
Important part seeking 'to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, Which automatically impUes continUity with the past' (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger. 1984: 1). Below I will deal with the central nOtion of "the past'. 
It is necessary to say a bit more about the use of the concept culture at this point -
without. however, mOVing unnecessarUy far into an area that Is notoriously slippery. 
The way in which I use It here owes much to the discussion by Robert Thornton 
(1988). Thornton wrote that 'culture Is the information which humans are not born 
with but which they need in order to interact with each other in soclalllfe'. It Is a 
changtng resource for people, but it also changes in the manner in which we th1nk 
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about it (see. for example. Raymond Williams' discussion (1976)). This resource is 
used (although there is most often not such a self-conscious attitude to culture as this 
verb might lmply) by people 'to make statements to each other and about themselves. 
One such statement. perhaps the most slgn1flcant for our understanding of the 
Concept. is the statement about identity and group membership'. Culture creates 'the 
boundaries of class. ethn1clty ( ... ). race. gender. neighbourhood. generation and 
territory Within which we all live' (Thornton, 1988:26-27). We construct meanlng 
through culture - for example through using symbols to draw the boundaries around \ 
the etlmlc group. - ! 
Important to an analyUcal approach to etlmlclty is Thornton's reminder that an 
understanding of culture Is more than 'a knowledge of differences. but rather an 
understanding of haw and why dlfferences in language. thought. use of materials and 
behaviour have come about' (1988:25). It demands an historlcal examination. as do 
all the aspects of etlmlc group formation. 
Are ethnic groups then no more than cultural groups? No. although cultural 
organisations can serve to reinforce an ethnic identity this is not sufIlclent to define 
ethn1clty. We could lnvert the terms and make the statement that cultural groups do 
not equal ethn1c groups. We can speak of workers' culture and a buslness culture. 
Without in any way lmplylng an ethnic identity. Culture serves to define boundaries. as 
Thornton (1988) argues, but there are only certain boundaries which we call ethnic. 
The deflnltion of ethnicity cannot be based only on references to culture. 
Cert.alnly organisations for the advancement of language rights. or to promote cultural 
fesUvals. in many cases. play an lmportant part in giving coherence to an ethnic group. 
Cultural symbols may be legitimated as 'traditional', as that which we have always 
possessed: cultural events may be perceived to be that which we have always 
celebrated - whether they in fact orlglnated at some distant begtnnlng or are simply 
believed to have done so. They form part of our social memory. Cultural 'tradition' 
may be much Wider than found within ethnic groups (such as Western culture') and 
does not. on the other hand. capture the full range of what is drawn from the put to 
serve the present in ethnic mobl11sation. That past. In Itself and as a catalogue of 
uniqueness. also selVes the ethnic project. 
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The presence of the past 
Ethnicl1¥ Is characterised by a sense of history and ortgtn that gtves coherence and 
legltlmacy to the present existence of the group - 'we have always been, therefore we 
should be now'. This sense of history is more accurately captured by the term 'the 
past' _ It Is backward looking, seeking contlnu11¥, for a confirmation of the present. I 
wlll call the speclflc way in which history is used to confirm the ethnic group 'the past'. 
It Is not to imply that there is a neutral history that is somehow the truth, whereas this 
usage is false. "The past' does, however, serve in a spec1ftc way to self-consciously 
bound the ethnic group. The distlnction between history and 'the past' Is important for 
strategtes that might be devised and attempted to counter the excesses of ethnic 
moblllsation (see chapter 5). Anthony Smlth argued that.ln fact. wbalcUstlngUlshes 
@Jl ethnic from an other]t!nd of soCial grouping is the rationale that sustains the 
sense of oup belonglng and grou uni ueness, and which links successive 
~era~Qna.of ita members~t ratloMle is to be found In-theapec1fle-hlatory of the 
ou ,and, above all, in Its m~ of 8!:0u o~ and group Uberation (1981 :65). 
"The past' cannot be chrono1ogtcally separated from the present in this U8e made of 
history - It is not slmply thought of as 'history', as a set of events that 'exist', that have 
already happened, but as experienced here and now, as part of a present Identi1¥, as a 
present Ideology, that through which we live and experience our every-day Uves. It is 
part of the story with which we make sense of day-to-day Uvtng. part of 'the 
Uiformatlon which humans are not born with but which they need in order to interact 
with each other in soc1alllfe', as Thornton argued (1988:24). 
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"The past', or rather a spec1flc past. unique to that ethnic Identi1¥, is needed for 
several reasons. F1rst. because it 1eg1Umates, through contlnu11¥, the ethnic group (as 
It does with nation). As Inkatha presldent Mangosuthu Buthelezl said in 1988, 'we 
have the tremendous advantage of being a product of history Itself - by impUcation 
others in South AfrIca do not have this advantage and have to invent their traditions, 
or Uve outside of history, or, at best. they are products of distinctively separate 
histories. Through this superficially trite statement he is also saytng that there Is a 'we' 
because of that history (BS, 24 Sep 88: 1). Buthelez1is using history here as 'the past', 
and not in the more accepted sense, of events that have occurred. His cla1ma illustrate 
the point made by Smith (1981 :65) that '(tlhe more str1k1ng and well-known these 
myths of group formation and group deUverance, the greater the chances for the 
ethnic group to survive and endure .. :. The converse also holds (I wUl return to the 
spec1flc clalms made on behalf of 'Zulus' in chapter four). 
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Dunbar Moodie went so far as to describe the Afrikaners' sense of 'their' history as a 
'sacred' text (at least In one very powerful Interpretation of that past). As example he . 
quotes (In translation, 1980: 11) a review of the Ossewa Gedenkboek (ox wagon 
commemoration book) that appeared In 1940 In the Cape newspaper Die Burger. The 
Gedenkboek was Issued In 1940 In connection With the 1938 centenary celebration of 
the Great Trek, an historical event that was used to famlllarlse hundreds of thousands 
of Afrikaners with the myth of orlgln, a shared sense of groupness that was essentlal 
to polltical mobilisation: 
'In all reverence. I would call It the New Testament of Afrikanerdom. 
Again with the greatest reverence I would declare that It deserves a 
place on the household altar beside the famlly Bible. For If the Bible 
shaped the Afrikaner People. then the Gedenkboek reveals that 
product In Its deepest being .. : 
~ nd. a specUlc sense of the past serves, as does culture, to draw the boundaries of 
the ethnlc group· It serves as a 'template of exclusion and inclusion' (a phrase that I 
have borrowed from colleague. professor John Wright). Individuals have to accept the 
dominant version of the past presented in the discourse of mobilisation to be part of 
the ethnlc group: and. on the other hand. those who do not share the same history. or 
even the same version of a s1m1lar history. are excluded or exclude themselves. It Is 
also possible to be a traltor to your ethnic past • the past demands loyal1;y and 
co~~ent \ { 
I 
Once more to tum to the Afrikaner ethnic IdenU1;y for illustration. Moodie summartses 
It as follows: 
••• according to their cr-eation story. Afrikaners were CalVln18t8 of 
Western European orgtn and a nation in their own rtght before the 
arrival of the EngUsh. 
The subsequent history of this people. as Interpreted by the dvll 
rellglon (the set of symbols legiUmating uniqueness and state power). 
centers on the Great Trek. The latter forms the national epic-formal 
proof of God's election of the Afrikaner people and His special destiny 
for them (1980:2-3). 
This 'chosen people' notion of Afrikaner ethnic IdenU1;y raises an lnterest1ng Issue With 
regard to the d11ferences between rellglous soclalldentities and ethn1c11;y. The 
Christian reUglon sets out to WIn 'unbellevers·. to gain converts. On the other hand 
ethnlci1;y Is not usually proselytlslng • 'the past' has detlned who belongs and by Its 
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very nature cannot be presented as changeable Un practise, of course, it is open to 
vast reinterpretation and invention). 'The past' excludes, by deflnition, all those who 
do not share it. It is not future oriented With a heaven to Win, but is shaped around a 
past to protect and to stay true to. In the case of the Afrikaners rellgious events have 
become part of 'the past', such as the 'battle of Blood "River', where God ensured the 
surviVal of the Trekboere againSt overwhelmlng odds thanks to a covenant. and the 
notion of the 'chosen people' within a dark and barbaric cont1nent. For a people with 
such a claim to Christian faith and a destiny, the missionary aspect of Chr1st1an1ty 
could not be neglected but. at the same Unle, it could not be allowed to dUute the 
ethnic group boundaries - especially that of skin colour. ~e solutlon was to create 
separate churches ('daughter' churches) for those who could become Christians, but 
not Afrikaners. 
By way of contrast. Judaism marries ethnicity and a non-proselyUsing rellglon. It is 
not a smooth process though. In South Africa. for example, the central role of reUglon 
to mould the ethnic coherence had to struggle against the faultllne of class. Large-scale 
lmmlgratlon of Jews occurred between 1880 and 1914 - more than half of the 
lmm1grants were Lithuanians allgned either to the labour movement (one of the best 
known being SA Communist Party leader and subsequently, untll his death, mlnlster 
ofhouslng, Joe Slovo) or the pOUtlca1 movement for a Jewish state (Chldester, 
1992: 176), The Jewish 'community' was marked by extremes of poveJ1;y and of wealth 
(the latter concentrated in mine ownership). After the Angl~Boer war the Jewish 
Board of Deputies was formed with the spec1flc task of addressing 'the problem of 
communlty formation'. However, this middle-class organisation, '(b)y suppressing 
elements oflts lmm1grant heritage', could define the 'mainstream Jewish community ... 
as whlte, EngUsh-speaklng. middle-class, urban, and upwardly mobne' (Chldester, 
1992: 178). Wblle there was an alternative labour oriented, Yiddish-speaking 
deftnlUon, outsiders, through antl-Semitlsm, forced, or at least contributed to a 
common deftnltion of the 'Jewish community'. 
'6 \ 
ThIrd, 'the past' enables action, in that it provtdes a sense of efficacy and of 
precedents - In discourse it would be expressed in the form 'Look at what we have 
achieved In the past. look at the glory of past moments. Let us repeat them'. It enables 
action because It both Justlftes present action and informs how it should be done 
based on precedents. We can say that this sense of the past resonates most powerfully 
With individuals who need the security of a yesterday, of a sense of cont1nulty - even If 
that yesterday has been Invented. This security may also be llnked to the soclallslng 
function of the past. conveying ways of accepted behaviour, both to employ or to strive 
for, with various demons responslble for the loss of those ways, the loss of 'the past'. 
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An extremely COn.&en'1lUVe use of the past potentially Ues in this element of ethnic 
mobWsatlon. "The past' Is that whlch Is hankered after, as providing a romanticlaed 
model for a static present. If the present into whlch people are born and social1sed is 
one In which 'the past' features strongly, in a spec11lc version that borders on 
'. nostalgla. then future- or change-oriented events and programmes are read as 
threa~lng In' the extreme. The close l1nk between a re-idenUfication as Afrikaner or 
Boer and reststance to transformation or reform in the early-1990s South Africa is an 
example, albeit extreme and obVious. 
Ethnlc11¥ as a backward looking social and group ldenti1¥ can be illustrated with 
reference to John Berger's dlscussion of the 'much-proclaimed' conservatism of the 
peasantry (1988:204-5). Berger argues that peasants Uve wlth1n a culture of survlval (a 
polnt that Is stressed by John Wright. drawtng on Leroy Vall's work, when he 
dlscusaes the growth of ethnic senUments during Urnes of cr1s1s (Wright. 1991 )), as 
against a culture of progress. The former sees the future as 'a sequence of repeated 
acts for survtval', whereas the latter sees the future wldentng lnto extended 
opportunlties. Berger offers us this diagrammatic presentatlon (1988:205): 
-. 
They are mlrror Images. 
DaVid Harvey (1992:359) ends his discussion of the condition of post-modem11¥ by 
draWing attention to a s1m1lar polnt on UIne perspective and arguing for 'becoming 
rather than belng", through quottng PoggtoU (1968): 
'In the consciousness of the classical epoch, It Is not the present that 
brings the past lnto culm1nation, but the past that culminates in the 
present. and the present Is in turn understood as a new trtumph cd 
ancient and eternal values, as a return to the principle of the true 
and the just. as a restoration or re-birth of those princ1ples. But for 
the moderns, the present Is valid only by Virtue of the potenUaUt1es of 
the future, as the matrix of the future, lnsofar as It Is the forge of 
history in continued metm:norphosls, seen as a permanen~ splrltual 
revolution' (emphasis added). 
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Berger describes the peasantry as 'a class of survivors" lnvolved In an 'economy Within 
an economy', where the 'political and social systems offered them the m1nlmum of 
protection. For this they had to look to themselves· Within the village community and 
the extended famlly' (1988: 196-7, emphasis added). And so the ethnic group also 
claims to offer 'protecUon' (Uterally in some cases); security; a 'past' thatjusUfies, that 
offers glorious deeds (and the potential of repeaUDg them); a 'past' that is 
d1sUngulsbable from that of others; and the trappings that allow that dlsUnction 
(whether these be cultural weapons or the blessings of a racist god in the Church of 
the Creator) (for a fuller discussion, see Hayes and Mare, 1992) • 
. ~ 
F'Oarth, "the past' (and the sanctity of "tradltion', which is another .expresslon of the 
same notion) may legitimate present authority (either of institutions, gender, age, 
soclal pracUces or of the status of indlV1duals). 'The past' is used as jusUftcation for 
selecting spectftc cultural practices, certain relationships, gtvlng them the sanctity of 
'tradition" and suppressing others through ignoring them. The Zulu case Is ffiustraUve 
here (and I w1l1 return to that), but it is far from unique In the legitimation of authority 
that occurs Within Its contemporary expression. Importantly, 'tradltion' and with that 
'the past' has served and sUll serves regularly to exclude comment on and 'speaktng 
for' those whOse 'past' or "tradition' you do not share (see, for example, the debate 
Within the pages of the journal Agenda, such as Agenda, 1991; Funanl, 1992; Fouche, 
1993; Gouws, 1993; Hasslm and Walker, 1992: Kemp, 1993; Sunde and Bozalek. 
1993: Campbell. 1993: Melnt;Jes, 1993). 
It needs to be stressed that the domlnation bestowed. and attempts to give such 
domination authortty. through 'the past', need not rest within a slngle person. It may 
be of men over women, such as briefly discussed by Terence Ranger ( 1984) - the 
colOnial Prlnted records reflected 'tradltional' gender roles as 'deriVed from male 
Informants', determined by men's fears of changtng power relations under colonial 
admlnlstration. Men decided which relationships had to be preserved, which were 
'tradltJ.onal' . 
Leroy Vall notes. in the introduction to a book of essays on "tribalism' In southern 
AfrIca. that etbnlc ideologies helped. in an industrialising society, 10 provide the 
control necessary to mlnlmlze migrants' natural anxieties about what occurred at 
home'. Chlefs, so Important to colonlallncUrect rule, also served to watch over the 
world left. behlnd by those forced to enter capitalist production: 
It was they who brought into dally practice those 'rediscovered 
tradltions' which emphasized controlln the name of 'custom' ... The 
good chlef was a proxy who protected the lnterests of the mJgrant 
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workers and, for that. they were ready - if not eager - to reward him 
mater1ally (Vall, 1989:15). 
It was migrant men who most strongly supported ethnic ideologies in these early days 
of cap1tallst penetration in Afrtca -including, 1mportaritly, the 'traditional' role of the 
chiefs and the Pos1tion of women (both,iron1cally, 'traditions'interpreted and frozen 
by colonial adm1n1strators). 
Cherryl Walker (1990) argued that. for various reasons, early migration in southern 
Africa was 'largely gender-speclflc'. Women as the prtmary producers in the rural 
homestead 'allowecr the export of male labour, and also allowed the explo1tation of the 
'slngle' male migrant by m1n1ng cap1tal (see also Guy, 1990). Rather than having to pay 
a wage that would allow the survival of an urbanised famlly, the mine owners argued 
that the fam1l1es' subslstence needs were catered for on trlballand through the labour, 
essentially, of women, For a range of (dlfferent) reasons 1t benefited husbands, ehlefs, 
the state and cap1tallsts, all men. to ensure that women remained on the land during 
the early period of cap1talist development in southern Afrtca. The alllance 'baaed on 
very different objectives ••• nevertheless threaded through with a un1fylng presumption 
of male power over women' (Walker, 1990: ISO). 'Native op1n1on', on which state 
legislation was based, 'amounted to male oplnlon'. 
MIgrant workers, interviewed in the Dube hostel during the violence in the Transvaal 
in 1991 that centrally involved these workers against other permanent townsh1p I 
dwellers, expressed themselves in the following way, call1ng on the past to Justify 
supposedly ethnic charactertstlcs: J 
We can go to Natal to see our wives. This thing ofbelng away from 
your wife doesn't klll any man.' 
Asked if 1t wasn't normal for husbands and wives to llve together, 
another man says: 'No. That is true on the slde of the white people. 
They do have such a feellng but on the part of black Zulu people the 
husband can be away for five years. They can come back and the wife 
1s still at home looking after the children and there 1s no quarrel.' 
Another man speaks up: 'This comes from our great-great-
grandfathers. They used to come to the mines and left their famll1es 
in Natal - we are not prepared to change what our forefathers were 
doing' (Weekly MaU, 30 May 91). 
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So historical facts relating to the penetration of capitalism in the nineteenth century, 
and the estabUshment of the highly repressive and exploitative mlgrant labour system, 
have become the ethnic 'past'in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
ID a study based on these interviews Lauren Segal noted that the male mlgrants 
perceive the hostels, and their urban Ufe, as partial - '"we are here to work"'; '"we know 
that we are here temporarily because our homes are in Natal"' (Segal, 1991 :37). Their 
call on the past to Justify absence from wives and girlfriends served to make sense of 
an economic necesslt;y. 
Afrikaner women were taken up lnto ethnic mobUlsation during ~e first half of the 
twentieth century in a particular role, as 'volksmoeders' (mothers of the nation). This 
notion served as 'role model for Afrikaner women'; a 'deliberately constructed Ideal, 
the work of male cultural entrepreneurs who deUberately promoted a set of lmages 
surrounding women ... (centertng) malnly on their nurturing and home-making roles'. 
However, Elsabe Brink (1990) polnted out that this notion was also cultivated by, 
especlally, mlddle-class women. Amongst those younger Afrikaner women who were 
proletar1anlaed In this period there was an alternative moblllsation (lnto trade unlons) 
that did, however, at1ll take account of Afrikaner ethnic symbols and ldentit;y, but 
articulated these wtthln a working class mobUlsation. It became 'a contested Idea', 
laying claim "to the common Afrikaner cultural heritage', such as during the 1938 
centenary celebrations of the Great Trek. In the Garment Workers' Unlon, however, 
the Afrikaner women workers 'llnked the struggles of the Voortrekkers with their own 
struQlles In an industrial environment' (Brink, 1990:289). 
Women were not always relegated to an lnferior posltion wtthln Afrikaner ethnic 
moblllsatlon, although the exceptions may say eomething about class dlfJerencea 
wtthln the ethnic group. A somewhat dlfJerent focus on the role of mlddle-claas 
Afrikaner Women as 'cultural brokers' (rather than the men who were predominantly 
Ident1fled by Brink), sees a more act1ve role for them in a small Karoo town, Cradock, 
In the fields of language and reUgton. Butler (1989) argued that these women, 
operating through the Afrlkaanse Chrlstellke Vroue Verenlglng. were lnstrumentalin 
shaping an Afrikaner ethnic ldentit;y during the first half of the twentieth century, that 
could be dlsttngulshed from the poUtical moblllsation of that Identity: 
We are deallng here with a society in which women were playing the 
role of culture brokers, lncidentally creating an ethnic 
self-consclousness and poUclng a social boundary (Butler, 1989:73). 
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A case where an ethnic idenUty. based on certain tradiUons. can serve to reverse the 
trend towards male dominaUon. and where women played an acUve and creaUve role. 
was offered by.DaVid Webster in his study of the Thonga in the Maputaland area of 
Natal (1991). Here males. haVing to fend within a world of migrant labour. adopt a 
"Zulu' ethnic idenUty in order to benefit from the posiUve percepUon that frequently 
exist with white employers of the Zulu ethnic group (stereotypical characterisUcs such 
as mascullnlty. strength. mllltarism and rellablllty are held to apply. explalnlng why 
Zulu-speaking migrants were. and stlll are. deemed by employers to be ideally suited 
to be night guards). Women. on the other hand. have a more favourable status within 
Thonga society than they would have in Zulu ethnicity and. hence, adhere to such an 
identity. Withln this identity "a woman has a great degree of independence - her mind 
and political allegiance are her own'; certaln kin posiUons "confer enhanced status on 
women'; women playa slgnlftcant role within "famlly counclls'; younger women have 
greater freedom from the "hlgbly elaborate' rules of respect towards in-laws and "status 
superiors'; and women had a right of divorce under certain circumstances In which 
the husband falled her (Webster. 1991:257-9). 
Women are the bearers of the Thonga ethnic idenUty. continuing to speak Tsonga. for 
example. As Webster commented: 
The paradox Is that mlgrancy (and Its attendant concept of Zuluness) 
brtngs in the money without which no famlly could surVive. but the 
price Is female. subordlnaUon. In contrast. the Thonga idiom speaks 
ofwomen's defiance. lndependence and emanclpatlon (1991:268). 
Here Is a clear case where ethnic socialldenUUes can dlfJer even between brother and 
slster. remlndlng us forclbly that socialldentlUes are held by indiViduals. allowing 
biography Un this case of gender) to shape the soclalldentlty In a meanlngful way. In 
the Thonga case the dominant group awareness( es) lle outside ethnic group formation 
and allows the society to continue. even though the contrasting male and female ethnic 
IdentlUes may introduce tensions - or. as Webster wrote. "ethn1city Is a metaphor for 
the regional and domesuc struggles being contested between men and women' 
( 1991 :267). This case. with the slm1lariUes of the migrant labour context that It shares 
with that studied by Segal within the hostels (above). provldes an interesting contrast 
in gender perceptions and illustrates well the fiex1blUty of ethnic IdenUUes and the 
process of creation and maintenance of such idenUties. 
The contributions in Hobsbawm and Ranger's Inventton ofTradttton (1984). a phrase 
that must Vie with "lmagtned communities' for frequency of use within the social 
sclences. illustrate the Variety of uses of a past Within speclflc contexts. When the 
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situation has demanded. groups have been w1ll1ng to accept an Imposed tradition. or 
invent their own traditions. Hobsbawm and Ranger agree that since the industrial 
revolution these invented tradltIDns (to a large extent what I have referred to as the 
need for a 'past' Within ethnic group formation) have served to 'establlsh or symboUze 
social cohesion .. .': to 'estabUsh or 1eg1tlm1Ze soclallnstltutions (and organisations]. 
status or relations of authority' (or leadership]: and to 'soclallze. inculcate bellefs. 
value systems and conventions ofbehavlour' (1984:9). Whether 'true' or 'invented'. the 
past serves stmllar functions in ethniclty. 
For social relations of survival, which include not only the materlal wen-being or even 
llfe ofindlvlduals and groups, a sense of 'the past' (even when invented) Is moat potent 
in the ways suggested above. Is It any wonder then that history should play such an 
Important part in any ethnlc moblllsation and Identity formation. What Is included as 
relevant Within 'the past'. whether It contains some agreed-upon 'factual' hlstory or 
whether It Is clearly created. and whether It Is of falrly short duration or not. does not 
concern me at thls stage. Its potency Ues exactly in the apparent 'lawlessness' of 
modem aocl~ where ethnic Identities. as group Identities. as well as many others 
(famlly. relJglon. etc) serve to give meaning through stressing community. through 
stre-tng conUDulty. through stresstng a 'genesis' - a point of ortgtn, and the further 
back the more potent. David Harvey. in hls stimulating book on Ute 'condition of 
post-modernity' (1992). commented: 
The greater the ephemerallty (of the post-modern world]. the more 
pressing the need to dlscover or manufacture some k1nd of eternal 
truth that might, Ue therein. The rellglous revlval that has become 
much stronger since the late s1xt1es. and the search for authenticity 
and authority in poUtics (With all Ita accoutrements of nationallsm 
and locaUsm. .. ) are cases in point. The revival of interest in baste 
lnsUtutions (such as the famlly and community). and the search for 
"historical roots are all signs of a search for more secure moortngs 
and longer-lasting values In a sh1ft1ng world (1992:292: also see 
Hayes and Mare. 1992: and the dlscusslon of decentrtng by Hall. 
1992:285-91 ). 
It Is in thls area that the potent1ally conservative nature of all ethnlc Identities Ue. A 
romanticised past may be all that allows some measure of self-worth. of cUgnlty. in a 
present that Is characterised by loss. poverty. degradation. insecurlty. This is the past 
as refuge, the past as remembered glory. In addition. It would seem that ethniclty. 
ma~ more than any other Identity, needs what Jeff Pelres (1987:22) called 
"time-depth· for confinnation. 
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Groups apart 
The third characteristic of ethniclty Is that It sets a group apart from other groups and 
the population in general. The legitimacy of any group, by deflnlt10n a part of a larger 
complex (whether of other groups or of a total population), depends on Its uniqueness 
_ In other words, 'we' are not the same as 'them'. different from the 'other'. 'Our' 
culture, 'our' language, and 'our'. unique history sets 'us' apart. 
For Mrtkaners that uniqueness of the ethnic group was, and for some stUlls, loaded 
With 'sacred stgnlflcance' - 'their language, their Calvtnlst faith, their customs and 
conventions, their very dress' - wrote Moodie ( 1980: 15). 
That 'apartness' may not be based on notions of Inferiority or of superiority, although 
such an absence would be rare. It mlght simply slgnlfy differences which are worth 
stngUng out for group Identity. However, most frequently an ethnic Identity (as felt by 
the group) Is attached to superiority or inferiority - It Is through competition of some 
sort that the Identity Is confirmed or estabUshed. The particular status of an ethnic 
group may be 'accepted' by the outsiders and It may even be created or reinforced by 
the outsiders. For example, colonialism was not only a materially exploitative 
relationship, but also InVolved Ideological domtnation, shaping the way in which 
colOnised people came to perceive themselves and act on the world around them. This 
culturallmpertallsm, creating an Inferiority complex. so well illustrated by Frantz 
Fanon in Algeria (in his book Black Skin White Masks), 
... Is the outcome of a double process: 
prtmarUy, economic: 
subsequently, the lnternal1zation - or, better, the epldermallzation - of 
this Inferiority (Fanon, 1970:10). 
A reaCtion to this aspect of colonialism also formed the basts of the black 
consciousness movement in South Mrica In the 19708. Its component organisations 
demanded that the dominated group had to 'restore' Its past in order to gtve the 
group an Identity, to estabUsh pride in the boundaries of the group: 
The black man (sic) ... will continue to address his black brother and 
Sister because the events and the rich heritage that are their history 
have not been made fully ava1lable to them In the usual way In which 
a society Informs Its membership about the slgnlflcant aspects of Its 
development. Blacks want to know, and must Imow, more about who 
they were and who they are If they are seriously concerned about 
whom they intend to become (Khoapa. 1973, emphasis ortglnal). 
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WhUe the example from black consciousness mobilisation reflects a raclallsed 
consciousness and not strictly an ethnic mobilisation. It was a response to being 
treated as social inferiors. In a slm1lar fashion the Afrikaner ethnic group had been 
perceived in a negative way. not only by those they oppressed but also by the majority 
of white EngUsh.apeakers. The former relationship (Afrikaners to black people) could 
be ignored by Afrikaners because they themselves felt superior to this population· a 
'superiority' which did, of course, also lead to strong group formation, but because of 
a threat that lay in nwnbers and competition for Jobs, from 'below' rather than from 
'above'. Africans had been, to an extent. wrltten out of the ethnic 'other' because 
people With black skins had been raclallsed beyond cultural comparlson With 
Mrlkaners. Raclsm left a soclal·psychologtcallegacy much more complex than 
establishing ethnic boundaries for Afrikaners. On the level of group Identity, however, 
It was slmple • black people could not be Afrikaners and, therefore, did not deftne 
Mrlkanerdom. 
A more complex relationship existed in relation to coloured people as was the case 
With the negatively stereotyped tmage of Afrikaners by EngUsh·speakers in the way in 
which It affected ethnic group formation. The latter relationship reflected both a 
strong antagonlsm from Afrikaners, a resentment that orgtnated in the British wars of 
lmpertal1sm fought agalnst the (white) ctt1Zens of the Beer repubUcs (and the atrocities 
of scorched earth and concentration camps), and an attraction to the dominant 
British colonlal culture in South AfrIca. The fact that AfrIcan participation and 
Immense suffering dUrIng the Angla.Boer war was so etTectively wrltten out of many 
histories indicate the predominant use made of that struggle in subsequent 
mobWsation (for correction see, for example, Warwick, 1983). 
The struggle over Identity formation was fought out especially during the flrst half of 
the twentieth century and reflected also the dlfferent processes of class formation for 
the two language and ethnic groups. Afrikaners. from a predOminantly rural existence, 
became workers within the mln1ng and lndustrlal concerns of the 'English'. This was 
the 'race problem' early In the twentieth century and not the relationship between 
black and white. 
It Is difficult to ascertaln the extent to which Mrlkaner group Identity has otTered 
protection agalnst and been reinforced by such epithets as 'hairy back'. 'rock spider'. 
'spark plug' (from NGK • Nederdults Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church) 
and a brand of spark plug), etc. As Pieter Ie Roux commented: 
But the historic wrongs lofBrltish action durtng the Angla.Boer War 
and subsequent culturallmperlallsm) would in my oplnlon not have 
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been sufficient to keep the fires of resentment burntng had English 
people not repeatedly rekindled the flames by often unconscious 
revelat10ns of feeUngs of superiortty (1986: 196). 
The same could be asked of many other negat1vely stereotyped Ident1t1es. such as that 
of the Irtsh within the English-speaking world. There are many examples. other than 
those of Afrikaners. that could be drawn from stereo1¥Ping between ethnic groups on 
the African conUDent. Little examined. in the South African context. Is stereotyping 
among black Africans. 
In South Africa It would be dtftlcult to agree on the presence of an 'Engllsh' ethnic 
group. In southern Africa the Brtt1sh settler presence was really only felt from 1820 -
and then the connection was with the impertal power. the home country. rather than 
with a unique local. African Ident11¥. The cultural deftn1tlon of being 'English in the 
colonies' rested ftrmly on language and values that were confirmed in Brttatn and not 
in the colony, through pubUcat1ons. educat1on, travel. aspiratlons. etc. The Afrlkaans 
derogatory epithet for English-speaking South Africans reflected this ambJgul1¥ - 'sout 
pier ('sa11¥ penis', because It dangles In the ocean, With one foot in Africa and the 
other in Britain). The equlvalent (to Afrlkanerdom) soc1alldent11¥ for many 
EngUsh-speakers remained one located within the Brttlsh nat1on. the 'mother country'. 
'Ote repubUketnse strewe' (republlcan goal) of the Afrikaners. an Mrtcan (albeit 
raclaltaed) repubUc. was not shared by English-speaking South Africans - the 1960 
referendum amongst white voters on whether to become a repubUc was won by the 
very close margtn of 52.3% in favour. In Natal, With Its large white English-speaking 
populadon a mere. 24% voted for a repubUcan form of government and a break from 
the British Crown (see Survey. 1959-1960:7). 
The boundaries of groups are. therefore, important: for assert10n of an ethnic ldenU1¥~ 
for proteet1on, and to advance interests. However, they are flexible. They change both 
In the way in which the group is defined, and In the idenUties of indiVidual members 
of the group. Ethn1c1~. as asoctal construction. finds or loses its potency in Its abW~ 
to meet the historically speclftc and particular needs of its adherents (and ofthoee 
who manipulate those idenUUes. in some cases). There is no such thing as an 
uncbanglng ethnic ldenUty and It Is possible to find the genesis of any ethnic group 
IdenUty, which mtgbt have llttle In common with the source that exists in the group's 
own myth of orlgln. The boundartes that are drawn are flexible because the speclftc 
cultural elements and histortcalinterpretaUon that are deemed to be important to gtve 
content to 'us' changes. Ethnic groups. and the 'makers' of ethnic idenUUes. exist 
within a changtng soctal environment. (At this point I am st1ll talk1ng of Ideological 














A frequent struggle In ethnic group formation. especlally when such Identities are 
being manipulated lnto political mobilisation. Is to shape the ethnic Identity to 
'suppress' other potentially competing Identif:les. These competing Identities may be 
ethnic or of larger or alternative social groupings. When ethnicity moves into the 
poUtical arena the faultllile (possible divlsion or fissure) of class poses a potential 
threat to the apparent homogeneous ethnic group. For example. simply put. not all 
Afrikaners had the same economic lnterests or benefited to the same extent from 
'ethnic power mobllised' In the 19305 and 1940s. In the 19905 Afrlkaans.speak1ng 
farmers. threatened by the demands for the restoration of land made by previous 
black occupants. and an lnsecure white working class provide ferUle soU for the seeds 
of a new ethnic mobUlsatlon. bel1ev1ng that they had been sold out (both economically 
and ethnically) by the FW de KIerk reforms. 
S1m1larly John Saul (1979) pointed to the potency of ethnic mobUlsatlon against a 
common colOnial enemy in Africa. provlding soUdarity in the struggle for 
lndependence. We could. with some Justification. talk of ethnic populism. where a call 
to a specified 'people' hides a range of confllcting class and gender interests. In the 
colOnial example, a broad mobWsation that easUy overcame potential dlvlsions could 
succeed because the 'other', the colOnial state or a colOnially-favoured ethnic group or 
regton. was avallable to mobWse against as it was experienced as the exploiter of all. 
irrespective of class. etc (see also Smith. 1981 :141-7: and below). 
The case of the Thonga. mentioned above. illustrates the diVision of gender that 
a1fected the ethnic identity chosen by males and females. Any group of indivlduals who 
meet most or all of the requirements of belongtng to the ethnic group and yet who do 
not accept what belongtng means. threatens the 'obviousness' of ethniclty. I w1ll return 
to this point when discussing the spec1flc case of Zulu ethnic mobUlsatlon, as well as 
in chapters three and five. 
Can we DOW deflDe? 
The dlscusslon above allows me to propose a working deflnltion of ethntctty. although 
it bears repeating that the particular mix of elements that go to form an ethnic Identity 
must be a matter of historical exam1natlon rather than deflnltion. This necessary 
greater complexity wUl be returned to in chapters three and five. Ethnic1ty as an 
analytical concept. Is not just a deflnltlonal 'invention', useless analytically except to 
giVe credlblllty to an endless variety of manipulations of group identities. On the 
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contrary. ethnlc1ty has suffic1ent common elements to Justify a general1sation. thereby 
providing a conceptual tool that can be applied in dlfferent circumstances. Ethnic 
groups exist even if they differ from each other in many respects. are not fixed. and 
are percetved in a variety of ways by each individual member who at the same time 
~mploys an array:of ident1t1es. Once again I must stress the biographical element of 
soclalidentit1es. displaying (or perhaps exactly not 'displaying' in any vtslble form) 
\ greater variety than the mobU1sers of ethnic identity would. or can dare. allow. 
The concept of ethnfclty. then. refers to social identity format1on that rests on 
o culturally speclflc pract1ces and a un1que set of symbols and b~liefs. the combina-
t10n and strength of which have. however. to be examlned in each specl1lc case. and 
how they are held and valued by individual agents: 
o a belief in common ortgtn and a common history ('the past') that is broadly agreed 
upon. and that provides an lnherltance of ortgtn. symbols. heroes. events. values. hi-
erarch1es. etc. and that confers identity: 
o a 8en8e of belongtng to a group. that in some combination (to be examined in each 
case) confirms aoclalident1t1es of people in their interact10n with both members 
and outsiders (members of other groups). 
The ideology of etbnlc11;y involves the process by which ethnic. subjects are formed. 
and the way in which they are called on to accept or to rally to an ethnic ident11;y as 
adequate to ·explain· 
what exists ••• (and in this case. what had existed] that is who we are. 
what the world is. what nature, socle1;y. men and women are like. In 
this way we acquire a sense of ident11;y •.. : what Is good ••• : what Is 
possible and impossible .•. • (Therbom. 1980:18). 
We can see how close Therbom's deftnlt10n of ideology is to what Hogg and Abrahams 
( 1988:7. and see above) said about the effect of belongtng to a group - It ·confers social 
fdenttty. or a shared/collect1ve representation of who one is and how one should 
behave'. Ethnicl1;y constitutes the way in which people think of themselves and others. 
the way in which they act upon the world around them. Ethnic11;y refers. therefore. to 
both the appeal or call addressed to ethnic subjects in their actual or potent1al 
moblllsat1on and to the outlook and pract1ces of members of ethnic groups (their 
soclalldent11;y). The former. while by no means static. allows for little deviat10n (the 
lfue between membership and defection, between 10yal1;y and treachery Is narrow. and 
mostly out of the control of those so labelled). The latter. ethnicl1;y as soclalldent11;y 
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that carries the story of appropriate behaViour and is carried by the indiVidual social 
agent. each With her or his biographical detail. is less clear. is less pubUc and hence 
more open to ·alteration (even if such adaptation may not be the result of conscious 
choice). It allows for. and is characterlsed by. greater flexibility. and the consequences 
of deviation are not as potentially extreme as that carried by the label of'traltor' on the 
poUtical terrain. 
Patrick Wrlgbt. in a book about the way in which the past is used in contemporary 
Brltain. also used the notion of 'story' (slmllar to that employed by Berger. referred to 
earUer. and to Therborn's deftnltion of ideology). The relevance to my discussion of 
ethniclty should already be clear. He wrote: 
(E)veryday llfe is full of stories and ... these are concerned With 
be1ng-in-the-world rather than abstractly defined truth ... The essential 
th1ng for a story is that it should be plausible ... (S)torles playa 
promlnent part in the everyday actiVity of maktng sense. They help to 
bring thlngs into the order of our world - to themat1se events. making 
them expUcable in a way which also defines our present relation to 
them. Making sense ~s a fundamental actiVity of everyday llfe and. 
whlle it can obViously lead to dUTerent conclUSions in dlfferent 
sltuations. it tends to follow the same basic form. It works. for 
example. by naming thlngs and events. and it accounts for 
phenomena in terms. say. of analogy or causality. It explalns 
happentngs in terms of the mach1nations ofjate or in terms of 
voluntary fntentfon. and it has always a powerful sense of what is 
probable or possible (Wrtght. 1985:14-15. emphases in ortgtnal). 
This brings me to the next point - what can we say about the way in which the ethnic 
identity Is formed? Who tells the storles and to whom are they told? 
BomEthnic? 
In a revlew of the book Brothers Bom ofWarrtor Blood (Mare. 1992) Rupert Taylor 
( 1994) noted that what was not explatned was the ortgtn of ethn1c1ty as a 80Clal 
Identity. He was partly correct in that that book did not make any generallsable 
statement about the historlcal ortgtn of ethnic1ties. It is dlfDcult to say whether that 
could be done. at least not Without a very Wide historlcal survey. What can be said is 
that the e'Jdstence over time. for whatever lnltial or continuing reason. of any group 
w1llleave the sedlmentation of shared culture. conunonly experlenced 'past '. and 
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'groupness' that may take ethnic form. However, I did make reference to the sodal and 
psychological orlglns of ethnic group formatton. I Wish to expand on that point below. 
There are several prevalent approaches to, or percepUons of, etbnlclty. By call1ng It a 
socfalldentlty and drawing attentlon to Its changing appearance I Wish to note some of 
these. Firstly. ethniclty Is not something that we are born With, although some 
anthropologists did argue that It was an intrinsic Identlty, and many poUtlclans and 
pol1tlcal analysts grace the phenomenon With s1m1lar unchangeable centrallty. even If 
just in their approach, There Is probably a fairly Widespread popular perceptlon that 
many ldentlUes are 'Inherent', such as the attrlbuUon of cultural characteristics and 
capacltles to the pseudo-sclenUftc notton of 'race'. the most often examined 
'common-sense'. 
A clear example of such an 'intrinsic' ethnic Identtty approach Is offered In the claim 
by professor PJ Coertze who wrote that 'Soos elke mler aan 'n mlernes behoort en 
elke by aan 'n bynes. so behoort elke mens aan 'n etnos' ('In the same way that every 
ant belongs to an ant nest and every bee to a hive. so every human being belongs to an 
ethnic group') (1979). In other words, nature determines the place of each of us In an 
ethnic universe ofultlmate soc1al security. The argument here. and whUe put 10 rather 
extreme terms. Is not that uncommon. Within this argument there Is no escape from 
the genetlcally determined ethnic Identlty With which we are born. ThIs approach. and 
Its extension 1oto the pol1UcaI field. underlay the cruditles of apartheid. 
Another perspectIVe on ethnic identlty is 1ostrumental1st - In other words. the focus Is 
not on what ethnic ldentltles involve but how they are employed to advance certain 
interests. usually pol1tlcal and economic (see Webster. 1991:245). ThIs approach may 
well leave the 1mpression that ethnic ldentlUes are solely manipulated and that 
adherents are slmply recipients of soc1a1 Identltles which are then used to advance 
interests that might Include their own personal desires and goals. It Is this dlsm.lsslve 
atutude towards human agency that prompted Patrick Wrtght to say that If that was 
the case all that Is left Is farmtngwtth so many sheepl (1985:5). Some crudely 
determ1n1stlc approaches are very s1m1lar. interposing the 'shepherd' between the 
material conditlons and the sheep. Rather. and It Is to that which I have suggested 
approaches in the previous sectlon. the quesUon remains: 
What Is the actual basis for the natlon lin this case. once more. the 
ethnic group lin contemporary experience and how can the forms of 
self-understanding which It promotes come to be shared by people of 
st:r1k1ngly dtfferent sltuatlon and circumstance? (Patrick Wrtght. 
1985:5). 
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WbUe ethnlc identities are not necessarUy 'primordial sent1ments"(there 'at the very 
beglnn1ng', the ortgtnalidentities) or 'natural', they are in each case presented as 
having 'existed from the earUest stage'. Whlle such identities are certa1nly used in 
mobWsation to achieve political and economic ends they cannot be collapsed into 
such manipulation. I would argue that analytically the'most useful approach Is, in the 
first instance, to examine the ethnlc Identities that we are frequently born Into. In 
other words, we are made members of an ethnic group (as we would ach1eve other 
identities), we are socialised and mobilised into ethnlc Identities that mostly pre-ex1st 
our own lmmerslon into the practices, language, soc1al conventions of an ethnic or 
other Identity (each with more or less coherence) lnto Bourdleu's habitus (1990), and 
sometimes even lnto ethnlcally-speclftc organlsatlons. The soc1ologlst Anthony 
Giddens stressed this aspect when the wrote that '(e)thnlc dlfI'erences are whoUy 
learned. a point which seems self-evident untll we remember how often some such 
groups have been regarded as "born to rule" or, alternatively, have been seen as 
"unlntell1gent", innately lazy and so forth' (Giddens, 1989:244, emphasis ortgtnal). 
Those perceptions of the group exist before the lndlvtdualleams and is taught to be 
an ethnic subject; the community nearly always pre-exists the tmag1n1ng of 
membership, the tmag1n1ng of communlty. 
Glenn Bowman (1994) In a chapter on Palestine In a book on poUticalldentities, 
comments that whlle Bened1ct Anderson (1983) is correct in notlng that 'the particular 
systems of communication characterlzlng socleties with popular literacy allow the 
tmagtned community to be extended far beyond the bounds of the knowable or 
face-to-face communlty of soc1eties characterlzed by oral communlcat1ona' (Bowman, 
1994:140), such popular literacy does not 'automatically interpellate the reader within 
the subject positions they proffer: the text. and Its posltlons, are objects to be 
lnterpreted ••• there is already In play In the reader an identity •• : (1994: 141. 
emphasis added). 
Detenn1n1ng the characteristics of the ethnic group. In their spec1ftc relatIVe 
lmportance and mix. and the historical process of ethnic group and 80Clalldentity 
formation (of socialisation) are. thus. the prior tasks. Subsequently. we must examine 
the manner in which. and whether. such an ethnic group is given organlsatlonal form 
and whether such an identity serves to advance political and economic lnterests: to 
ask the question about the extent of the ethnlc group. how big Is the tmagtned 
community: and how is it presented and by whom? 
It Is lmmed1ately acknowledged that the two aspects mlgbt not be separable at all. The 
'cultural brokers'. 'ethnic entrepreneurs'. the 'organic lntellectuals' of dominant or 
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dominated classes. m1ght have had a political role in mind from the moment of giVing 
organisational form to an ethnic IdenU~. and they and their interpe1laUons are part of 
the social world into which children are born. they are part of the socialisation (this 
would partly explain the horror of the Involvement of young children In the extremes 
of ethnic confilct}. However. even then we are left with the question as to why there 
should be a population avaUable (Saul. 1979:397) for ethnic mobUlsation - why do 
individuals respond to a call to act as ethnic subjects In the poUttcal field? Some 
answers have been suggested above. but others lle In the historically specific process 
of ethnlc mobUlsation of which there have been several revealing studies both locally 
and Internationally. The historical context of such mobUlsation IS essential to an 
understanding as to why certain elements dominate In giVing substance to the group: 
why such Identities wax and wane: whether a speclflc class project dominates In the : 
pollticl&aUon of ethn1cl~; and why. In other cases. ethnic IdentiUes should co-ex1st as 
reflecting cultural pride. alongside directly polltical social groups such as that 
provided In national Identities. Bowman (1994) has given nuance to the analysis of the 
dlfIerent notions of pollticalldenti1¥ that are possible. the dlfIerent InterpeUations that 
are made. In his case all subscrlbtng the notion of the 'Palest1nlan nation', but taklng 
various forms. 
The maldn, and the maken of ethnlcity 
The socialisation to which we are all subject In order to reproduce socle~ - In other 
words. to maintain It largely as It Is - and to allow each individual to function with the 
mlnlmum of confilct In dally social actlvl1¥. starts lmmedlately after blrtb. We are 
frequently dressed. In a western context. In blue or pink to s1gnlfy our sex. and to start 
a gender-speclflc soclallsation - a speclflc tdenti1¥ that continues In a multitude of 
ways unUl most of us function as gendereci beings assumtng the roles assigned to men 
and women In our self-perception and In relation to one another. ThIs gendered 
perception Is. In tum. reinforced by and reinforces the lnsUtuUons and practices 
within soctety. 
We are soclallsed into dresstng In certain ways. appreciating certaln kinds of food 
(think of how many ethnlcally- and nationally-specIflc cookbooks there are. and how 
often 'getting to know the other' means an Introduction to 'etbnlc cooklng"). We are 
brought up to belong to a specific reUgton. and so on. Most Importantly. we are taught 
to express ourselves In a certaln language which not only allows us to communicate 
and to share In recorded material but places us In a speclfic cultural: context - one of 
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the Important elements of an ethnic identity. Each of the areas of communication that 
language opens up. whether it be written or oral. such as films. books. education. 
speeches. stories. newspapers. radio. add to our culturally-based identities. However. 
language also closes us off. makes statements about our group boundaries: a preacher 
gets k111ed on a commuter train from Soweto 10 the early-1990s because he conducted 
his prayers 10 Zulu; Afrikaans. for many. is the language of oppression. and all those 
who speak it have part 10 domlnation; an accent often determines the response of 
those you talk to; who we are is often 'lost 10 translation' (Hoffman. 1989). 
The spec1ftc language 10 which we are ralsed allows us to be brought loto a historical 
conUnulty - 'the past' - that defines boundaries and teaches us about the differences 
between us and others. Language senres as the prlme socialising means - we 
communicate through language - although by no means the exclusive one. But It does 
more than that - language locks cblldren lnto a spectftc set of 'communications' and 
excludes them from others. In her citscusslon of French-speaking children 10 a 
minority school 10 Toronto. Canada. Monlca Heller notes: 
Language use Is ••. lnvolved 10 the formation· of ethnic Identit¥ 10 two 
ways. Ftrst. It constrains access to participation 10 activities and to 
formation of aoctal relationships. Thus at a basic level language Is 
central to the Jormatton of group boundaries. Second. as cblldren 
spend more and more Ume together they share experience. and 
language ta a central means of maJd.ng sense of that shared 
experl~ce (1987:199. emphases added). 
Our histories are frequently also the btstory of a language. The ortgtn of the Mrlkaans 
language. and the date from whlch It could be called a disUnct language (and not a 
cltalect of Dutcb). features strongly 10 the formation of the ethnic group and Its 
distlnctlve history. Isabel Hofmeyr aptly called her contribution to a book on race. 
class and nationaltsm. 'Bulldlng a naUon from words: Mrlkaans language. Ilterature 
and ethnic IdenUt¥. 1902-1924' (1987); whlle Glenn Bowman notes that 
All communities are 'countries of words' 10 so far as the rituals of 
tnscrlbing borders. picturing terrltories and populaUons. and 
themat1zlng issues saltent to those terrains and the communities 
believed to occupy them occur Wlthin cUscourse (1994:140; also see 
SaId. 1994. and his discussion of narrative 10 the formation of the 
'tmaglnation of empire'; and Hofmeyr. 1992). 
Those who came to lead the bulldtng of an AfrIkaner ethnic identit¥ were aware of 
language as a bullding block. Moodie noted that It was feared that angUclsaUon would 
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occur With urbantsatlon, where English was the language of commerce and expressed 
the links between the colonial power and the colony. The Afrikaans language, and Its 
use, had to be Unked to a larger motivation, that of protecUng the volk. He quotes Dr 
OF Malan, later to be the first apartheid prtme minister: 
·A UvtDg powerful language Is born from the sOU of the People's 
history (volksgeskledents) and Uves only in the mouth of the People 
(vollesmond) •.. RaIse the Mrlkaans language to a written language, 
make 1t the bearer of our culture, our history. our national Ideals, and 
you will ralse the People to a feeling of self-respect and to the call1ng . 
to take a worthier place in the world civilization •.. A healthy national 
feeling can only be rooted in ethnic (voiles) art and science, ethnic 
customs and character, ethnic language and ethnic rellglon and, not 
least. In ethnic literature' (1980:47). 
Here we see many of the charactertstlcs of ethniclty being presented, but what 1s 
Important 1s the manner in whlch these are cast as a project, as something that has to 
be done. to be created. 
From that earUest group Withln whlch we absorb so many aspects of our various 
soclal1denUUes. the famlly. we are exposed to an ever-increasing circle of structures 
and lnBtltuUons that can be used to concreUse an ethnic Identity (the 1denUty that 
concerns us here). These Include. Importantly. the educaUonal system (In the case of 
the Afrikaners. Chrlstlan NaUonal Educatlon). churches. youth groups. poUUcal 
parties. cultural associatlons. and members of the ethnic group already In existence to 
welcome us Into Its apparently pre-ordained fold. 
In the poUUcal mobWsatlon of an Mrlkaner ethnic 1denUty re1Jgton played an 
Important role - the church conftrmed the 'yolk'. and justlfted certaln distinct ethnic 
practlces and later even the apartheid polley. However. in contrast.ln the Inkatha 
movement rellglon has played no Vlslble role at all. indicating that the cement of other 
aspects (for example the central role of 'the past' and cultural attrlbutes other than 
rellglon) were suffiCient for mobWsatlon - rel1g1on in this case rntght have proved 
extremely ~Vlslve of the common-sense of a common Zuluness. It, Zuluness whose 
myth as to the moment of ortgln pre-dates the introduction of Chrlstlanlty. precluding 
the use of a ·chosen people' approach (or at least of a people chosen by God). 
Furthermore. the central personallty In Zulu ethnic mobUlsaUon. Mangosuthu 
Buthelezl. 1s a practlslng Angllcan. excluding non-Chrlstlan forms of reUgton as central 
mobWslng symbols. 
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Ethnic socialisation. as With all other soc1allsations. starts early in life. and is filled 
With contradictions· the manner in which children ass1m1late ethnic differences is 
frequently not at all the way In which we interpret their perceptions (see. for example. 
the contributions to Phinney and Rotheram (eds). 1987). A very important factor. that 
we need to keep in mind in our own perceptions and atutudes and in analysing 
behaViour around us. is that 
Young children. like adults. try to construct their ideas and integrate 
new information in ways that w1ll make the world meaningful and 
predictable. They frequently reduce the complexl1¥ of information by 
fonning global assumptions and th1nk1ng in absolute rather than 
relative terms ... (what I called categOrization. above]. 
In their search for coherence. people often suppress indiVidual 
variations to support group generaltzations (Ramsey. 1987:67·8). 
This process appUes not only to the way in which we are socialised into 'our own' 
ethnic group and accept an ethnic ldenti1¥. but also in the way in which we create. and 
reinforce. groups for others. in the way in which we stereo1¥pe people. How many 
people have not been forced into an ethnic ldenti1¥ in the con1l1ct in the Transvaal over 
the past few years. through no chOice of their own. by being defined as "belonging' to a 
group? 
What may also happen is that a cultural (or even an ethnic) identi1¥ is shaped by 
assoc1ations smaller than the major societal socialising structures· that would be the 
case. especially. in lllit.erat.e societies or where small groups are isolated from others 
who share ethnic aspects With them. In such cases tmagtnation of the communl1¥ is 
llmlted (in extent. but certalnly not in intens11¥ and complexl1¥) by oral culture. The 
full complexl1J of the transmission of ethnic identities cannot be dealt With here. I 
have mentioned just the major channels of socialisation and communlcation. where 
the various structures are coordinated so as to reinforce the message. the call. to 
lncl1V1duals to respond and to define and Uve their lives as ethnic subjects. 
It is. however. not in all cases that these various structures are brought together and 
coordinated. mutually to reinforce a speclftc identi1¥. Frequently they meet different 
needs. and what we gain from belOnging and learntng from each. need not be 
compatible With every other. The youth group may well focus on transmlttlng the 
sk1lls necessary for soc1a1int.eractlon. or mtght focus on adventure and the 
enVIronment. The rel1glon. or denomination. we become part of may be such that it 
stresses the common factors of human11¥ and sP1r1tuall1¥ and not be Unked to a 
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culturally exclUsive group. EducaUon need not have a 'clvic' component. or may stress 
that which defines the role of the citiZen withln state boundaries or the cltiZen within a 
world context. It 15 not lnevitable that an ethnic idenU1¥ wUl be transmitted so that it 
dominates others. or even that there be an ethnic idenU1¥ at all • cultural 
distincUveness In a broad sense. yes: ethnicity. In the way defined above. not 
necessarily. 
EtbDicity serving a purpose 
It Is necessary to return to a disUnctlon made earUer. Ethn1clty can be an IdenUty that 
demands no more than a sense ofbelongtng (or as llttle as acceptance). For many 
people It might be something that has no stgnlftcant relevance amongst the many 
sodalldenUtles they would acknowledge. one story amongst sev~al.I However.lt can 
also be an IdenUty that serves a pollUcal and material purpose. or is seen to advance 
these ·extra-ethnic·lnterests. Examples wlll Ulustrate the difference. 
First. a sodal psychologtcallnvestJgaUon by Joha Louw·Potgteter (1988) of Afrikaner 
d1ss1dents showed that the people she studied disttngutshed between their ethnic 
Identl1f and the spec1ftc way In which that Identl1f had been Unked to a parUcular 
pol1Ucal mobWsaUon. The dissidents. 'white. polltlcally left Wing AfrIkaans speakers'. 
mostly tnalsted on holding on to a form of Afrikaner ethnic Identlty. whlle strongly 
reJecttng the latter • ..the pollUc1sed version of that identlty • what has become known as 
Afrikaner naUonallsm. As one respondent satd. In response to a question about 
sltuaUons In which 'he felt more Afrikaans than would normally be the case', he would 
rather answer and say when he felt 'less Afrikaans': 
'(W)hen I read th1ngs that are satd by Afrikaners who are bUnded by 
the Ideology of apartheid and how they accept th1ngs Uke chosen 
people Ideas. superior race. superiority. using the Bible to JUBtlfy 
things ... I feel. It's no use. my volk Is being destroyed by Ignorance'. 
Said editor, of the 'dissident'. matnly Afrikaans-language weekly. Vrye Weekblad. Max 
du Preez. expressing the same separatlon that I am argutng for· 
'I am not detrlbaUsed. and I don't see any reason to be ... but at the 
same time. I see no confllct between being an ethnic Afrikaner. writing 
Afrikaans. lovtng Afrikaans, being Afrikaans In my envtronment· and 
not a Nat. a racist. or In favour of white leadership' (quoted In 
February. 1991 :128). 
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InteresUngly, 10 some cases the reJecUon by the dissidents of apartheid and 
pre-apartheid poUUclsaUon of Afrikaner ethniclty also led to a questioning of the 
speclfic version of the past that was essenUal to Mrikaner group formaUon: or else 
seeing that 'past' as one amongst others advanced by other etlmlc (or raclallaed) 
groups, where these also lncluded tragic events (and heroes). However, this did not 
hold for all. As Louw·Potgteter commented, '(s)ome respondents .•. reported resldual 
feelings of soUdarity with the Mrikaner group when reading Afrikaner history" 
(Louw.Potgteter, 1988:79). Her study also illustrates the polnt that etlmlc soc1al 
identities are not composed of the same 'mix' of items for alllndivlduals, even whlle 
accepUng the existence of a common group identity. 
What these 'dissidents' rejected was poUticlsation of the ethnic group, or of a 
claas-spec1ftc etbnlc project. The poUtical mobUlsation of ethnicity was prlmarily the 
way In wblch AfrIkaners who accepted the hegemonic project advanced or secured 
materlallnterests within the larger South African SOCiety. Even more speclflcally than 
that. it illustrates the manner In which a class-specific project can mesh with etlmlc 
mobUlsation. Dan O'Meara (1983:cbapter 5) discussed the manner 10 which the 
ideologlcallnterpellatlon of, a 'call' to, 'Mrikaners' developed, In competition with 
other lnterpretations of Mrlkaner IdenUty. It showed many of the characterist1cs 
already d1scusaed: the naUon had to be estabUshed as 'the prlmaJy soc1al unit from 
which alllndivtduals draw their Identity'; class divisions had to be papered over. a 
position clearly stated by Dr N Dledrlchs (later to be Mlnlster of Finance and State 
President) in the 19308 • 
'if the worker is drawn away from our nation, we may as well Write 
Ichabod on the door of our temple •.. He must be drawn lnto his 
nation in order to be a genutne man. There must be no dlvtsion or 
schlsm between class and class' (quoted O'Meara. 1983:71); 
the volle was presented as threatened by an external onslaught in order to strengthen 
the boundaries of the group. a percepUon captured by the statement that "'our 
exlstence as a volk was threatened In various ways by lmper1al1sts. Jews. coloureds, 
natives. Indians, AfrIkaner renegades and so on'" (quoted O'Meara. 1983:73): culture. 
including language, was deliberately used to strengthen a speclflc detlnltlon of what it 
meant to be an Afrikaner, ln1Ually at a distance from party politics and class poUtics • 
••. sonder die bestaan van Boerekultuur ts daar by die Boerenasie 
geen sprake van kultuurbewustheid nie; en verder. sonder die 
bestaan van 'n ele soorttge Boerenasie ts $Owel die eie kultuur as 
die bewustheid daaroan natuurllk onbestaanbaar (Van der 
Westhuysen, 1950:44) ( ••• Without the existence ofBoere (or 
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Afrikaner I culture there is no possibility of cultural awareness in the 
Afrikaner nation; and. without the existence of a unique Afrikaner 
nation. both an own culture and the awareness of it obViously cannot 
exist). 
It is Uttle wonder that the Great Trek should occupy such a central role in the 
Afrikaner ethnic mythology. The departure of the Voortrekkers from the Cape Colony 
Is presented as a statement against 'racial m1Xlng' and described as the 'most generally 
self-conscious cultural action' by AfrIkaners ever (Van der Westhuysen. 1950:58). Dan 
O'Meara wrote that 
Through this strong emphasis on kultuurpoltttek (cultural poUtics) 
rather than partypoltttek. the Bond (the Afrikaner Broederbond 
formed in 1918) was increastngly able to dellmlt the legitimate 
parameters of Afrikaner culture. and to direct mass campatgns on 
cultural Issues. This culminated in the Bond-organised celebration of 
the centenary of the Great Trek (O'Meara. 1983:76). 
The Great Trek celebrations (the Eeujees or centenary festival) in 1938 culminated in 
a rally in Pretoria which 100 000 people attended, and the laytng of the foundation 
stones of the Voortrekker monument occurred. Unlty of the Afrikaner ethnic Identity 
(Volkseenhetd) was the message, even If, as O'Meara points out. It meant different 
things to different people. 'By the begtnntng of 1939, the Bond's perSistent emphasis 
on kultuurpolitfek was slowly beglnn1ng to poUtlclse the Issue of Afrikaner culture', 
wrote O'Meara. Furthermore, kultuurpoltttek was given a 'spec1flc class content. 
poUtlc1slng class cleavages in cultural terms' through an onslaught on trade unions 
and an 'economic movement' which 'made expUcit the economic basis and 
petty-bow-geols character of Afrikaner nationalism' (1983:77). A decade after the 
Eeujees Afrikaners captured poUtical power. 
An interesting study would be to explore in much greater deta1l the differences 
between both ethnic stories and ethnic mobilisation of Afrikaners and Zulu-speakers. 
The former ethnic group drew on'-the trek. the Journey. to a place where volles. or 
ethnlc. Identity could be lived; It drew on the God-given task of a chosen people. With a 
missionary obligation of establishing 'Christian ciVilisation'. The Zulu task (through 
Inkatha), on the other hand, Is seen as a return to an Ideal and Idealised past. to the 
re-estabUshment of a 'nation' and a kingdom; absent. except in mobilisation (where It 
exists as the exhortation to 'conquer In order to incorporate'), Is the notion of a 
missionary duty. 
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A second example of the way in which ethnic moblllsaUon can serve material or 
JX>UUcalinterests is offered by Terence Ranger (1989) who showed the manner in 
which an ethnic idenUty was manufactured and then accepted in order to secure 
speclflc kinds of employment In Rhodesia. He took the example of the Manylka. and 
th~ development:of an ethnic idenUty in response to, and reinforced by, 
soclo-econom1c change during the late-nineteenth and the early· twentieth century. 
Whlle before 1890 a common Shona language was spoken and cultural tralts were 
shared, 'these Shona·speakers were not conscious of a cultural identity, st1llless a 
JX>Utical one'. Through colonial manipulaUon of territory and, more lmportantly, the 
language work of mtsslon stations that prtvUeged a written language based on the 
Manylka dialect. an ethnic identity was created around a sub-unit of Shona·speakers, 
the Manylka. The Manylka mJgrants, furthermore, benefited from Uteracy skllls that 
gave them 'access to much desired Jobs in domestic service and in hotels' • the 
"'Manylka" came to be thought of as "'natural" domestic servants' in the towns of 
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Even .mJgrants from areas where a Manylka 
ethniclty was resisted had to capitulate in the urban areas and claim to belong to such 
an ethnic group. 
By the late-1950s wider identities came to dominate, albeit not to the total exclusion of 
what Ranger calls 'sub-ethnic1ties', such as that of 'Manylka'. He wrote: 
All these factors - the aspiraUons of a second·generation African eUte, 
'prlnt-capitallsm', the enlargement of urban ethnicities, and so on • 
meant that the movement towards a untfled Shona language and a 
sense of wider Shona identity became irresistible ( 1989: 143). 
Guy and Thabane (1988) have also written about the acceptance of a work·related 
ethnic identity, In their case by Basotho miners. They argued that whlle state and 
capitalln southern Africa. as elsewhere. have created and benefited from ethnic and 
'trlbal' divisions. the 'existence of ethnic solidarity of some klnd •••. - has time and 
again been uaed by workers as protection in an hostile, Violent. and rlghtless 
environment'. Slmllarly Ranger (1989) had noted that the ethnic identity proVided 
more than 'a convenient reference group, but (also) an ideal which sustained them 
during their migration'. Reference was made (above) to the study by Segal (1991) that 
also deals with this issue. 
In their paper Guy and Thabane examined an ethnic stereotype in the m1nlng lndustry 
about Basotho being excellent shaft sinkers. Without gOing into the detall as to haw it 
was created (speclflcally out of the relationship between the technical and dangerous 
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demands of a specialised labour process· shaft sinking - and stereotyping of workers 
who came to undertake this task). and deta1l1ng the fasclnat1ng investigation by the 
authors. what Is relevant here Is to note that the ethnic stereotype was accepted and 
repeated by the Basotho mlners themselves. Especlally In the perlod from World War 
n until the early-l960s 'management used the sense of ethnic Identl1y and superlorl1y 
to motivate and organise (the Basotho shaft slnk1ng teams)· while labour used Its 
ethnic reputation as sinkers to obtain better pay and working conditions' ( 1988:274). 
The examples above also 1llustrate the sttuattonal nature of ethnlcl1y. Terence Ranger 
(1983:252) quotes. with approval. the conclusion by John IUtJe that 'Europeans 
. belleved Africans belonged to trlbes; Africans bullt trlbes to belong to' to capture this 
dlmenslon of ethnic ldentl1y formation. The need to assert an ethnic ldentl1y at any 
particular time needs to be explained for It Is not always there - It might not even have 
existed for any slgDlftcant number of people at times during the falrly recent past. at 
least not within the Ufe that Is subsequently claimed for an ethnic Identl1y and 
exlstence (such as has been the case with both the Afrlkaner and Zulu ethnic 
ldentltles). It draws attentlon to the need to exam1ne these groups within an historlcal 
context. to test the myth of orlgln. to Crltlcally examine 'traditlon' and Cultural 
dlstlnctlveness. to probe Oux in the supposed rlgtd boundaries - to exam1ne the waxing 
and waning of ethnic ldentltles. 
The situational character of etbnlcl1y Is also bome out by an examlnatlon of the 
. particular. and changing. mix of elements that are said to constltute the essence of any 
ethnic ldentl1y~ FIrstly. there Is varie1y between ethnic ldentltles. In one case a myth of 
orlgln might be th~ most important factor that binds members. in another It might be 
a common relIgton. and in yet another It mJght be language. Or else various factors ~ 
apparently 1nseparable comblnatlon w1l1 provide ldentl1;y. The 'artlculatlng principle', 
the 'domlnant' discourse that can 'sew' the elements (for example, Salecl, 1994:209), 
needs to be examined In each case of ethnic ldentlt;y formatlon and maintenance. 
Secondly, even within ethnic groups the stress may shift according to the speclftc 
needs of the moment. or even depending on the character of the 'other' agalnst whom 
the boundaries of the ethnic group Is drawn. In an article on the central Asian 
repubUcs of the USSR. described as the 'colonies of the Soviet Union' by an adVisor to 
Gorbachev, Ahmed Rashid of The Independent wrote that for 70 years Moscow has 
'plundered Central Asla for raw materlals'. Agalnst the common enemy of Russian 
domlnatlon. therefore. 'Islam Is the main prop for ethnic nationalism .•. but forgotten 
when confrontlng their fellow Musllms belongtng to another etbnlc group. who are 
potentlal rlval~ for better housing. jobs or food suppUes' (reprinted Daily News. 15 
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Jun 90). The competition that fragments Islam is sUrred up, in addition, by ·corrupt. 
feudal-minded local party bosses, who are too scared to 1mplement radical reforms 
and fuel ethnic conflicts to keep themselves ~ power'. This is s1mllar to the 'national' 
mobilisation that was possible against colonial powers in Mr1ca. creating a temporary 
and fragUe unity that collapsed in many cases when the older patterns of social 
Identity, reinforced or created by the colonial adm1n1strators, revived in post-colonial 
competition for resources and power. 
Thirdly, indivldual members might experience their ethnic identity, within the group 
and against others, in remarkably dtfferent ways - and yet be wt1llng to consider 
themselves part of the group. The disagreement over whether 'coloured' people in 
South Africa should be consldered as part of the Afrikaner volk (ethnic group), from 
within the Afrikaner group Itself, Is an example of such flux. It reflects both basiC 
agreement that there is such a social unlt as the Afrikaner volk and s1multaneous 
disagreement about the characteristics for inclusion and exclusion, and hence of the 
relevant and essential boundaries. A more recent phenomenon is the self-conscious 
mobUtsation of coloured Identity in Itself (see Mare, 1995: 1995a: 1995b). 
Bowman'. Palest1n1an study Is relevant here as well. He comments that 
Central to this inqutry Is the way PalesUn1ans, in the numerous places 
to wb1ch they have been acattered by the loss of their homeland, 
dJscurslvely construct images of themselves, their homeland, and the 
antagonists that have prevented them from achievtng the national 
fulftllment which grounds their Identity ... The nation-bulldtng 
process ... Is, I contend, made dtftlcult by the different senses of what 
It means to be Palest1n1an engendered by more than forty years of 
dislocation and dispersal (1994:138-9). 
He then dJscusses the presentations of the Palestinian nation by three authors and 
analyses the differences in conception based on the differences in experience. I wlll 
return to the looseness of deUberate social Identity construction in chapter five. 
Fourthly, It Is in the first Instance indlvtduals who share social Identities. Each of 
these indiViduals are subjected to a multitude of other experiences that cannot all be 
incorporated into the ethnic soclalldentity. There 15 no stngle social Identity for each 
indtvldualln society. On the contrary, we draw on a wide range of such identities, and 
we receive soclallstng dJscourses based on our indiVidual experiences, our 
'blograpb1es', to use C Wright Mllls' term (1971: 11-20). At the same time we must not 
lose sight of the wider structural aspects of SOCiety: nor of the manner In which 
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identities articulate. lDteract With each other. so that women wUl experience and Uve 
ethnic social Identities cWJerent from men. and young people cWJerent from an older 
generation. 
EtbDicity and 'modernisation': 
Frequently part of the conunon-sense vlew of ethnlclty Is that It 18 l1nked to rural 
soclety. and that It pre-dates capltallsm and Is. therefore. slmply an anachronism In a 
modem urbanised and lDdustriallsed world. It Is felt to be a klnd of prtmltive 
senUDlent out of place lD the 'global vUlage'. This view. In some ways, reinforces the 
Idea that ethniclty Is prlmord1al. . 
It Is, however. not only lD the conunon-sense perceptlons of soctal reality that this view 
ex:lBts and exlsted. Anthony Smlth has Written several studies on the phenomenon of 
ethn1clty. In a book called The Ethnic Revival in the Modem World (1981) he polDted 
to the fallure of the predictions of both liberal and soclallst analysts and pol1ticlans 
that rational, urban. lndustrlal, ach1evement-Orlen~ soclety, Withln a world context 
marked by mass conununication and frequent deliberate attempts to suppress ethnic 
group formation. would lead to the demise of ethnlclty. 
Wlthln this argument It was. and probably sUllls, thought that the process of 
modemlsaUon (the lDevitable goal ofwh1ch was symboUsed by Its apex. the United 
States of America - see Rostow (1960) for the classiC argument on 'stages of growth') 
would make ethnic IdenUftcations Irrelevant: that new forms of solidarity, frequently 
much smaller or ar1alng out of urban industrial soclety, would take Its place; that the 
Indlvldual, the bastc unit of consumption and production, would no longer need 
support In groups beyond the famlly; that where support was needed It would be 
materially functional (such as lD trade unions) or l1nked·to recreational and splrltual 
needs - clearly defined needs would be met by dlscrete organisations. 
In the USSR (that other symbol of a directlon that modem soclety could take In the 
twentieth century) It was argued that a new Identity Withln the workers' state would 
obviate. lD the medium- to long-term. the need for such soclal supports as ethnic 
Identities seemed to offer. WhUe consUtutional provlslon was made for predOmlDantly 
ethnic repubUcs. even provlding for lDdependence from the USSR if they should so 
desire, It was strongly argued that etbnlclty would fade away and poliey was directed 
to this atm. 'NationallD form, soclallst lD content' was the slogan that Informed this 
approach. There was Uttle doubt In the minds and the WritlnWJ of the theorlsts of the 
conununtst state that the soclal1st content would make the nationalist/ethnic form 
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redundant in the future. which was perceived to be both classless and internaUonalist 
(for a deta1led discussion see. for example. Connor. 1984). 
There was no long.tenn place for naUonallsms or ethnlclUes within socialist or 
communlst socleUes. The lessons of post-perestroika fragmentaUon in both the BalUc 
republlcs (Llthuania. Latvia. Estonla) and in Trans-Caucasla (Armenla. Azerbaijan 
and Georgia) confirmed that 70 years of soclallsm did not dim the embers-of an 
ethnic. or naUonalist. revival here either (see Suny. 1990). However. the fragmentaUon 
went beyond the fringes and what appeared to be the final collapse of the USSR 
occurred. to be replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the Unle of 
writing (1995) that process has not ended with Russian heUcopters. planes and tanks 
pound1ng the city of Grozny. the capital ofChechnya. nominally part of the CIS. 
In YugoslaVia the CroaUan and Slovenlan republlcs voted overwhelm1ngly In 1991 for 
independence and a subsequent loose alliance with other yugoslav republlcs. lead1ng 
to clvU war agalnst the Serblan-dominated centre and Serblan minoriUes within these 
regions (see. for example. Mages. 1993: Salecl. 1994). And In Czechoslovakla the 
same process of intense ethnic confllct has contributed to the fragmentation of eastern 
Europe Into many mln1-stateS or federal units with greater polltical and soclal. if not 
economic. autonomy than was ever envisaged. and with the spectre of long-term 
Violence as populations and borders get redrawn. 
Do these examples not strengthen the hand of those who argue for etbnlc identities as 
somehow Inherent. something near-genetic In lts perseverance In shaping social 
\ Interaction? The referendum campaign In South Africa In 1992 was fought. from the 
\ aide of the advocates of a 'no'-vote to refonn. In terms of ~t1y such a posltion -
\ hold1ng up as example the collapse of the USSR as confirmaUon of the lnevitabWty of 
\ _ ethnic mobWsation and the moral and historical right of 'peoples' to 'govern 
\ 
themselves'. In 1995 the same examples serve the cause of Zulu autonomy and of 
clalms by coloured people. Griquas. Namas. and Bushmen (San) for distinct 
recognition. 
In the east European cases that I have referred to. and in many other examples of 
ethnic fragmentation and confllct. there are two lmportant aspects present: the first is 
the spark that gave rise to any fonn of revolt and the context that allowed It to 
suddenly flare up: and the second is the ethnic fonn that It took. The spark has been 
the feellng that a definable population (whether regional or cultural) has been 
oppressed and explolted by a central authorlty (whether that be the central state In a 
federation: a conquertng naUonality or naUon-state: or an exclusIVe polltical party). 
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The immediate context in the USSR has been the perestroika poUey followed by 
M1khaU Gorbachev, Itself a response to the collapse of the Soviet economtc and 
political system. The new openness and a weakening of the central authority allowed 
protests that would have been unthinkable even a few years before. There has been a 
general collapse of what has been called 'g1oballsing ideologies', along with the abillty 
to maintain cohesion, either through force or through ideology, over populations. 
The form has often been the most immediate mobillsatlon that seems to encompass 
the full variety of experiences of oppression and exploitation, namely ethniclty and 
nationalism. As I argued in developing a defln1t1on, etbnlc1ty can, furthermore, call on 
a real or 'invented' tradition of valour and resistance, with examples of previous 
resistance against Invaders and conquerors. Politlclsed etbnicUy (and I will discuss its 
relationship to nationalism below) answers the need to mobillse geographically and 
across classes; It legtttmates and explalns present conditions In terms of a past history 
of conquest and incorporation (whether actual or reinterpreted); and it provides a 
multitude of readlly-avaUable cultural symbols for group formation and exclusion of 
the 'other'. It is apparently the most appropriate answer to the most visible and 
immediate form of uneven development and cultural oppression. What ethnic 
mobillsatlon does not do Is to answer the question of exploitative relations within the 
ethnic group (see chapter three). 
EthDicity and some other concepts 
If ethnic1ty Is defined in the way that I have done, It has implications for the way in 
which other concepts are used. I w1ll discuss some of these in the rest of this chapter 
in order to draw disttnctlons where I beUeve termlnological and analytlcal confusions 
have arisen. 
A frequent and reflex response, in the African context. Is to term ethnic Identities 
'tribal', even when It would appear to be otherwise inappropriate - possibly to 
communicate with that 'common-sense' that exists around ethnic groups. So, fo~ 
example, the term 'tribe' Is often used in reference to Mrlkaner Identity - such as "the 
white tribe of Africa'. In this case It Is also Implted thatJ\frlcan ethnic Identities are 
tribal, with the attached meantng of 'pr1m1t1ve' In a derogatory sense (see the very 
useful discussion of the orlglns and usages of the term 'tribe' by Peter Skalnlk, 1988). 
Would Serbs or Croatians be called 'tribes'. or Quebecois In Canada? We can see 
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already that to collapse ethnic identities into tribalism is lncorrect: a 'tribal' or clan 
unit or chiefdom referred to a much smaller functional societal grouping under 
pre-capltallsm or under conditions where aspects of that small socle1¥ relate to a 
pre-capitallst past. draWing a nwnber of smaller homestead productiVe units 
together. The prlmary reason for such social units woUld have been productive, and 
sUllIS In some cases. 
It could be argued, as Benedict Anderson did With regard to nationalism (1983), that 
an ethnic group, in the way defined here. could not exist in a world dominated .by 
small. production-based, Isolated. pre-llterate groups. For example. in the Manylka 
study Ranger refers to the absence of a 'culturalldenU1¥, stUlless a polltical one' 
amongst Shona-speakers before 1890 In Southern Rhodesia. He added that the reality 
'of which the Shona-speakers were conscious, was the local chieftaincy group' 
( 1989: 120). All of these units, therefore. are characterised by a variety of forms of 
leadership by a ·chief. whether hereditary or appointed. 
Welsh (1973:5) defined the pre-capltallst version of 'tribe' as 
SOCieties that possess, Inter alia, the followtng character1st1cs: they 
are sovereign pollUcal enUUes, smallln scale, economlcally 
self-sufficient and non-llterate. 
Under colonlalJsm this lnsUtution was distorted, legislatively frozen. made subservient 
to colonial demands, and created when they did not exist. speclftcally In order to 
fragment larger potenUallties of moblllsaUon against foreign dOmination and 
exploltation. "TrIbes'. furthermore, served as essenUal elements in Indirect rule 
pollcles. such as in nineteenth century Natal where Britain was not keen to spend 
money where there appeared to be llttle ftnanclal return. Shula Marks wrote that 
'tribes' were defined by the colonial government In Natal In 1891 as 
• ••. a nwnber or collection or body of natives fOrmlng a pollUcal 
organtzation or community, and composed of not less than twenty 
kraals under the government. control. or leadership of a ehlef, and 
which organization or communi1¥ has been recogntzed or estabUshed 
by the Supreme Chief (1970:31 n). 
She noted that'trlbes' no longer had their kinship base under thls admlnlstrative 
deftn1tion. The term preferred by Marks In her study of the Bambatha rebellion Is 
·chlefdom'. 
Welsh remarked on these changes and argued that the term should not be applled to 
the colonial period when these 'socieUes' lost their soveretgnty. were incorporated into 
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a wider society. suffered a steady decllne in their economic vlabWty. and were 
Chrtst1anised and educated into a Uterate socie~. He would prefer the term 'local 
group', and only used 'tribe' to avoid confusion with the common usage at the time 
(Welsh. 1973:5). 
Leroy Vall. too. in both the preface and lntrociuct1on to his edited volume of articles on 
'tribalism' (1989) was careful to. distance h1maelfby using quotation marks around 
'tribe' and 'tribalism'. and rather used the terms ethnlcity and ethnic group for the 
social groupmgs he refers to (although he does, also refer to 'the development of 
ethnic cOnsciousness. or triballsm' (1989: 10)). 
What is lmportant to note in the South African context. and for my concerns in this 
thesis. is that wh11e 'tribes' have frequently been taken to coincide with ethnic groups 
or putattve 'nations' (especlal1y under apartheid poUey). such as Swazi. Zulu. Venda. 
such neat categorisations or coincidence is not possible. The 'poUtical unlts as can be 
idenUfted in history were small and highly varlable ••. "mlcropoUties" by subsequent 
standards ( •.. ) and were a far cry from the "tribes" so readlly idenUfted today' 
(Skaln1k. 1988:74). 
£thnIcftJI. poUtlu. nationalism and tenito'1lf 
I have lmpUcitly argued that ethnic identiUes and belonglng to an ethnic group are not 
automatically and inherently polltical acts. An ethnic ldent1~ is not necessarlly also a 
politically mobUlsed ldent1~. Members of ethnic groups. meeting all the requirements 
of the manner in which I am using the term 'ethniclti here. may well belong to 
different political persuasions and parties. Furthermore. a number of ethnlc groups 
may co-ex1st Within a stngle naUonalidenU~. The mobWsaUon by FRELIMO during 
the war of resistance agatnst Portuguese colonial rule was character1sed by its stress 
on the Mozambican nation '"united by the same historical experience and the same 
poliUcal. economic. and social alms. engaged in the same sacred task • to fight for 
their liberation"' (FRELIMO document. quoted Saul, 1979:418). Saul comments that 
he saw how. In the cultural arena. the movement act1vely supported 'the attempt. .. to 
reallze a genuine "fusion" of diverse aspects of the cultures and "popular traditions" of 
Mozambique lnto a novel national and revolutionary form. a fusion which people 
could be expected to make their own'. He asks. pertinently for our task in South 
Africa and for the subsequent struggles in Monmblque. that the success of 
FRELIMO's response to 'other diversities which can have an ethnic edge • those llnked 
with different economic situations created ... by uneven development' stlll had to be 
observed (1979:418). I wlll return to the attempt to create Wider solldarities within the 
nation-state. especially through ·naUon-bullding'. in chapter five. 
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In Its 'pure' form - not directed at poUtical power - ethnic soclalidentltles can. 
nonetheless, take on an organised form, and the boundaries that exclude and include 
can sUll be clearly drawn. These boundaries may be less mUltantly claimed and 
defended than in the poUticlsed version of ethnIc groups but they may well be 
extremely d11Dcult to penetrate - in other words, it may be very dtfDcu1t to meet the 
requirements of membership of the ethnic 'communlty' at anyone moment. without 
necessart1y implying that the boundaries are fixed in the longer-term. 
Ethnlc idenUties, however, are frequently manipulated and mobilised in the service of 
class and pol1tica1interests (such as in the case of Mrtkanerdom d1scussed above). It 
is not surprising as ethnic groups function as such strong representations of common 
identiUes, and carry such powerful mobilising sentiments. That strength arises from 
the multiple reinforcement (cultural, emotional, historical, antagonism to or simply 
cWference from the 'other') that they enjoy, and the multiple needs that they service 
(8OClal support. historical motivation, ideological clartftcation. and 80 on). The clout of 
ethnlclty ls equalled by that other Social unit that is probably loaded with as much 
meaning in some societies. the famtly. For this reason "the fam1ly·. or a parUcular 
version of It. is sometimes clalmed to be the butldlng block of an ethnic group. 
What the pol1ticlsation of ethnlcity adds ls to direct those bonds towards a goal that 
has no essenttalllnk to ethnlclty. PoUtical manipulation moves ethnlclty into the 
arena of compet1tion for power against other groups. Pol1ticlsed ethnlclty (ethnic 
nationaltsm) ~oves 80clalidentity to pol1tica1 agency. provides the means for pol1tica1 
moblUsatlon and organisation. and submits this identity and group to another set of 
rules· those of compeUtion for institutional power. 
Pol1tictsed ethnlclty ls not. however. ldentical to nationallsm. Nationalism can be. and 
most often ls, mu1U~thnlc • nation states. the territorial form in which most nations 
extst or strive for. are 'plural socleties· in which dlstinct ethnic groups 'share the same 
pol1tica1 and economic order· (Giddens. 1989:244). Smith noted that In 1971. of 132 . 
independent states, 'only 12 were ethnically homogeneous. representing 9.1 % of the 
total. whlle another 25 (or 18.9%) have a stngle ethnic commun1ty comprising over 
9OCJ6 of the state's population' (1981:9-10). Nations have become llnked to nation 
states, a fairly recent. but nonetheless powerfulldeological notion and pol1tica1 and 
economic unit. Nationalism ls. therefore. seen as the supra-ethnic collecUvlty • that 
which binds people together who otherwise would find thelr greatest sense of 
belonglng In ethnic groups. reltglous groups. productive un1ts. and so on. and 
probably stlll find those to be the most lmmed1ate identities In day-to-day existence. 




Anthony Smith proVides ( 1981 : 1 ()'11 ). a list that was drawn up a decade before the 
present fragmentation In eastern Europe. 
However. whUe the nation state gives territoriality to a communlty of people that 
probably includes many ethnic groups, It does not exClude poUtical competition 
between ethnic groups aver terrltory and politicallndependence. In this case we would 
talk of ethnic nationalism, or the strivlng for political and terrltoriallndependence on 
the basis of ethnic identity. The June 1991 votes by the Croatian and Slovene 
repubUcs Withln the Yugoslavian nation state for independence, is a clear indication of 
the power of ethnic nationaUsm, as have many other east European struggles since 
then illustrated the same force. 
As Smith (l981:1S.20) argued, ethnlclty Is boosted by the nationalism of the 
nation-state: 'Perhaps the single most potent tnfluence on the ethnic revival has been 
the blrth and dtffuslon of nationalism. As an ideological movement. nationalism seeks 
to attain and maintain the autonomy, unity and identity of a soc1al group' - conflnnlng 
the group that Is so s1m1lar to the nation, the ethnic group, in Its quest for poUtical 
autonomy. He then argued that a 'nation' can be created In two major ways: 'territorial 
nationalism or poUtical community', and a 'community of culture'. The revival of 
ethnic1ty, therefore. is strongly bound up With the Widespread acceptance of 
nationalist ldeologles in the modem world, and With the rise of self-consc1ous 
natlonallst movements. The prlnclp1es of self-determination, popular sovereignty and 
cultural diverstty which nationalism enshrines. lend movements on behalf of ethnic 
communltles a self-confidence and legitimacy that was absent In the case of previous 
ethnic revtvals. 
The model that Is on offer Is that of politlc1sed ethnlc1ty, a moblllsation that strives for 
'self-determination, and popular sovereignty'. Successful etbnlc natlonaltsm can, 
potentlally, be the ethnically exclustve nationaUsm and nation state of tomorrow. 
Smlth added that '(n)atlonalism has also extended the scope and Intensity of the 
current ethnic revival In two other ways' - the first is the Idea of 'cltlzenship', which 
means that 'nationalism binds together elites and masses In a stngle ethnic nation 
with a stngle legislative wtll': and secondly 'nationalism extends the scope of ethnic 
commun1ty from purely cultural and SOclal to economic and political spheres: from 
. predominantly private to pubUc sectors' (1981: 19, emphasiS added). This Is the realm 
of poUtlclsed etbnlclty. 
The first polnt Is relevant to ethnicl1;y and populism: whlle the second relates to 
'poUticlsed ethn1clty'. Examples of the demand for ethnically pure states are the 
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Balkan states In the Soviet Union - as are the Transcaucasian repubUcs and Croatian 
and Slovenian st:rugg1es In Yugoslavia. and the several Afrikaner or Boer groups In 
South Africa. appeal1ng to the same or largely overlapping constituencies, call1ng for 
~eir particular versions of a 'homeland', a 'Volkstaaf. 
The dJst1nction I have drawn here between ethnic group and nation is slmUar to the 
dJst1nct1on previously drawn In the Soviet Union (wlth a difference In terms employed) 
between. on the one hand, the nation - 'a human grouping whose members share an 
IntultlVe Itmagtned?] sense ofldndredness or sameness, predicated upon a myth of 
common deacent. .. (such as the Russians. Tibetans. Croats. and Slovaks)'. In other 
worda what is more commonly called ethnic group; whUe. on the qther hand there are 
people -Wbo are conacious of their multi-ethnic background (for example. the 
Czechoslovak people. the Soviet people, or the American people)' (Connor. 1984:x1v). 
The latter refers to what we mJght also call a nation, citizens of a nation-state. 
Territory and space serve ethnic mobilisation and ethnic nationallsm In two distlnct 
ways. Ftratly. territory can serve as a powerful marker for group identity. and even to 
dellneate Incluslon or eJCcluslon from the spec1flc past that serves that group or its 
leaders - In other worda. the comblnation of space and ldeology as telling subjects 
what exl8ta and what has existed; secondly. territory may serve to estabUsb the 
pbys1cal boundaries of political clalrns for ethnic nationallst groups - creating new 
nation states In the mould of those that exist around them (etbnlc separatist. moves, 
such as thoee In Quebec. or Kurdish, Welsh or Scottish nationallst organlsations. or 
the Vollcstaat eectlon of Afrikaner or Boere groups' demands; or amalgamation with a 
larger ethnic identity. such as those by Catholic Irish In northern Ireland). The two 
aspects may well function In comblnatlon. such as when a mythology of space. of holy 
territory. of the land on which and forwhlch blood bas been spUt. serves to strengthen 
clalma for a pbyslcally bounded area. The speeches of Eugene TerreBlanche of the 
far-l1gbt Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweg1ng in South Africa are replete with examples of 
this approach. 
The case of laying claim to symbol1c space for purposes of ethnic moblllsation and 
group boundaries can best be ffiustrated with reference to the Inkatha case study and 
wm be dealt with below. 
However. it is not only in the, more obvious examples of space and territory in ethnic 
~obilisation that this issue needs to be examined. The complexity of space and 
ldentlty. in the South African case. needs separate and extenslve study. For example. I 
would argue that the distinction between ethnic story in everyday life. on the one hand, 
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and ethillclt;y mobUtsed, on the other, has to be extended to the Issue of 'land' as well. 
The notion of 'land' plays a different role, and Is transmitted through different 
discourses, in :the two cases (at the two 'levels'). In addition, whlle related, we have to 
maintain a distinction between the cultural notion of land (which, as With other 
cultural elements Within ethnic Identities, has to be examined in each speclftc case), 
the 'tmagtned' space, and the 'thlng', land that can be occupied and utll1sed 
productively, These and other dimensions would provide most Informative studies in 
themselves, as well as in comparative studies of claims for restoration and restitution 
from abor1g1nalllnd1genous inhabitants in South Africa. Australia, Canada and the 
USA. 
EtIudcftg. commwUty. and the people: 
The tenns 'conununlty' and 'the people' often serve In polltical rhetoriC in South 
Africa. For analyUcal purposes they need to be subjected to scrutiny. However, that 
task largely moves beyond the speclftc aim of this work. I Wish to deal With just one 
example of the use of the term 'conununl1¥' because It Is frequently lmpllc1tly used as 
a synonym for ethnlc group, That example is of the 'Indian communlt;y' - as in the 
eentence ' ••• soclologlst Yunus Carrtm said there were people Within the Indian 
commun11¥ who were anxious about their future, but so too were people Within all 
communities Within South Africa' (Natal Witness, 19 Jun 91). 
The Natal Indian Congress. formed in 1894, has served Within the alllance of 
resistance organ'saUons Within South Africa to give expression to demands for 
polltical particlpaUon by Its members in the central parllament. Nearly a century later, 
when the 'Indian conununlty' was to be given secondary representation through the 
trl-cameral system introduced in the 19808, the NIC and Transvaallndlan Congress 
were at the forefront of opposltion to such incorporation lnto apartheid reform 
measures, The Indian Congresses were. part. and remained part into post-elect1on 
South AfrIca. of a broader alliance of rac1al1sed rraclally' speclftc) Congress 
organtsations. 
However, the retention of the 'Indian' label whlle engaged in a struggle for 
'non-rac1allsm' came in for strong criticlsm, and still does. as post-February 1990 they 
declded to continue With their 'conununlt;y-based' existences. The crlticlsms were set 
out earller in an article by Singh and Vawda (1988). The authors argued that the 
history of the NlC showed 'a conceptuallzation of the oppressed people as raclally 
segmented', wh1le the organtsation's presentation of Its own history 'expresses the 
notion of conununl1¥ as being a homogeneous and unlfied whole.,: (1988:5). So in 
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this sense the mob1llstng call to 'the community' is similar to the populist-levelling 
aspect of ethnic mobWsation discussed above. 
There Is no doubt that the descendants of the people who lnltially arrtved as Indian 
lndentured labourers and who were subsequently Jolned by traders and professionals 
have experienced many levels of common oppression and discrlmlnation, even if 
explottatlon was not shared by all. However, I would argue that the common features 
arose out of a raciallsed identity or categorlsation ('the Indian community') that 
orlglnated In the speclftc historlcallntroduction to Natalln the nlneteenth century and 
the exlst1ng and subsequent racist poUcies of colonial and South African governments. 
This 'raclal' identity could, however, be, and frequently Is fragmented by ethnic 
divlsions that rest on rellglon for coherence. "The past' is not strong enough as a 
common factor to hold the 'Indian community' together as an ethnic group. As Fatima 
Meer had written: 
(Indian South Mrlcans') feeUngs of common identity was to an 
lmportant extent thrust upon them by their very precarious position 
as a minorlty. Surroundlng non-Indians saw them as a stngle poUtical 
and status entity ... Yet. despite their lntegration lnto a community, the 
dependents of the three streams of 1mm1grants from Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras, continue to maintain, to some considerable 
extent. the cultural dlfferences that marked them In India. and are 
thereby dlvlded lnto a number of sub-groups, most conspicuously 
recognlsable by language and religlon (1969:60-61). 
'Community', whether used In this Wide sense to refer to 'Indian' people In South 
AfrIca. or to amaller residential or geographic units, should not be taken for granted 
as common-eense expressions of group belonglng. As With ethnlcity the question 
should rather be asked as to the situational relevance of the term for participants or 
members~ and the speclflc content gtven to it. 
On the other hand, the appeal to 'community' may well serve to provide a situational 
cohesion that cuts across ethnic diVisions - this has been the case With some 
res1dentially-consUtuted appeals to 'community'. The ideological notion of 'the people', 
whlle s1mllarly problematic as an analytical category, may serve under certaln 
circumstances to bond rather than fragment (see Saul, 1973: Laclau, 1977: Mare, 
1984). 
In tbl~ chapter ethnlcity has been defined and the process lnlt!ated of making it more 
complex than common usage would indicate. The notion is distIngUished from other 
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concepts that would seem to overlap or which are confused with ethniclty. a necessary 
task in fonnulaUng a useful deftn1Uon to be employed In the rest of the study. In the 
next chapter a more saUsfactory. because complexly articulated with other IdenUUes. 




There is no single. untfled. commonly-shared ethnic identity among all members of an 
ethnic gr.oup. The various ethnic stortes. despite general acceptance of the broad 
'principles' lnfonnlng each one. are shaped by social categortes that. in addition. may 
assume the form of identities in their own right. Second. these various identities 
articulate. mutually relnforclng or contradicUng each other. Third. identities are 
subject to what C Wrtght Mills called 'biographies'. expertences of the 'indiVidual as 
biographical entity' (1971 :15). the unique bearer of soc1alidenUties but always in 
social relaUons (see Campbell. 1992:35). Fourth. ethrilc idenUties wax and wane and 
even disappear and change (see Waters. 1990. for analysis of material relevant to this 
point in the USA). As d'Entreves writes. the 'process of idenUty-construction is never 
gtven once and for all. and is never unproblematic. Rather. it is a process of constant 
renegoUaUon and struggle..o' (1992:158). 
Whlle a distlnCUon bas been made throughout between poUtically mob1l1aed ethntc1ty 
and ethntc1f¥-a1 socta1idenU~ th1s sbould not be read as arguing that the latter is 
separate from any noUon of power. On the contrary. the discussion below well 
illustrates that IdenUties relate to power. as does poUUcally mob1l1sed ethntc1ty. but in 
the latter case to tnsUtuUonally-located power. Pettman. for example. notes that 
'(p)1urallty needs to be placed Within the structure of power relauons' (1992:136). 
Campbell cr1Uses Soc1alldenUty Theory for faUtng'to accommodate the societal level 
of analysts. ignoring the fact that group memberships are located agatnst the 
background of a 80Clal blerarchy of unequal power relations' (1992:88). I would go 
further and say that It Is not just a 'background' of power relaUons but. as Campbell's 
own study sbows. that unequal power relaUons are embedded in soclalidenUUes. 
Whlle the primary focus ofthls thesis (within the case study presented in chapter four) 
Is on attempts by ethnic brokers to proVide a single version of wbat it means to be 
ethntc subjects. the attempt that is essential to etbnlcity mob1l1sed under a poUtical 
banner. I also need to discuss the factors that diVide and that shape difl'erent calls and 
experiences of ethn1c stories - ethnicity as soc1alidenUty. In addiUon. there is the need 
to isolate and stress the different ways in which subjects are Interpellated even Within 
a stngle ideological discourse. depending on sex. age. class. 'race'. and biography. If 
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Ideologies, the creation of the stories by which we Uve our everyday Uves, tell us, relate 
us, and make us recogmse 'what exists', 'what Is good', and 'what Is possible' 
(Therborn, 1980: 18), then It does so dlfferentl. ' for men and women, for the young 
and the old, etc. They exist In dlfferent power relations to each other wlthln the same 
soclal Identity. I will deal with some of these differences In this chapter. 
If, as Laclau argued (1977a: 101), the 'unlfy1ng prlnclple of an Ideological discourse Is 
the "subject" Interpellated and thus constituted through this discourse', then those 
subjects are at the centre of the articulation of various Identities, and each ethnic 
Identity Is cris8-crossed by such elements as rellg1on, age, gender, 'race', by personal 
biographies. Laclau also referred to the existence of 
different types of Interpellatlons (poUttcal, rellglous, famlllal, etc.) 
whlch co-exist whllst being articulated wlthln an Ideological discourse 
In a relative unity ... By unity we must not necessarlly understand 
logical consistency - on the contrary, the Ideological unity of a 
discourse Is perfectly compatible with a wide margtn of loglcal 
inconsistency - '" (1977a: I 02). 
These 'lmptngements' on the etlmlc Identity offer other Identities as appropriate to 
deal with ce:rtaln or even the same sltuatlons, and/or give unique form to the manner 
In wblch the broad 1magtned community' Is acted out by the Indtvldual. It Is after all 
Indtvlduala who respond to the SOCIallsation and the lnterpe1latlons that make up, that 
create, SOCIal ~dentltles. There are,lndeed, imaginings of the tmaglned community. 
The stories of ethnlclty are crtss-crosaed by many Injunctions, some of them shared 
With most or all other members of the etbnlc group (especla))y In Its mob1llsed form, 
where a common discourse Is dlrected at creaUng a single perspective of both self and 
other). However, some are located wlthln individual experience, or Withln speclflcally 
differentiated SOCIal and/or structural experiences shaped by gender, etbnlclty, 'race' 
and class (see Campbell et al, 1993). It would be a mistake to take the dtscourses of 
mobUlsattDn of ethnic Identities as reflecUng homogeneity within the 'community' to 
whlch appeals are directed. On the contrary, not only are the strictly ethnic elements 
articulated In a variety of ways. but these elements are also gendered, 'classed', and 
'aged', etc. David Harvey argues, from the perspective of a more complex class 
analysis than economic determlnlsm. that It Is required that theoretical development 
should occur In several areas, the first and foremost being that: 
The treatment of difference and 'otherness' not as something to be 
added on to more fundamental Marxist categOries (Uke class and 
productive forces), but as something that should be omnt-present 
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from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of 
social change (1992:355. emphasis added). 
I have previously argued that Inkatha's mobillsation is In many respects 
ethnic-populist. and that the claims made for populism can be extended as well to 
ethnlcity. namely that'all antagonism (1s transformed) Into simple difference' (Laclau. 
1977:173: &Iso Mare. 1984:24: Raby, 1983:15: McCaul. 1983:61: Salecl, 1994:215: 
Pettman, 1992:vli, 4). This covert (and sometimes even overt) aspect ofmoblllsation is 
as powerful In creating rlgtdities as is the overt selection of events and Interpretations 
that characterise the centrally propagated. and slngular. ethnic story of the moblllsers. 
Patel ( 1991) argue4. strongly. against the 'powerful myth' of multiculturalism, and 
against the position 'that "ethnic minority communities" (in Britain in this case] are 
homogeneous entities. Without internal divisions, acting in complete unison in the face 
of racism' (1991:209). The efTect of this argument for internal homogeneity. implied 
by the multi-culturallsm approach. is that '(t)hose who have benefited are the 
conservatiVe, orthodox and often fundamentalist forces Within our communities. while 
those who are the least powerful. such as women. lose out' (1991 :210). She 
concluded: 
The task ahead is twofold: to resist constructions of our identities 
which fix us in lmmutable and essentialist moulds. and to create a 
new political agenda. away from one based on simple "shared 
oppression", towards a shared strategy for change which reflects the 
multi-layered reallties of our existence (1991 :213). 
The indications are there. We have to guard against an unexamined acceptance of 
ethnicity as internally devoid of several interpretations and of confllct. and that 
confllct and antagonism is only located in inter-ethnic relations. and not also in 
intra-ethnic relations. Ethnicity. as With other social identities, carries its own 
contradictions. The importance of this argument i8 that cr08&cuttlng identities and 
interests can serve to dilute the apparent inviolable strength of ethnic moblllsation. 
Ethniclty and class 
In 1977 Ernesto Laclau published an essay in which he argued towards a theory of 
populism. That contribution to the debate on ideology and the relationship between 
class and ideologies was very influential on my own work on Inkatha and its 
mobll1sation of a population using an ethnic-populist discourse. with 'the people' 
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being 'Zulus' (Mare, 1984). It remains a very evocative approach, and I will start this 
secUon by referrtng to aspects of Laclau's position. 
Laclau wrote that to avoid crude reductionism in analyses of mobilising ldeologtes 
~uch as nauonallsm and popullsm we have to cWJerenUate, first. between "the general 
problem of class determtnatlDn of pollUcal and ldeologtcal superstructures, and the 
forms of existence of classes at the level of these superstructures' (1977: 158, 
emphases o~). Without entertng lnto the debate on the arch1tectural metaphor of 
base and superstructure we can sull follow Laclau's argument. He said that class 
determlnaUon dld not estabUsh the :form In which this determlnaUon Is exercised', 
and, lmportantly for my own posiuon, argued that not 'every ldeo~ogtcal and pollUcal 
element has a necessary class belongtng' (1977:158-9, emphases orlgtnal). Laclau 
conunued: 
If classes are present at the Ideological and poUUcallevels - slnce 
relaUons of producuon malntain the role of determlnaUon In the last 
tnstance - and if the contents of ideology and of poUUcal pracUce 
cease to be the necessary forms of existence of classes at these levels, 
the only way of concelvtng this presence 15 to say that the class 
character of an ideology 15 given by ltsJorm and not by its content. 
What does the form of an ideology consist or? ••. the answer Is In the 
prlnclple of aruculadon of its consutuent lnterpellaUons. The class 
character of an ideologtcal discourse Is revealed In what we would call 
its specUfc artfculating principle (Laclau, 1977: 160, emphases 
o~). 
Ethn1clt¥, as is the case With naUonaUsm or popullsm. Is, therefore, not necessarlly a 
class ideology In content In the process of mobilisatlon. What needs to be done In each 
case 18 to examine not only the varlous elements that together make up the Ideological 
appeal and the content of the ethnlc soclalldenu1¥, but also to take account of the 
'apeclflc aruculatlng prlnclple' that gtves it Its class form. One of the most lmportant 
such formaUve methods, as argued above, 18 that of 'transforming .•• all antagonism 
into simple dlfference' (Laclau, 1977:173). 
Laclau used this phrase In relauon to the ldeologlcallnterpellaUons of the Ideology of 
the domlnant class, and It Is In that way that I used It In the earUer paper (Mare, 
1984) and that Salecl (1994:215) used It In her dlscusslon of Serbian nauonallsm. 
liowever. I would wlsh to extend that clalm to other dlmenslons of the ethnlc 
dlscourse, speclftcally that of gender relauons (see below). where the domlnatlon of 
men over women Is also presented as 'slmple difference', sanctioned by ·tradltion'. 
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In studies of social relations and the development of analytical paradlgms to apply to 
African societies there has sometimes been what John Saul termed 'crudely 
polartze(d) ethnic analysts and class analysts' (1979:392). ThIs means that frequently 
those who hold to an explanatory framework that rests on class analysis deny the 
val1dity of etbnldty as an explanatory factor for people's actions and sociallnteraction, 
or else etbnldty Is relegated to a mere Wlfolding of class relations - the speclftc form 
that class confllct takes. On the other hand. by opponents of an marxist approach. 
ethnlclty is frequently advanced as providing the obviOUS Ue to those who would argue 
for class confllct as the major tool for understanding SOCieties. The momentous events 
in eastern Europe, In this perspecUve, have apparently confirmed that ethnlc and 
national1st sentiments are the enduring motivaUons for human soclal action. How, 
then, do 'Marxlst and other progressive writers' approach this 'minefield', as Saul calls 
the phenomenon of "trtbal1sm' (or ethnlclty.ln this case)? 
In the first place the two social relationships funcUon on cUfferent levels. Ellen 
Metkslns Wood (1990:64). in a discussion of the notion of'clvU society' warned 
against the ImpUcations of 'a particular method' of focusing attention on the legitimate 
and frequently neglected ar~ of 'human experience' and 'social movements, not 
bued on class'. as well as on 'socIalldentiUes'. That particular method would be an 
ind1scr1mlnate pluralism. or 'conceptual portmanteau', as Wood deacrlbes It. an 
approach that leaves a fragmented world 'with no over-arch1ng power structure. no 
totallztng unity. no systemlc coercions - in other words. no capltal1st system. with Its 
expansionary drive and Its capadty. to penetrate every aspect of social Ufe' (1990:65). 
In other words, she argued. the system of production and of exploitation remalns 
capitalist. even though not all aspects can be reduced to class relationships and 
Interests. 
Class baa Its structurallOC8Uon in the 'hidden' economic relations that centre around 
production. At Its simplest level, therefore, the existence of classes derive from 
dlfferentiated control over the means of production - under capltallsm a few own the 
means of production and thereby gain control over both machinery and over d1rect 
producers. That does not mean that workers will necessarlly act as workers, at all 
Urnes acung In such a way as to advance material Interests against other class 
Interests, and defln1tely not exclusively as workers - there are powerfullnterests and 
stories outside of class relations. In other words, classes may exist Without class 
agents (such as the working class) acung In a way informed by c1ass-speclflc social 
Identities (the most obvious. and frequently dted. example Is that of hundreds of 
thousands of members of the working class voung for conservative governments). This 
position has always been acknowledged In attempts to explain either 'false 
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consciousness', or the 1nabllity of the nwnerlcally-super1or working class to use 
democraUc poUUcal rtghts within struggles to overthrow the capltal1st system. 
Ethnic groups. on the other hand. do not exist outside of soc1alidentUy. To refer back 
to Anderson's (1983) noUon of 'the naUon' as °lmag1ned community'. an ethnic group 
does not exist outside of "the lmagtDauon·. There is no structured posltlon in socie1y 
that determines an 1ndlv1dual's membership of an ethnic group. An ethnic group may. 
or may not. exist- The fundamental relationship 1n soclety remains. therefore. a class 
relationship. without clalmlng an essential course of action associated with 
membership of a class. 
This does not deny the need to contextuallse etbnlcl1y within a context of materlal 
conditions and class relations - a full understanding of any soclalidentlty demands 
such contextuallsation. PoUtical or economic mobilisation of ethnic sentiments occur 
within a context of class relations and class power. Etbnlc mobilisation frequently 
occurs 1n situations of uneven development. of colOnial exploitation. and of poUtical 
and economic domination. This factor has to form part of the investlgatlon of the 
ortglns of ethnic identity. the re-awakening of ethnic sentiments. and the operation of 
ethnic manipulators. To return to Laclau. he wrote (1977a: 160) that nationaUsm (as 
an example). 
Considered in itself .•• has no class connotation. The latter only 
derives from its speclflc articulation with other ideological elements ••• 
He then referred to Bismarck's and Mao's nationaUsms so as to Wustrate his 
argument. and asks the question. with direct appllcablli1y to the discussion here on 
ethniclty. 
Is it the case that nationalism refers to such diverse contents that it is 
not possible to find a common element of meaning In them all? Or 
rather is it that certain common nuclei of meaning are connotatively 
llnked to diverse ideologlcal-articulatory domains? .. If. therefore. the 
second solution - which we consider to be the correct answer - Is 
accepted. it is necessary to conclude that classes exist at the 
tdeologtcal and poltttcalleuel in a process oj articulation and not oj 
reduction ( 1977a: 160-1. emphasis in ortglnal). 
The elements. the particular mix of elements Within an ethnic identity. as argued 
earUer. cannot be reduced to class. and may have no necessary class belongtng. At the 
same time there is a sufDclency of °a common element of meaning' in all instances of 
ethnlclty to Justify the use of the term. Without denying the various ways In which 
etbnlclty can be &rUculated with class Ideological practices. 
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The second major point I Wish to make 1n relation to class and ethnlc1ty Is that the 
relationship between ethnlclty and the way in which people organISe society around 
production Is tenuous and mediated - analysis demands that we move between the two 
investigations. of structure and of Identities (which Includes class identities - which 
are not the same as class structure or class positions Within production). to arrive at a 
fuller and more satisfying picture. Thus. for example. Patrick WI1ght presents Agnes 
Heller's argument on class and 'every-day Ufe·. and writes: 
wh1le everyone belongs to a class •...• the Uved relationships of 
everyday llfe are not In themselves class relationships. The cruclal 
point. then. 18 that wh1le everyday Ufe Is indeed moulded and 
del1m1ted by soc1al structure. U does not in Uself simply express this 
social structure (1985:7-8. emphasis added: also see Smith. 
1981:43). 
At the same t1me. the powerful mobWstng field of ethnlc symbols ls frequently entered 
by poUticians operating With a class-spec1flc agenda - to hide the class Interests of the 
'cultural entrepreneurs': to paper over horizontal strat1flcations and confllcts. such as 
. those of class and gender. through a kind of ethnlc populism: and to directly advance 
the class Interests of the mobWsers. 
If the power of ethnic lIOClalldentity Ues In lts potential to moblUae. then the power of 
class. and of eome other ldentities. are percelved by mobU1sers to lie In their potential 
fragmentation or cillution of the poUtic1sed ethnlc identity. Hence. clase-speclflc etbnlc 
mobll1sat1on frequently operates through the expllctt denial of class Interests or 
gender dlvlslons. re-artlculating them as difference. flxlng them In a set of practices 
that are presented as unchallengeable. here. once again, the power of the 'the past' 
plays a role. Such re-artlculation can give rise to an ethnlc populism characterised by 
calls to the 'Afrikaner people', or the 'Zulu people', In the same way that there are 
raclaUaed popullsms or nationalisms addresstng the 'African people'. 
I have already referred to the way In which Afrikaner ethnlc moblUaers aimed to 
subsume worker identity and the diVisions of class Within Mrlkaner identity. "'What I 
do here I do as a worker, but I do it In the service of my nation'", wrote Dr Dlederichs 
In 1937 (quoted Moodie. 1980:169). O'Meara commented in his analysis of 
uolkskapttallsme (people's or ethnlc capltallsm) that: 
(A)s LenIn pointed out time and again. the spec1flc forms of 
organisation (and Gramscl would add, ldeology) ofvarlous class 
forces are a Vital element In the determ.lnation of the manner In whlch 
the temporary resolution of class contradictions takes place ... This 
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study then seeks to explore the material condit1ons. contradicUons 
and struggles In the development of capitalism In South Africa which 
gave rlse to 'Afrikaner naUonallsm' (Afrikaner ethnic mobWsaUon) as 
the ( •.. ) form In which speclftc class forces came to be organised ... 
(1983:3). 
One cannot take the 'organic unity' of the Afrikaner group (or any ethnic group. for 
that matter) for granted. as so ViVidly illustrated In the recent past. With spUts In the 
late-l960s (when the Herstlgte Nasionale Party was formed) and a multitude of 
far-right" groups being formed In the 1980s and 1990s. each cla1rn1ng to represent the 
soul of Afrlkanerdom. Such fissures reappeared In what was a crisis period for 
Afrikaners during the late-1980s and early-1990s. when new idenUUes were being " 
shaped (or. rather. rearUculated). new idenUties that formed the bases for power 
struggles (see. for example. Van Rooye~. 1994: and the contrlbuUons In Friedman and 
Atkinson (eel). 1994). 
However, AfrIkaner ethnic mobWsaUon was not only concerned about the potenUally 
dlvlslve effects of class idenUUes and organisation. but also almed to Win over the 
working class to capitalism - albeit an ethnic variant presented as 'volbkapitallsme·. 
As Moodie commented (1980:203). what the Afrikaner 'had therefore to do was not 
overthrow capitalism but to seize his (sic) rightful share of the fruits thereof. As one of 
the mobWsers into volbktJpttaltsme, Professor EP du Plessis. argued: 
' ••• the new ethnic movement is Intended to prevent the further 
destruction of the Afrikaner People in an effort to adjust to a foreign 
capitallst system. and Intends rather to moblllze the People to 
conquer this system and to transform it so that it fits our ethnic 
nature' (quoted Moodie. 1980:204). 
This Is slmllar to Inkatha's arguments for 'AfrIcan communallsm' as the basts for an 
economic system (see Mare, 1984: Mare and Hamilton, 1987:chapter 6). Ethnic 
flexlbW~ or re1nterpretaUon to sult economic relations is dealt With above (In the case 
of the Tsonga). 
EtImlcity and gender 
Gender refers to the social roles attributed to men and women and the relaUonship 
that exists between men and women, as they have been soclallsed Into those discrete 
roles. When we examlne the gender aspect of ethnic group formaUon it 1s, therefore. 
necessary to quest10n the characterisUcs attrlbuted to both male and female ethnic 
subjects, both the -Warrior' and the 'mother of the naUon'. 
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Gender relations occupy a s1m1lar status to that of class. where the structured 
pos1tion 18 that created by sexual (biologlcal) dltTerences. As in the case of class this 
does not necessartly say anything determlnlng about the actions of agents or the 
hlstorically-speclftc fonn that gender relattons or gender 1dent1t1es w1ll take. but 1t 
does provide an apparently determlnlng 'essence' on which to construct attribUtes. 
Ethnic mob1l1sat1on 1s never gender neutral. Campbell (1992:46) wrote: 
gender Is more usefully conceived of as a set of ideological power 
relat10nships underlying all group memberships in a patriarchal 
social order, in such a way that group memberships present men and 
women with a systematically different set of behavioural poss1b1l1ties 
and constralnts (emphasis orlgtnal). 
The consUtution of ethnic socta11dentities occurs wtthln the general social relations of 
societ¥. Furthermore, the few examples referred to above clearly Wustrate the 
hierarcblcal relattonship that accompanies 'traditlon' and 'tradit1onal' roles that are 
ascribed to men and women wtthln the ethnic project. 
Th1a locally under-researched and under-theorised area. the gender dimension of 
etbn1c1~, 18 further compUcated by the presentatton by males of ethnic homogeneity or 
of a generally unproblemattc clarity and fixedness to, and acceptance of, the roles 
ucr1bed to males and females withln the ethnic group. The case of the Tsonga 
(dl8cua8ed ab:ove) illustrates that such presentatton should not be accepted at face 
value. Furthermore, the gender dimension of etlinlc group formatton needs to be 
historically situated. As Walker (199Oa:26) noted: 
••. It should ••• be clear that a stat1c and culture-bound understanding 
of gender is inadequate ... The meaning of 'woman' (also in ethnic 
terms) was not the same in precolontal as it was1n twentieth century 
southern Mrlca (and nor was that of 'man'): ... The cWrerences went 
beyond obvious ones in the type of work and responalblllt1es assigned 
to women, to encompass the structural stgnlftcance of the sexual 
dJv1slon of labour withln these societ1es, as weU as the social 
meaning assigned to women's roles (emphasis added). 
That meaning 18 assigned not only by the participants (male and female) in the ethn1c 
socialidenttty, but also by those who stand outside of it. The term, and the labell1ng of 
what is deemed 'ethnic', proUferates in fashion, food, and tourlsm, to name but a few 
areas, and in many cases it reflects what outsiders want to sell rather than a version 
acceptable to those who are part of the ethn1c group. It may, of course, become 
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'acceptable" Integrated Into Identit;y over time. It may well be that these tmages 
coalesce around a 'new tradition'. Women feature pertinently In the 'ethnlc sales drive', 
partly because they feature In certain spec1fi~ roles Withln the various ethnic Identities 
being sold (they feature In OWly aspects of the 'exot1c'). and partly because lInageS of 
women are In any case essential Withln the general adVertising of commodit1es in 
contemporary capltallst soclet;y. In the next chapter I examine the stereotypical roles 
Withln whlch Zulu men are presented (by Insiders and outsiders) as a 'warrlor nation'. 
The fam1ly is a strong element in ethnic mob1llsatton, servtng to reinforce not only 
authorl~ of age and parents but of the gender hlerarchy that exlsts in this soclal 
tnsUtutton. The Ideal of the f&m:lly provides a notton of conttnu1~. stabUl~ and order. 
For example. within AfrIkaner ethnic mob1llsatton. the famtly as patrlarchal. 
conservatIVe and reUglous unlt was stressed as an element binding the ethnic group: 
In ons voUcswordtng het die hutsgesin so 'n sentraie plek tngeneem en in die 
bepaltng van die kultuur van ons nasle was dtt sodantg van deurslaggewende 
betekenls dat die JVHkanerdom met reg as 'n by uttstek :famUfale' volk bestempel 
Icrut word (In the formation of our ethnic group the.famtly played such a central role 
and In the dete:rmtnatton of the culture of our natton It was of such cardinal 
lmportance that the AfrIkaner natton can just1flably be called an essenttally "famtllal' 
ethnic group) (Cronje. 1945:309: also Botha. 1952:222--3). 
Rachel Holmes ( 1993: 12) noted the use of 'the language of the polttkxJlJamily to 
authorize the rlght to protect &OCtal·subjects •.. • (emphasis added). She was referring to 
the homophobic manner in whlch Wlnnle Mandela (brlefly depu~ mlnlster of arts 
8C1ence and technology) justtfied her acttons in 'saving' three young men and a boy 
('Stomple' SeIpel. who was murdered after his kidnapping) from alleged sexual abuse • 
"'What should I have done about Reverend Paul Verryn raping our chlldren'r • where 
the 'our' clearly refers to the AfrIcan "famtly' ( 1993: 12: also see Lawson. 1993, on th1s 
case). The notton of the 'pollttcal famtly' accurately captures an aspect of ethnic 
mobUlsation, namely the attempt to clearly allocate gender and age roles Within the 
social grouping and stmultaneously to gtve It the common·sense stamp of approval 
that 'the famtly' enjoys Withln socl~. How often are the terms 'mother' and "father' of 
'the nation' used In cl1fferent contexts and times? 
In the next chapter I W1ll give another example of the horrlfy1ng consequences of the 
'disobedience' of chlldren Within this pol1ticlsed ethnic famUy. 
77 
EthDicity and trace' 
The authors Phlzacklea and MUes wrote that / 
Viewed historlcally. the 'race· concept has tended to be used when 
people ar~ being classWed in terms of their physical characterlstics: 
thus. If a Population consists of two groups which are clearly 
physically dlstlngulsh~le. and slgnlflcance Is attached to some aspect 
of this dlstingulshablllty. It Is usually concluded that the two groups ) 
belong to dltJerent 'races' (1980:21). 
, Despite the commltment by most polltical organlsations in South Afrlca to a 
non-racial, non-aexlat. democratic future. the common-sense of the existence of 'races' 
permeates every facet of our soclety and accusations of racism often serve to explain 
the actions of indlviduals and groups. with llttle evidence being presented. It needs 
llttle to break through the slogans and to expose the manner in which the laudable 
commltment bas llttle content and no programme ost people belleve that 'races' 
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exist. even If only in the weakest sense of a slgniftcation of physical dltJerences, at 
present largely a categorisation based on skin colour. Many, If not most. also accept 
that these physical dltJerences are llnked to certain cultural attributes, patterns of 
"behaviour, abWty. and so on. These bellefs inform their aCtions, as do the many 
structures and practlces that form the raclallsed sediment of post-apartheid South 
Africa. 
Robert Miles bas argued that a dlscourse of 'race' 'in the everyday world', bavtng lost 
all serious valldlty In the biological sciences where genetics bas replaced It. rests on a 
process of slgnlficaUon. Thls refers to "the representational process by which 
meanings are attrtbuted to parU~ular objects, features and processes'. To arriVe at a 
noUon of 'race' two selecUons are made In the process of slgnlftcaUon: the first selects 
phyalcal features 'as a means of class1ftcat1on and categorisaUon' of people; the second 
selecUon 1a from the range of'somaUc charactertsUcs' which signify '. suppoeed 
dUference between human beings' (1990:70-71). These 'races' are then frequently 
deemed to have dlstinct cultural characterlsUcs - really a third level of selecUon and 
sJgnlf)caUon. 
When 'soclal relations between people have been structured by the signification of 
human biologtcal characterlstlcs In such a way as to define and construct 
cWrerenUated soclal collecUviUes' a process of raclaltsatlDn bas occurred. These 
"relaUons vary historlcally (Mlle&. 1990:75). Racism then refers to a process of 
raclallsaUon where 'the group so ident1fted must be attributed with addlUonal, 
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negatively evaluated characteristics and/or must be represented as lnducing negative 
consequences for any other' (Miles, 1990:79). 
Ustng MUes' argument. we can see quite clearly how racialisation occurred In South 
Africa. lead1ng to policies based essentially on the supposed existence of 'races', where 
in addition. and essentially, practices of racism permeated and still permeate much of 
80Clal and lnter-personal relations, structures and policies (see Mare, 1995). The 
ideologlcal and organisational practices of resistance tended to operate within the 
same terrain of racialised social and politicallnteraction. with the Congress All1ance of 
the 19508 lnvolvtng a 'multiracial' alllance of four 'racial' organisations. In this regard. 
it is interesting to note that Robert Sobllkwe of the splinter Pan-Africanist Congress 
argued that'multi-racial1sm' perpetuated diVisions and that 'there is but one race. the 
human race' (see Lodge. 1983:85: Pogrund. 1990). The present PAC and other 
Africanlst positions are, however. despite the veneer of socialist rhetoric in some 
cases. ractallsed perceptions of social relations. In the case of the PAC this apparently 
all-encompasstng approach. as articulated by Sobukwe, has not translated into 
conslstent organlsaUonal practice or discourse. 
Rac.lallsaUon 0CCUl'8 on the basts of the slgn1ftcation of physical characteristics. Th1s Is 
very dlfI'erent from the basis of ethnlcity. As diverse ethnic groups can exist within 
nations. 80 ethnic groups can exist Within the racial1sed collecUVity. It is probable that 
all members of an ethnic group wlll belong to a slngle raclal1sed soclal unit. but this is 
not the essence. Whlle all members of the 'Zulu nation' are black or African. for 
example (although symboUc exceptions have been made), the Afrikaner etbnlc group 
has come under frequent assault through the need to define the positlon of coloured 
people who in all eseentlal aspects. except that of 'race', quaUfy for incluslon. It can be 
expected that the plastic and elastic boundaries of AfrIkanerdom wW be stretched 
under the new moblllstng strategtes of the National Party where the Afrikaans 
language has already come to playa central role in the mobWsation of a constituency 
since 1990. 
On the other hand a clearly raclallsed alternative AfrIkaner ldentity (such as that of 
'Boerenaste') wtll contract and r1gtdlfy the boundaries. as it had for much of the past 
of this ethnic group. For example. it was unambiguously stated in the publication 
commemorating the completion of the then major symbol of ethnic mobWsation, the 
Voortrekker Monument. that this 'volle' was 'blank' (white) (not 'European' but 
'white'). Summarlstng the content of messages sent to the monument from all over 
South Africa it was stated: 
Die handhawtng van 'n blanke beskawlng in Sutd-Pifrika. tot in die 
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verste toekoms Is blykens die boodskappe 'n sterk gekoesterde en 
bewuste tdeaal by die volk. •. Die volk beskou sy blankhetd as een 
van sy trotsste klelnode, een van die mees ttperende erjentsse wat 
oor die grootste beproewtnge getrtomjeer het (According to the 
messages the maintenance of a wh1te c1villsation In South Africa Into 
a distant future is a strongly held and conscious ideal with the volk. .. 
The volk views its wh1teness as one of its most precious treasures, 
one of the most 1¥Picallegac1es that triumphed over the greatest 
tribulations) (Botha. 1952:217). 
The 'Indian commWllty', discussed briefly above, reflects the ractaltsatiDn of social 
relations In South Africa and not the existence of an 'Indian' ethnic group. That 
process was both the mirror lInage of the rac1alisation of exploitation by colonial and 
white-ruled South Africa. and also necessary to provide a wider oppositional (to 
apartheid) consUtuency than that allowed if ethnic (Including centrally the issues of 
rellg10n and language) and class divisions were to have shaped organisational strategy. 
Whlle attempts continue to be made to raciallse th1s population, by several political 
parties, Including the NP and the ANC, who address their appeals to 'the Indian 
commWllty', Intense reUglous antagonism came to the fore between Muslims and 
Hindus durtng 1995 Within KwaZulu-Natal. 
Ethulclty and .,e 
If the political f~ is characterised (permeated) by speclftc gender relauons, then it 
is also shaped by noUons of age and a hierarchy of generations. This is an extremely 
under-reaearched area Within ethnic studies (llWly antbropologtcal studies could, 
however, be examined to extract. the Wider implications of their flndings). Only a few 
conunen~. Wlll be made at th1s point. With an illustration In the next chapter. Here, as 
elsewhere In this study, the dlst1nction between the moblllsing cllscourse around 
ethnlclt;y and the actual 'every-day life' stories of ethnic Identit;y has to be kept In mlnd. 
The former may well reflect. but also shape or present an 'Ideal 1¥J>e' of the 
relationship between generations, the status of the old or the young. Furthermore, the 
position attributed to old and young men and women Is not the same - age is gendered. 
In his study of Tsonga-speakers on the then Transvaallowveld, Stadler noted the 
'cultural construction of age categories .•. whlle ageing Is a blologtcal process, age 
categories are not reduc1ble to physiology' (1994:1). He wrote that '(a)ge categories are 
elaborated upon and acquire meantng In terms of cultural ~owledge', and that these 
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categories display an apparent inapproprlateness within contemporary localllfe. The 
people whom he studied 
cast current events and experiences into a traditional mould. 
The use of tradition in deftnlng age stages can be seen as a 
conservative response to change which threatens to transform 
generational relations (l994:2). 
Stadler's case study Wustrates the ruptures that are already present. 
If women are frequently presented within the discourses of nationalism and ethnicit¥ 
as 'mothers of the nationt then ch1ldren occupy an ambtguous position between being 
interpellated as givers of respect to their elders, and simultaneously as being at the 
forefront of change and ensurtng that goals are achieved or protected. Old people also 
occupy spec1ftc positions within different ethnic groups. 
Ken Blakemore and Margaret Bonehamts (1994) book deals with 'age, race and 
ethnict1;y' among tmm1want black communities In Britain. They noted, for example, 
that age differences have meant different l1fe experiences - 'one generation'. or cohortts 
experience of hiatory and of old age wID be different from that of succeed1ng 
generations' (1994:57). Wblle older people from the Carrtbean islands have only 
recently come to idenUfy with the term "West Indian' (haVing thought of themselves 
rather as "Barbadian', 'JamaIcan', etc, an 'island identi1;y'). younger 1mmlgrants have 
had different experiences ('independence from colOnial rule .... the west Indtan 
Federation ( ••• ) and the development of Black Consciousness and "black" identit¥ •. :): 
So while an ·ethnic group'(the inverted commas indicating awareness 
of a more complex notion of ethnic group used by the authors) such 
as 'Afro-Can1bean' may be deftned as one which shares a common 
past or h1story. it Is important to remember that the pclst has 
dltTerent meantngsfor dllferent age groups (Blakemore and 
Boneham, 1994:57, emphasis added). 
This Is a spec1flc case of 1mmlgrant people, but the case holds for other siuations as 
well. We could examine each of the aspects in the deftn1tion of ethnictt¥ proposed in 
the previous chapter to Wustrate the generationally-spec1ftc experience of them -
language, dress. 'the past', perceptions of other groups, and so on. 
Campbell ( 1992), in her study of soctalidentit¥ construction and action amongst 
Zulu-speaking townsh1p youths, provides an insight into the complexlt¥ of 
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Inter-generational relations. For example, the notion of 'respect' (ukuhlontpha) plays a 
large role with1n the ethnlc mobilisation employed by lnkatha. as essential to Zuluness 
(see chapter four). Campbell, however, fOWld that whlle 'respectful inter-generational 
relations', centred around the famUy, did 
at a superflc1allevel ... appear to be the central guide of youth's 
behaViour •.. closer examination of the interv1ew materlal revealed 
evidence of a range of subtle challenges ...• with alternative 
posslbWties being proVided by a range of competing group 
membershlps ••. (1992:276). 
Her intervlews show convoluted adaptations of the notion of respect and jusUftcations 
for contradictory behaViour. In one case a young man said that 
the current polltical contllct in the townshlp made It necessary to be 
selectlve regarding those adults one would obey. He said It would go 
agalnst hls polltical prlnclples to treat an Inkatha member with 
respect ( 1992:279). 
Conclusion 
It ls not ~le to talk of the 'age dimension' of ethnlclt¥ Un the same way that It ls 
not possible to speak of the 'gender aspect of ethnlc1t¥). Ethnlc Identities are 
inextricably Informed by perceptions and soclal practices shaped by age, as they are 
by gender. Identities are possible to label, and are frequently 80 labelled by the 
'holders', but they have to be theorlsed and investJgated as articulated composltes that 
are gendered, 'aged', 'classed', etc. Campbell (1992:315) writes that,'wblle It ls 
poeslble to Isolate gender from race and class for analyUcal purpoSes, in the "real 
world" these three sets of power relations are inextricably Intertwlned'. Slmllarly 
Pettman notes that "Gender ls coDSUtuted In and through rac1al and cultural 
c:Wrerence, and race and cultural c::Uft'erence are experienced in gendered form' 
(1992:15). 
Further work needs to be undertaken on the articulation of ethnic, gender, class, 
generational and rac1allsed Identities. We have to understand these processes lfwe are 
to formulate the correct strateg1es to make the noble and essential goals of a 
democratic South AfrIca realisable, a soclet¥ that c1alms that It ls constructtng a 
'multi-cultural (but non-'rac1al') nation'. More studies are required to understand the 
speclflc1ues of the soc1al construcUon of these articulated IdenUties - studies that wtll 
be essentiallf we are to reconstruct them. or at least allow the condiUons for change. 
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These studies have. in addition. to take account of the two dimensions of ethnic 
IdentlUes. namely that of soc1alldentlty in everyday Ufe. and ethnic idenUUes 
mobilised. The articulations are different Within each domain. and have to be 
approached c:Ufferently: the former. for example. through exam1n1ng the many facets of 
socialisation (the creation of the stories that guide us through everyday Ufe) and the 
interpellaUoDB of mobilisation (that 'petr1fles' social relations With a clarity that they 





On 1 May 1986 the Inkatha movement launched a pro-capitalist trade union amid 
great media fanfare. The next day newspapers reported that a poll conducted by the 
Unlversl~ of South Africa in 1985, ten years after Inkatha had been formed, bad 
. shown that Pretoria businessmen preferred chief Mangosuthu Gatsba Buthelezl to 
president PW .Botha as leader. Clearly Inkatha's message was reachlng one oHts most 
coveted audiences. Buthelez1 bad not always been receiVed so well, even by this 
obViously conservat1ve audience, but through perSistent effort he had managed to 
present a picture of blmself as a man offering a commodl~ that is increastngly valued 
by certain interests· it Is not for nothing that he bad described himself as a politician 
of the 'marketplace'. 
In the View of some very lnflUeDtial reformers, in the mld·1980s, the Inkatha 
movement had an essent1al role to play in a chang1ng South Africa. This was partly 
due to the way in which chlef Buthelez1 had made hlmself and his followers avallable 
(with an added perception ofbelng indispensable) to conservatiVe reformers. Whereas 
ten years before Buthelezl and the National Cultural Liberation Movement. Inkatba. 
were perceiVed to be part of the radlcal opposition to apartheid and his approaches 
for partlclpation were scorned, by the mld·I980s the same overtures. in the context of 
other contextual changes, had gained a level of acceptance by the state and even by 
business that would bave been unthinkable in the mld·1970s. It Is not that Buthelez1's 
position had changed much, but that under pressure there were more takers for wbat 
he had to offer. 
The same Afrikaans-language newspapers that crlt1cized Buthelez1 as recently as 1983 
when he opposed the new constitution now, two years later, adVised that reform was 
all but lmpossible without his participation. The state that castigated and threatened 
him, and repeatedly attempted to undermine his posIt1on in the bantustan It had 
created under the apartheid Vision of a fragmented South Africa. now nodded with 
approval at his local endeavours to ensure stablll~ and profttablll~, and tentaUvely 
offered him a nattonal role. Probably the USA government and large-scale economlc 
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interests in South Africa had been most consistent in their support for Buthelezl and 
his acUons over the years. especially over the decade after the formaUon of lnkatha. 
They. and the media they control or lnfluence. had gtven both the man and the 
poslUon that he holds greater coverage than any other opposlUon pol1Uclan. The 
~te's direct Involvement in aiding lnkatha's poUUcalln1UaUves (such as funding for 
the Inkatha-ln1uated Unlted Workers Union of SA. formed In 1986 to oppose the 
Congress of Trade Unlons of SA. Itself formed In 1985). and collaborating With 
lnkatha structmes In violence on the ground. can be dated back to thls Urne. 
However. the same pressures that brought what Buthelezl had to offer Into llne With 
what a number of conservaUve Interests now felt they needed we~ also rapidly 
making those offerings. those poUUcal commodlUes. Inadequate to the Urnes. It was 
the fear that they may already be obsolescent that had the business conununlty 
scurrylng to Lusaka to confer With the African Natlonal Congress. whose Urne was 
then perceptibly closer than at any other tlme In the 75 years of Its existence to 
re-establlsh Itself to a poslUon ofpre-emlnence In lntluenctng change In the country. 
Whlle Buthelezi was not Irrelevant to that change. he was probably being forced to 
define his poslUon too clearly too soon. to reveal too many of the comproml8es he had 
had to make. to assoc1ate With the wrong Interests (especlally Withln the state 'securlty' 
forces). when pol1Ucal survlval then depended on lack of clarlty. on greater ambIgUIty 
and on fewer open compromlses. the pollUes of closed door diplomacy and then the 
pol1Ucs of consoclaUonal negoUations during the 19908. 
Broadly speaking. Buthelezl and Inkatha then stood for a 'mulU-raclar capltallsm 
untainted by apartheid; for the pollUcs of non-violence towards the central state. and 
hence for negoUations With the current holders of power; for 'constttuency pol1Ucs·. 
which Increaslngly had come to mean less democraUc representation of Interests and 
more control over members (an Indlspensable element In the pol1Ucs of 
consoclaUonallsm that Buthelez1 engaged In). The leader and his movement had come 
to represent 'stab1l1ty'. which in the context of mass lnsWTeCUon had come to mean 
taking acUon against the many other organlsatlons of resistance. and compromlstng 
on Its own stated previous poslUon. both In terms of the nature of the vote (away from 
demands for universal franchlse) and of the structure of a future South AfrIca (away 
from a unltary state). It was clear that It Is more In the deta1l than In the prlnclples 
that the apparent gulf between Buthelez1 and the state then lay. the NaUonal Party 
Itself trying to find ways of lessening the damage of open and all-Inclusive negouauons 
. that were to follow on acknowledgements that apartheid had falled. 
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In the political 'marketplace' there are many competitors offering their ideas about 
change and attempting to gather a folloWing to boost the relevance of their wares. The 
big prize at the time was acceptance within the 'reform' process, a future place in a 
South AfriCa that would not have been too radically altered. Those who would be 
indispensable then, It was thought. largely depended on the kind of future that could 
be shaped through reluctant and piecemeal concessions. Outside the 'marketplace' in 
the mld-1980s were the organisations carving a new South Afrlca through struggle 
eungovernabwtY and 'armed struggle'), largely rejecting the new facades that st1l1 
rested ftrmlyon the old foundations (SARS (ed), 1983). 
There were competing notions of what the struggle for transformation in South Afrlca 
was about. To struggle for the vague consutuency, 'the people'. defined simply by their 
common (If variable) experlence of domlnation. at that stage in South Africa's history 
was not as simple as It had been ten years before. when Inkatha was formed. Even 
when popullst mobWzatlon succeeded Its hold was tenuous (as It is in the 199(8). 
open to alternative vlews of what holds people together and what sets them apart. and 
of what post-apartheid South Afrlca would look like. The spec1flc role of the working 
class could not be unprobl~cally collapsed into populist mobWzaUon. Buthelezl's 
popullsm. clearly class-speclflc. was the populism of the dominant classes (albeit 
wtth1n the black population commonly discrlmlnated against) demanding a reordering 
of the aWances of capltal1sm rather than a popuUsm directed agatnst capltal1sm Itself 
(on the class nature of populism. see Laclau. 1977; on Inkatha and populism. see 
Mare. 1978. 1984). 
The Inkatha movement. inextrlcably Ued as It was to the bantustan polley and the 
structures created under that polley. was subjected to the same buffetlng and erosion 
by mass revolt that bad been directed at the central organs and pollcles of ractst and 
cap.1tal1st South Africa. This clarlfled many aspects of the movement. exposing what 
bad been hldden. conflrmlng what some bad argued and suspected. Inkatba had also 
bad to enter into new aIllances as old ones fell away· the tlckleneas of opportunlst 
politics bas never made for long-term political friendships. For some supporters 
Inkatha offered the last hope for a peaceful. negotiated settlement. a settlement that 
would be based on acceptance of group rights. For the state. at least after 1986 and 
unt1l 1990. It seemed to be the most hopeful partner in the tlrst tentative steps beyond 
or away from the bantustan poliey. steps aimed at brtngtng AfrIcan people into the 
central power structure whlle malntalnlng a poliey based on 'power-sharing" between 
'groups' - a plurall~ of minorlties. For mllllons nationally Inkatha was a sellout 
organisation. For hundreds of thousands of Its members Inkatha. llke any popul1st 
organisation. represented many options - they may belong to the same organisation. 
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but they had not all Joined for the same reasons; the interpe1lations of mobUlsatlon 
drew responses dependlng on many factors. but the most Important. the articulating .. 
principle. was an appeal to 'Zulus' to stand together. 
WhUe the major focus of this study is on the period 1975 to 1986. the period during 
which Inkatha was formed. struggled to estabUsh itself and to counter central state 
strategy. and had to change from a national goal (at least in part) to regional 
consoUdation. mention wUl also be made of continuities and change. In December 
1990 the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement changed its name to the 
Inkatha Freedom party (lFP). as well as its structures and the quallflcations for 
membership. to attempt to aga1n enter national poUtics (see Survey. 1991192:32ftl. 
Section three of this chapter wUlinclude a brief overview of the first five years of the 
19908. 
At the end of the decade of the 19808. with the unbanntng of the African National 
Congress and other organisations. polltical relations in South Africa were Irrevocably 
altered. However. the increasing desirability of Inkatha (now the IFP) to conservative 
forces had moved It into strategic a1Ilances with. and tnto slmllar poUtical space as 
poUtical actors to the right of the National Party. The 'unholy alllanoe' that preceded 
the electtons between these rlght-wtng organisations. such as the ConservatiVe Party 
and the Clskel and BophuthaTswana bantustan governments and governtng parties. 
was flrst known in 1992 as the Concerned South African Group (COSAG) and then 
the Freedom Alliance (see Harber and Ludman (eels). 1994:326). 
Of central Importance to understanding the path along which Inkatha leaders have 
steered the organisation is the dlstlnct10n that is made within the organtsation 
between regional and nationaltnvolvement and aspirations. This was as true during 
the 19708 and the 19808 as It is now in the 1990s. This dlstlnction can take many 
forms (nOt all of them compatible and not conslstent over ume). such as that between 
·Zulu· on the one band. and ·African' on the other. or between ·ethnic group· and 
·South African nation" ·KwaZulU/KwaZulu-Nata1/Zulu kingdom' and ·South Mrtca'. 
Chief Buthelezl expressed It like this tn 1976: 
We must accept regional poUtics as a reality which existed long before 
we were conquered. The danger comes only when some people allow 
themselves to be bUDded by reglonaltnvolvement to the exclusion of 
any particlpation tn the cause of all Blacks .•• (l)t is so much 
poppycock ••• for people to lmply that. being tnvolved tn regional 
poUtics. one Is neoessarlly undermlnlng Black unity. The people in 
these Reserve areas have to exist and they should be helped by us. 
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and we by them, In our attempts to eke out -an existence, even within 
our dreary circumstances. 
This means that we have to face the fact that we have day-to-day 
goals, as we have to live for 365 days each year and every year. On the 
other hand, we must have long-term goals which are In the lnterests 
of our common Black struggle In the whole of South Africa. I have 
never been confused about the line between these two phases of 
our Black struggle (KlAD 8, 1976:85-86, emphasis added). 
This lmportant statement draws attenUon to the tension between regtonalinvolvement 
(which Buthelezi equates In the excerpt with 'short-term day-to-day goals'), and 
national aspirations ('long-term goals'). This tension has, over the years, brought 
about many apparent amblgUlUes In the role that Inkatha and Buthelezi have played 
Within South African politics, and has consciously been used to foster confusion. 
While Buthelezi claimed never to have been confused about the disUDction he drew, 
this study shows that the nature of his lnvolvement In regtonal politics, because It was 
ethnlc politics, Irrevocably tainted his clalm to be involved In the interests of 'our 
common Black struggle'. What the quotaUon, and the approach that it illustrates, also 
shows is the direct Unk that is drawn between space and identity, a llnk that has been 
at the centre of Inkatha's poliUcal mobilisation, as well as of claims against the central 
authority (especlally after 1986, and increasing in lntensity In the 199(8). 
This issue, of the local and the naUonal as It relates to ethnlc mobilisation, will form 
one part of the subject matter of this chapter. I wUl present a history of the lnkatha 
movement's atrategles, especially of the first decade of Its existence, strategies geared 
to organise an 'available' populaUon into a circumscrtbed version of the shared aoclal 
Identity that exlsted among Zulu-speakers, in order to provlde a context for a 
dlscusslon of the use of ethnic symbols and ethnic moblllsaUon of a regtonal 
population generally. 
Inkatha. as an integral part of apartheid's poliey of ethnlc separation, cannot be part 
of the successful transformaUon of South Africa into a new politics of diversity and of 
democracy - whether 'naUon-bulldlng" can be that policy will be discussed in chapter 
five. Neither can Buthelezi successfully hold what he claims to be a 'traditional' 
leadership role within the 'Zulu nation' and at the same time fulflll a role Within 
national politics that Is compatible with the way In which he has defined, and been 
defined lnto, ethniclty. Inkatha's history, I argue, Is the history of the dangers of 
political moblllsation of ethnic IdentiUes. The themes developed in the previous three 
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chapters are illustrated here through an investigation of the d.1scourse of mobilisatlon 
employed in the lnkatha movement. 
The region within which Buthelezl chose to wage the 'day-to-day' struggle on behalf of 
the populatlon lsJargely confined within what became the pravlnce of Natalln the 
late-nineteenth century. Unless otherwise stated 'Natal', in this chapter, refers to the 
territory within pravlnc1al boundaries, including KwaZulu (the bantustan until 1994). 
The term 'KwaZulu-Natal' (KZN) is applled to the province created through the Intertm 
Constitution under which elecUons took place in AprU 1994. Natal was one of the four 
provin~ that were created within the Union of South Africa in 1910, while KZN is 
one of nine pravlnces created through the Interim ConsUtutlon. The Union brought 
together the Boer Republlcs that had been defeated in the Anglo-Boer war at the turn 
of the century and the Colonies of the Cape and Natal. It also integrated the African, 
coloured and Indian populations without their partlc1patlon in deciding the form or 
the content of the new state. 
Natal occupied an area of some 91 355 km2, or 8.1 % of the total land area of South 
Africa. but. with 2096 of the tQtal South African populatlon resident there, it has a 
populaUon denst~ more than twice as h1gh as the natlonal average. These oftlclal 
figures for 1985 excluded the eo-called 'independent' bantustans (see, for example, 
Survey. 1985:278-83). If these territories were taken lnto account Natal would have 
accounted for an even smaller percentage of the total land area of South Africa. 
Offic1al figures are notoriously unreliable in South Africa. and past statlstlcs are 
quallfled by the polley contortions of apartheid. For example. the populatlons and the 
land area of the "independent' bantustans (the Transke1. Bophuthatswana. Venda and 
the CIake1) were excluded from natlonal statistlcs. It is. therefore. frequently necessary 
to refer to unoftlc1al counts and estlmates. The bits and pieces that made up the 
KwaZulu admlnlstratlve area totalled about 38% of the province's land area. but 
accounted for 55% of its populatlon. KwaZulu. as a polltlcaI and spatial entl~. was 
created in 1970 with the formatlon of the Zululand Territorial Authority (changed to 
the KwaZulu Leglslauve Assembly in 1972). 
Most of South Africa's Zulu-speaking populatlon is concentrated in KZN (75% of the 
natlonal total). wh11e about 90% of Africans resident in the province are 
Zulu-speaking. The remainder are mostly Xhosa-speakJng who llve in and around the 
urban areas (The Buthelez1 Commlsslon, vol I, nd:69-72). The African populatlon of 
Natal in the 1980& was about 4.7-m1ll1on (or 77% of the total populauon of the 
province). 0ftlc1al figures allocated about 8.9-mUllon to KwaZulu and all but 700 000 
of these to 'rural' KwaZulu. With the enormous and rapid movement of people into 
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'informal settlements' - shanUes. slums. squatter areas around the Durban/P1netown 
and Pletennar1tzburg 1ndustrial areas - this last figure was clearly already a vast 
underesUmate. even by the mid-1980s. HaarhotT (1985:39) argued that about 
1 ~5-m1llion AfrIcans llved 1n an urban enVironment 1n the Natal region. 65% of them 1n 
the Durban metropolltan area. 
Several processes were at work here. First. the state attempted to relocate as large a 
part of the African population as was possible to the bantustans, and to confine them 
there except for periods during which they sold their labour wlthtn 'white' South 
Africa. The bantustan land areas were legally establlshed through the 1913 and 1936 
'Land ActB', and gtven separate ethnic and pollticalldentity under the National party 
(NP) government through. for example, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 
of 1959. Control over movement from the bantustans was attempted through lnflux 
control- the 'Pass Laws' (abollshed 1n 1986). Second, there were African South 
Africans who attempted to establlsh a legal presence outside the bantustans, through 
so-called 'section 10' rlgbts. 'Section 10' of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolldation 
Act spelled out the stri~t cond1tions under which Africans may llve outside the 
bantustans (see Horrell, 1978:174: Hindson. 1987). In Natal these 'rights' were 
frequently abollshed through the admlnlstrative 1ncorporation of townships, such as 
KwaMashu, 1nto KwaZulu. Wblle the residents of these townships were then located 
within the Jurtadlctlon of KwaZulu they continued to llve wlthtn dally commuting 
cllstanoe of the lndustrial areas situated wlthln 'wblte' South Africa. The thlrd process 
was the movement of people, In defiance of the law as It stood until 1986, from the 
bantustans to itve in 'white' South Africa In order to be wlth fam1ly or to find 
employment. 
Flnally, there was the conglomeration of people Into the urban areas of Natal, but still 
within the boundaries of KwaZulu. ThIs movement had been motivated by a number 
of factors. probably the most Important of which had been, and continues to be, the 
destitution of the outlylng areas and the posslbWty (no matter how remote) of 
employment. or some other means of making money, closer to Industrial and urban 
concentrations. In Natal such movement was possible wlthout breaking the Pass Laws 
because of the proxlmlty of pieces of KwaZulu land to 1ndustrlal and urban areas. 
ThIs was In contrast to the western Cape, where squatter camps such as Crossroads 
were hundreds of kllometers from the nearest bantustans, the Clskel and the 
Transkelln the eastern Cape. The African residents of Crossroads were, therefore, 
always In contravention of lnflux control laws unless they had acquired 'section 10' 
status (see, for example, Spp, vol3, 1983: Platzky and Walker, 1985). 
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The distribution of KwaZulu's land also affected the' number of people who commuted 
to work dally, rather than migrated to industrial areas within the provtnce. Of a total 
of I 329 000 African migrant workers in ~uth Africa in 1981. 280000 (or 21%) were 
from Natal (obviously not all were migrattng to Jobs within the region). This compares 
with 384 200 commuters in Natal, or 52% of the national total of 'frontier commuters 
employed in OWhlte" areas' (Survey, 1983:138). 
The Indian population of the prOVInce, having arrived prtmarlly as indentured labour 
for the tledg11ng sugar industry in the 1860s, today comprlses about II % of N.atal's 
population. This makes them the second largest 'population group', followed by whites 
( 10%) and coloureds (1.5%). Both whites and Indians often provided the raciallsed, 
and class, 'other' in Zulu ethnic mobUlsation. 
Immediately after Its annexation by the Brltish in the mld-n1neteenth century, Natal 
lacked a viable base on which a settler economy could be bullt. and was starved of 
financial resources. This changed with the planting of sugar. The first publlc sale of 
the crop occurred in 1856, and by the end of the decade sugar was being exported to 
the Cape colony. It was also at thls time (1860) that the labour needs of the sugar 
growers forced them to look beyond the colony and to lmport indentured labour from 
India (for further discussion see below). 
Both sugar and wattle. Natal's other major agricultural resource, were establlshed and 
maintained over the years as extremely labour-repressiVe actlvitles, with poverty wages 
and poor llvtng conditlons. This and the fact of foreign ownership made both 
industries the subject of critical enqulrles into wages and working conditlons durtng 
the 19708 and early-I98Os. 
Afrlcan economic actlvi~ during the n1neteenth century was not solely agriculturally 
baaed. As Ethertngton commented: 
By the time of the Anglo-Zulu war. Afrlcan Chrlstlan communltles had 
not only establlshed a tlourlshlng peasant economy. but had also 
embarked upon entrepreneurlal capitalist ventures on a slgnlftcant 
scale. 
He suggested that measures taken by white settlers to curb the economic activities of 
Afrlcans through legislation 
were not so much designed to safeguard WhItes aga1nst potentlal 
Black competltlon. but aimed rather to undo progress whlch had 
already been made. Moreover, it Is at least arguable that the rlse of 
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political activism and rel1g1ous separatism at the end of the 
nlneteenth century owed more to the loss of valued economic 
opportunitles than to a newly awakened desire to compete on equal 
tenns In the dominant society (1985:265). 
Defence or promotion of commerclallnterests by a petty bourgeoisle clalm1ng a 'Zulu 
identity' came to the fore both In the 19205 and the 19705 around 'Zulu' political 
movements - both called Inkatha. Agricultural actlvity became more and more dlftlcult 
after the 1913 Land Act had frozen the acquisition ofland by Africans. During the 
tlme of the first Inkata it was largely around agricultural activity. based on mission 
land and freehold farms. that the petty bourgeoisie consoUdated .~d sought to 
safeguard their -valued economic opportunities'. In the 19705. trading and services 
were the areas of most rapid expansion, largely through the Involvement of the state's 
Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). wblch, by the 19905. became the KwaZulu 
FInance and Investment Corporation (the KFC). under the control of the domlnant 
party Within the bantustan. 
In the 19208 the worries and the woes of the Afrlcan petty bourgeoisie were 
perlpherallsed Within the growth of colonial an seWer capitalism In the regton 
(except when they were needed as aWes In labour recruitment for larger concerns). 
The centre of the economy was provided by the sugar Industry and the concerns that 
grew up around It (Sltaa et aI. 1984:6). Tb1s made for a regtonally-apeclftc economy. 
even If not an Independent economy (see Marks. 1986: 11). until the central state 
poUey to at1mulate a national capltal1sm started having Its effects on Natal. After 1910. 
when the Union of South Afrlca came Into being. 'the Natal bourgeolsle became part of 
a natlonal bourgeolsle' (Marks. 1986:13). This was not a sudden event but a process. 
and for some Ume there was Inter-capltal1st contl1ct over the flow of labour from the 
atrocious conditions of the sugar. wattle. and coallndustr1es In the province to the 
sUgbtly better conditlons of the Transvaal mines. 
The proceaa of Incorporatlon through ownership and control took rapid atrldes 
durtng the decades starttng from the 19605. Sltas et al discussed 'some of the llnkages 
which ultlmately subordinate a large proportlon of Natal's Industry to the control of 
large national or foreign corporations' (1984:22). They found that With concentratlon 
and centrallzatlon of ownership and control of capital In South Africa generally. 
employment was stabll1zed, but th1s stablllty appUed to a smaller and smaller 
~roportlon of the work force. Manufacturing output Increased durtng the 1960s by 
8.5% whlle employment In this sector grew by 5.6%. Durtng the 19705 output grew by 
5.4% and employment by a mere 2.8% (figures quoted Sitas et ai, 1984:24). 
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Natal had not been exempt from this trend that had thrown about 25% of South 
Africa's workforce (or 3-m1lllon people) out of work by the 19808 (Thomas, 1986). 
Sltas et al argued that the malntenance of a relatively stable work force, linked to sk1l1 
and length of employment. had occurred In Natal as well, with the concomitant 
unemployment on a fairly permanent basts especially of yotmg entrants to the Job 
market and people far removed from urban centres (1984:28: 48: also Mare, 1982). 
Much productiVe act1V1ty remains regtonally tied, though It 15 no longer corr: t to talk 
of a regtonally speclflc capltal1sm. Access to the port. labour (at reasonab cost. with 
the approprlate skllls, and preferably unorganlsed), water, decentr Uon subsidies, 
favourable cl1mat1c conditions, etc, all serve to favour one place against another for 
accumulation purposes. As Harvey noted: 
The free flow of capital across the surface of the globe, for example, 
places strong emphasis upon the particular quallties of the spaces to 
which that capital might be attracted. The shrinkage of space that 
brtngs diverse communities across the globe into competition with 
each other lmpUes locaUzed competitive strat.egtes and a he1gbtened 
aenae of awareness of what makes a place special and gives It a 
competitive advantage ( 1992:271 ). 
Probably the most lmportant aspect of reg10nal preference during the perlod of 
Inkatha'. growth (the 19708 and 198(8), at present and in the foreseeable future, Is 
that of stabWty, or the lack of It. It is in this context that the 'regtonal options' such as 
the KwaZulu/Natal 'Indaba' became central, and poUtical and economic alllances with 
African economic interests became essential to a nationally-controlled but 
reg1onally-bued large-scale capltaUsm and to Its poUtical representatives (on the Natal 
economy, also flee Stanwlx. 1983). 
The poUey of 'separate development' (as the so-called 'positive aspects' of apartheid 
came to be called) attempted to g}ve dJgnl~ to the idea that South Afrlca 18 baslcally 
compoaed of 'First' and 'Third World' components. rather than the more dlrectly 
racist categorization of backward Afrlcan and advanced white segments of the 
population and of the economy. The termlnology was used to 'explaln' and JusUfy the 
stark contrasts (tn Uvlng standards, educational and soclal fac1l1ties. incomes, health, 
etc) between white society and the Afrlcan population. The Internal 'Third World' was 
then gtven convenient geographic form through the enforced separation of Africans 
lnto the bantustans. Wlth1n this duallsm everybody is 'developing' but each had 
sta.rted from a dlfJerent point and hence advances at dlfI'erent rates. At some distant 
future polnt the exlSUDg lnequallties wlll, 80 the argument goes. be overcome. Unt1l 
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then the slogan is 'paUence' (for a discussion of the ideological funcUon of the noUon 
of "worlds'. see Sharp. 1988). 
That was, and in many circles sUllls, the dominant argument in the KwaZulu-Natal 
region, except that the clear geographic dlstincUon does not exist to the same extent as 
elsewhere in South AfrIca and on certain levels, even If only admlnlstraUvely, an 
interrelaUonship between the 'racial groups' had to be acknowledged. ArUflc1al 
separatton.it was argued in the region, leads to instabWty. It was not by chance that 
the report of the Buthelezl Commission in 1982 was entitled The RequlrementsJor 
StabUUy and Development in KwaZulu and Natal. taking the many levels of 
interdependence between bantustan and province and their populattons and economic 
activlty as a starting point. The same demands for stabWty and acknowledgement of 
the interwoven character of the socia-economy of Nata! revived interest in the 
'KwaZulu/Natal Option' at varlous stages during the 19708 and 19808. as it is dotng In 
the 19908. At present. however. the advantages. for capital. of strong and competing 
regions. are (In KZN) often outweighed by the poUUcallnstabWty that has 
accompanied the ftgbt for federaUsm: whlle the SA Chamber of Buslness (Sacob) 
called for greater regional powers (Mercury. 6 Apr 95). local business leaders warned 
against. the manner and extent of the powers demanded by the IFP (see. for example. 
Mercury. 31 May 95; 18 Jul95). 
The inter-relationship that was stressed during the 19808 was. however. not only on 
the level of employment. residence, infrastructure. services. recreational facWties. etc; 
another element was that the wealth that had been channelled into white hands 
ol1glnated through. the poverty of the black. especially the African. population. 
Nattrass wrote (1985:50) that 
South AfrIca eI\Ioys the somewhat dubious distinction of having one 
of the most unequal dlstrlbutions of income in the world. Not only la 
.~me unequally dlstrlbuted here. but the lnequaUty also has a racial 
overlay and is partnered by the continuance of slgnlftcant poverty. 
She compared the national picture With that of Natal. and concluded: 
Whllst. KwaZulu/Natal region has a different demographic. ethnic and 
economic structure from that of the rest of the RepubUc. these 
dlfferences have not had a marked lmpact on elther the lncome 
dlstrlbuuon or the Ufestyles in the regton. White standards of Uvlng in 
this area are. on average. Ove tlmes better than those of the Indian 
and Coloured communities and nearly 12 tlmes greater than those of 
. the Black regtons. and wlthln the Black communlty there Is a gap 
emerging between urban and rurall1festyles. 
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The same gross lnequal11¥ was noted in the Carnegie Enquiry into poverty. as was the 
marked discrepancy between urban and rural populations (see WUson and Ramphele. 
1989:23-26. chapter 11). 
In 1976. 56% of the economically active population of KwaZulu was employed outside 
the bantustan (SPP. vol 4. 1983:4). This meant that in 1¥Plcal KwaZulu rural areas 
'between 70 and 80 per cent of famllles have members away as mlgrant workers' 
(Nattrass. 1985:55). More than a thlrd of the population of KwaZulu was landless and 
where land was available the resources to use It productively were not available. It Is 
therefore no wonder that mlgrant remittances far exceeded KwaZulu's internal 
revenue creation. Nattrass referred to a study of three districts that showed that these 
remittances. even though a small percentage of the mlgrants' actual incomes. about 
17%. st1ll made up some 75% of total household incomes (1985:55). Apart from 
employment wtthln the KwaZulu admlnlstraUon services (as pubUc servants. nurses. 
labourers in the department of works. teachers. etc). there were few jobs. In 1981 a 
mere 6 122 people were employed in industrlal undertakings in the bantustans 
themselves. All except 700 of these jobs were at the Islthebe industrlal 'growth point' 
on the Thukela rtver. Some SO 000 new job-seekers .entered the job market in the 
region every year (SPP. vol 4. 1983:4). By 1984 the number of employeeS atIslthebe 
bad increased to 11 000. whlle another 1 200 people found work at Ezakhenl. also 
within KwaZulu. 'Other things belng equal'. said Corporation for EconomiC 
Development cbalr Professor SP du Tolt VllJoen in 1977 at Islthebe. KwaZulu could 
become the 'Ruhr of South AfrIca' (Ftnancfal Mall. speclal report on KwaZulu. 11 May 
79). But of course 'other things. are not equal in South AfrIca. and one of those 
1nequalltles was and remains the totally skewed power relations that have exl8ted for 
80 many years. both between "races'" classes. wlth black women In rural areas by far 
the worst off (see. for example. Wllson and Ramphele. 1989). 
KwaZulu. for which chief Mangosuthu Buthelezl took responslbW1¥ and in which he 
hoped to achleve some measure of development. could not ever hope to feed its 
populatlon. provlde them with Jobs. and stgn11lcantly improve the general standard of 
llvlng measured in terms of basic facillUes.infant mortal11¥. educaUon levels. 
employment. SOClal and health services. etc. Under the grossly uneven structural 
power relatlonsblps that pertained under apartheid (see GWomee and Schlemmer 
(eds), 1985; Wllson and Ramphele. 1989). and even in some solutlons for the future. 
thls lnequall1¥ forms part of the whole. 
In fact KwaZulu was only a diStinct region in that it was artlflc1ally maintained as 
such. reinforced through participation of some Africans In that maintenance. even If 
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such parUc1paUon was hedged with quallflcaUons. The effect was that Its existence. as 
with the other bantustans. served to deflect responslbWty from the central state and 
capital In South Africa on to the KwaZulu authority and on to the people who lived. 
·and mostly conUDue to live there (the 'Third World' component). In 1986 parllament 
was told that ·South Africa's Thlrd World component was too large for (the) housing 
goals' that would have to be met if lnflux control was truly scrapped. tnstead ofbelng 
replaced With the euphemlsUcally named 'orderly urbanlzaUon strategy' (NaUonal 
party Member of Parliament. quoted DaUy News. 6 Feb 86). 
StanWlx (1983:55) noted that the populaUon In Natal was then poorer than In South 
Mrlca as a whole (probably In large measure due to the relaUvely small wblte 
populaUon in the provlnce. wblch served elsewhere to push up the average Income)! . 
He also noted that In Natal "there are severe lnequallUes between the KwaZulu 
component and the rest of the region as well as marked dlfferences in their 
compoalUon of economic acUvl1;y'. However. he warned that this did not prove the 
'existence of two clearly dlfferenU&ted sub-regtons ••. (but rather these factors] reflect 
much more the integraUon of these components and the arbitrary (in economlc terms) 
nature of the KwaZulu boundaries' (1983:55). 
A glance at the apartheid map shows the fragmented nature of KwaZulu, and alao 
casta a great deal of doubt on Buthelez1's contenUon that his inVolvement in KwaZulu 
wu partly JuaUfted by the need for regional development (that region being KwaZulu). 
KwaZulu existed as a separate enUty In terms of admlntstraUon and legtalaUve 
control, and of Ideology (to JuaUfy the vast inequallUes between the 'races'), but 
geograpblcally and economlcally there was little toJusUfy It. However, in the rest of 
this thesis It Will be shawn how the Involvement of Buthelezl and his supporters was 
based much more on the potenUal for pollUcal moblllsaUon (or that that was the only 
really successful project) than on the development needs of the KwaZulu bantustan. 
The rest of this chapter falls Into three main secUons. First. to provide backf10und on 
the formatlon of Inkatha. Here I deal With the historical material Without whlch It Is 
lmpoulble to understand the dynamics that allowed such a movement to arlse and to 
grow to the promlnence It has achleved. The hlstory of dlsunctly AfrIcan pollUcs In 
Natal from 1948, the year in which the Natlonal Party (NP) came to power, Is 
discussed. The first legtslatlon In the process of fragmentatlon of the African 
populatlon that was to lead to the 'Independence' of the Transkei 25 years later was 
the Bantu Authoritles Act of 1951. Thls Act reaftlrmed and redefined the role of cblefs 
and the 'tribe' as the base of an admlnlstratlve pyramid. The bantustan Iegl81aUve 
assemblies were to become the peaks of these pyramids. It was intO this 
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aparthetd-aftlnned structure. and not (as he was to maintain later) simply Into some 
IdeaUzed noUon of tradlUonal authority. that chief Buthelez1 stepped In the 
early-1950s. to take up his poslUon as chief of the Buthelezl clan. 
In 1959 the PromoUon of Bantu Self-Government Act made provision for the ulUmate 
independence of the bantustans. and gave greater clarity to the other two layers within 
each etbnlc pyramid. namely the regional authoriUes and territorial authoriUes (tribal 
authoriUes had already been provlded for since 1951). The regional authoriUes were 
to supply the majority of members of the bantustan legislaUve assembUes • their 
'parliaments'. Th1s meant that chiefs always outnumbered elected members in these 
bodies. The terrltorlal authoriUes became the leglslaUve assembUes: for example. the 
Zulu Territorlal Authority (ZTA). formed In 1970. became In 1972 the KwaZulu 
LeglslaUve Assembly (KLA). Chief Buthelez1. although reJecUng the state-envlsaged 
ftnal goal of 'Independence' and having resisted the estabUshment of tribal authorlUes 
for a whlle during the 1960s. became head of the ZTA In 1970 and remained in 
command of the KLA unUllt was disbanded with the elecUons In AprU 1994. 
The next eect10n deals with the formaUon (or re-formaUon) of the Inkatha movement 
In 1975 and With the structures of the organtsaUon. The process of reformaUon. and 
the earUer orlg1ns of a specJ1lca1ly Zulu organtsaUon In the Inkata of the 19208 of 
which Klng Solomon was the patron. is exam1ned: whUe the consUtuUon and 
consUtuUonal changes that have taken place. the Women's and Youth Brtgades of 
Inkatba. and membershlp and methods of recrultment. are discussed to the extent 
that It gtves conteKt to the focus of the thesls. namely an examlnaUon of etbnlc soclal 
IdenUty mob1llsect 
The 1ut eect10n gives content to the prevtous chapters by examining the Inkatha 
movement 'in action" as the orpntsaUon through which such etbn1c moblllsaUOIl took 
place. In It I dlscuss the early and Increaslng Involvement of Inkatha In direct 
economlc enterprises. albeit largely through development corporaUons and 
white-owDed capital. and spell out some of the impUcaUons of tbls Involvement for Its 
strategy of moblUslng the 'Zulu people'. 
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SECTION 1: 
THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PAST. AND 
THE PAST THAT IS AVAILABLE 
KIng Cetshwayo kaMpande •.. was my maternal great grandfather. I 
am the son of his granddaughter. Prlncess Constance Magogo SlblWe 
Matithl. NgangezlIlye kaDlouzulu. full sister to KIng Solomon 
Nkaylsbana kaDlnuzulu. and of the Senlor Prlnce Mshiyenl Arthur 
Edward. former Zulu Regent during the mlnortty of KIng Cyprtan 
Bhekuzulu Nyangavez1zWe kaSolomon. father of our present 
Monarch. His Majesty KIng ZweUth1n1 Mbongl Goodwtll kaBhekuzulu. 
I am also proud of the fact that on my father's side my famlly bas 
served the Zulu KIngdom for so many generations. and that my 
paternal great grandfather. Myamana Buthelezl was Prime M1nlster of 
the Zulu Nation during KIng Cetshwayo's retgn and also 
Commander-lo-Chief of the Zulu army. 
With these words chlef Mangosuthu Gatsba Buthelezl. then chief m1n1ster of KwaZulu. 
president of Inkatha and chalrman of the South Mrtcan Black Alllance. lald clalm to a 
speclflc etbnlc tradition withln 19808 South Mrica. He was Writing the foreword to a 
booklet on king Cetsbwayo pubUshed by the KwaZulu Monuments Councll (Laband 
and Wright. 1983). 
Buthelez1 continued with several references to the 'Zulu Nation', and placed the 
administrative capital of the KwaZulu bantustan, Ulundt. within that hlstory: 'From 
thla place of our forefathers, we are pursuing the Ideals of establlshlng a free and open 
soclety ••• ' (10 Laband and Wright. 198300). Chief Buthe1ezl was extremely aware of and 
sensltive to the histortcal tradition that underpins modern 'Zulu' Identity and gives 
legtUnlacy to his parUClpaUon 10 the poUties of the 'Zulu NaUon'. as dlstlnct from 
participation 10 the apartheld-created KwaZulu bantustan. The same 'Zulu NaUon' 
history acb1eved even greater prominence 10 the lead-up to the elections 10 1994 and 
sloce then. This awareness lB displayed 10 frequent tracings of his genealogy 10 hls 
speecbes (eg Sunday TrIbune, 6 Nov 83: Ngubane, 1976:121-2: BS, 26 Oct 76:4-6: 
BS, 7 Feb 79: 1 ). 
However, It Is not only Buthelezl's personal hlstory that bas given a measure of 
coherence to the mobUlslngverslon of ethnic IdenUty of the Zulu-speakers of Natal (a 
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point to which I wU1 return). but also the hlstory of Africans In south-eastem Africa 
since the late-elghteenth century. and especially since the colOnial occupation of Natal 
In the 1840&. It was In this period that the patterns of government. labour exploitation 
and land occupation were estabUshed that were subsequently to be gtven extreme 
"expression under apartheid. with its massive population removals. racial separation. 
polltical exclusion. labour exploitation and allocation. and concoinltant repression of 
the vast majority of the country's people (this section of the chapter relles heavlly on 
Beall. et aI. 1984. 1986: and Mare. 1982). 
In the early-n1neteenth century the strongest state yet seen In south-east Africa 
emerged under the leadership of Shaka Zulu. The formation of this state Involved 
deep-seated changes In the social and economlc structures of the' productive units that 
made up the Zulu nation. As Petres wrote (1981:8). the effect of all these changes was 
to produce 'one of the most arresting features of the Zulu state ••. its capacity to 
harness the energy of Its subjects In Its service'. ThIs. In turn. meant that the Zulu 
state was able to withstand the polltical. mllltary and. Importantly. the economic 
pressures of colonialism unUllate In the century. The exlstence of such a dlstlnct and 
relatIVely 10ng-lasUng polltical entity. as well as Its resistance to colonlallsm. has made 
available to Buthelezl. as It bad to ethnlc poUticians before him. a rich tradition of 
symbols that could be used to mobWze a regional population. 
The first penetration of the Zulu state by the forces of colontallsm was through the 1(-: 
agency of hunters. traders and missionaries. even wblle the polltical power of this I 
state was wholly unchallenged. Later. wblle the area In which the Zulu klnga 
conUnued to rule was drasUcally reduced through first Trekboer and then British 
colonial occupation of the area south of the Tugela river. trade stlll did not 
fundamentally disrupt the economlc and social organisation of the kingdom. Trade 
between Natal and Zululand In the mld-nlneteenth century was malnly (except for 
firearms) In Industrially produced goods that were already avallable In the 
precapitallst society. such as blankets. hoes and picks. even If the products from 
Europe mlgbt have been more efficient. Moreover. 
the trader gained possession of the surplus commodity already 
produced In the country (cattle or bides) and thus demanded no 
alteration to the process of production (Guy. 1982:15-16: also Bee 
Guy. 1982a). 
Zulu 80clety was. therefore. left fairly lntact under the economic pressure of merchant 
capital. 
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In colonial Natal the fact that colonialism made Its effect felt in the form of finance 
capital (or speculative capital). also served (at least in part) to allow a measure of 
resistance on the part of the African populatlon to the ravages of wage laboW'. 
Speculators bought up large areas of Natal in the hope that land prices would increase 
and profits could" be made. By 1870 the land area held by speculators reached a hlgh 
of nearly S096 of the land avallable in Natal (Ie excluding Zululand) (Chrlstopher. 
1969:351). This land was used for what was known as .K.afftr farming'. or renting out 
to Africans. much to the disgust of colonial farmers. who felt that this practice was 
deprtvtng them of laboW'. At the tlme the colonial administrative authorlff was not 
wUl1ng to" use reduction in the land area avallable to Africans to force African laboW' to 
work on commerclal farms. It does not mean that other methods. such as taxation. 
were not used. However. the local colonlal authorlties were 
sufIlc1ently aware of the realities of the sltuation to know that a frontal 
attack on the AfrIcan way of llfe. and the appropriation of their land 
was not posslble. He (Shepstone. the Secretary for NatiVe Affalrs in 
Natal) therefore supported the idea ofleavtngAfricans In possession 
of large tracts of land. but. by gradually usu,rptng poUticaI control. 
dlverttng the surplus products of laboW' created In African societies 
to support colonlal systems of government (Guy. 1979:9: also 
Ethert.ngton. 1979). 
The effects. first. of colon1al demands for cheap admtn1st:rat1on and the tnab1l1ty to 
subdue mllltar1ly the Zulu kingdom north of the Tugela river. and. second. conUDued 
access to speculators' land. reserves or locations in Natal. and the land wtthtn 
Zululand proper. allowed the Zulu state to retain its esaenUal autonomy. AfrIcans In 
Natal generaDy were able to avoid havtng to laboW' for colonists - at least on a 
large-scale - unt11 the last quarter of the ntneteenth century. It was only in 1897 that 
the Zulu kingdom \V88 lncorporated lnto the colony of Natal. and only in the 
early-twentieth century that white occupation ofland"wtth1n Zululand took place. 'later 
than almost every other case In southern Africa' (Beall. ct ai, 1986). The drect was to 
leave a legacy of unconsoUdated land occupied by Africans. and the symbols of 
conUDulff. reslstance and apparent Zulu poUtlcal and cultural coherence that could 
be used by subsequent regtonalleaders. 
The ava1lab1l1ff of land was not only important in the avoidance of wage labour for a 
longer tlme than elsewhere. but also allowed the conUDuation. albeit under perpetually 
changlng'trlbal' conditions. of'tradltional' authorlff structures - the ch1efs (amakhosl) 
and their counc1llors. The system of lndlrect rule estabUshed In the mld-ntneteenth 
century. in part as a result of demands for cheap admtnlstrauon In" a poor colony. 
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sought to transform the adm1n1strative power of the chiefs (both hereditary and 
appointed). As Justice Beaumont pointed out in 1905. 
'In Natal you are underm1nlng the authority of the Chiefs every day. 
Every act deallng with the Natives that Is passed more or less 
undermlnes the authority of the Chiefs. and. on the other band. you 
are trying to bolster them up to retaln thelr position •• : (quoted in 
Marks. 1970:41). 
The powers that were given to chiefs by the colonial authority were of a cWferent klnd 
to the powers they had had in independent pre-colonlal socleties; the effect was to 
undermine the legttimacy. If not the power. of thelr position because such absolute 
power would not have been countenanced. Furthermore • 
••• the most fundamental prop of chieftalnly power. the chiefs power 
to grant his followers land and cattle. had been undermined by the 
pressures of population within the Reserves. and the severe cattle 
diseases which had decimated African·owned cattle in the colony at 
the turn of the century (Marks. 1970:41 ~2). 
Wblle the Zulu klngdom and Arrtcans in Natal had been able to hold out against the 
demands of capltaltsm for labour and land for longer than most. when the Inevttable 
collapse came It was as overwhelmlng as elsewhere In Its lmpact on the economic. 
social and poUticall1fe of Africans. It benefited white agrtcuituraUsts. IndustrlaUsts 
and mlnlng Interests. who now had greater access to cheap labour. The tumlng point 
came with the Bambatha rebellion In 1906. the last major resistance of an African 
chief agatnst capltallst encroachment. and. In the lJgbt of the nlneteenth century 
history of the region. It was no surprise that It should have occurred In Natal. now 
including Zululand (for an excellent and full discussion of the events see Marks. 
1970). Roux wrote that the rebellion dlst1ngu1shed 
between two periods In the history of the black !nan In South Africa: 
the early period of tribal wars against the white Invaders .•. : and the 
eecond period. one of struggle for national and democratic rights 
within the framework of present·day South Africa where black and 
white Intermlngle In complex economic and poUtical relationships 
(1964:87. emphases added). 
On one level the divide was as great as pointed out by Roux. but on another the past 
Uved on In subsequent poUtical practice. The rebellion was about labour. and 
speclflcally the one pound head tax lmposed by the Natal Government In 1905 on 
every male over the age of 18. ThIs tax. It was hoped. would both·ralse revenue and 
101 
force Africans into wage employment. The rebelllon of chief Bambatha of the 
Greytown district drew the full wrath and military power of the colonial and settler 
authority because of fears it would lead to a consolidat1on of resistance under the 
Zulu king Dinuzulu. In a m~cre in which British troops used machine guns against 
the warriors. between 3000 and 4000 of Bambatha's followers and those of the chiefs 
who had Joined him were mown down in the Nkandla forests (Marks. 1986:29). 
Bambatha's head was cut off and displayed to prove that he was dead and the 
rebelllon over. In the same year. 1906. John Dube. who was to become the first 
presid~nt of the movement that was later called the African Nat10nal Congress. started 
a newspaper in Natal called nanga lase Natal (decades later Inkatha was to buy the 
newspaper that still carried that name). This was to be the new direction of polit1cal 
act1on. 
The populat1on mix of modern-day Natal was also largely established in the nineteenth 
century. The African populat1on had been scattered by the wars that accompanied the 
format1on of the state under the Zulu people led by Shaka. It was this disrupt10n that 
allowed Boers and Brit1sh to settle south of the Thukela river and then to contain 
many Africans within reserves (locations) in Natal on their return to all of their land. 
Natal never attracted large numbers of colonial settlers. for which there were several 
reasons. The threat that was cont1nually felt to be posed by the unvanqulshed Zulu 
kingdom Just to the north. the difficulty in finding crops that would provide an 
economic base for the various emlgrat10n schemes that were offered to people in 
Britain. and the greater attract10n of emigration to estabUshed colonies such as 
Canada. all served to place Natal low on the list for potential settlers. It was on the 
Cape that the Brit1sh first placed their hope for a viable colonial economy in southern 
Africa. However. the settlers who did arrive in Natal were largely of Brit1sh stock. and 
many of the Trekboere who had preceded British occupat1on and ultimate annexat10n 
in 18451eft Natal to avoid the colOnial system they had fled in the Cape colony (see. 
for example. Brookes and Webb. 1979). 
The Indian 'community' that now outnumbers the whites in the province (each 
const1tuting about 10%) owes its presence to the unwilllngness of Africans in Natal to 
work for the wages and under the conditions that appUed on the sugar plantations in 
the colony - the process of proletarian1satlon was far from over in Natal and Zululand 
at that stage. About 90% of the Indians who came to Natal arrived as indentured 
labourers from 1860. and stayed on after the complet1on of their period of indenture. 
They remained as labourers. servants. in the fishing industry. as traders. 
professionals. market gardeners. farmers and in many other occupat1ons. Today most 
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of the econom1cally active Indian population is employed in industry. fll11ng many of 
the positions of supervision between white owners and unskUled African workers. but 
also working alongside Africans in all occupations and together came to belong to 
,worker organtsatlons and poUtical organisations such as the United Democratic Front 
(UDF). the Azanlan People's Organisation (AZAPO). and the ANC. At the same Unle. as 
mentioned earUer. Indians also maintained a separate identity (or identities) through 
poUtical organlsatlons,such as the Natal Indian Congress. and were rac1al1sed into a 
'community' that was anything but homogeneous on ethnic. gender and class Unes (see 
for example, the recent contribution by Freund, 1995. and discussion above). 
In the twentieth century the discrtmlnatory practices estabUshed J.n Natal during the 
previous century were fOrmattzed. Land allocations were gtven legislative form in the 
'Land Acts' of 1913 and 1986. allocating 35% of Natal and a derisory 13% of the total 
land area of South Africa to the bulk of the national population. As the Surplus People 
Project (SPP) commented: 
By providing that only strictly defined areas would henceforth be open 
to African ownership and occupation. and by placing the power to 
detennlne and regulate these areas In the bands of the all-white 
ParUament. it put a stop to the previous very l1m1ted purchase of 
freehold land on the open market by Mrlcans and furthermore made 
Isolated Mrlcan properties that had already been bought vulnerable to 
the charge that they were misplaced in white territory (SPP. vol 4, 
1988:84). 
Years later these 'Isolated Mrlcan properties' came to be called 'black spots' by the 
National Party government. and their populations (owners and tenants) were 
subjected to forcible removal from the midst of white -owned areas which surrounded 
them. After 55 years of the removals poUey, the populations of these areas can for the 
first UDle. in a democratic South Africa. claim restitution of the land from which they 
bad been removed after 1913. 
As In the rest of South Mrlca. the clearing of 'black spots' was not the only reason 
Africans were relocated into the reserves and later the bantustans (see Mare. 1980; 
SPP, 19S5; Platzky and Walker. 1985). Whatever the reason, and they have all been 
'racially' discrtmlnatory in their conception and/or execution. the effects have been 
human misery, anger and a settlement pattern that crowded the bantustans far 
beyond any posslbWty of subSistence production. The SPP (vol 4, 1988:53) estimated 
that between 1948 (when the National Party took power) and 1982 about 750 000 
Mrlcans, Indians and coloured people had been removed In Natal and relocated 
elsewhere, With another 600 000 Africans then under threat of removal. 
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On a national scale this shift in population is 1llustrated in the table below 
I · (Roux et al. 1982): 
~--------------------------------------~ 
















If we look at Natal we find confirmation ofthls population shift. In the Nqutu area of 
KwaZulu. infamous as a relocation site. the Tomllnson Commission. investigating 
conditions under which the African areas could be made economically (agriculturally) 
viable. recommended a population of 13 000. If implemented this would have meant 
that at the tlme (the early-1950s) about 5000 famllles would have had to be moved 
from Nqutu. Most of the people there could only llve on their own produce for between 
five and seven months of the year. However. rather than decreasing. the population 
had risen to an estimated 200 000 people by 1979 (Mare. 1980:13). At that tlme '30% 
of the householders had no land at all to cultivate' (Clarke. 1978: 11). while 70% of the 
economically active population of the area were forced to migrate in search of work 
(Barker, 1974:5). This example could be multiplied countless times in KwaZulu. and 
in other bantustans. The social and economic dislntegratlon of these areas was and 
remains enormous. and is integrally related to the aftluence that characteriZes most of 
what was -White' South Africa and the manner of malntalnlng profitablllty of capi~st 
production in the country. 
Not only had a slow but steady increase in population density and land degradation 
made any but the most l1m1ted production an impossiblllty by the mid-I960s. but the 
conditions were aggravated by the abolition of the labour tenant system on white 
farms. which forced some 300 000 African people mainly into the bantustans 
(Surplus People Project. vol 4. 1983:53; Mare. 1980:8-15). In the words of the 1932 
Native Economic Commission. labour tenancy referred to 'the gtving of services for a 
certa1n period in the year to the farmer by the Native and/or his fam1ly in return for 
the right to reside on the Iwhite) farmer's land. to cultivate a portion ofland. and to 
graze his stock on the farm'. A 1972 report painted this picture of the ravages caused 
by the forced abolltlon of this system in favour of full-time wage labour by a reduced 





Scores of farm workers and their children. shunted away from the 
Weenen district lnto the bleak homeland settlements after the 
abolltion of the labour tenant system. are starving In the Mslnga 
district. .. 
Once a progressive community. these people were pastoral peasant 
farmers and each had more than 200 goats. Now they are llving In a 
rural slum (Natal Mercury. 17 May 72). 
Dr Anthony Barker. for many years based at the Charles Johnson Hospital. wrote In 
1974: 
Where I llve at Nqutu Iln KwaZulu). just as In a hundred other areas. 
the numbers of people are greatly increased. throWing out of balance 
the older equations of economic ViablUty on a basis of subsistence 
agriculture. The homelands have become the nation's overcrowded 
back yards (1974:1: also Clarke and Barker. 1974). 
On the admin1stratlVe level a slmllar process of exclusion from central processes and 
the simultaneous maintenance of supposedly 'traditional' structures (such as the 
chlefs) occurred. The provincial' system of second-tier government for whites within 
the Union of South Africa that was created In 1910 was In part the result of a reaction 
from the other delegations to the demands for even greater autonomy made by the 
Natal contingent to the pre-Union conference. White Natallans (Africans were totally 
excluded from the deliberations) wanted a federal system to allow the province 
freedom to give expression to its 'British tradition', whlch they felt would be lost under 
a centralized government (as Buthelezl and king Goodwtll argued In the 19908 the 
'Zulu character' would be lost to a central government). Tb1s the other delegates were 
not wtll1ng to grant. fearing the 'sort of plague spot and publlc danger' that Natal's 
admlnlstration of Africans had created In the reglon. The memory of the Bambatha 
rebellion was still fresh In the memory of the delegates. It was hoped that Natal's 
closer Incorporation lnto the Union, as a proVince, would put an end to this 
'mismanagement' (Marks, 1970:353). The provlnctal system was, therefore, a 
compromise between a unitary state and a federation. In a way s1m1lar to the 
manufacturtng or maintaining of the tradition of the 'Zulu Nation', there bas also been 
a created and maintained tradition ofwhlte Natallan Identity (ethn1c1ty?) aver the 
decades, With a set of proclaimed values that bear llWe relation to the practice of th1s 
communlty. Language rtghts, 'llberallsm', a more easy-gotng attitude to 11fe In general 
and a less tense relationship with the African population, were claimed to be 
important elements of these values. 
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As If their exclusion from the deliberation that led to Union was not enough. all 
anti-Union meetings by Africans in Natal were banned. and the few Mrtcans who had 
the vote in the colony (three in 1903. six in 1909. and only one in 1936) were later 
removed from all participation in a vote for central authortty (Brookes and Webb. 
1979:77). 
In 1936 two lmportant Acts were passed: the Trust and Land Act. which added a 
'quota' ofland to the land 'scheduled' for African occupation in the 1913 Land Act 
(Horrell, 1978:203). but conftrmed the principle of 'racial' separation: and the 
Representation of NatIVes Act. which entitled Africans in Natal to elect. indirectly. a 
single senator to the central government The elections were to take place through 
chiefs. local councUs and advisory boards. The Act also established the NatIVe 
Representative Councll (NRC). on which one nominated and three representative 
members from Natal were to serve. The nomlnated member. untll the NRC was 
disbanded in 1951. was Mshiyeni kaDinuzulu. acting paramount chief of the Zulus. 
Other posts were ftlled by such people as John L Dube. first president of the South 
Mrtcan Native National Congress (later the Mrtcan National Congress). and Chief 
Albert Luthull. later to become president of the ANC untll the organisation was 
banned by the state in 1960. They were both involved in Natal as well as national 
politics. 
The NRC was 1n1tially called the 'official mouthpiece of the African people' by the 
conservatIVe president-general of the ANC. Rev S Mahabane. who had been re-elected 
in 1937 (Walshe. 1970:127). For some years the ANC tried to make support for the 
NRC a major part of its policy. In the 1942 elections for the NRC the ANC gained 'an 
informal but reallnfluence through at least seven of the 16 member COUDcll' (WalsQe. 
1970:271). James Calata. secretary-general of the ANC from 1936 to 1949. said the 
Congress had 'succeeded in sending Congressmen to the NRC Without saytng so'. 
However. by 1944 some of these members were urging the government to abandon all 
segregatlonist legislation. and by 1946 a resolution was moved in the ANC proposing a 
boycott of the NRC. The fut1l1ty of the previous policy of 'working Within the system' 
was becom1ng clear. As Walshe wrote: 
At this point (by 19481 Congress. with the Youth League in the 
vanguard. came to accept the need for non-collaboration in the NRC. 
the 'Programme of Action' and the systematic use of passive 
resistance as in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 (1970:370). 
'Working Within the system' was to become the strategy employed by Buthe1ezt, with 
reference to the ANC's efforts In the past as Justlflcation. 
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The NRC was eventually abolished by the National Party government in 1951. The 
Bantu Author1ties Act of that year both did away with the NRC and made proVision for 
tribal and regional author1ties, redefining and re-emphas1z1ng the resolve of white 
political author11¥ to maintain control through untraditionally static and strong 
'traditional tribal' structures. What must be borne in mind is that wh1le the ongtns of 
these structures lie In the poliCies developed by the colonial author1ties in Natal from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards, thelr purposes have changed over time. Inltially 
they served as an economic and politicalltnk between pre-capltallst socle1¥ and 
colonial admlnlslrators. In many cases even today (in the mid-1990s) chiefs and tribal 
author1ties (wlth some notable exceptions) form part of the control mechanisms over 
an African population superfluous in the long- and short-term to capltal1st labour 
needs. The role of ehlefs, and the approaches by both the ANC and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party. wlll be returned to below. 
Mr1can politics in Natal, outside of state-created structures. Is far too complex a 
subject to enter into in this thesis, and is not strictly necessary to the main purpose of 
the case-study. A few general comments do, however, need to be made. especially in 
the l1ght of the frequent references made by chief Buthelezl, not only to his Zulu past 
but also to the spec1ftc ANC tradition within which he places h1mself and the Inkatha 
movement. The tradition Is that of the 'founding fathers' of the ANC (the term used by 
Inkatha leaders). In other words, It refers to an expression by the pre-I94Os ANC of 
the 'need for equal opportunl1¥ for all, and hence the rtghts of educated and qualified 
Mr1cans to adv~ce in the modern sector of the economy and to parUclpate in the 
provlnc1al and parllamentary institutions of government' (Walshe, 1970:413). These 
senUments - a fair share for those who deserve It (the educated and quallfled) - are 
adequately encompassed by Buthelezl's 1 970s and 19805 Ideologtcal stance. 
His references to the ANC usually took the form of allegiance to ' •.. the Ideals of the 
Mr1can National Congress as propounded by the founding fathers In 1912. bullt on 
the solid rock of our Ubuntu-Botho ideal' (8S, 18 May 80; also see. for example. 24 
Sep 83:6; 5 Nov 83:5). The Ubuntu-Botho approach has been described as follows by 
then Inkatha secretary-general. now ANC mlnlster of education. Dr Slbusl80 Bengu: 
Inkatha strives for the promotion of African patterns of thought and 
the achievement of African Humanism otherwise commonly known In 
Ngun11anguages as Ubuntu and Sotho languages as Botho (Bengu. 
Lecture 4, 1977:5). 
As in the case of the early-ANC. chiefs always played a prominent Uf not always pliant) 
role in Inkatha. In the ANC during the early years of Its existence this was because of 
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the organisation's rejection of the 1913 Land Act which centrally affected chiefs and 
their control over land. Subsequently it was predominantly in Natal that the ANC 
managed to gain slgnlftcant support in the ~al areas: Albert Luthull, Natal ANC 
leader from 1951 and later national president. was himself a chief. However, even 
here the banning of the organisation prevented support from being converted into 
organisational strength (Lodge, 1983:290). 
The s1m1lartties between the ANC in 1912 and the Inkatha movement in 1975 should 
not be stressed to the exclusion of fundamental differences - differences that increased 
as Inkatha gained confidence in its own independent role in South Africa. The ANC 
was founded in 1912 in the self-conscious desire of the 'founqmg fathers' to 
'encourage a sense of supra-tribal uni1¥' (Walshe, 1970:412), while Inkatha was born 
out of the 'tribal' or ethnic institutions of the apartheid state. It has tried to escape the 
legacy of that birth ever since, in repeated calls (with little success) for 'black unitY 
under the banner of Inkatha. The most important step in the attempt to shed itself of 
its ethnic image came with its conversion to a national, 'non-racial' political part¥, the 
Inkatha Freedom part¥ (lFP) in December 1990. However, the results of the 1994 
elections showed that It had not to any extent been able to escape its regional and 
ethnic base (see Hamtlton and Mare, 1994: Mare, 1995). 
A fairly strong ethnic homogenel1¥, a 'Zulu identit¥', has been created in the region, 
particularly in the twentieth century with increased urbanization and Improved 
communication. This 'identitY has buUt on the history ('the past') of political 
consolidation under Shaka. and of decades of successful resistance to political 
domlnatlon from colonial authorities. Because of the avallabili1¥ of this identlt¥ for 
mobilisation, and of the politicians to make use of it. soctal movements in the region 
have frequently taken a rather idiosyncratic and chauvinistic line towards national 
movements. Thls tendency is well illustrated by the political actions of such 
indtvlduals as AWG Champion. renegade in both the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers Union (leU), a mass movement that had Its ortgtns 'in the early post-war 
attempts by white soclaltsts to organize black labour in Cape Town' (Lodge, 1983:5). 
and in the ANC in Natal, from which he was ousted by Albert Luthull. 'An . 
embarrasslngly conservative colleague' is how Walshe described Champion as Natal 
president of the ANC in relation to Xuma, the national president. To strengthen Its 
independence the Natal ANC even went so far as to seek more money from chiefs 
(Walshe. 1970:393-5; on Champion also see Marks. 1986; Webster, 1974). 
It Is ironic, as Brookes and Webb pointed out. that 'from conservative Natal and 
Zululand came the institution which for many years was for many Africans the symbol 
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ofliberatlon' (l9~:296; Rich 1984:132-3). It says much that it should be from the 
Natal leaders and from the 'founding fathers' of the ANC that Inkatha should draw Its 
clalm of contlnulty with the ANC and its ideas. The tactlcs and the content of the 
demands made by the ANC started moving away dramatlcal1y from those of the 
founders with the formatlon of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) 10 1944. It is necessary 
to add that whlle Inkatha draws Its claims to a natlonal politlcal directlon from the 
'founding fathers'. Buthelezl has-never been shy of call1ng on a vast array of ANC 
leaders of subsequent generatlons to add credibility to his actlons. As he told his 
audience when celebrating ten years of Inkatha existence: 
From my mother's knee onwards. I was drawn lnto politlcs. The great 
founding father of the ANC. Dr. Ptxley ka lsaka Seme. was my uncle. I 
spent many a long hour on numerous occasions talklng about the 
struggle for liberatlon with Chief Albert LuthuU. I knew people like 
Walter Slsuiu, Nelson Mandela. Zaml Conco, M.B. Yengwa. Oliver 
Tambo. J.K. Ngubane and Joe Matthews personally. I was a member 
of the ANC's Youth League. Thus both by hereditary right and by 
voluntary assoclatlon. I was steeped in the struggle for liberatlon (BS. 
29Jun85). 
The ANCYL saw the posslbll1tles of mass organisatlon. essentlal for pressure rather 
than petltlon poliUcs. 10 the poverty of a rapidly growlng Mrlcan urban populaUon 
lncreastngly severed from any contact with rural subSistence productlon. Lodge wrote: 
(It wasl this recognlUon of the political opportunity presented by these 
popular outbursts I among the urban poor 10 the 19405) that was the 
most Important contrtbutlon made to the naUonallst movement by the 
Africantsts 110 the ANCYL). From such struggles they dist1lled a 
strategy of mass actlon. centred on the use of the boycott weapon.,. 
but also lnvolvlng strikes. clvll disobedience and non-cooperaUon 
(1983:22). 
Such acUons. rather than merely the threat of them. remained largely anathema to 
Buthelezl and Inkatha and It Is no wonder that the modemlslng politlcal orlglns of the 
Inkatha movement should have been sought 10 an era that predates the ANCYL. this 
despite Buthelezl's own brief membership of the Youth League whlle he was a student 
at the UniverSity of Fort Hare 10 the late-1940s (for more detall see Mare. 1988). 
In 1948 much of the SOCial fabric of South Africa was fundamentally altered when the 
NaUonal Party came to power. The disappointment felt. even by conservatlve African 
poliUclans. that the relaxation of controls on urbanIzatlon and the lncrease 1n Job 
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opportuntUes forced by wartime demands for labour were not to be carried through 
by the Smuts government. was turned into firm knowledge that white South Africa 
had no intention of willlngly shartng power. never mind of ever submitting to majority 
rule. A barrage of leglslation to crush opposItion to the state was passed and 
ruthlessly used. as was the power of the repressIve apparatuses (the army and the 
pollee). To confirm their exclusion separate pollUcal structures were being forced on 
the black population. and not only on Africans. Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelez1. 
contenUous heir to the Buthelez1 chieftainship. became part of those separate 
structures in the 19505. In the year that the National Party came to power he went to 
the Unlverslt¥ of Fort Hare in the eastern Cape. as so many of central and southern 
Africa's pollticalleaders have done. 
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SECTION 2: 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE 
FORMATION OF INKATHA 
Administrative separation 
As chief Buthelez1 told the Inkatha Annual General Conference in 1985, he became 
involved, not only in the 'struggle' as he would have it. but also in the structures of 
apartheid, both 'by hereditary right and by voluntary association' (SS, 29 Jun 
85: 1 0-11). To understand the implications of involvement in the structures of the 
state. it is important to examine the nature of what the apartheid poliey had been and 
remalns in Its effects. It can be seen as a series of separations (the word apartheid 
does, after all, mean 'separateness'), the most obviOUS of which are 'racial' and 
territorial. 
The previous section dealt With the rac1allsed separation of land areas and of 
adm1n1strative bodies in Natal and Zululand. as it developed during the nineteenth 
century. Centuries before that time the early European settlers at the Cape had 
already started the pattern of protecting what they had laid claim to, and excluding the 
incUgenous population. This at times occurred not for 'racial', but for religlous or 
purely economic reasons, such as the fear of competition for land, and later for 
markets. However, the land they laid claim to was already inhabited by the existing 
African population, and over time all other factors became raciaUsed. By the end of 
the nlneteenth century, through the use of superior m1lltary technology, a 'divide and 
rule' poliey, and the help of collaborators. the settlers had 'largely stablllzed' terrltorlal 
separation between settlers and the Mrlcan population. Such separation was gtven 
legislative force soon after the Act of Unlon. the Land Act 
Separate areas are important to just11Y separate adm1n1stration and exclUSion from 
central poUtical power. The 1913 Land Act continued not only the principle of 
territorial separation but also that of adminlstrative separation. The Act was 'an 
important prerequlslte for the establishment of separate government institutions for 
these (reserve) areas' (Kotze, 1975:25), as distinct from bodies established for 
Africans in 'white' South Africa. 
There ~ad been two posslbl11ties for government over Africans. The first was to 
weaken the institution of chieftainship and rule through the eolonlal bureaucracy and 
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a council that attempted to involve 'non-traditionalists' In goverrunent - this was the 
system attempted in the eastern Cape. The second was to rely on chiefs. appointed 
and hereditary. for (lndlrect) rule - the system developed In Natal. At first the fonner 
method was tried. and the council system was extended to all African areas through 
the 1920 Native Affairs Act. Whatever the reasons. the counclls were never 
enthusiastically lmplemented and by 1948. when the National Party came to power. 
there were only three local councils In Natal (out of 25 outside the Transkel). whlle the 
sole general council. an umbrella body. existed in the Transkei (see. for example. 
discussion in Greenstein. 1995: Hammond-Tooke. 1975). 
In urban areas outside the reserves the state established native advisory boards 
(under the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923). with extremely llm1ted and purely 
advisory functions. They were replaced in 1961 by the possibly even more despised 
urban bantu councUs (the UBCs. or 'Useless Boys Clubs' as they were scathlngly 
labelled). The USCS were in turn replaced. first by the communlty councUs (from 
1977). and then by black local authorities (after 1983) and Regional Services CouncUs 
(Jolnt Services Boards in Natal and KwaZulu) (see contributions in Heymans and 
Totemeyer (eds). 1988: Great. 1988). It is only in November 1995 that elections are 
planned to be held for democratic local government structures for all people living 
within speclfted wards. 
On a national level at the time of Union there had been extremely llmlted participation 
in central government allowed to Africans. Before Union there were 6633 AfrIcans on 
the common voters rollin the Cape. In Natal there were at one time six. AfrIcans in the 
Boer Republlcs (to become the Orange Free State and Transvaal provinces) never had 
any vote. This representation was totally eroded under the National Party goverrunent. 
Even before the NP came to power the threat posed by black voters in a few margtnal 
constituencies in the Cape set in motion a process that was to lead to the separation of 
voters' rolls in 1936. From then on Africans who had qu8.Ufted for the vote would elect 
three (of 153) white members to the House of Assembly. whlle four indlrectly elected 
senators would represent all Afrlcans In the Union of South AfrIca. At the same time a 
Natives Representative CouncU (NRC) was established. but this proved totally 
tnadequate to the increastngly mllltant demands for representation at central 
government level (see above). 
In 1948. when the National Party came to power. the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) 
presented a 'Programme of Action' around the moblllslng idea of African nationallsm 
and involving a mass organization. boycotts. strikes. and civil disobedience (Walshe. 
1970:289). The pressure was for the ANC to move away from the negaUve strategy of 
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reaction and to take the ln1tiative. WhUe the Congress was still wary of the left. It had 
by the ear1y-1950s shifted sllghtly from the Afrlcanlst position that had characterized 
It during the 1940s (Lodge. 1983:37). The Programme of Action. adopted at the 1949 
annual congress of the ANC. rejected white leadership and all forms of segregatton In 
national government. It led to the 'appointment of a councll of action which would 
organize a boycott of all differential poUticallnstitutions' (Lodge, 1983:26). 
'EthD!c' separation 
In 1951, with the passing of the Bantu AuthOrities Act. the National Party government 
started on the process of estabUshlng or reinforcing separate poUticallnstitutions for 
Africans. The Act made provlslon for three levels of admlnlstration - tribal. regtonal, 
and terrltorlal authorities. The mlnister of Native Affairs, dr Hendrlk Verwoerd, said 
this three-tier system of government would reintroduce traditional tribal democracy to 
Mrlcan people. Kotze (1975:26) commented that only the first tier, 'consisting of tribal 
authorities, resembled the traditional system'. The next two levels, regtonal and 
terrltorlal authorlties, simply brought the local level bodies together on a spatial basis. 
The counell system was to be replaced, and the focus shifted to etbnlc fragmentation 
of the AfrIcan population. away from predomlnantly 'racial' deftnltions and 
consequent'raclal' admlnlstrative or advisory bodies (see Hammond-Tooke. 1975). 
The NRC was also abandoned - partly because It was 'racially' rather than etbnlcally 
based, largely because It was already a discredited body . 
On the establlshed terrltorlal and 'racial' base the new government. through the Bantu 
Authorities Act and then the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act In 1959, added 
admlnlstrative structures for what were now ethnically defined 'homelands'. The 1959 
Act was Introduced by the mlnister of Bantu Affairs, De Wet Nel. who spoke of 
'cultural nationallsm' and 'ethnic particularities'. attempting to move away, at least 
rhetorlcally, from racism. However, the tension between the racism of the apartheid 
polley and what Moodie called 'positiVe apartheid' or 'cultural pluralism', was there 
from the start: 
Major publlc proponents of apartheid have tended to shlft their 
ground dependlng on the argument. thereby creaung an Ideological 
system which is rlddled with inconsistencies ... cultural plurallsm Is a 
morally acceptable reallty. whereas racism Is not; and protagonists of 
apartheid tend to justify racism on the grounds of cultural plurallsm 
( 1980:275-6). 
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The apartheid policy, with Its ethnic separation and ethnically-based admlnlstration, 
was an attempt to defuse several pressures that were mounting agalnBt the central 
state. Growing worker mlUtancy was reflected in the fourfold increase in the number 
of strikes inVolvlng African workers between 1950 and the mld-1950s. The South 
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), later a member of the Congress Alliance 
which brought together most radical opposition to apartheid, was formed in 1955 (see 
Luckhardt and Wall, 1980). Rapid urbanisation of African people during the 1950s 
was making a rac1al1y exclusive political system more untenable by the day. Instead of 
exclusion from central power the state was attempting to shift the focus to separate 
polltical power. The 'winds of change' of African nationalisms that swept through the 
conUnent after the second world war set an example as they forced aside the direct 
control of the colonial powers. Verwoerd acknowledged the effect of international 
pressure when he commented that '"we cannot govern without taking into account the 
tendencies in the world and in Africa'" (quoted in Moodie, 1980:264). 
International pressure came from the United Nations as well, and in addition South 
Africa was soon to leave the Commonwealth. Moodie quotes the author of the book 
Van Malan tot Verwoerd, ~umont Schoeman, as saytng that prlme m1n1ster 
Verwoerd told his cabinet that he '"wished to show the world something great and new 
which would confirm the just intentions of the government's pollcy, and also provide a 
basts for the western members •.. to prevent action agatnst South Africa in the UN"' 
(Moodle, 1980:264). This message was given just before the Transkel Constitution Act 
was passed (a .dlrect result of the polltical path taken through the principles of the 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act). Verwoerd had to persuade the other 
members of the cabinet of the necessl1¥ of the policy of 'separate development' as they 
percelved It as an undesirable extension of the autonomous power of African 
government. 
The apartheid pollcy was destgned to meet all these threats to white supremacy and 
exclusive control over wealth and political power. It ful1Uled many other needs as well, 
most lmportantly that of malntalnlng separate areas for the social reproduction of the 
labouring class where increasing poverv and a crlmlnallmbalance in resource 
allocation could be justlfted in terms of 'dual economles' and 'Thlrd World' 
components rather than racism, sheer greed and the necessities of capitalist 
development. From these separate areas labour could, furthermore, be allocated to 
the politically powerful but economlcally weak agrtcultural sector, where wages were 
too low to attract workers from the mlnlng sector and the by now dominant 
manufacturing sector ( see Lacey, 1981: Posel, 1991 :30-31). 
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More important for the present study. however. concerned as it is with the poUtical 
consequences of apartheld on regional political structures. is the attempt to create or 
rekindle ethnic nationallsms. 'Posltive cultural nationalism' was to take the place of 
the wider African nationallsm - '"the monster which may sUll perhaps destroy all the 
best things In Africa"'. as Bantu Affairs mlnlster MC de Wet Nel described It in 1959. 
He admitted that there were two bonds that kept the black population of South Africa 
together: "'their colour'" and '"their hatred of the white man'" (quoted in Moodle. 
1980:265). 
'Cultural nationallsm'. on the other hand. meant that "'the Bantu too wlll be Unked 
together by traditional and emotional bonds. by their own language. their own culture. 
their ethnic particularities"'. Underlying the polley was not white social engtneertng. he 
argued. but the fact that: 
'The Zulu Is proud to be a Zulu and the Xhosa proud to be a Xhosa 
and the Venda Is proud to be a Venda. just as proud as they were a 
hundred years ago. The lesson we have learnt from history during the 
past three hundred years is that these ethnic groups. the whites as 
well as the Bantu. sought their greatest fulfllment. their greatest 
happiness and the best mutual relations on the basls of separate and 
Indlvldual development. .• the only basiS on which peace. happiness 
and mutual confidence could be bullt up' (quoted in Moodle. 
1980:266). 
In these words De Wet Nel presented the grand justlfication for a poUey that was to 
cause untold mlsery in Its implementation. but that was also to provide the basts on 
which ethnic partlcularlsms could flourish where the historlcal subjects for such 
Identities were avallable (see Norval's non-reductionlst approach to the analysts of 
apartheid. 1992). Norval argued that there are baslcally two characterist1cs of the 
functioning of 'frontiers' (In the creation of 1magtned communities): first. 'through 
constant re-creat(ton) through a pr?Cess of homogenlsatlon and destruction of 
differences' lnation-bulldlng in one of Its forms? - see chapter five); second. 
as in apartheld, the other Is there to remain ... here the frontler can 
only exist through a constant construction of differences and 
production of equlvalent exclUSions ... (T)his process of construction 
Is const1tutively ambIgUous: it requlres a slmultaneous affirmation 
and the exclusion of the other. This amblgUlty - undecldabll1ty - Is 
characterist1c of all forms of dOmination and dlstlngulshes them from 
purely antagonlstic forms in which one force tends to the destruction 







This stlmulatlng approach to an aspect of the apartheid polley cannot be investigated 
in this thesls. However, I wUl return to the approach below. 
It was not only 'raciar domlnance that was to be safeguarded through apartheid. The 
~tem of cheap labour was to be continued with the added measure of greater control 
over the allocation of that labour. Verwoerd had sald in 1956 that the opposltion in 
Parliament 
' .•. apparently dld not understand the dltrerence between one national 
economy and one State ... The slmple fact is that the opportunl1y of . 
separate govermnent. the opportunl1y ofliVlng separately, and the 
opportunl1y of developing separate tertiary lndustries for. each of the 
race groups does not of necessi1y mean that the economlc acUViUes of 
the country should be spUt up' (quoted in Davenport and Hunt (eds), 
1974:49). 
The single economy relied heavUy on what had euphemlstically been called 'the 
prlnclple of impermanence'. ThIs meant that Africans outside the bantustans were 
either there temporarily as mtgrants or commuters, or, if resident. would have no 
property or poUUcall1ghts, precious few amenities, and would be subject to the same 
humlllations of pass checks as all other Africans (Hindson, 1987). 
The 'principle of impermanence' meant that wages could be kept low on the by this 
time quite untenable grounds that such income was supplemented by family 
subsistence agriculture in the bantustans. Union organlsation was also made very 
dlfficult With the workplace lnstabili1y caused by a mtgrant work force, and housing 
and other social facilities could be kept to the very mlnlmum, away from the obvious 
contrast With the standard of llVing of white South Africans, and away from lndustrial 
areas In case soclal unrest should spill out of the townships. Profits. however. were 
high in the 19608. Sharpevllle caused a brief scare and foreign capital fiowed out of 
South Africa. but the trend was soon reversed as the state clamped down on 
opposition. The rate of return on United Kingdom investment in South Mrlca in 1965 
(by which time the post-Sharpevllle outflow of capital had been reversed) was 12.1 %, 
higher than in any other country in which Britaln had substanUalinvestment. The 
equivalent figure for US investment was 20.6%. as against 10.4% average return on 
investment for all other countries in which the USA was economlcally involved (see 
Mare. 1982:115; Seidman and Seidman. 1977; First. 1972). 
As the apartheid polley unfolded after 1951. and especially post-1959. 'radal' 
categOrization of people contlnued: even the tricameral constitution of South Mrtca In 
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the 'refonn' period of the 1980s, with its claims to 'widen democracy', was essentially 
based on 'racial' categorIzatlon, and 'racial' dominatlon - what was 'widened' was the 
number of direct (reluctant or enthusiastic) participants in the structures and 
execution of the polley. For African people, however, the polley meant further 
separation into state-defined ethnic groupings. These groupings had. furthennore, 
been elevated into polltical 'nationaUsms', each one allocated to a land area 
fragmented and ecattered to varylng degrees. There were ten of these 'national states', 
four of which had been granted 'independence' from the rest of South Africa by the 
time the whole polley collapsed. The participants in the Surplus People Project. in 
their investigation of population relocatlon In South Africa. documented some of the 
bitterness created between communities through the polley that defined access to 
social facll1ties, Jobs. education, housing, medical services, etc. on the basis of 
allegiance to an unacceptable ethnic unit (see, for example, Platzky and Walker. 
1985:23; SPP. vol 5. 1983). 
The tragedy of the social violence lmpllclt in the polley of enforced ethnic separation 
was clear from early on. In 1960. already. JCM Mbata wrote a report for the South 
African InsUtute of Race Relations in which he commented on one area that he had 
visited: 
The Tsonga admit that until the Bantu AuthOrities system was 
Imposed. they had Uved peacefully, and successfully together with 
both Venda and Sotho people .•. (T)here was ... intennarrtage on a 
large scale •.. no one in the past sought to Impose his authorlt¥ or way 
of Ufe on the others ... The Sbangaan argue that the Bantu Authorities 
system has upset this dellcate balance of co-ex1stence. 
He concluded most pertinently: 
It Is clear that the fragmentation of South !di1ca and Us peoples has 
had the effect of creating antagonisms where none existed, and 
opening up old wounds where these were healing. To 'WlSCramble' the 
population of the country is lmposslble, hence the fallure of the 
Government to follow to the letter its polley of ethnic separation ... 
(emphasis added). 
What happened in South AfrIca. especially since the introductlon and lmplementation 
of the Bantu AuthOrities Act. clearly 1llustrates a process in wblch 'cultural pluralism' 
becomes the polltIclzatlon of trlbal d11ferences. to paraphrase John Saul. As Saul 
wrote: 
For 'trlballsm' (the pollticlzation of etbniclty which Is all too 
characteristically a pathology of dependent Africa) does not spring 
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prtmartly from the bare fact of the existence of cultural dlfferences 
between people. Rather. It has been teased Into Ufe. first by the 
div1de-and-rule tactics of colonialism and by the uneven development 
In the economic sphere which colonlal1sm also facilitates. and 
secondly by the rul1ng petty bourgeoisie of the post-colonial period •.. 
(Saul. 1979a:309). 
In other words. precapital1st social. economic and political forms of organization were 
and are arUftc1ally maintained or recreated. However. they are 'used'in a distorted 
form, and in a context where they have very little relevance (other than to create 
antagonisms and to serve as a handy point of reference If confllct should arlse) (see 
Saul. 1979:391-423). However, this evaluatlon should not detract from the very real 
existing non-opportunlstic value that many people attach to theJorm of 'traditional 
leadership'. In the same manner that ethnicl1¥ serves as a safe haven within the 
turmoil of socia-political change. so do elements within an ethnic appeal. 'Traditional 
authority' then comes to stand for that which Is being lost. for 'the past' when social 
relations were ordered (see Hayes and Mare, 1992: Campbell et al, 1993: and below. 
chapter ftve). What is to be noted Is that the support structures and stories of 'cultural 
difference' exist without the mobilisation. without being 'teased into llfe' in the public 
domain. 
It comes as no surprise that over the years competition for scarce resources, whether 
educational facWUes. JObs, most Importantly land, and many other necesslUes, should 
often have been, and wlll continue to be defined in ethnic terms. The state handed 
over land. budgets, Job allocaUons, infrastructural schemes, and political power, on 
an ethnic basis to the various groups (or 'nations') created by the poliey of apartheid. 
There have been many land disputes such as that between Bophuthatswana and 
QwaQwa in the Thaba 'Nchu area of the Orange Free State, between the Ciskel and the 
Transkel "over Glen Grey and Herschel, between KwaZulu and the Transkel over 
Urnzlmkulu (and now, In 1995, also over East Griqualand), between Lebowa and 
Gazankulu over the Bushbuckr1dge. Tzaneen and Phalaborwa regton, between 
KwaZulu and KaNgwane and SwazUand over the state's Intention (in 1982) to hand 
over the KaNgwane bantustan and the Ingwavuma region to SwazUand. 
On a smaller scale the same 'ethnic' deftn1tlons have also lived on to define 
antagonlsUc groups. To take Just KwaZulu: the confllct over land in southern Natal 
was presented as a clash with the Transke1 (now,in 1994 and 1995, with the Eastern 
Cape province). Much of the continuing debate over the future of the Ingwavuma 
district Is put in terms of age-old histories of conquest and allegtances and whether 
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people are 'Swazi' or 'Zulu' or 'Tsonga'. Clashes in the shanty towns surrounding the 
fonnal townships around Durban took on an ugly 'factional mask' as war between 
'Zulu' and 'Pondo' at the end of 1985 and early in 1986. A small Soth~speaking 
community near Nqutu came in for criticism for wanting to hold on to their language 
in a Zulu-speaking area - this particular tension incre8sed over the years leading to 
the suspension of chief Elphas Molefe by KwaZulu cb1ef mlnlster Buthelez1, then also 
holding the portfoUo of 'traditional affairs' in the bantustan government. and a tragtc 
attack on the chiefs homestead in November 1993 in which he was wounded and 11 
chUdren kllled (see for example, Natal Witness Echo, 21 Jul94). 
Buthelezi on the stage 
Chief Gatsha Mangosuthu Ashpenaz Nathan Buthelezi was born on 27 August 1928 in 
MahlabaUnl to cb1ef Mathole and princess Constance Magogo Zulu. Some five months 
before his birth Inkata KaZulu had accepted a new constitution. This document. that 
of an 'organlzaUOD dealFed by the Z~u arlstocra and the Afri ~~e. 
to g&!n state recognition for the king (Solomon)' (Marks, 1986:36), was to receive - ----mention in the first consUtution of the Inkatha movement revived by chief Buthelez1 47 
years later in 1975. (I have retained the ortgtnal spelllng of the first Inkata movement 
to distlngUlsh it from the 1975 Inkatha). 
In 1948 the young Buthelezi arrived at Fort Hare, the university for black people in the 
eastern Cape that produced many southern African leaders oflater years (see, for 
example, Beard, 1972:172-3). He studied for a BA degree, majoring in Bantu 
Admlnlstration, under professor ZK Matthews, an lmportant ANC figure. Buthelezi 
was 19 when he started his student days, and he was a member of the ANC Youth 
League from 1948 to 1950. He often refers to this fact. but does not give it the content 
which would enable his position within Youth League radlcal1sm to be clarlfted (see, 
for example, Deane, 1978:24). An ANCYIAed boycott of the visit to Fort Hare by the 
governor-general of the Union of South Africa. Brand van Zyl, in 1950, caused 
Buthelez1's expulsion for action taken by him and others against students who had 
welcomed the governor general. Buthelez1's biographer hinted that the 'heartbroken' 
Buthelez1 might not have been gu1lty of any offence, and that he felt that he had failed 
in his duty towards his tribe, within which there had been some opposition to his 
university career (Temkin, 1976:36-37). Tribal opposition had been 10 part directed 
at the 'radical' company that he had been keeping (such as then journallst Jordan 
Ngubane). To make matters worse, in 1949 Buthelez1, then 10 his second year of 
study, had helped 10 the offices of the ANC in Durban in attempts to ealm the 'racial' 
119 
tension that had erupted between Indians and Africans (Temkin, 1976:36: see, for 
example, Webster, 1977, on the '1949 riots'). These events have since become a 
symbol of the rac1alised form that social and economic tensions can take In South 
Africa's racist society. 
It is not clear what Buthelez1's role was in the attempts by the Natallndtan Congress 
(NlC) and ANC to restore calm, but Tem.k1n commented that. 'as a future ehlef, he had 
to play b1s poUUcs In as low key as possible' (1976:34). 'Low key' appears to be a fair 
descripUon of Buthelezl's actions over the next few years. Having assured liberal 
senator Edgar Brookes 'that he would steer clear of poUtics for the Ume betng', 
Buthelez1 took his exams at Natal University but graduated at the University of Fort 
Hare. He was then Interviewed by dr WWM Else1en, secretary for Bantu 
Admlnlstration, and warned that if he wanted to become a tribal chief (as he was 
desUned to become) he would have to "'wipe out" the Fort Hare episode' (Temkin, 
1976:39). Temkin said that it was to achieve this cleaning of his slate that Buthelez1 
joined the Department of Native Affairs for nearly two years, 1nstead of serving b1s 
articles, as he had planned to do, With Rowley Arenstein, 'a Durban lawyer, who was a 
self-confessed communist' (Tem.k1n, 1976:39: BS, 24 Sep 83:9; 24 Aug 85: 16). 
Temkin noted Buthelez1's 'stngle-mtnded' approach to becoming chief, a post With 
Uttle prestige and a small Income, and adds that Buthelez1 had been greatly tnfluenced 
by ehlef Albert LuthuU, who gave up teaching to become a chief at GroutvUle (Temkin, 
1976:39). What Temkin falls to mention here is that LuthuU was never offiCially 
recogniZed by the central government as chiefbecause of his decision to Involve 
h1mself in naUonal Uberation pollUcs. LuthuU became ANC president In 1952. Lodge 
wrote of LuthuU: 
A man of great dignity and courage, he was immediately at home in 
the world of popular poUtics ... His experiences as a local 
admlntstrator gave him an Insight Into the paroch1al worries and 
concerns of ordinary people. His reltglous f81th and tratntng brought 
to his pollUcs a prtnc1pled bellef in non-Violence and a remarkable 
opUmtsm about the capacity of whites to undergo a change of heart. 
For him, passive resistance, even on a mass scale, held no fears 
( 1983:61: also 68). 
Lodge quotes LuthuU at this point in words that could easUy have been uttered by 
Buthelez1 years later In a very different context: 
'It (mass passive resistance) is not subversive since it does not seek to 
overthrow the form and machinery of the state but only urges for the 
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inclusion of all sectors of the communlty in a partnership in the 
government of the country on the basis of equality' (1983:61 ). 
There are many s1m1larlties of language (the claims to Christian values. adherence to 
non-violence. calls for equallty and shartng Without changtng the system. and bellef in 
mass action). but there are also important dl1ferences. such as Buthelezl's claims that 
his espousal of non-violence is simply a tactical move. his ambtgulty towards a 
poUtically-involved Christian action. and. most lmportant. his central involvement in 
purely 'Zulu' poUties and state admlnlstratlve machinery. 
The Bantu AuthOrities Act was passed in 1951. durtng Buthelezl's period of 
employment with the Department of Native Affairs. In Noveniber 1952 the Buthelezi 
clan decided that Buthelezl. who was 24 at the time and had married in July. should 
become cblef and take over from the regent. chief Mallyamakhanda. In March 1953 he 
was installed as acUng chief and four years later his position received government 
approval (Temkin. 1976:45). Temkin wrote that Buthelezl saw It 'as his role to help 
re-estabUsh the paramountcy of the Zulu klng' (1976:46). even though the king, as 
chief of the Usuthu seemed to have decided to accept the Bantu Authorities system for 
his people. something which Buthelezl's clan members were apparently not wUllng to 
do. The term 'Usuthu' came to be appUed to the followers of Cetshwayo. one of the 
sons of the Zulu king Mpande in their struggle against the followers of another son. 
Mbulazt. who were known as the Gqoza.in 1856 (Guy. 1982a:13; 96. note 34; 246). 
The 'stngle-mlndedness' of Buthelezl's move towards chieftainship, in itself a fairly 
small prize, has already been mentioned. However. this particular chieftalnsblp was 
also the source of the claim to 'prlme mlnlstership' or 'premiership' to the Zulu king, a 
post that Buthelezl's father had held under king Solomon (this became an extremely 
contentious issue in the struggle between Buthelezl and Inkatha and the ANC - see 
Mzala. 1988; and chapter five below). It could thus expand the young man's poUtical 
horizons considerably. but only if the king should be restored to something of his 
previous central posiUon in Zulu society (this time as figurehead and not as an 
executive monarch). The s1m1larlties with what the Zulu 'eUte' had hoped to do with 
the kingship of Solomon early in the century are strlklng. A wide 'Zuluness' with a 
dlstlnct poUUcal deftnluon had. therefore. to be created (or recreated), but it had to be 
prevented from falllng totally into the hands of the ethnic planners of the central state 
- which would have meant apartheid 'independence' for KwaZulu. 
It was not enough for Buthelezl to remaln at the level of tribal authorlUes. With its 
extreme small-scale fragmentation of a specifically 'Zulu' poUty. Natal had been 
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divided into more than 280 'tribes'. A larger un1t had to be accepted, namely the 
poUtical entl1¥ that later became the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, clalmlng to speak 
for all 'Zulus'. In the same way, at the ideol~callevel, Buthelez1 'was also doing his 
best to restore the pride of the Zulu in their nation', setting up a committee to honour 
Shaka. 'the founder of the nation' (Temkin, 1976:48). On 23-25 September 1954 
celebrations were held at Stanger, where Shaka lles burled. Temkin claimed that 
Luthull, on behalf of the ANC, donated the largest ox to the celebrations (1976: 116). 
Jordan Ngubane, who had been requested by the paramount chief to write on the 
Stanger ceremony, wrote to Buthelezi, congratulating him on the role he was 
estabUshtng for b1mself· 'once more (we are going to) employ all our resources for our 
own good as people'. He said that it was only because of Buthelez1's position that he 
would write about the ceremony. That the king would be the 'rallying point' and 
Buthelezl the 'premier' 18 what 'many Zulu intellectuals' hoped would happen, 
according to Temkin (1976:49). 
During a 1955 visit to Natal by Hendrlk Verwoerd (then mtnlster of Natlve Affairs), 
when he addressed some 300 chlefs and other leaders at Nongoma. Buthelez1 
'welcomed the government's promtse to retain the chleftalnship' and asked that the 
position of the king (Cyprian) be changed: "'Most people resent the fact that the king Is 
only used as a tool whenever there Is trouble and they want him to have more of a say 
In our afJalrs'" (Temkin, 1976:51: Survey, 1955/6:66). Buthelez1 was to change his 
mlnd on the executive position of the king once he had consoUdated his own position 
Within the bantustan structures, and had gained greater confidence and support. 
Verwoerd confirmed the position of Cyprian as head of the nation, but this was 'not 
acceptable to all the Zululand tribes, some of whom felt that the authori1¥ of the Zulu 
king did not extend to them' (Temkin, 1976:56-7). It Is dlfIlcult. even today, to see to 
what extent the king (now GoodwUl ZweUthlnl) has ever served as a 'rallylng point for 
the nation', or to what extent he has served polltlcally to fragment AfrIcan people In 
Natal through the inappropriateness of his position as 'traditionally' a figure of speclftc 
Zulu tribal allegiance, and even more so the struggle over appropriating h1rn for 
various poUtical mobWsations. 
On 6 September 1957 Buthelezi was offiCially Installed as chief. He had steered clear 
of the pass protests that his Wife and mother had been involved In so as not to 
jeopardize officlal recognttion of his position. Luthull, who could not attend the 
ceremony because of Ulness (says Temkin, although Luthull could hardly have done 
so With the ANC opposition to Bantu Authorities) sent a letter (which arrived late, 
wrote Temkin) in which he restated ANC rejection of Bantu Authorities because chiefs 
would become 'officlal mouthpieces' (1976:59). The director of the Institute of Race 
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Relations. Quintin Whyte. who attended the ceremony. wrote that 'whlle leaders such 
as Buthelezl had no part in making the laws. they had to admlnlster them. Buthelezl 
and others could only do their best to reduce the harshness of these laws and to 
develop their people within their framework' (Temkin. 1976:61). 
Working within the system 
With this reference to Whyte's comments. Temkin set the scene for a frequently 
repeated explanation. 'or justlflcatlon. of Buthelez1's involvement in state polley over 
the next three decades. 
At a meeting of the Mashonangashonl Regional Authorl1y in 1968, before the AuthOrl1y 
had been formally estabUshed, Buthelezl as chair jusUfted his partlclpatlon in the 
Bantu Authorities system. This meeting is said to have stgnlfted capitulation to the 
state's polltlcal plans in Natal. Buthelez1 said that 'eo-operatlon was not acceptance of 
the apartheid system but evidence of a desire to progress within whatever system was 
tmposed upon them' (Temkin, 1976:118). This idea is repeated at least 15 times in 
Temkin's biography of Buthelez1, reflecting the chiefs undoubted sensit1Vl1y to 
accusations of working within, and hence supporting the apartheid system. This 
justiftcatlon also extended to obeying the laws and authOrl1y of the land: for example, 
when Buthelez1 opened the first session of the Zulu Territorial AuthOrl1y in 1970 he 
pointed out that '"essentially" they (the Zulu people) had co-operated "as subjects with 
whichever government .. (was) in power"' (Temkin, 1976:127). 
Wblle much has been made in the polltlcal rhetoric of bantustan polltlcs in Natal of 
resistance to the lmposltlon of Bantu Authorltles during the 19608, the basis of that 
oppositlon is not clear to this researcher. Nor 18 it clear whether chiefs and 
commoners opposed the move for the same, or even slmllar reasons. There are vague 
reports that some 'tribes' wanted to walt and see how the lmplementatlon would work 
elsewhere, and that people reslsted slmply because they had not been consulted by the 
state. This aspect of regional political history needs much further study. 
There 18 some suggestion that opposition at local level from the chiefs (the Unchpins of 
the polley) could have been conservative rather than a rejectlon of the state's attempts 
at greater and more efficient control through reintroduced 'traditlonalism'. Temkin 
(1976:63) and Hill (1964:89) suggest that the chiefs feared changes in the degree of 
'local autonomy they had over such matters as the fines that they lmposed on their 
'subjects'. It is possible that suspicion about loss of income and authorl1y Was behind 
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their reluctance to accept the system (as it was with the formaUon of Inkatha in 1975, 
and as it is with pollUcal change in South Africa since 1990, and not only in 
KwaZulu-Natal). If this was the moUvation, then for some of the ch1efs an 
understanding of the system government that was being established under apartheid 
would have made clear that some chlefs were gOing to benefit beyond anything that 
had occurred under previous governments. Some chiefs were going to be absorbed 
into the bantustan l~slative assemblles providing salaries and posslbUlties of 
patronage far in excess of that which they had enjoyed before. 
Buthelezl, for example, asked for the system to be made compulsory, long before the 
state made It clear that the 1n1Ual element of chOice had been removed. At the time of 
the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) Buthelez1 wrote to a 'white 
political friend': 
'I have stated at public meetings in the presence of my tribe that it 
would seem that the best thing would be to co-operate with it (the 
Bantu Authorities Act) since my cousin who Is the Paramount Chief 
has done so. The people have not rejected the Act as far as 1 am 
aware. All that they have said Is that 1 am trying to rush them despite 
the choice gtven by the government - that they are watching it in 
operation in the Usuthu ward (that of the Paramount ChiefJ. 
1 am not the person standing In the people's way to acceptance. I am 
prepared to abide by any Act passed by ParUament. Parllament has 
chosen to make this particular one penntsstve. My suggestion is that 
it should be compulsory like Bantu Education and other Acts of 
Parliament' (quoted Temktn, 1976:72; slmllar sentiments were 
expressed in DaUy News. 28 Apr 64). 
This remarkable letter was quite correct In that acceptance was voluntary at that time. 
However. with the ANC opposing the system. there must have been a fair degree of 
popular resistance to It (although little evidence for such resistance to tribal 
authorities exists in the sources consulted). for different reasons from that offered by 
the chief (see Temkln. 1976:89). As late as 1965 the M1n1ster of Bantu Adm1n1stration 
and Development said in parliament that '''under no circumstances would I allow a 
Bantu Authori1y to be forced upon any tribe"', and that the Act stated that consultation 
had to take place (Suroey. 1965:133). At the same time Bantu Affairs commissioners 
(white district officials functioning as magistrates) said that it was ·consultation. not 
acceptance. that was called for' (Sunday Times. 18 Apr 65; see also Buthelezl. 
1972:7; Temkin. 1976:93-96). 
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In 1974. looking back on this period in the 1960s. Buthelez1 told the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly (KLA) that 'Mr Oltman. who Is a member of my department 
here', and Mr Otto (the maglstrate at Nongoma) had told his tribe that there was no 
option. He alleged Otto ~ said that 'magtstrates were wrongly lnstructed when they 
told tribes and chiefs that they had an option In the matter. There was no such option. 
I compUed because I am a law·ablcilng non-clttzen of South Africa' (KLAD 4, 
1974:214; also Survey, 1969:131). Buthelezl said at the Ume that he was reUeved to 
hear that acceptance was unnecessary, and that wh1le he did not belleve that the 
system was the answer to South Africa's problems, he would co-operate. Little Ume 
was wasted and under a Government Gazette notice In September 1965 a tribal 
authori~ was estabUshed for the Mahlabat1n1 tribal area. consisting of Buthelez1 and 
67 counc1llors. 
It would seem that Buthelez1 was not the centre of resistance. In 1966 107 tribal 
authorities had been estabUshed for the 282 govemment·recogn.tzed 'tribes' In Natal, 
and 12 regtonal authorities were functionlng (Suroey, 1966:147). By the next year, 
remembering that a trlbal authori~ had been estabUshed In Buthelez1's Mahlabatln1 
tribal area two years earUer, only a further 12 tribal authorities had been estabUshed 
amid conUDulng resl8tance, and early In 1968 there were stUl 135 to be created. 
However, during this year no fewer than 50 were formed and It appeared that the tide 
had turned. It was also In 1968 that chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu (the paramount chief of 
the Zulus) died and Buthelez1 became head of the Mashonangashon1 regtonal 
authori~ In the Mahlabat1n1 district. 
In 1969 prlnce Israel Mcway1Zen1 became regent untU prlnce GoodwUl should come of 
age and marry. A rift developed between Buthelez1 and prince Israel, who apparently 
wished to ask for a Territorial Authori~ for the Zulus, wblle Buthelez1 claims that he 
did not want It to be lnltiated from wlthln the royal family. This was the beginning of 
the rift between the royal family and Buthelez1 that was to absorb much regtonal 
Mrtcan poUtlcal energy over the following decades, a confl1ct that the central state was 
quite wUUng to fan durtng Its lnltial opposition to Buthelez1's loyal resistance, and that 
Dared up yet again after the 1994 elections lnvolvlng several of the same actors that 
had played a part In the 19605 and 1970s. 
Whether he was going to lnltiate moves to establ1sh a Zulu Terrltortal Authori~ (ZTA) 
or whether he was simply going to go along with Its creation, there Is Uttle doubt that 
Buthelez1 benefited poUtically from this apartheid structure. If his accession to 
chleftalnshlp had been perceived by observers Uke Jordan Ngubane In the 1950& as 
enabUng the mobUlzation of Zulu socle~ by the use of traditional authori~ In a 
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modem context. he lost that advlsory role as prime m1n1ster to the royal house after 
the death of Cyprlan (at least for several years), and again - at least in the eyes of a 
reconstituted royal council and of the ANC - in 1994. The 'prime m1n1sterlal' role of 
the Buthelez1 clan to the Zulu royal house dates back to the prominent role of 
Nqengelele under Shaka. and especially to the 'prominence in Zulu affairs' accorded to 
the Buthelez1 chiefdom With Nqengelele's son Myamana being prlme m1n1ster to 
Cetshwayo (see Buthelezi, 1978;'Marks, 1970:31; Guy.1982:46). 
Brenda Robinson, one of the local journalists in the English-language press who had 
kept Buthelezi's name and Image in the public eye in an extremely sympathetic way, 
wrote at the Ume, shortly after Cyprlan's death: 
'In 1968, after the death of Cyprlan whom he had served for sixteen 
years, Buthelez1 was elbowed out of Zulu royal affairs in a manner far 
from subtle. But to elbow him out of the public eye or the Zulu 
people's esteem proved a slmple impossibility' (Sunday Tribune, 16 
Jun 70, quoted in Temkin, 1976:121). 
Ironlcally, it was the creation of the Zulu Terrltorlal Authorlty (ZTA) - based on the 
state's deflnltion of 'traditional' society - that enabled him to conUnue to playa central 
role. Apartheid saved the chief from possible obscurity. 
Temkin offered reasons for Buthelezl's decision to enter into the highest level of the 
admlnlstraUve system devised for Mrlcans by the National Party government since 
1951. It was suggested that he was 'reluctant', but that his friends and poliUcal 
mentors of many years standing. bishop AH Zulu and the joumallst Jordan Ngubane, 
urged him to enter. However, despite his alleged resistance and indecision it must be 
clear that this was simply the next step on a road of prlor particlpaUon in government 
structures (whatever the jusUftcaUon) on which he had started many years earlier. 
Why did Buthelezi feel it wortbwhlle to participate here as well? First. he would have a 
'platform' from which he 'could draw attention to the lnlqulties and inequaliUes of the 
system', wrote Temkin (1976:123,216). The plausibility oftb1s reason is dlm1n1shed 
when one recalls that this 'system' had been in existence for nearly two decades, and 
its '1n1qulUes and inequalities' had been shown up and popularly rejected urnes 
Without count. It would hardly seem necessary to expose the disastrous effects of a 
system that prosecuted hundreds of thousands of people under the pass laws, that 
relocated as many into the hell-holes of the 'resettlement' camps (see, for example, 
Desmond, 1970), that banned organlzatlons of resistance, and condemned thousands 
to a life of migraUon. Participation in the bantustan structures would seem to have 
carried such a taint as to negate any value it might have had. 
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In an interview with the Financial MaU (14 Feb 75) Buthelezt was asked if he had any 
regrets about working within the 'framework of separate development'. His reply was 
as superfiCial as the earller Justlflcatlons: 'No. If the government does not dellver the 
. goods, It only proves that I was right In the first place. And if I have exposed certaln 
fallacles and frauds in the system I have accompllshed something' (also see Langner, 
1983: 11). As w1ll be argued later, this Circular argument does not hold if at the same 
time clalms are made for a clear polltlcal direction. 
A seconc;l clalm was that participation would offer 'some hope for the Zulu' if a 'Zulu 
homeland' was effectively led. It was lmplled, in this argument. that developmental 
possibilities could have arisen out of the apartheid system and that admI:nlstratlVe 
effiCiency would assure such a direction. 
This strand of Buthelezl'sJustlflcation for involvement In, first. Bantu Authorities and 
then the next stage of the apartheid structure - the pragmatic, reallsUc argument - Is 
well captured in his first report to the ZTA: 
"We as a people need development more than any other race group, 
and, for this reason, we say to those who have these reservations that 
a negative atUtude w1ll deprlve us of the development that Is avallable 
to our people within the framework of the polley. 
Let us. therefore, unite as a people as whites are united and glean 
whatever development Is allowed us In our llfeUme, for the benefit of 
posterity. 
What w1ll be more grat1fy1ng to us as we close our eyes on our 
deathbeds than to think that we did our best 10 the circumstances 
and to the very llmlt of what was possible ••• Let us make mistakes 
and learn by them instead of folding arms' (quoted 10 Temkin, 
1976:131). 
Temkin conunents that this approach of 'doing the best within the legalllmltations' 
(whlle condemning the llmltations) has been Buthelezl's 'standpoint to the present 
Unle' (1976:131). There are several crltlclsms to be made ofthls approach. Some have 
already been mentioned. There Is also more than a hint that 'legality' was equated With 
partlclpatlon In state structures. 
Third, his 'abstalnlng could have a destructive effect on the Zulustan government' 
(Temkin, 1976:123). However, by the mld-1980s after 16 years of Ute ZTA and then 
127 
the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly under the leadership of Buthelezl, the bantustan 
was having to screen pensioners as they could not all be pald, a fraction of the jobs 
had been created that would have been necessary to absorb the unemployed, let alone 
new workseekers, and there had been frequent complaints of mismanagement. 
corruption, and totally inadequate infrastructural and health facUlties. Buthelezl and 
his admlnIstration may not have directly caused this situation, but particlpation In a 
system that had these and other 'lnlqulties and lnequallties' as its lnevltable and 
sometlmes consclous effects entaUs some responstbW1¥ for them - especlally when 
Buthelezl and his admlnIstration clalmed credit for small vlctorles that allegedly arose 
out of their particlpation. 
Buthelezl argued that he was doing no more than particlpating In this technical task. 
In this velD Buthelezl told Justice and Pollce mlnlster Jlmmy Kruger In 1977 (lnkatba. 
nd:7). when the latter called him In to warn him against taking non-Zulus lnto the 
Inkatha movement: 'In fact. the Ulundi thlng as far as I am concerned is nothing more 
than local admlnIstration of the Zulu people ... we are just a section of the South 
Afrlcan people'. In 1976 he told the KLA (KLAD 8. 1976:85-86) that the 
people in these Rese~e areas have to exist and they should be helped 
by us. and we by them. in our attempts to eke out an existence ... This 
means that we have to face the fact that we have day to day goals, as 
we have to llve for 365 days each year and every year. On the other 
hand. we must have long-term goals ...• 
Fourth. the most credible statedjustlflcation for Buthelezl's particlpation was no 
doubt that fact that he had resisted the very strong push from the NP government for 
KwaZulu to take 'independence'. Such a step would have been the jewelln the 
intended 'constellation of states' that was envtsaged as 'the Zulus' were the largest 
etbnlc group in the apartheld plan. Buthelezl rejected this status. However. such a 
jusUflcation was volced only after he had already entered the system. 
Fifth, particlpation was Justlfled in terms of the conUnul1¥ of pre-capltallst polltical 
and cultural traditions. ThIs ls probably the most frequently used explanation of why 
Buthelezl had chosen the path of 'separate development', not because It is the polley of 
the central state but because It Is prlmarlly the historlcal conUnul1¥ of 'Zulu' socle1¥ 
and of Buthelezl's own polltical destiny. This is the strand that is focused on In this 
study. 
Buthelezl restated this position In an article Written after the results of the referendum 
ofwhlte oplnlon on the 'trlcameral' parl1ament became known In 1983 (Sunday 
Tribune. 6 NOv 83): 
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I was the traditional Prime Minister to my first cousin, King Cyprian 
for 16 years, long before there was any KwaZulu Legislative 
Assembly. I never thought that the ~e Minister was so politically 
illlterate to the extent of him being unaware that I am not Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu by the grace of the Nationalist Government. 
And in remarkably slmllar language he had written in the Sunday Times (16 Jan 83): 
I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 
or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his political eminence to any 
colonlal power. The solidartt¥ of the Zulu people was not dependent 
on white-created instltutions when they defeated the might of the 
British Army. White South Africa observes a so-called Day of the Vow 
as testimony to the fact that the people I now lead have their own wtll 
and their own sense of destiny. An act of history made us South 
Africans and South Africans we are and will remain. 
Here is a restatement of that short-term and long-term stratqGr that Buthelezl referred 
to In the KwaZulu LegIslative Assembly (the KLA). The former Is expressed In this 
version in terms of a separate 'Zuluness', and a spectftc history that dates back to 
pre-colonlal south-east Africa. That in Itself is falrly trite. What Is remarkable Is that 
this spec1flc local history should have been used In the last quarter of the twentieth 
century to justify involvement in a poliey as divisive and generally abhorrent as that of 
apartheid. Temkin, in trying to justify Buthelez1's participation, effectiVely condemned 
him, through pointing to the 'heads I wln, tails you lose' basis of the argument: 
'Homeland's (sic) poliey has been superimposed on Buthelezl's own position: his 
mandate does not require acceptance of the poliey, only Its exploitation and 
conformlt¥ to Its statutes' (1976:357). 
It was probably a measure of discomfort with this justlfication that made Buthelezl 
call upon the legtUmatlng approval of certaln ANC figures for the path that he had 
chosen. In a letter to the DaUy News (28 Mar 79) he wrote, In response to something 
that Natal Unlverslt¥ sociologist professor Fatima Meer had said about him: 
... I want to know whether the suggestion is that I should abandon my 
people at the Buthelezl tribal level, and also at the Zulu ethnic group 
level in order to be passed by her (Fatima Meer) as the authentic voice 
of my people? Must I leave the Zulus to the wlles of BOSS-sponsored 
ambitious characters so that they can lead them to Pretoria's 
pseudo-independence? Neither Chief Albert Luthull, Nelson Mandela 
or Walter Sisulu (and some leaders in exile), have ever told me that 
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there was any confllct in serving my people at home and the black 
liberation struggle in which I am engaged on a wider basis. 
His reference to 'BOSS-sponsored ambitious characters' was to attempts made during 
the 1970$ by the central state. through the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) and the 
Department of Information. to unseat him and replace him with an executive king. 
working through ultra-conservative traditionalists in the royal household. His fears 
were real. 
In an interview With Graham Watts (Sunday Express. 1 Ju184) Buthelez1 said that •.•• 
when he was a young man. he was adVised by ANC leaders Chief Albert Luthull. 
Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu to take up his heredltary poSition of chief minister 
of the Zulus'. He added that this was before the 'homeland pollcy' and that he did not 
choose to work Within ·the system'. (There might not have been a 'homeland pollcy' 
when the young Buthelez1 took up his chieftainship. but the Bantu Authorities system 
had been created and the role of chiefs within the system of indlrect rule had been in 
existence for nearly a century. albeit 1n1tlally outside Zululand). 
These claims were somewhat soured. Without necessarily castlng doubt on them. 
when in 1983 Albert Luthull's eldest daughter. dr Albertlnah Luthuli (Uving in 
Zimbabwe at the tlme) said: '1 ask myself where Buthelez1 went wrong. I remember so 
well years ago at my home in Groutv1l1e when he used to Vislt my fathe~ and he was a 
youth member of the ANC ... And now he stands for the very things my father 
opposed .. : (Star. 16 Sep 82). By the 1980s the context of Buthelez1's (and the ANC's) 
pol1tles had changed dramatically. 
Sixth. there ls ajustlf1catlon that can be called one of'moral affront'. It goes something 
like thls: 
'Each and every person in South Mrlca. white or black. ls willy-nilly 
working and liVing Within the system imposed by oppressors on all of 
us. Vociferous black spokesmen who thrive on reiterating these 
cl1ches live in the natlve townships under WRAB (the West Rand 
Administration Board) and other-adm1nlstratlon boards to which they 
pay rent. They are educated in black schools that are financed 
directly by the Department of Educatlon and Tralning. They attend 
separate black universitles financed by the Government' (Star, 14 Jul 
78. reporting on Buthelez1's address to the Inkatha central committee 
meetlng: also Cape Tlmes. 10 Apr 78). 
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The argument Is that there was Uttle difference between simply UvIng In South AfrIca 
as a black person. and actively participating in the structures of that society. To call 
those who opt~ for participation 'stooges' or 'puppets' was and remains, according to 
this argument totally wrong. However, there was a big dtfference between living in 
apartheid South Mrtca - carrying a pass. attending schools, living in group areas set 
aside for dtfferent racial groups. etc, and becomtng part of the structures that had 
been set up for the maintenance of the society in this form. Becomtng part of 
ethnically fragmented bantustan adm1n1strations, runnIng an ethnic police force, 
fighting battles with other ethnically deftned units over resources, was a far cry from 
doing those things that apartheid society enforced, doing them under pressure and, 
more and more often after the 1970s, dying whUe resisting apartheid. To have equated 
these two aspects to Justify participation In the apartheid structures reflected a 
measure of unease about such participation, whlch mJght account in part for 
Buthelez1's well-known sensitivity to whatever he has perceived as a slight. It was 
precisely this Inab1l1ty to adapt to escape the strictures of what may well have been a 
correct strategy of 'using the system' (and supported as such by the ANC 1n1tially), that 
made Buthelez1 and Inkatha the object of hatred from the new generation of 
opposition In the period afteI: 1976 and especially during the 1980s. 
Whatever the Justifications offered over the years, and they fluctuated according to the 
audience, the orlgln of the attacks and the general political climate, the direction and 
effect was that of consol1dating power for pol1tical and economic entrepreneurs, using 
the government's bantustan poliey. 
On 9 April 1970 a meeting of ch1efs eventually decided upon the establishment of a 
Zulu Territorial AuthOrity (Survey, 1970:141). Proclamation 139 of 22 May 1970 set 
out the regulations for the ZTA. As elsewhere. ch1efs and their 'traditional councillors' 
formed the basis of the AuthOrity, the head of whlch had to be a chlef. Buthelez1 was 
unanimously elected the chlef executive officer. Two out offlve of the other executive 
members also had to be chlefs. At this stage there were 188 tribal authorities (out of 
282 'tribes') and 22 regional authorities. 
Buthelez1, replying to the mlntster of Bantu Adm1n1stratlon and Development who 
opened the first meeting at Nongoma on 9 June 1970, assured him that reservations 
about the system had not meant 'disloyalty or "communism"', and he called for an 
acceleration of the process that had been set in motion - 'we cannot be expected to 
move towards self-determination and self-realization at ox-wagon pace' (Suroey, 
1970:143). 
131 
Buthelez1 was now 'on the national stage'. He turned down an invitation to open the 
National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) congress. 'because he believed it 
better to avoid such a possibly controversial engagement so soon after his election' 
(Temkin. 1976: 129). He did take part in 'controversial' political events during the 
early-1970s (including .participation in calls for the release of Nelson Mandela. one 
such campalgn ln1tiated by the National Union of South African Students). but 
possibly the memory of student clashes With pollce in the general protest at detentions 
during 1969 and 1970 was too lmmediate during the year that the ZTA was formed. 
NUSAS had also been the target of several state threats and direct action against the 
movement. 
It must be kept in mind that both white and black opposition groups and indlvlduals 
perceived the newly-fonned bantustan structures and some of the indlvlduals who 
occupied places Within them in a far from unfavourable Ught during the early 19708. 
or at least were ambiguous in their responses. To take just some examples: d.r 
Richard Turner. a radical Natal University lecturer who was very lnfluentialin both 
black and white student Circles (and who was assassinated in January 1978). wrote in 
an early-1973 postscript to his book. The Eye of the Needle. which was orlglnally 
WrItten in 1971: 
In a sense. black consciousness has certainly furthered the 
development of black solldarity in South Africa. But it is people like 
Chlef Buthelezi who are recognised by the bulk of Africans as their 
present leaders. wh1le the BPC (Black People's Convention) is 
probably known by a relatively small percentage of predominantly 
middle-class blacks (Turner. 1980: 127). 
Whlle voictng caution about the future. the llberal-Christian oriented Study Project on 
ChrlsUanlty in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS). for whom Turner bad WrItten his book 
as well. commented in 1973 that: 
Chlef Gatsha Buthe1ez1 has led the way among Bantustan leaders in 
vOictng demands that could be satisfied only by a substantial 
modlflcation of. or indeed by the abandonment of. separate 
development (SPRO-CAS. 1973:39) 
In 1973 there occurred what was described by SPRO-CAS director Peter Randall as an 
event that 'may serve as a turning point in the history both of Black Solidartty and of 
Coloured-white relationships'. Clashes between students and University authorities at 
the University of the Western Cape for coloured students led to several mass meeUngs 
being Caned. At one cb1efButhelezl. Fatima Meer (the University of Natal. Durban. 
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sociologist with whom Buthelezl was subsequently to clash). and other leaders 
appeared together. Randall wrote that 'slgnlficantly enough. the SASO (the black 
consciousness student organization. the SA Students Organisation. that had split from 
NUSAS in 1969) President was prepared to share the platform with a homeland 
leader ... • (Randall. 1973:32). Steve Biko h1mselfhad shared a platform with Buthelez1 
in 1971 under the theme 'Development of the African Community' (Khoapa (ed). 
1973:8) . 
. The justlflcations. as well as the explanations. for Buthelezt's involvement in apartheid 
structures need to be treated with greater understanding for the context within which 
they occurred than was and is often the case within the apparent clarities of a struggle 
against a system so abhorrent as apartheld. A fuller regional history of the 1950s to 
the 1990s. reflecting the clrcumstances under which decisions were made. as well as 
the continuities ('the historical conditions for possibility' (Norval. 1992:7)) and 
conttngencles. stlll has to be written. In the next sections I w1ll add further information 
and analysis to this task. 
The 8J8tem develops 
Polltlcal development in KwaZulu did not take place at the 'ox wagon pace' that 
Buthelez1 bad feared, and by 1972 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly was created to 
replace the Zulu Terrltorlal AuthOrity. This was a major step forward in the state's 
general constitutional planning for the bantustans, gtv1ng l1m1ted legislative as well as 
executive powers to these regtonal admlnlstratlons on thelr paths towards 
'independence'. The Act under which the KLA was created. the Bantu Homelands 
Constitution Act of 1971. made proVislon for 'Chapter I' and 'Chapter 2' powers. 
During the Orst stage. which started for KwaZulu in 1972, an executive councll was 
allowed, which was to become a cabinet in the next stage ('Chapter 2'). Excluded from 
'Chapter I' powers were important areas. such as establishment of townships and 
business undertakings. the appointment and dismissal of ehlefs. and educational 
syllabi. This meant that the bantustans were forced to move to the next stage, even if 
they should reject the 'final' stage of 'independence', as KwaZulu had already done (see 
Horrell. 1978:52-53). 
In 1972. then. a constitution was drafted for KwaZulu. This constitution contained 
two changes to the constitution subm1tted by the central government. The king had 
been 'downgraded' to a figurehead position. at the Insistence of Buthelez1 and the 
other executiVe councillors. This occurred against the wishes and petitions to the 
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central state of such royallsts as prince Clement Zulu who had wanted an executive 
'paramount chief (king) (Kotze, 1975:55-58: Schmahmann. 1978:93: Butler et al, 
1977:40). There was also a pledge of 'respect' for 'all laws appllcable in the area of the 
KwaZulu LeglslatlVe Assembly', rather than to the South African government (Temkin, 
1976:149). 
-
The issue of the constitutional role of the king was, and has remained, of central 
importance to the detail of spec1ftcally 'Zulu' polltics. Buthelezl's tactics have all along 
rested on occupying a commanding position in KwaZulu that could not be challenged 
'by an alternative trad1tion~ such as that of the king. With the potential or actual 
back1ng of the central state (then the NP, now the ANC). As mentioned above, powerful 
forces in opposltion to Buthelezlin the 19708 were trytng to set up a system of 
government slm1lar to that in SwazUand, another monarchy but With an executive 
king. These forces were operating not only within Zulu societ¥, but also found ready 
alUes in the state, and later amongst a disgruntled pet:t¥ bourgeoiSie. Their alUes 
Within the state did not want a somet1mes rebellious Buthelezi running the bantustan 
for the largest ethnic group in South Africa. a potential showpiece. Buthelezi tried to 
delay the lnstallation of Goodwlll as king of the Zulus. This was interpreted by some 
as a tactic to get the constitution for the KLA passed first. With its clauses detln1ng a 
non-executlVe role for the king. This interpretat10n is rejected by Temkln, but on 
somewhat unconVincing grounds ( 1976: 140). Such a move would have made sense 
Within the strategy Buthelez1 w~ to follow in out-manoeuvring the central state's 
ambitions to ~ a less rebellious leadership in the bantustan. 
Both parties In this conflict for the polltical power (real or lmaglned) of the king drew 
heavUy on 'trad1tion' to jusUfy their particular clalms (see, for example, Temkln, 
1976:139-46: and below). It comes as no surprise that the first debate Within the ZTA 
should have referred so often to the idea of a 'Zulu nation'. The ambIgUities of this 
message when read together With reject10n of the South African government's polley of 
trytng to create a 'Zulu nation', are clear. Within that 'nation' and its cultural history 
there were at the time, and for a long time lnto the 19708. two interpretations. One 
came from Buthelezl and the pollticlans (many of them ex-members of the ANC In 
Natal) and economic Interests that perceived their aspirations to be best served With a 
less direct Involvement of the king. However. they were not stepping away from the 
spec11lcally 'Zulu' element In the rules of this polltical game. On the contrary they were 
simply deftnlng or redeftnlng the rules of 'Zuluness': for example, Schlemmer and 
Mull ( 1975: 125) said that moves by the king and his adVisers were opposed because 
'they Violated custom'. On the other side were a mixed bag of securlt¥ pollce agents, 






executive king (which they claimed was historically correct). and tradlng10terests who 
felt threatened by the close llnks that Buthelez1 and those around him had built up 
with 'white' (especially monopoly) bus1oess. 
Twenty years later slmUar struggles are being fought out 10 the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. now with a democratically-elected central government In place. Once 
again the struggle 1s over political power and the role of the reglon In relation to 
central authority; now. irontcally. with the central state attempting greater integratton 
of a recalcitrant regional government. that of the IFP (see. for example. Mare. 1994). 
The 1972 KLA constitution proVided for 24 September to be an offic1al public holiday 
In KwaZulu. to be known as King Shaka Day. a matter dear to Buthelez1 slnce 1954. 
The KLA would comprise a personal representative of the king. three chiefs (or chairs 
of community authorities) appointed by each of the 22. existing regional authorities. 
and 55 elected members (elections were. however. not held unttlI978). A comment by 
Butler et al (1977:41) draws attention to a polnt that has been mentioned In 
connection with Buthelez1's dental that he partic1pated in apartheid: 
It is important to emphasize the limited nature of the changes in the 
constitutions of the homelands. The legislation of 1970 and 1971 (the 
Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act and the Bantu Homelands 
Constitution Act) provides no major break with the system 
established in the Transkeiin 1963. the roots of which go back to the 
Bantu AuthOrities Act of 1951. What has been achieved 
constitutionally 10 recent years is the extension of Transkei-type 
models to the other former reserves. 
A further concess10n that Buthelez1 won was the right to select members of his own 
executive councll, although the names st1l1 had to be presented to the KLA for 
approval. 
The status achieved in 1972 was that of stage one self-government. The Zulustan was 
one of the last of the at first eight envisaged ethnic groups to get to this point (two 
further bantustans were added after the orIginal 1959 Act was passed). Buthelez1 
fairly consistently came out against the final step. as enVisaged by the political 
planners In Pretoria. and the KwaZulu bantustan never became one of the 
'independent national states' (of which there were finally four), politically recogntzed 
only by each other and by the South Mrlcan state. Some of Buthelez1's early 
statements mtght have been read as leaVing the way open for this largely fictitious 










somethlng that had been ruled out by the inadequate consoUdation proposals made 
over the years by the state (see Temkln. 1976:165). 
The KwaZulu Government Diary (1974: 1 0) Carrted a 'statement of polley' in 
Buthelez1's foreword: 
We beUeve that it 18 in the interests of the Zulu nation that we gear 
our approach towards full poUtical rtghts with the least poUtical delay 
and that means nothlng less but unqual1fted independence. 
We w1l1 therefore in terms of our const1tut1on from time to time ask 
that more and greater powers and more comprehensive dut1es in 
respect of KwaZulu matters be handed over to us that we can orderly 
develop towards full autonomy. 
This 18 followed by another statement which. although vague. seems to refer to 
protect1on. on an ethnlc basiS. of certain resources. such as trading fac1l1t1es that were 
to become a major issue during the mtd-1970s. This point reads as follows: 
We ftrmly reject any poUcy or move which could have the tendency 
and/or ultimate result that the wealth. resources and commercial 
opportunlt1es of KwaZulu would no longer be reserved and developed 
exclusively for us. 
To be fair to Buthelezi, the speech on which he (or the compiler of the Diary) based 
this foreword (quoted above) was given in the KLA the previous year (KLAD 3, 
1973: 168-9). Here the phrase 'unquallfted autonomy rather than 'unquallfled 
independence' was used. It would be correct to say that while one may find such 
lnstances where he enVisaged 'independence' under certa1n condit1ons (condit1ons that 
were extreme and lmpossible to meet under the apartheid polley as then envtsaged). 
generally he had rejected the cUmax of the bantustan polley. When Drum magaZine 
wrote (December 1982) that he had seen the estabUshment of the ZTA as a 'step 
towards eventual independence' • Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo was qulck 
to respond that 'It was blatantly untrue to allege that there was ever a time when Chief 
Buthelez1 ever contemplated taking so-called "independence"' (Drum, February 1983). 
During 1974 the KLA asked to move into the next phase of self-government (with 
greater legislative powers) in terms of the Bantu Homelands Const1tut1on Act. The 
m1n1ster of Bantu Adm1n1strat1on and Development replled sympathet1cally but said 
that It would have to await elect10ns in KwaZulu. This was a pointed reference to the 
delay in holding elect10ns In the bantustan because of the KLA's reluctance to use 
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'reference books', the notorious pass-book ('dompas'), and the declslon that KwaZulu 
'c1Uzenshlp cerUftcates' were to be issued prior to elections (Langner, 1983:51). 
Greater status and power were agatn requested in 1976, and were finally granted in 
~ebruary 1977. still without elections and with KwaZulu divided into as many 
fragments as before. 
Internal bantustan politics had by the mid-1980s not changed greatly except that the 
level of direct repression had already escalated dramatically (for example. Haysom. 
1983: 1986). However. the changing political cl1mate in South Mrica as a whole had 
fundamentally altered the position ortglnally envisaged for these r~ons. The 
KwaNdebele 'homeland' was due to gain its 'independence' at the end of 1986. but 
popular res18tance forced the South Mrlcan state and African supporters of 
'independence' for the 'state' to back down and postpone plans for further 
fragmentation of South Mrica. Fewer attempts were subsequently made to force the 
remaining five into 'independence'. Instead, a greater measure of incorporation of 
these bantustans into 'white' SA was on the cards (see, for example, Cobbett et al, 
1986). This new poliey, only in its 1n1t1al stages in the mid-1980s. meant that it 
became counterproductiVe to find a way of ctrcumventtng Buthelez1 or forcing him into 
'independence'. As the l1nes during the period of mass resistance appeared to be 
drawn ever more clearly in class rather than Just racial1sed terms, 80 the traditional 
opposltlon to Inkatha and to Buthelezi from the state and NP-controlled media 
changed. Gone were the days when every session of the KLA was dominated by 
revelations and accusations about Department of Information and security police 
involvement in KwaZulu politics in attempts to replace Buthelez1 with someone more 
pliant. Even business had. in the early-1970s, wanted Buthelez1 and other bantustan 
politlc1ans to be leglslat1vely excluded from the labour field. However. the name and 
face of Buthelez1 was in the 1980s frequently to be found making a point that 
supported the state'S or capital's new direction, or attacking the enemies of 'reform' in 
South AfrIca. In this new deflnlUon of a conunon South Africa. albeit st1ll composed of 
'minorities'. there was certalnly a place for Buthelez1 and h1s ethnic support base. The 
question was simply. where? How could concessions be made without opening the 
doors to majority rule? 
It Is in this context that the federal option. advocated by Buthelez1 for so long, came to 
demand serious consideration from politicians and academics. It had been given the 
stamp of approval by business leaders in Natal, through their parUc1patlon in 
. dellberatlons of the Buthelez1 Conun1ssion and then in the discussions for a joint 
adm1nlst:raUon and l~slature in Natal and KwaZulu (the venture known 88 the 
KwaZulu-Natal 'Indaba'. or consultation). Buthelez1 and Inkatha were by then turning 
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the weakness. on an ideologlcallevel •. of being part of the bantustan system. into a 
strength through making the bantustan and its poUtics a central part of regional and 
hence national. poUtics. The presence in force of KwaZulu poUce. armed with 
automatic weapons. at the 1986 May Day launch of Inkatha's trade union in the heart 
of 'white' Durban was a sign of the future. as was the fact that the union. UWUSA. was 
subsequently revealed to have been state funded (Mare. 1991). 
Inkatha re-formed: parallels from the past 
On 22 March 1975 Inkatha YaKwaZulu was revived at KwaNzlmela Diocesan Centre 
near Melmoth in northern Natal. More than 100 delegates were present from Natal. 
the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The gathering represented 18 of the by then 
26 regional authorities in Natal. the KwaZulu executive councillors. most of the 
members of Ubhoko (an interim preparatory body) and prominent Zulu women (see 
Langner. 1983:20). 
The first constitution of this 'new' Inkatha not only used the term 'Zulu' Ue made the 
movement ethnically exclusive at its start), but also referred to the first Inkata of the 
19208: a bracketed reference at the head of the first constitution read '(Founded in 
1928 • by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu)'. Langner claims that by the time the first 
copies of the Inkatha constltution were pubUshed, 'Inkatha YaKwaZulu' had been 
altered to read 'Inkatha Yeslzwe' ('Inkatha of the nation', rather than 'Inkatha of the 
place of the Zulus') (1983:21). This ambiguity ofbelng caught between the 'Zulu 
nation', on the one hand, and national aspirations (the 'Mrican nation). on the other, 
continued to haunt the movement. 
This was not the first attempt to revive the Inkatha movement in Natal since king 
Solomon's times. In an interview Zephaniah Mahaye. a Mtubatuba businessman. said 
there had been an attempt in 1943 (KCAV. no number). Langner cites an interview 
with chief Buthelezl as his source for the claim that chief Albert LuthuU. then 
president of the ANC. also tried to reVive Inkatha even before the ANC was banned 
(Langner. 1983:12). Buthelezl. then the 30-year old chief of the Buthelezi tribe, 
allegedly supported this move. Paramount chief Cyprian Bhekuzulu. apparently after 
being dissuaded by the Department of Native Affairs. opposed the revival and claimed 
that it was Just a vehicle for Buthelezl to estab.lIsh a power base outside formal 
structures as his (Buthelezi's) tribe had rejected the Bantu AuthOrities system. 
Buthelezl's biographer. Ben Temkin, denies this claim and says that Buthelezl went as 
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far as call1ng a 'conference of leading Zulu' at the lnslstence of 'many of the older Zulu, 
including a number of mlnlsters of reUg1on'. This meeUng was, however, 'gatecrashed' 
by CB Young, secretary for Bantu Admlnlstration. Bl5hop AH Zulu, the first black 
Anglican bishop in South Africa and a close friend of Buthelezl, wrote a letter to 
Buthelezlin which he said he knew that the chief 
'did not want this thing ... The conference must certainly not meet if It 
w1ll be interpreted as your attempt to create a counter-attraction to 
Bantu Authorities. If some people in Zululand and Natal want to view 
this matter from that angle you can be sure Pretoria w1ll do so as well' 
(quoted Temkin, 1976:75). 
As It turned out. Buthelezl established himself ftrmly in the Bantu Authorities 
structures and in the KwaZulu bantustan before forming Inkatha in 1975. 
Further 'attempts to revive Inkatha by the ANC in the 19408 and by Buthelezlin the 
19608' are referred to in a dissertation completed in 1977 (Bernstein, 1977: 122). It 15 
not clear whether these are referen~ to the same moves that have already been 
mentioned. What is clear Is that the conservatism and Zulu 'natlonal1sm' or ethnic 
consciousness that had characterized much of Natal African politics during the 
twentieth century also lay behind attempts to revive Inkatha. 
Wblle the first Inkata became effective in 1924, arising out of a prior 'Zulu National 
Fund', It was the rejuvenation of the organiZation in 1928 that has received most 
frequent mention in historical overviews. A new constitution was written In 1928 (see 
the excellent study by Cope, 1993:chapter 8), hence the reference to the 'founding' in 
that year by Solomon in the 1975 constitution of Inkatha and the clalm to a link with 
the past. Wblle this explicit attempt at conUnul1;y was dropped, because It would 
interfere with the 19708 movement's national political aspirations, It does draw 
attention 10 the ironies of history. To paraphrase Marx. history repeats Itself - the first 
time as farce and the second time as tragedy. If the farce of the 19208 was to be found 
in the overt misuse of Inkata funds collected from the pover1;y-strlcken population of 
Natal to maintain klng Solomon in a s1;yle that lncluded large liquor debts (he was an 
alcoholic) (see Marks, 1986:chapter 1: Cope, 1993:202) and ostentatious motorcars, 
the tragedy of the 19708 lies in the effects on national and local political struggle of the 
Zulu chauvlnlst and ultra-conservative elements In Inkatha and their actions. 
It Is worth mentioning some of the continulties and ironies of the links between the 
two Z~u-based movements. FIrst. the 1928 constitution, presented by Buthelez1 as an 
element In a tradition of Zulu politics, was drawn up by a white Durban-based lawyer 
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at the lnstlgation of sugar interests in Natal. George Heaton Nicholls, in the mld-1920s 
member of Parliament for Zululand and president of the South African Planters' 
Union and its affillate, the Zululand Planters' Union. and a strong segregationist. 
lnstructed Nicolson and Thorpe (solicitors) to draw up the 1928 constitution (Cope. 
1993: 196. 217). a document that ensured that the interests of the conservative African 
petty bourgeoisie and b1bal eUtes were ftrmly entrenched in Inkata. The whites who 
lnfluenced Inkata at thls time operated behind the scenes. and expUcltly kept thelr 
names out of any link with the movement. ThIs has a parallel in the later Inkatha. 
which. despite Buthelezl's hypersensitive denials. had at various Urnes also collected a 
number of white advlsers coming from slmllar agricultural and industrlal 
backgfounds (such as Chris Saunders and Tony Ardlngton). from academic 
lnstitutions (such as professor Lawrence Schlemmer of Natal University). from the 
press. where a long Une of JournaUsts ensured that Buthelezl and the Inkatha 
movement were kept in a very uncritical focus for many years (people such as Tim 
Mull. Brenda Robinson. Roy Rudden. Suzanne Vos. and Arthur Konlgkramer). and of 
course Walter Felgate (social anthropologist. bUSinessman. and for many years the 
least pUbUclsed personaUty in thls constellation despite the frequency with which his 
name was connected to Buthelezl and Inkatha) and Rowley Arenstein (a communist 
lawyer. 'banned' under apartheid South Africa's 'security legislation'. Buthelezl's 
lawyer and long-time friend). Inkatha had maintained links with white poUtical 
personaUties (such as Ray Swart. of the Progressive Federal Party) and partles. but 
thls had been on a much more overt level. 
In 1928 Heaton Nicholls went so far as to write a speech for king Solomon. in which 
the Indusb1al and Commercial Workers Union. the ICU, was attacked and Zulu 
'traditions' praised (see Cope. 1993: 194-5). Through the mouth of Solomon. but from 
the pen of Nicholls. the traditlonal virtues of the Zulu people were extolled. Temkin 
made the clalm. implausible if only because of the number of speeches given every 
year. that Buthelezl'researches and writes all his own speeches in longhand .. : 
( 1976:4). It appears that the process became somewhat more sophlsUcated in the 
19708 and 1980&. using modem technology to transmtt.ifnot Write. the chiefs 
speeches. but bore many stmUaritles with what happened in the 19208. Such a 
statement Is not to suggest that Buthelezi was not capable of Writing his own speeches 
or devising his own poUcles. but to argue that once again 'white' conservatiVe interests 
in apartheid raclaUsed pol1tlcs found fertile common ground with Zulu 
ethnic-nationaUsm - polltlcally. Ideologically and economlcally. 
Second. the first Inkata was the creation of the African petty bourgeoisie in Natal1n 
the 19208. which .had seen the possibWUes of ustng Zulu 'tradltionallsm' as a polltlcal 
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tool and a means of economic advancement. In additlon. it was not only white 
interests that shaped the 1928 constitution. but also speclfic class interests (white 
and Zulu). It suited both sugar planters and white commercial farmtng interests to 
'retrlbal!ze' Zulu society. and to attempt to cement close links with the trlbal elite and, 
especially, wtth the Zulu royal family (offers were, for example, made to repay king 
Solomon's large debts). Whlle Solomon had not been accepted as paramount chief of 
all Zulu people by the South African government officialdom (out of fear of a revival of 
Zulu political and milltary might), he had been acknowleged as chief of the royal clan, 
the Usuthu. At the same time his acceptance in Zulu society stretched far beyond the 
measure of offiCial recognition he had gained. 
Such 'retrlballzation' at a reglonallevel, already part of the national strate§ of the 
state through the 1927 Native Admlnistration Act. was perceived by regtonal 
agrlculturalinterests to be a necessary step to secure what was being lost to the 
mlnlng industry· suffiCient. cheap Zulu labour, disciplined in production, as well as 
through trlbal structures and values (for example. Cope, 1993:209). 
As early as 1916. when Solomon was offiCially installed as paramount chief, the l1m1t 
of formal recognttion from the government. the motiVation was that he could be used 
for 'administrative purposes'. The lmmediately most lmportant of such purposes was 
to recruit labour for the war effort in 1917 (Marks, 1986:33-34). Sugar producers in 
the 19208 wanted to use Solomon, through Inkata. to preserve Natal labour for the 
region. More than five decades later chief Buthelezl was being 'used' in a slmllar 
function as labour recrulter. but now by the mlnlng industry, reflecting the changed 
economic circumstances. It was no longer possible to talk of purely regfonal business 
interests, at least not as far as the manner in which large-scale capital operated, and 
in any case there was probably enough labour to take Jobs in Natal even at the low 
wages being paid. I wtll return to this theme below, when discussing the way in which 
Inkatha'traditionalism' had been used to diSCipline the working class in the 19708 
and 1980&. 
In the 19208 Inkata conservative petty bourgeois interests were well personlfted in 
John Dube, president of the ANC from Its formauon in 1912 to 1917 and then, 
"vlrtually for the rest of his llfe ... to run the Natal provincial branch of Congress 
vtrtually as an independent fief (Marks, 1975:163). A point made by Marks, that 
Dube's apparent later conservatism did not mean 'that he had changed from an earller 
radicallsm. ••. , but that the world around him had changed' (1975:165), applles in 
large measure also to Buthelezl and Inkatha. within the changes in polltical context 
from the UJne of formation in 1975 to the radical rupture in February 1990. Dube, by 
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his 'avoidance ofv1olence ... his deeply ingrained desire for law and order .. : and other 
attributes (such as a stress on self-help and the value of education), prefigured the 
Inkatha leadership of the 19708 and the 1980s. However, most 'prophetically', Dube, 
in his cloee alllance With large-scale (sugar) producers in Natal, set a pattern that was 
to be repeated half a century later. Marshall Campbell, the sugar baron, apparently 
provided ftnancial aid for Dube's educational1nstltution (Marks, 1975:174). Today the 
Mangosuthu Teclm1kon in UmlaZl stands as a monument to the close relationship that 
existed between Buthelezl and the Anglo American Corporation. 
ThIrd, the use made of 'tradition'. and especially of Solomon as effective (If not formal) 
klng. found an echo in the tnltial direct use made of king Goodwtll as patron of the 
1975 Inkatha. Even the term 'patron' was used of both Solomon and GoodwUl, both 
relegated to (powerfully) symbollc positions as 'figureheads' of the ship of the 'Zulu 
natlon'. The 'Zulu natlon' as a term of political mobilisatlon 1s st1l1 avaUable to 
contemporary AfrIcan polltlcians (as it was 1n the 19208), but has come to be 
associated With the most conservative of politlcal1nterests, partly because it carries 
With it the baggage that the apartheid policy had attached to it. It does notJust stand 
for a history of resistance, as 'Yas argued above, but also for the fragmentatlon of a 
natlonal struggle in South AfrIca. and was linked to racial dominatlon and economlc 
exploltatlon. However, It also carries that conservatIVe tag because it has served Within 
ethnic politlcal mobilisatlon, and not only for Inkatha. 
A difference between the polltlcal and ideological struggle of 1928 and of 1975 lles in 
the central role that Buthelezl had taken upon himself to ensure contlnutt¥ of Zulu 
tradltlon. This is not really surprlstng as the 'prime mtn1ster1al' role that Buthelezl 
had 'inherited' from his paternal great grandfather, Mnyamana Buthelezl, 'prime 
mlnlster' to King Cetshwayo, grandfather of Solomon, was only belng reinstltuted 
under Solomon. Solomon married several women from the Buthelezl clan to resolve 
the tensions that had bullt up over the years between them and the Zulu royal famlly. 
He also married off one of his Sisters, Magogo (Chief Buthelezl's mother. who died in 
1985), to Mathole, chlef of the Buthelezl. Whlle chief Mangosuthu Buthelezl managed 
to shift the king, Goodwtll, into a subsidiary posItlon (With no executlve powers), both 
in regard to the KLA and to Inkatha. he at the same time drew as much l~tlmacy as 
poss1ble from his own direct blood relationship With the royal famlly and from his 
ancestors' polltlcal relationship with the royal hou~ (see for example, Buthelez1. 
1978; Laband and Wrtght. 1983). 
Fourth, the 1928 constltutlon and reconstructlon of Inkata served not only to advance 
the direct interests of the classes 1nvolved, but also to counter the threat posed at the 
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time by the large grassroots support that the Industrial and Commerclal Workers 
Union (the ICU) was galnlng in Natal. Ironically the organisaUon of workers was 
happening under the leadership of, amongst others, AWG Champion, another Zulu 
leader who bad to a large extent broken away from the naUonal body Within which he 
was funcUoning, as Dube had from the ANC. 
The speech referred to above, written for king Solomon by Heaton Nicholls, was 
atmed at attacking the ICU and brtnglng the weight of royal displeasure to bear on 
those who supported the movement. The ICU was draWing support because of the 
intense pressures exerted on the African rural populaUon through changing conditions 
in agriculture, pressures such as land hunger because of the rising value of 
agricultural land, and the need for labour as the lmportation of indentured Indian 
labour bad come to a halt. The supporters of Inkata. spec1flcally the sugar industry's 
Heaton Nicholls, saw a segregationist policy and 'retriballzation' as a counter ·to 
class-based politics. These were the themes of the speech Solomon delivered in 1928, 
the year in which 'an emotional pitch'. unsurpassed by anything 'since the days of the 
native rebellion of 20 odd years ago' swept the small Natal midlands town of 
Greytown, brought on by the real. albeit exaggerated, threat posed by the ICU in the 
dlstrlct (Bradford, 1984:128; also 1987). 
Ftfty-elgbt years later Inkatha engaged in a process of trying to crush unions afBllated 
to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and establish Its own union 
(UWUSA) 1nstead, the latter arising out of the perception a non-antagontsUc 
relationship to capital and support for continued foreign investment during the 
sancUons years. Nicholls, through Solomon. called the ICU leaders a 'nolsy band of 
self-seekers'. In 1986. With the formaUon of the United Workers' Union of SA. the 
'Inkatba union' (funded in part by the SA security police (Swvey. 1991192:294-7; 
Mar~. 1991)). Buthelezl referred to COSATU's 'celebrity leaders who prance and 
posture as real leaders' (BS. 18 Mar 86:5). 
The campaign by the alliance of business interests. the conservatiVe African petty 
bourgeoisie and the tribal elite during the 1 920s was given publicity by the editor of 
the nanga newspaper. John Dube. In 1985 nanga Journallsts went on strike in 
protest at the pro-Inkatba editorlal bias of the newspaper. The newspaper was 
subsequently bought by Inkatha on 14 Aprll 1987 from the Argus Printing and 
Publishing Company. and placed under the Mandla-Matla publishing company With 
the then Inkatha secretary-general. dr Oscar Dhlomo, at the head (Swvey. 
1987/88:815). The newspaper then had a circulation of 100 000. making it a very 
powerful poliUcal vehicle. 
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The analogtes between the two periods could be expanded. but the point should be 
clear: the tradition of the 'founding fathers' of the ANC and of the first Inkata to which 
the revived Inkatha leadership appealed is a very conservative tradition with strong 
elements of anti-popular and anti-worker rhetoriC and action. In part this history. 
~en Just through. the appeal made to it. served to shape the present of the 19708 
formation of the next Inkatha. 
Inkatha ill the 19708 
The Mrlcan Nattonal Congress was formed In 1912. when 'several hundred of South 
Mrlca's most prominent ciUzens: professional men. chieftains. m.lnlsters. teachers. 
clerks. interpreters. landholders. businessmen. Journallsts. estate agents. building 
contractors and labour agents'. met In Bloemfontein (Lodge. 1983: 1). In 1975 the 
formation (or re-formation) meeting of Inkatha. the vehicle for Zulu ethnic 
mobUlsatton since then. was attended. In the words of chief Buthelezl. by 'the cream of 
the elite Zulus in this proVince (Natal). from the Transvaal and the Free State' (KLAO 
7. 1975:772). Sixty three years had passed. but it appears that the two groups were 
remarkably stmllar. if not in occupational composition then in class interest and 
aspiration. What dlsttngulshed the two meetings and the tmmedlate concerns of those 
present was that the 1912 gathering aimed to create a national movement. to work 
against the exclUSion and fragmentation strateg1es of the state that was formed in 
1910 out of the Boer Republics and British Colonles (under the slogan of white unity: 
'Ex UDltate Vires'). The 1975 gathering met to form an ethnic organtsation Within a 
state-created admlnlstraUve regton of an already enormously divided South Africa. 
The first president of the ANC was the reverend John L Dube. educationalist and 
editor of lkmga lase Natal. who was seen as the man 'to weld the supra-tribal unity 
Congress had set itself to achieve' (Walshe. 1970:35). More than 60 years later 
Buthelezl was to appeal repeatedly to the personal and ideologlcalllnks that Inkatha 
suppoaedly had With the early ANC. a Unk that carried Uttle of the radicalism and 
direct resistance that is usually assoclated with the ANC as poUtical symbol. but that 
did resonate with ANC positions at various stages during its long resistance existence. 
The process during the early-1970s that led to the formation of Inkatha is not all that 
clear. As already mentioned. there are several references to the existence of a body 
called 'Inkatha' predating the officlal formation in March 1975. So. for example. In 
. 1972 Buthelezl told the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLAO 1. 1972: 1 0) that the 
first Inkata was something that Solomon kaDlnuzulu had 'dreamed up'. to promote 
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the economic development of the Zulu people (whose economic Interests were served 
by the 19208 Inkata. was discussed above and it was certainly not those of the 
ordinary 'Zulu.people'). He stressed that what he was talking about was not a political 
party but a 'national movement'. He continued: 
As Chief Executive Councillor I would llke to propose that this 
'lbandla' is not a party when we call ourselves 'Inkatha Ka Zulu' so 
that whoever has ambitions will be outside this 'Inkatha kaZulu'. That 
is something that was bequeathed to us by our late King Solomon ka 
Dlnuzulu. I wish to stress that this is not a party. It is a national 
movement. but I would lmaglne that we of this Government when 
elecUons come we shout 'Inkatha' and they will say 'Ka Zulu'. 
In 1973, the year after this rather cryptic reference, Buthelezi distributed the 1928 
Inkata constitution to members of the KLA (Bernstein, 1977:117; KLAD 3, 1973:281). 
Buthelezl repeated an earUer reason for the suggested revival of Inkatha. namely 
'economic upWbnent' (KLAD 3, 1973:174): 'We should not stop to do anything to 
improve our economic situation ... Once we have a measure of economic power our 
battle wW be half-won. That ~ why we should all support Movements such as Inkatha 
kaZulu and the Black Bank'. During the next session of the KLA Buthelezl said that he 
had recelved a telegram from a 'Mr Madlala of Johannesburg', who is 'the Chairman of 
lnkatha KwaZulu' (KLAD 4, 1974:101). Wentzel (1977:6) wrote In the introduction to 
her interview With dr Nyembezi and John Mavuso, chair and executive member 
respectively of the Black Unity Front. a movement formed With Inkatha at the forefront 
in frustration at central state political recalCitrance (Mare and Hamilton, 1987:157-8), 
that: 
Inkatha had started in Dr Nyembezl's house in 1974 whlle a pubUc 
meeUng was be1ng organiZed to receive Chlef Gatsha Buthelezl and 
introduce members of his government to the Soweto pubUc. The 
organlzers of the meeting felt they would llke to estabUsh something 
more permanent and asked Chief Buthelezi for a name. He suggested 
the name Inkatha be revived ... 
In 1974 (sic) the revived Inkatha was omcially launched. 
WhUe the name was certainly around. and may have had several organizational forms 
before the formal reconstitution of Inkatha in 1975, what is clear is that the 
lnuned1ate fore-runner was a group known as 'Ubhoko' (a walking sUck). Langner 
wrote that according to dr Alpheus Zulu. a group of 'leading Zulus' began meeUng 
during the early 19708 'funCtioning as a .. think tank" to try to work out a strategy for 
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founding a national movement to halt the divisive effect of separate development and 
at the same time to act as a vehicle for the evolution of Black cultural patterns and 
self-reliance' (1983: 17). This body developed into Ubhoko. 
Accorcl1ng to Langner, Buthe1ez1 had claimed that the revival was his idea. With 
support from bishop Zulu. In 1972 he started punctuating his speeches With the cry of 
'Inkatbal kaZulul'. Interestlngly enough, in the Ught of the origlns of the 19208 Inkata 
in the Zulu National Fund, Buthelezi also opened a trust fund 
which would be used for the development of KwaZulu and its people 
and In particular in the fields of industry, commerce, agriculture. 
education. pubUc relations and communication. He said the money 
could be used. for example. for the formation of a company to run a 
newspaper. a pubUc relations office. and a planning and development 
body (Langner. 1983: 17). 
Ubhoko was formally constituted In February 1974, a year before Inkatba was formed. 
In the KLA Buthelez1 presented Ubhoko as a vehicle for the KwaZulu cabinet for 
'llalson with the Zulu pubUc and access to all those celebrtties to advise us on any 
matter Informally in the Interests of the Zulu nation' (KLAD 5. 1974:63). Members of 
Ubhoko included church flgures such as bishop Zulu as chairperson. members of the 
Zulu royal famlly such as prince Gideon Zulu. academiCS such as Otty Nxumalo of the 
University of Zululand and professor CLS Nyembezl. as well as businesspeople 
(Edward Ngobese. RS Ngobese) and professionals (see Langner. 1983:18). One of the 
tasks of Ubhoko was to decide on a constitutlon for the planned Inkatha and in 
particular to examlne the Zambian United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
constitution with this task in mind. Buthelezl had been Impressed With this document 
during a 1973 vlalt. The UNIP constitutlon. With minor changes. was adopted by 
Ubhoko for Inkatha. 
Buthelezi had also been a member of 'the group of leading poUticlans and academiCS 
of all races and parties who meet regularly and who are known as "Synthesis'" 
(introduction by ES Munger to Buthe1ezi. 1972). This must have been at the time 
when the Idea of Inkatha was first sertously discussed. but whether there was any llnk 
Is not known. 'Synthesis' was then an exclusive and apparently lnfiuentlal discussion 
group composed of representatives of. for example. large-scale capital. sympathetic 
academics and some poUticians. who invited speakers from a Wide range of 
perspectives to brtef them on contemporary issues that mtght have bearing on the 
decisions they had to make. 
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Before we look at the k1nd of organisation that was created In 1975. it is necessary to 
say something about the lmmeci1ate reasons for the creation of Inkatha. Late In 1973 
nearly all the bantustan leaders met in Umtata (Venda and QwaQwa were not 
represented). This meeting decided that an Interview with prtme mlnlster BJ Vorster 
would be sought early in 1974. It also asked for more ·money from taxes that were 
generated in the 'white' areas of the country. and the repeal of the influx control 
legislation (Survey. 1973:164-5}. Buthelezi claimed that this meeting showed the 
soUdarl~ that could be achleved through working within state poUey. 
The eight bantustans (two more were st1ll to be created) met With the South African 
prime mlnlster in 1974 In a 'splrlt of goodwill' and it was agreed that further meetings 
would take place. After a meeting early in 1975 it was reported that Vorster had not 
agreed to any of the major requests made by the bantustan representatives. although 
minor concessions were made. such as the inclusion of Africans on the boards of 
bantustan development corporations. Consideration would be given to the return of 
non-communist exiles. and the recognition of trade unions for Africans could be 
discussed With the mlnlster of labour. Buthelezl took exception to the suggestion that 
bantustan leaders meet With Department of Bantu Admlnlstration and Development 
officials to discuss the 'easing of the hardships caused by influx control regulations' 
(Survey, 1975:26). He was concerned with the abolltion of the system. 
Langner argues that the last straw before the formation of Inkatha was this 
'homelands' leaders conference With Prime Mlnlster Vorster in 1975. Eight days after 
a report-back meeting that was addressed by Buthe1ezlln Umlazt, Inkatha was formed 
in Zululand. This might be stretchlng the events somewhat on the part of Langner, as 
the process of re-fOrming Inkatha was already well under way, but the Vorster 
meeting, 88 another example of the frustration experienced by the bantustan leaders 
that dates back much further, could have influenced the decision to go ahead With the 
formation meeting at KwaNzimela. 
According to Langner, the motivation for Inkatha lay in attempts, first. to oppose the 
dlvIsive effects of the apartheid polley, and, second, to sUmulate self reliance 
(1983:33). On a pollticallevel Buthelezl must have realised that he had reached the 
end of the road of what the apartheid pollcy had to offer. Without taking 
'independence', an act that would have meant poUtical sulcide for anyone With sights 
higher than regional poUtics, he had to open options beyond the KLA. 
However, Inkatha's potential as a vehicle for achlevtng national goals only became 
clear later. At first the movement was locked into regional and ethnlc polltics, both in 
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structure and in motivation. When Inkatha was discussed extenslvely in the KLA for 
the first tlme during April 1975 (shortly after its formation), Buthelezi made the claim 
that the organization was the 'base from which to plan our llberation ... I said in the 
past we need liberation even from such things as Ignorance, poverty and disease. It 
was for this reason that I annoWlced ... that we were reviVing "Inkatha", a National 
Cultural Llberation Movement fOWlded by King Solomon ka Dinuzulu in 1928' (KLAD 
5. 1975:134). Not only was it to 'concentrate, in concepUon, on issues that could in 
effect only be resolved through further participaUon in the bantustan stuctures (the 
same Justlflcation was earlier offered for taking part in the regtonal adm1n1stration of 
KwaZulu), it was also lnlUally for Zulus only. 
When Buthelezl re-emphaslzed in April 1975 that Inkatha was not a polltical party he 
continued: 
In other words, all members of the Zulu nation are automatically 
members of Inkatha if they are Zulus. There may be people who are 
inactive members as no one escapes being a member as long as he or 
she is a member of the Zulu nation (KLAD 5, 1975:134). 
Probably Buthelezl never agatn stated this position as clearly, and would not have 
done so outside the confines of this ethnic adm1n1strative tnstitution, the KLA. but 
these sentlments are of direct relevance to Wlderstanding the apparent amblgulUes of 
the Inkatha movement. To oppose Inkatha was to oppose the 'Zulu nation', was the 
message that he gave. a message that was to lead to increasing vlolence over the years: 
to form any other organisation was to break the unl1¥ that Inkatha gave; to criticize 
Inkatha and Its leadership was to meddle in the legttlmate struggle of the Zulu nation. 
The first national cOWlcll and general conference meetings of Inkatha. held in July 
1975, accepted Buthelezl as the ""unchallenged leader of the 4 112 m1lllon Zulus in 
their struggle •.. ". and he was empowered to speak on behalf of all Zulus' (Langner. 
1983:25). To wtravel the complexities of what is and has historlcally been meant by 
the 'Zulu nation' is beyond the scope of this thesis. but a fuller discussion follows 
below (for historlcal discussion of slmllar issues, see W11ght. 1983; Hamllton and 
Wright. 1990). On a pollticallevel an appeal to Zulu 'nationhood' has had a profoWld 
1mpact. The stress on a separate Zulu identity. excluding those outside the 'Zulu 
nation'. started very early on in the life of the ethnically-defined KwaZulu authority. 
When the ceremonial mace was received by the chairperson of the KLA from the 
rnlnlster of Bantu AdmlnlstraUon and Development in 1973. Buthelezl reassured the 
rnlnlster that' ... it wUl be kept as a token of the cordlal relationship and good 
nelgbbourUness between our respective nations in this COWltry' (KLAD 3. 1973: 1 ). 
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Buthelezl. proposing that Shaka Day should replace Settlers Day as a publlc hollday 
In KwaZulu. said that • ... he (Shaka) united all the tribes which is depicted on those 
strands of "lnkatha" of our Mace. each strand represenUng a tribe In the KwaZulu 
area. and amalgamated these tribes tnto one nation' (KlAD 4. 1974:334-6). In 1974 
the positive. tnclusive expression of Zulu nationaltsm was given form around the 
figure of the king. Buthelezl told the KLA that: 
The young man who was sitting here a few days ago. King Zwelttb1nt 
Goodwtll kaCyprtan. is the King of 4 1/4 m1ll1on Zulus in South Afrlca 
and when we are now being moved in the area of separate 
nationhoods as a nation. 1 think that he deserves such a place 
befitting a King of 4 1/4 m1ll1on tn South Afrlca. •. (Buthelezl was 
argutng for expenditure of RSOO 000 on a palace for the king). This 
House tn fact belongs to the Zulu nation itself ... If the Zulus want a 
monarchy. they must pay for it. .. If we are going to be tndependent. 
Sir. I think it is known that the King is a future head for the Zulu 
nation. I mean. for tnstance. Just across here the King of Swaztland 
has not only one palace. but a number of them. And the Swazi nation. 
With all due respect to them. is a smaller nation than the Zulu nation 
••• (KlAD4. 1974:360: alao 6. 1974:56: 7. 1976:889). 
In the early-1970s Buthelezl answered a question With the optnton that the 'Zulu 
nation' was. at the UU1e. 'more united than it has been for the past 100 years' 
(Buthelezl. 19.12:10). Buthelezl has argued consistently in this vetn. sometimes agatnst 
strong evidence of confltct .- approachtng a ctv1l war in the region - to the contrary. 
There are many instances when he referred to the pollcy of the National Party as 
dtvtstve and argued for a Wider South Afrlcantsm. but the much stronger and 
contradictory element of mobtllsed ethnlc Identity remalned and sUll remalns. an 
approach Within which the Zulu people are the largest 'group' in South Afrlca. In an 
interview in 1980 Buthelezl said that '(w)e in Inkatha recogntze cultural Identity ••. we 
cannot Wish It away. But I think most blacks would agree With me that cultural 
identity has been abused under the separate development pollcy' (Star. 19 Aug 80). In 
the same year. however. Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo wrote that the 'Zulus 
are not a tribe: they are a nation •. : (Natal Witness, 7 Feb 80). 
Also in 1980. Butbelezl dtsttngulshed between 'national groups' (of which the Zulu 
people 18 one) Within 'the nation of South Mrtca'. ustng language that reminds of the 
approach in the Soviet Union (Buthelezl. 1980:3: Connor, 1984). On Soweto Day (16 
June) in 1986 two of the very few meetings allowed to continue under the state of 





and by king GoodwUl. The latter told his audience that 'Zulus' should 'root out those 
among them who are underm1n1ng their natlonal Wl1ty'. He warned against '"new 
-fangled'" poUtical organisations which 'propagated values which were total anathema 
to Zulu prlde and culture' (Dally News, 17 Jun 86). There was Uttle doubt that he was 
referring ~ the ANC and ANC surrogate or supporUng organisations in South AfrIca. 
such as the United Democratic Front. Nine years later the king was to side With these 
organisations against Buthelezl and Inkatha. 
There 18 a degree offiuldity attached to the terms 'tribe', 'ethn1city'. 'nation', etc (see 
above). What is clear is that the audience and the event shape the strength of the 
'nation' appeal made to Zulu speakers - the clear references to 'the nation' quoted 
above were addressed to the KLA. composed nearly totally of chiefs at that Unle. and 
when the identity of this body had yet to be created In many ways. When addressing 
the LuthuU Memorial Foundation meeUng, the stress was placed on the 'AfrIcan 
nation'. composed of a rich variety of ethnic (cultural) groups (see Bernstein. 
1977:145-6; Langner. 1983:133; Booysen, 1982:160). 
Without the clarity of commitment to a single 'nation' in South Mrica (no matter how 
broadly inclusiVe). the appeals to a separate Zulu identity. Within the context of the 
state's poUey of a quarter of a century since 1959. were potentially very dangerous. 
and have remained so. Unscrupulous manipulators of exlsung ethnic senUnlents fed 
on the tensions that had been created under the apartheid poUey. ready to attempt to 
direct and redirect antagonisms to advance their own ends. 'Ethnic nationallsm' also 
does not bode well for a future Wl1ted South Mrica. where regtonal poUticlans and the 
remnants of the old apartheid order are sure to attempt ethnic mobilization. and 
where previously denied identities come to the fore in poUtical contestation. It leaves a 
very dlftlcult task of meeting legtUmate demands for cultural recognlUon and poUUcal 
demands for fragmentaUon. and finding a consistent basis for separaung them (see 
chapter five). 
There are several cases where opposition to Buthelezl. the KLA and KwaZulu 
admlnlstraUon. and to Inkatha. had been labelled in raciallsed and ethnic terms. 
where the group ('Zulus') can only exist against other Similar. but antagonlsUc. groups 
(see chapter two). For example. the celebration of historical figures in a regtonal past. 
so necessary for poUUcal mobiUzatlon (see Connerton. 1989). on occasion took on a 
reacUonary tone. Annual Shaka Day celebrations (launched in 1954. see above) were 
held all over South AfrIca. In 1981 dr Frank Mdlalose addressed 1000 Inkatha 
followers in Soweto. and Buthelezl. who appealed to employers to let their workers off 
for the day. spoke at Stanger. a town With a malnly Indian population on the Natal 
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north coast. The Stanger Businessmen's Association had called for the closure of 
shops during the Shaka Day celebrations, mindful of the 'disturbances' that occurred 
in the town during these celebrations the previous year, when 'many stalls were looted 
and owners assaulted for not alloWing their workers the day off. It was suggested that 
24 September be.declared a pubUc hoUday in Stanger as well as in KwaZulu proper 
(The Leader. 25 Sep 81). Buthelez1 told the 10000 people assembled that Indians 
had a great future. but that they 'should share 'their gifts With Africans'. and in his 
famWar Indirect s1yle reminded them that "'t will be a sad day if I have to adVise my 
people not to buy from these (Indian-owned) shops'" (Natal Mercury. 25 Sep 81). The 
Inkatha movement. as did ethnic mobilisation and confirmation of the 'Zulu nation' 
generally. denied a direct and a single role for either members of a black nation. a 
South African nation. or a regional or national citiZenship. 
The speakers in the KLA. who followed Buthe1ezl's introduction to the Inkatha 
movement In 1975. took up the theme of contlnuU;y With the 19208 Inkata. Chief 0 
Sithole. councUlor for agriculture and forestry. rem1n1sced in AprllI975: 
I was st1l1 a young boy when King Solomon inaugurated this 
movement. Our fathers were very much determined about this thing. 
A man from the Royal clan named Matshe used to collect 
contributions up in my area. Whenever this man addressed our 
people In our area. he would tell my people that there was so much 
money at the Royal Kraal Mahla. that he used to indicate a meal1e 
tank that stood next to my father's house. a very big tank, which 
contained about 60 bags of meal1emeal. He would tell us that. out at 
Dlamahlahla kraal. there were six tanks full of money. People were 
very Impressed by this, and this man used to go back to the Royal 
Kraal With many herds of cattle and a lot of money in his pocket. He 
would come not only once, but time and again he would come to 
collect. •. 
••. Let us sacrifice and give all that we have, let us fill the six tanks 
With money (KLAD 5, 1975:195). 
The KLA debate was dOminated by the themes of the 'Zulu nation' and how it was to 
form the base for the new Inkatha. references to the first Inkata and the need for 
. sacrlftce, as the romanticised version of that early history demanded, and the theme of 
Inkatha fees. as the historical lesson from chief Sithole indicated was appropriate to 
the new challenge. What Is str1k1ng is that while several pages of transcribed debate 
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were devoted to the issue of the amount of the contributions to be demanded from 
KLA members and Inkatha membership fees. In contrast there was very Uttle 
discussion about the principles and alms of the new organization: ' ... you have to pay 
lfyou want to become free' was the general message (KLAD 7. 1975:710). Even the 
unemployed were not excluded. Buthelezl argued that unemployed people should pay 
according to their means. but that people 'must not stay at home. This is another 
Uberation that I mention here. the liberation from slothfulness' (KLAD 7. 1975:716). 
The one issue, other than membership contributions, that raised debate was the 
relationship between the KLA and Inkatha. The first constitution stated that. should 
there be contllct between a declslon of the Inkatha central committee and the KLA 
cabinet. the decision of the former should prevail. Buthelezl said hesitantly that ' ... we 
feel that this is Mrlcan participatory democracy. I think it is a new form of 
constltutionallaw ... I do not think that it is constitutional law, I think it is African 
participatory democracy' (KLAD 7. 1975:721-2; also see Buthelezi. 1975:15). His 
confusion about how to Justify this measure. which would have taken power away 
from the ehlef-dominated KLA (one of the intentions behind the formation of Inkatha) , 
must have been apparent for ,~t offered one of the few examples of members 
challenging his wishes. Paul Sibeko queried the idea of'Mrlcan democracy'. to which 
Buthelezl retorted with the clalm that' ... Mrlcan democracy is democracy expressed 
through the medium of Afriean culture. as evidenced by the people who make up the 
nation .• : (KLAn 7. 1975:723). 
Later in the debate Buthelezl amended the contentious section, and asked whether it 
would be in order to say that the cabinet would 'seriously consider' the views of 
Inkatha. This was agreed upon. The reason for this unusual disagreement between 
Buthelezl and the ehlefs may Ue in one of the most lmportant lmmed1ate motivations 
for the formation of Inkatha. The various moves that led to the actual constitution in 
1975 had taken place withln the context of the state's and the arch-traditionalists' 
attempts to unseat Buthelezi and ~ btstall an executive klng. Buthc1ezl knew well how 
precarious any politician or structure was when it did not meet the needs or approval 
of the central government. The KLA was the weak link in his ambitions. bullt as it was 
on the potentially fickle support of the chiefs. and in the last instance under the 
thumb of the state. Inkatha. in its inltial conception, would have removed power from 
the chiefs and made Buthelezlless vulnerable to such state-directed or supported 
underp11n1ng in that It gave hlm a power base away from the apartheid structure. 
However. it proved to be unnecessary as Buthelez1 cont1nued. unW the present. to 
carry the support of the large maJorlty of ehlefs, and the KLA and Inkatha came to 
overlap In most lmportant functions and personnel. In this way the support for 
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Inkatha from the chiefs was ensured. although it remained a sometlmes diftlcu1t 
relationship. 
The 1891 Natal Code stipulated that the Governor of the Colony. as 'Supreme Chief. 
could appoint chiefs ~d remove them. and that the chief 'in charge of a tribe or 
section of a tribe. is a minor deputy of the Supreme Chief ... '. Daphne wrote that: 
As 'minor deputies' of an admlnistration which was often hostile to 
the interests of the black people of Natal the chiefs were. by de6nltion. 
no longer the representatives of the people. The power to appoint and 
to remove chiefs was taken out of the hands of the tribe although in 
fact the system of hereditary succession was allowed to operate 
provided it did not challenge the colonial government ( 1982:2). 
After Union. subsequent legislation dealing with the role of chiefs. most lmportantly 
the 1927 Native Administration Act and amendments. did little to change this 
position. Later the state president became the 'Supreme Chief to reflect the 
Republican status of South Africa. Even the KwaZulu legislation deal1ng with the 
functions of chiefs followed the central state's allocation of roles and duties (see 
Appendix 4. Mare and Hamilton. 1987). Control Is the predominant theme. with. 
'almost as an afterthought'. the stipulation 'that a chief should "generally seek to 
promote the interests of his tribe and of the region and actively support. and h1mself 
1n1tiate measures, for the advancement of his people'" (Daphne, 1982:5: Mare. 1982a). 
The 1978 elections in KwaZulu reduced the total dependence on chiefs but it stlllleft 
them as the numerically dominant component within KwaZulu politics. Not all chiefs 
have been enamoured of the Buthelez1 style of 'traditionalism' and. at various times. 
often with some central government support. they rallled round the king or the symbol 
provided by the king as an executIve flgure (both under apartheid and now under the 
ANC-led· Government of National Unity). This could have been embarrassing during 
elections within the bantustan that were required to show a massive degree of 
soUdarlty in support for Inkatha. Both Schmahmann (1978) and Langner (1983) refer 
to a meeting held at Ulund! at the end of September 1977. ostensibly to 'explain the 
election role of chiefs'. but also to warn that the institution of chieftainship could last 
as long as it served the interests of the people. and to spell out their role in Inkatha 
(also see Rand Dally MaU. 1 Oct 77). Most of the chiefs attended. The KwaZulu urban 
representative said chiefs had resisted being drawn into Inkatha because they belleved 
the state's accusation that the movement would strip them of their power 
(Sclunahmann. 1978:304). and that the meeting had been called to clarify the 
position. Buthelezi addressed this meeting. and denied the state's allegations that he 
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was standing in the way of an 'enVisaged reblrth of the Zulu nation', po1l1tlng out that 
he was a chief himself and that. 'being morally and pragmatically opposed to 
apartheid, he did not regard his Vision of Black unity as mllitatlng against Zulu unity'. 
As for Inkatha. he warned that if chiefs did not involve themselves 111 the affairs of the 
movement it 'would be regarded as dereliction of dutY and active involvement agatnst 
Inkatha would be "of course much worse"'. He po1l1tedly remlnded them that Pretoria 
no longer controlled their 'fate as chiefs' which would be decided at Ulundi 'if 
necessary' (Langner, 1983: 174). Langner said the meeting of chiefs subsequently 
became an annual event. 
There Is no doubt that Buthelezi 'believes' 111 the position of chieftainship and Its 
validity 111 late-twentieth century society. He Is extremely sensitive about his own 
chieftainship (as well as to his role as 'premier' to the Zulu klng), and has repeated 
claims for its leglt1macy to justify the authority due to him. It Is an essential element 111 
the repertoire of social Identities with which he functions. It would, therefore, be 
wrong to see his support of the role of chiefs as simply pragmatic or Machiavell1an. 
However, as has been argued. It is nonetheless support for a spectftc version of the 
role of chiefs 111 Zulu SOCiety. plactng h1mself at the top. and one that demands 
allegtance to bts position. In the KwaZulu Government DIary (1974: 1 0) Buthelezl 
wrote: 
We wlll preserve the traditional system of Chieftalnshlp in KwaZulu 
and re-aftlrm our constitutional relationship with the Paramount 
Chief and wlll buUd our future state with due regard to our cultural 
heritage and traditions adapted and fructlfled by the ideals of Western 
c1Vil1zation and democracy and modem sclentlflc principles. 
He said the KLA was not a 'mere transplant of Western democracy upon the Zulu 
nation', preferring 'to View It merely as a natural extension and development of 
traditional Zulu Culture and government' (KLA. nd:5). 
To consolidate this reliance on chiefs a 'special section' was created 111 the department 
of the chief mlnister 'to accelerate the activation of tribal authorities and to train them 
in local government techniques' (KwaZulu Government DIary. 1981:39). Thus. 30 
years after the Bantu Authorities Act had been passed, after many people had lost 
their lives 111 opposition to these structures. and after havtng clalmed to have ,resisted 
them for years 111 KwaZulu. Buthelezl 'activated· the Instltution as a central element In 
local government. 
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Efforts were made over the years to make the chiefs more effective. An lllumlnatlng 
debate took place In the KLA in 1976 when certain amendments to the Natal Code 
were proposed, the most Important being one to replace references to the state 
, president as 'Supreme Chief of all Africans With the 'Executive Councll of KwaZulu', 
not so much for ,what It said about processes, but what It revealed about the function 
of chiefs. It was submitted by the executive councillor for justice on the grounds that 
the requirements that declslons'by chiefs be referred to the state president caused 
unnecessary delays. The example he gave - delays In deporting various kinds of 
'diso~erit people' • received support from several speakers during the debate. 
CouncU1or Conco said that 'we have already reached a solution In terms of which to 
end the riots and flghtlng and disorder', but that it was negated by admlnistratlVe 
delays (KLAD 8, 1976:40). Chief M Ngcobo agreed that the delay in deportation w~ 
troublesome. 
Durlng the debate KLA members spoke of 'insolence', violent behaviour, 'hot headed 
disobedient people', and the need to maintain law and order. Some wanted the fines 
lmposed by ch1efs to be increased from R4 to a maximum of Rl 00 (this was agreed 
after an lnltJal amendment to.lncrease the fine to R40 was rejected), to bring it In llne 
With the Value of a beast', which was the usual form In which the fine was paid. The 
central government gave permission to lncrease the fine to R200 (KLAD 9, 1976:602). 
A reveallng remark was made by KLA member A Kholwa. who said that increastng 
fines 'would not change the insolent behaviour which eJdsts In the communlty because 
we normally find that people who are disobedient to their chiefs are the poor people', 
for whom corporal punishment might be necessary as they were not In a position to 
pay fines (KLAD 8, 1976:45-46). 
Later in the debate a chlef proposed a motion that 'the advisabUtty be considered of 
empowertng the ehlefs-ln-councll to eject undesirable persons and/or famllles from 
their areas. and that a place be made available by KwaZulu for such ejected people' 
(KLAD 8, 1976:243). Another ch1ef added that the problem was due to the lack of 
employment. and he moved that the KwaZulu government be given the power to place 
people in employment Without choice· 'In this way this problem of unemployment wUl 
d1m1nlsh. Communists and house breakers can be given a separate place where they 
can be kept' (KLAD 8, 1976:246-7). A year earlier the term 'communists' had been 
used for 'strangers'ln a chiefs area (KLAD 7, 1975:778-80). 
In the 1976 session, after the formation of Inkatha. moves were made to 'strengthen 
the ehlefs' crlmlnal courts', but this had to await the next stage of admintstratlve 
authority. An 'admintstrative guide' setting out procedures for greater effectiveness of 
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the courts was accepted: • ... It will become obvious now which chiefs are not using 
their power to the full In the maintenance of law and order In their areas'. said 
Buthelez1 (KLAD 9. 1976:413). 
It 18 clear that even. or especially. at the local level the KwaZulu authorities were not 
accepted 88 wholeheartedly by the admintstered population as they liked to present 
the case. The references above indicate social dissatisfaction; so does a remark In an 
article In the publication celebrating ten years of the existence of the KLA (KLA. nd: 1 0) 
In whicb the author acknowledged that because of the standards of adm1nJstratlon 
KwaZulu bad set itself 'it bas to work within the frustrations and the anger of the 
people'. There are many causes, other than hlgh standards, of such frustrations and 
anger. The allowances for cblefs were based on the number of taxpayer8 In their areas 
and thl8 led to Increased overcrowdlng in some areas. and anger bad been directed at 
the tax collector for many years now (see. for example. Survey, 1959/60: 108; KLAD I, 
1972: 12). Corruption and bribery accusations appeared in newspaper reports and 
were even made In the KLA. 
In 1975, during the period of massive social dlsruption In part due to the eviction of 
labour tenants from wblte-owned farms (see above), cblefs were warned 'not to 
continue with the unlawful practice of receiving money or kind In return for the 
allocation of a 8lte' (KLAD 7, 1975:695). The cblefs were literally casblng In on the 
land bunger of displaced people. In 1978 Buthelez1 attacked cblefs for 'fleecing' the 
people In that they were charging for sites. arable land and services such 88 pensions 
(Dally News, 11 Dec 78). These practices were confirmed by Zulu. In a paper baaed 
on research conducted In the early 1980s (nd:2-3). He wrote that 'nine out of every ten 
respondents wbo required a site on which to buUd a bouse bad to make some 
monetary payment either to the cblef or the locallnduna', and In some cases tbls 
payment became an annual 'rent'. In bls sample 40% of the respondents bad to pay 
for an fnduna to approve pension or dlsab1l1ty grant applications. Wblle glft exchanges 
bad been a tradltional practice, the obligation now fell on only the subjects: 
It 18 common practice that cblefs 'demand' some contributions from 
their subjects. These may Include collections towards the purchase of 
a new car, or a new bulldlng. a son's marriage, etc. (Zulu. nd:3). 
In 1982 a newspaper report spoke of corruption In various tribal 'locations' 
(settlements) falllng under the Vul1ndlela TrIbal AuthOrity, involving workseeker 
permlts (costtng a R20 bribe), and pension applications needing a KwaZulu 
government stamp or tribal signature (Natal Witness, 22 Apr 82). 
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Many other cases could be quoted to substantiate the argument that chiefs are often 
corrupt. Bekker, in his report for the Human Sciences Research CouncU, deal1ngwith 
the role of chiefs, wrote that they were guilty In other areas: the most common fault 
mentioned by magistrates of all chiefs in theti areas was that of favouritism: they did 
not know how far thelr powers went: and they contimied, to hold power after serving 
sentences for theft. arson, and assault. They were immediately biased against the 
accused or defendant: in a study covering a four-year period, the 551 cases tried by 
seven chiefs did not once favour the defendant. Bekker recommended that chiefs not 
be expected to fulftljudicial, admin1strative or legislative functions (undesirable in 
itself, but aggravated as chiefs had generally received no tralnlng in these functions) 
(Bekker, 1983:60-65). Nearly all of these polnts were confirmed by Zulu, who wrote of 
tribal authority members not being trained for thelr duties, and the absence of job 
descriptions for the tasks they were expected to fulfll. He concluded that the tribal 
authority system 'is more of an extension of the state apparatus than an organ 
representing the interests of the people' (nd:7), and that the system was 1n1mlcal to 
rural development projects (nd:8: also Daphne, 1982:12). 
In 1980 the KwaZulu m1n1ster of justice reported that his investigations into the 
apparent increase in 'lawlessness' led him to find the cause in 'very slack' 'discipline 
(ln) the enforcement of customs and law and order at the chiefs' court and tribal 
authority levels' (KLAD 19, 1980:496). There have been many complaints about chiefs 
falling in their duty In the malntenance of law and order, but also counter-complaints 
from chiefs about being unarmed or inadequately armed. For example, Chief SH 
Gumede sald that the Issue of small-callbre firearms to the chiefs made It impossible 
'to guard agalnst Communists in his area' (KIAD 16, 1979:452) (also see discussion 
above). 
Despite all these fallures and megallties, many of them admitted by Inkatha leaders, 
Buthelezl has conslstently argued that the chiefs are the 'base of government' in 
KwaZulu (for example, KLAD 6, 1975:412; 10:72). When he opened the Makhanya 
tribal authority headquarters and offices, Buthelezl told the gathertng: 'I respect 
Chieftainshlp as an indigenous African institution of the people. In KwaZulu It Is the 
very basis of our adm1n1stration'. However, he warned that the tnsUtution had to keep 
pace With the twentieth century (BS, 3 Sep 83). 
The revived Inkatha was not only placed squarely within Zulu etbniclty (the 'tradition' 
of the 'nation') and even 'nationhood', but also relied on the authority of chiefs in the 
rural areas, or in areas In which the power of chiefs held sway - not 'to give the chiefs 
great power or polley Involvement. but to demand of them particlpation In 
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recr:uttment. and because thelr role was appropriate Within the conservative 
mobilisation of a Zulu soc1alidentity. A suggestion was made early on that branches 
should coincide With the area of authority of tzlnduna (headmen or councillors to the 
ehlef). For urban areas branches would be formed in voung wards for the bantustan's 
~lections. R~ons. in rural areas would then coinclde With regional authority areas. To 
ensure rapid membership increases this stra~ made a lot of sense: not only could 
pressure be appUed by the chiefs on people subject to them in a range of ways, but 
pressure could also be applied on the chiefs through the KLA and the KwaZulu 
admlnlstration generally. So, for example. during the same year (1975), whlle Inkatha 
committees to run the planned elections (which in the event did not occur before 
1978) were being discussed, Buthelez1 said that he was • ... distressed to find that the 
districts here in KwaZulu - for instance here in Nongoma. .. , Inkatha Is almost dead. It 
is a dead duck' (KLAD 7, 1975:921). The blame was laid squarely on the shoulders of 
obstrucUonlst chiefs, who were called to account in the KLA - the assembly was by 
then already being used to advance the Inkatha movement. It was only later, when 
Inkatha was established and national polltical considerations gained greater weight. 
that it became important to deny the symbiotic relationship between the two bodles, 
the KLA and its tradiUonalists, and Inkatha. 
This debate around the role of the ehlefs In preparaUon for elections also made it 
clear that the declalon to form Inkatha had been taken by 'the cream of the Zulu eUte', 
and that at grassroots level there had been very little knowledge, and certa1nly no 
consultaUon. For example, a representative from the Hlangananl R~onal AuthOrity 
complained that the formation was taking place in a great hurry and he wanted Ume 
to go back and inform the people. The KLA chair assured him that he would • ••• be 
gtven the opportunity to go back to your people and to tell them what ts going on' 
(KLAD 7, 1975:801).lnkatha had been formed, to represent all the Zulu people, a 
couple of months earlier. 
It was not only the chiefs that appeared to be reticent in certain areas. The month 
after the formation of Inkatha Buthelezi was already complalnlng that clv1l servants 
( •... some of them are in this House'), were 'running down' the Inkatha constitution 
(KLAD 6, 1975:350), an accusaUon that was to be repeated over the years, but With an 
ever larger number of people being Included In the anti-Inkatha consplracy, a 
consplracy that was increastngly being presented as being against the 'Zulu nation', an 
inevitable conflation Within ethnic mob1l1sation. 
The chiefs, as should be clear from the presentation above, were not only an 
admlnlstrative necessa1ty Within the bantustan and the Inkatha movement. They were 
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also a central ingredient in the package of elements that together constitute the 'Zulu 
kingdom'. 'nation'. and Zuluness as presented within regtonal ethnic mobilisation. 
Inkatha was formed In 1975 within the KwaZulu bantustan and. whether as a matter 
of strategy or less self-consciously. it defined its issues at that stage Within the 
bantustan. It was clearly necessary for purposes of galnlng membership that an 
appeal should be made to the most inuned1ate constituency. that over which 
adm1n1strative responslb1l1t¥ had already been accepted. However. there seems to be a 
s1m1lar 'lnev1tab1l1t¥' about the pol1t1clsatlon of 'tribalism' that went hand In hand With 
this mob1l1satlon. Inkatha arose as a 'Zulu' organization. lnextrlcably tied to the 
bantustan structures of KwaZulu. and has never been able to escape this past In any 
slgn11lcant way. As a Zulu body it was able to mobilise readily. and as a bantustan 
movement It was relatively protected from state action during its early years. but these 
apparent advantages became serious hlndrances as the general mood In the country 
changed. These advantages were also those that brought the movement lnto the direct 
ambit of the state'S nefarious activities to ward otT the 'total onslaught'ln the second 
half of the 1980s. 
Ink.that • Structure 
The Inkatha consUtution was modelled largely on that of the Zambian UNIP. KwaZulu 
lnterlor mlnlster dr FT Mdlalose commented: 'We took several Ideas from the 1928 
Inkatha structure. but obvlously It was defective In a number of ways'. and that Is why 
they turned to the UNIP constitution (KCAV. 157 and 176). In 1979 Inkatha secretary 
general Oscar Dhlomo told Inkatha youth delegates that the constitution 'grew out of 
the Lusaka Manlfesto drawn up In 1969 by 14 AfrIcan states and adopted by the 
Unlted Nations Assembly by 113 votes to two' (Natal Mercury. 26 Mar 79). 
The Lusaka Manifesto commltted the 14 signatory states In eastern and central AfrIca. 
and later the members of the Unlted Nations General Assembly. to work towards the 
abolltion of racial discrlmlnation and the right of all people In southern Africa to 
particlpate In their own government (see BrownUe (ed). 1971 :526-33). It was partly 
inappropriate that Dhlomo should attempt to place the struggle of the Inkatha 
movement In the context of the Manifesto. as It states that peaceful change Is 
preferable. but' ••. whlle peaceful progress Is blocked by actions of those at present In 
power .... we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories 
(Mozambique. Angola. Portuguese Gulnea. Namlb~a. Rhodesia. South AfrIca) all the 
support of which we are capable In their struggle against their oppressors'. On South 
( 
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Mrlca the Manifesto advocated actions even further removed from what Inkatha 
always stood for in its strategy for change in the COWltry: 
South Africa should be excluded from the United Nations Agencles, 
and even from the United Nations itself It should be ostracized by the 
world communl1y. It should be isolated from world trade patterns .•• 
(Brownlle (ed) 1971 :532, article 22 of the Lusaka Manifesto). 
Buthelezl bad opposed the exclusion of South Africa from the United Nations as well 
as sanctions. 
As bas been mentioned, the first constitution stipulated that the Inkatha president 
also bad to be the cblef mlnlster of KwaZulu, the bantustan (something as dlfDcult to 
defend in a national Uberation movement as the stipulation about Zulu 
predomlnance). Patrick Laurence, writing some years after a change in the 
constitution in 1979 that opened up membersblp to all Africans. argued that tbls 
clause was put in to 'guard against the contingency of an unprincIpled opportunist 
taking over as Cblef Mlnlster and concludlng an independence agreement With 
Pretoria' (1984:271). Tbls might be true but it is one of many features conftrmlng that 
the Inkatha movement grew out of, and wltbin, the KwaZulu bantustan, wltbin the 
structures of the NP version of ethnic mobilisation, even if it obvlously bad an 
independent blstorlcal route and content. 
The movement had a 'well organlzed pyramidlcal structure', leading up from 
indlvldual members, branches. regtons. to the varlous top decision-making bodies and 
conferences. The natfonal councU (NC) was the poUcy making organ. The NC had 300 
members on average, although. as Langner wrote, tbls body, like the general 
conference (Ge). dl1fered in actual composition from the provisions of the 
coDSUtution. It was composed of the central cOmmlttee, the KLA members who were 
also members of Inkatba. four representatives of the regtons, members of the 
brigades' execuUves, one representative from each aftUlated organisation, and the 
organisation's admlnlstrative omcials. Inkatha bad 'absorbed' the KLA through the 
NC. so that it could be regarded as in practice havtng been ·the legtslative arm of 
Inkatha' (Langner. 1983:71). The NC could. in fact. propose legtslation to the KLA. 
Schmahmann. commenting on the 'absorption', wrote that '(l)f not eUtist. the 
movement has potential for being authoritarian ... The potential for abuse by those 
who control the movement Is .•. great. Intermlngllng the LegIslative Assembly wlth the 
National Councll and the Cabinet With the Central Commlttee precludes the growth of 
etrecUve opposition poUtical parties' (1978:285). The NC met at least twice a year and, 
except for the opentng. sessiOns were held in camera (Langner, 1983:79). 
160 
It appears. constitutionally. that the general. conference (GC) ~ould consist of all NC 
members. along with two or three representatives of every branch. In the early 19808 
there could thus have been 2300 delegates to the GC. Langner commented that 
'provision for the representation of other interest groups on the General Conference 
(and the National Counc1l) is negllgtble'. This provlsion had been copied from the 
UNIP constitution. Whatever the reason for its inclusion, in practice 'it is an effective 
preventive measure agatnst the forming of pressure groups by these affillated 
organiZations' (Langner, 1983:80). It is at this level that constitutional provlslon was 
made for the representation of trade unlons, amongst others. The GC could amend 
the constitution, by a two-thirds m~orlty, and could 'consider, review or change' any 
polley. The GC had to meet ·annually to discuss a programme prepared by the central 
committee (CC). and approved by the NC. Voting was by secret ballot. 
The central committee (CC) was responsible for 'progr8.lJlI1llng' and lmplementation 
of polley. It had to have a mlnlmum of 25 members (the presldent. secretary general, 
20 members elected by the GC every five years, and members nominated by the 
president in consultation with the CC). The number of nominated members increased 
dramatically over the years. Wblle in the pre-1979 constitution provision was made 
for only three such members, a year after the constitution was changed Ue in 1980) 
the presldent had appointed 20 members, and the CC had 46 members. It could be 
that these positions served to co-opt local (communlty level) leaders and warlords in 
KwaZulu whom it would be preferable to have within the organlsation rather than to 
have organise opposition from without. Presidential appointment. with the approval of 
the CC. also avoided clashes in the NC and GC where some of the appointees might be 
controversial. One such person, for example, was Thomas Mandla Shabalala of the 
Lindelanl 'informal settlement' outside Durban, who arose as a powerful local figure. 
apparently outside the formal KwaZulu and Inkatha structures. Shabalala featured 
promlnently in allegations of VIgllante involvement in the 1985 unrest in the Durban 
area and since then, but has, by the mid·1990s, been 'cleansed' through the formal 
polltics of post-election South Africa and election as member to the prOVInCial 
legislature, as he had been by co-option into the Inkatha CC earller. 
The formation of an 'inner councU' may have been an acknowledgement that the 
strategy of co-opting people on to the CC for polltical reasons had made It unwieldy. 
For example. by 1980 it was reported that certain decisions had been taken by the 
'newly-created inner council of the movement's central committee. It has been created 
to deal with urgent business' (Star, 24 Dec 80). Langner conftnned the existence of the 
Inner council. but said it was only formed In February 1981 (1983:86). For further 
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detaU of the structures of the Inkatha movement. see Langner's study (1983) and 
Mare and Hamllton ( 1987). 
A member of the CC had to be over 21, have no cr1m1nal record (a stipulation that 
could be waived by the CC), and had to be a 'cUsclpUned person'. The 1980 CC had, 
among others, elgbt chlefs, six women and seven people from outside Natal as 
members. Fewer than halfwere ·also members of the KLA (Langner, 1983:83), 
possibly refiecUng the lnltial fear that the KLA could be used by the central state. On 
elections to the CC Langner wrote that there was 'apparently much control over the 
candidature and It almost looks as If the outcome of the elections can be regarded. as a 
foregone conclusion', but that democratic proVisions did exist. The composition of the 
CC changed as well, With only 11 members of the first CC st1llln office In 1981. The 
CC was extremely powerful, both In the movement and also In KwaZulu poUtics. 
Internally the CC had 'overall control of the activities of the Inkatha and shall ensure 
that disclpUne In the Inkatha Is malntalned throughout the country'. Externally, the 
CC controlled the selection of candidates for 'ParUamentary and Local Government 
Elections'. The CC functioned through a serles of sub-committees, whose members 
were appolnted from the CC and the NC by the presldent: 
1. defence and securl1¥ committee ( 12 members); 
2. poUtical, constitutional, legal and foreign affalrs committee (10); 
3. economic and finance commlttee (5); 
4. social and cultural commlttee (9); 
5. elections, publlcl1¥ and strategy commlttee (8); 
6. appointments and disclpllnary commlttee (6). 
What Is clear. even from the constitution and not merely from the practice of Inkatha 
In KwaZulu, Is that at several levels the movement was part and parcel of the 
bantustan admlnistrative structure. The NC lncorporated the KLA. the CC decided on 
candidates for KwaZulu elections (that was the only 'ParUament' and 'Local 
Government' It participated In, and when particlpation In democratic elections became 
possible Inkatha had become the IFP), and the president had to quallfy 'to be Head of 
Government In any government whlch the Movement. by Virtue of having attalned a 
Victory at a General Election or for any other reason. Is entitled to form'. The Inkatha 
president was also the only candidate Which the movement would support for the post 
of head of government (Langner. 1983:82; Inkatha. nd(a». 
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It meant that. in effect. as was the case before the constitution was changed, the 
president of Inkatha had to belong to the Zulu ethnic group. Gibson Thula. in charge 
of publlcity for Inkatha for a time, said after the 1979 constltutional change, surely 
with his tongue firmly in his cheek, that it was now possible 'for a non-Zulu to become 
president of Inkatha and thus ~ chief of the Zulus' (Frontline, 1 (1), 1979). This 
would, of course, have made nonsense of the KwaZulu bantustan constitution and 
Buthelezt's clalm to sole legitimacy in the traditlonal position of prlme mlnister to the 
Zulu king. 
Inkatha was, in one of its aspects, simply another bantustan polltical party. In terms of 
the distincUon drawn by Buthelezt between short- and long-term involvement. Inkatha 
was ftrmly located in the former as the ruling party within KwaZulu. It was probably 
wishful th1nklng that made Temkin wrlte in 1976 that the presentation by Buthelezi of 
Inkatha as a natlonalllberation movement to overseas audiences, rested on: 
the already overwhelming and enthusiastic response with which it has 
been met in towns and citles allover the country.,. Inkatha is above 
black suspicions. It is not a government instltution nor is it an 
lnstltutlon arlstng even indirectly from offiCial pollcy. There is no taint 
of apartheid attachlng to it (1976:334). 
Apart from the quallftcation of being able to head a government in which Inkatha had 
come to power, the president of the movement had to be over 35 years of age. He 
(because of the 'tradition' appealed to by the KwaZulu leaders there is Uttle doubt that 
the president would be male) had been given wide, but not free, rein. Article 14 of the 
Inkatha constitution I1sted the powers of the president. which included that of giVing 
lnstruction"on any matter affecttng the Movement'. to appoint committees and to take 
dlsclpUnary actlon against any member, and provlded that he would be the principal 
spokesman for Inkatha. Below I discuss the centrality of Buthelezt to the ethnic 
mobWslng project into the Inkatha movement. It was essential that Buthelezt's 
constitutional position should be inviolable, to ensure the various ideological 
continUities that he came to claim to represent. 
Langner's comment on the powers of the president are probably correct: 
There is no doubt that the power of Buthelezt's personality Is a 
domlnant factor within Inkatha, and superflclally It seems as if he has 
unllmlted powers in certain lnstances. But Buthelezt and Inkatha 
acknowledge that the President can only act within the precincts of 
the 'wlll of the people' and that he can be removed if his orchestratlon 
of the affairs of the movement are not acceptable (1983:93). 
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What needs to be added, though, Is that Buthelezl made the movement and his own 
personallty, or rather polltical persona, virtually synonymous, which made any 
overturntng of his decisions dtftlcult to Imagtne. The hlerarch1cal nature of the 
movement. briefly sketched above, was essential not only for efficient functioning but 
also to allow a stngle story of Zulu ethniclty to be presented, with Buthelez1 also 
organisational head. Langner aclmowledged that the president could "entrench b1mself 
In a vtrtually unassaUable position', as could members of the CC. Inkatha argued that 
because consensus ruled, the loopholes In the constitution did not present any 
problem: 
He (Buthelezl) says a matter Is discussed until agreement has been 
reached. When asked In which way It becomes clear that there Is 
consensus, he simply said: "We know: He pointed out that nowadays 
they mtght vote by show of hands. but traditionally - and even today -
they knew when consensus had been reached (Langner, 1983:103). 
Buthelez1 operated by caucustng beforehand, "plantlng' Ideas rather than decld1ng. The 
llberalJournal Reality (7(5), 1975:3) commented editorially after an interview With the 
first Inkatha secretary general, dr SME Bengu (now ANC m1n1ster of education In the 
post-apartheid South Africa), that this type of consensus mtght mean that the 
'dissident voice' w1ll not be heard, a fear that was subsequently to some extent borne 
out by a KLA request to the central government that opposition parties not be allowed 
to exist Within KwaZulu. Whlle the main reason was a legttlmate concern about the 
Involvement of the central state security apparatuses Within KwaZulu opposition 
polltics In the early-1970s, It was also stated that opposition parties were an 
unnecessarlly diVisive force. The KLA did not have the powers under the first stage 
(tChapter I') self-government to Implement this Wish for trouble-free Internal pol1tics. 
Mtnlster MC Botha turned down the request for legtslation to give effect to the 
proposal In 1975. Once Inkatha had been formed the NC rejected the formation of 
opposition parties. As "Zulus were still bound In chains', they had a primary objective 
"to free the nation of these chains'. The motion concluded that "(t)herefore we can see 
no reason for the formation of polltlcal parties In KwaZulu' (Dany News, 16 Jan 76). 
This l1ne of argument made sense within Inkatha's self-perception If It Is kept In mind 
that the movement presented Itself, and Its leaders perceived It. as reflecting the w1ll of 
"the people', of "the oppressed', of the "Zulu nation'. It Is unfortunate that such 
attitudes created during the period of struggle against apartheid, and not l1m1ted to 
the Inkatha movement. have played a large part and could account for the very h1gh 
levels of pollticallntolerance evident before the elections and st1ll present In pol1tical 
attitudes after the elections (Sunday Tribune, 4 Dec 94). 
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Inkatha branches 
It is important. briefly. to look at the spread of branches and membership because it 
is on the basiS of these that Inkatha cla1med to be a national. cross-ethnic movement. 
going beyond the state's polley of fragmentation (and beyond its own claimS and 
practice of ethnic' representation. creating the amblgu11J within the movement already 
alluded to above). 'Non-Zulu' allegtance to Inkatha and Chief Buthelezl had been a very 
sensitive issue with the Inkatha leaders. and maybe even more 80 with pollticians and 
academl!!S who favoured the solution that the movement was said to hold for South 
Africa as a whole. 
Inkatha's branches had to have a minimum of 30 members. a committee of eight 
members. and a 'branch executive committee' of 14 members. Langner wrote that it is 
not clear why there should be provision for two committees (1983:75). The large 
number of committee positions. relative to the m1n1Jnum size of a branch. also drew 
comment. Venter (1982:37) suggested that it showed a concern not only with 
effectiveness. but also with status and 'el1te formation'. This vlew was supported by a 
member of the Inkatha Institute in an interview for this study. who then referred to a 
s1mllar structure in churches. Anthropologtst Jim Kleman (1982: 169). Writing on 
Zulu Zionist churches. said it had been suggested that 'the emergence of elaborate 
hierarchies serves the purpose of max1m1z1ng opportunities for the exercise of 
leadership. thus compensating "for the loss of such leadership opportunities in the 
polltica1 and administrative spheres .... If this is Indeed true of Inkatha It would indicate 
a very manipulative and patemal1st1c approach to membership. A more sympathetic. 
If not necessar1ly accurate. interpretation would be that in the case of a polltica1 
movement such as Inkatha the abundance of committee seats could serve as a tralnlng 
ground for members in the procedures of the organization. If this. was the case. It had 
not worked that well as a supplementary act1vl1J of the Inkatha Instltute as late as the 
mid-1980s was to train members and establlsh branch procedures. 
A month after the formation of Inkatha in 1975 It was reported that ten branches had 
already been formed in townships around Durban. Nomathemba Sithole (secretary 
with the Unlted States Information Service in Durban) was elected organising 
secretary of the interim committee. Buthelezl said that branches had to be formed in 
consultation with the KwaZulu urban representative. a clvU servant (Daily News. 26 
Apr 75). indicating that no time had been lost in making use of the facilities offered by 
the bantustan. Early in 1977 there were 300 branches (200 rural and 100 urban) in 
. existence. 18 of these outside Natal (Schmahmann. 1978:277·8). Lawrence 
Schlemmer. academiC and at one time Inkatha spokesperson. said on SABC·1V (3 
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Dec 84) that nearly a third of branches were in the Transvaal urban areas in 1984. 
Schmalunann made an early claim for Inkatha branches in the western Cape. where 
the African population comes mainly from regions inhabited by Xhosa-speaking 
people (the eastern Cape). Reference to these western Cape branches. placed 
spec11lcally in the townships of Langa. Nyanga and Guguletu. were made uncritically 
subsequently (see. for example. Frontline. 1(1). 1979; Natal Mercury. 21 Feb 80: 
Langner. 1983:71). However. researchers in Cape Town whom I approached in the 
mid-l980s were unable to discover any of these branches. 
A thesis submitted in 1983 mentioned 1000 branches of the movement in 20 regtons -
more than 90% of them in Natal (including KwaZulu) (Langner. 1983). However. 
Kane-Berman. writing a year earlier. claimed 1200 branches and placed 30 of these in 
Soweto (1982:155). Despite the contradlctory figures. and despite the primary reason 
for quoting branch numbers and location. namely to show national membership. 
observers have always accepted that Inkatha was formed as and remained 
predomlnantly a regtonal and Zulu organization. The 1994 election results once again 
confirmed that observation. even in its new guise of the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(Hamilton and Mare. 1994: ~e. 1995). 
Schlemmer admitted that branches outslde the proVince reflected a Zulu-speaking 
presence in those areas. and that even though ethnlc aftlliation dld not appear on 
membership forms. the bulk of its members was Zulu-speaklng (over 95%). and that 
it was a basically rurally-based organisatlon (1980: 115). This Zulu and rural bias 
correlated very well With organizational patterns of Inkatha during the first five or so 
years of Its existence and beyond. In rural areas constituencies coincided With chiefs· 
areas ofauthorl~ (Schlemmer. 1980:115: and above). and Inkatha regtons took the 
same boundarles as the regtonal authorities in Natal established in terms of the 1951 
Bantu Authorlties Act. It comes as no surprise then that the movemenfs 'spectacular 
growth· could 'in large measure· be ascribed to the 'active co-operation of tribal chiefs· 
(Schlemmer. 1980:116). 
John Kane-Berman. ex-Journalist. director of the South African IDSUtute of Race 
Relations and also vice-chairman of the KwaZulu/Natal talks in Durban (the Indaba in 
1986). wrote that Buthelezl confirmed this in that he 'has insisted that traditional 
authori~ be respected and that ehlefs, as patrons, should exercise a watching brlef 
over local branches' ( 1982: 154). As far as could be established Inkatha never claimed 











While membership of Inkatha proper was restricted to 'persons' over the age of 18, 
Jemale persons of not less than eighteen years of age' enrolled in the Women's 
Brigade, while 'persons' under the age of 18 and 'those people who are accepted by the 
Youth Population as Youth' (a flexible approach to 'youth' s1m1lar to that by the 
ANCYL) joined the Youth Brigade. The latter proVision regarding Youth Brigade 
membership was one of the additions to the constitution in 1979, while an 
amendment removed the Youth Brigade from the jurisdlction of the CC and placed it 
directly under the president (the Women's Brigade remained under central committee 
control) (see Langner, 1983). 
The Women's Brigade functioned in parallel With the 'mam constituencies, branches 
and other units' of Inkatha. It was supposed to play an 'instructive role in the 
mobUtzation of the womenfolk and upbringing of ch1ldren towards the objectives of 
the Movement'. The Youth Brigade was allocated a less supportive role. It was to 
function as the 'reserve of the Movement and shall play the vanguard role of upholding 
and consol1daunggams of the Movement'. It too existed side-by-side with the main 
structures. The chairs of both brigades were appointed by the president in 
consultation with the national women's councll in the one case, and with the CC in the 
case of the Youth Brigade. 
The Women's Brigade was inaugurated at the Inanda Seminary at the end of May 
1977, and its Brst conference was held at Ulundiin October of that year. As with the 
other eections of the Inkatha movement. the conferences of the Women's Brigade were 
usually attended by large numbers of people. In 1978, for example, it was clalmed that 
1000 delegates attended (Rand DaUy MaU, 5 Sep 78), and they elected Anastasia 
Thula (wife of CC member Gibson Thula) as secretary general. Ella Nxasana. Women's 
Brigade ~utive member, said in 1979 (KCAV, 194) that the tasks of the members 
were, for example, ploughing, gardening and sewing. She denied that Inkatha wanted 
women to stay in the home. W Yengwa, another executive member. said the Women's 
Brigade had fought very strongly agalnst the notorious restrictions placed on African 
women in Natal through the Natal Code and the Bantu Admlnistration Act of 1927. 
She also claimed that the Women's Brigade had been aiding unions, through food 
boycotts (she mentioned the Fattl's and Moni's pasta company boycott of 1978), but 
was clearly unsure of her facts and finally said that Inkatha was not working with 
existing unions but starting its own (KCAV, 188). This was in 1979, etghtyears before 
Inkatha formed UWUSA. 
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In 1974 WSP Kanye. executive councillor for Justice~ introduced a motion In the KLA 
call1ng for the lntroduction of a select comm1ttee to lnvestlgate the legal disabUlties of 
women under the Natal Code. Kanye was careful not to offend traditionalists. and 
admitted that there might be some members of the KLA who would be offended by the 
idea that women be given powers 'which they did not Possess formerly'. undoing 'that 
which belongs to the nation'. Buthelez1 seconded the motion to study the Natal Code. 
The debate was notable for sexist remarks (KLAD 4. 1974:64). The committee was to 
be chaired by SZ Conco.ln 1975 an lnterim report was tabled (KLAD 6. 1975:349). 
and later 10 the session presented by Conco (KLAD 7. 1975:823-48). but no debate 
took place. Conco said that very few replies had been received to the thousand 
questionnaires sent out. He blamed this on 1ll1teracy. obstructive offic1als. and social 
conservatiSm. 
The ftnal report. which was discussed In 1976. was only four pages long. Dr AH Zulu 
said that if the KLA was commltted to freedom then they had to accept the report. He 
continued that the KLA had previously 'accepted the necess11¥ for adjusting Its laws. 
contrary to custom. if It should be found necessary to do so'. referring. for example. to 
the 'un-Zulu' way In which the role of the king had been defined. He said that the 
inferior position to which women had been allocated had been 'accorcllng to Zulu 
custom'. but that secretary for Native Affairs Shepstone. In nineteenth century Natal. 
had arWlclally frozen the position (KLAD 9. 1976:536-8). The changes proposed 
would not affect the pracUce of lobolo (paying brldewealth). Conco said that a function 
of Inkatha would be to Implement the recommendations. and made several calls for 
the total repeal of the Natal Code rather than just Section 27. which was the only part 
dealtwtth. 
The Natal Code of Natlve Law.ln this case. refers to the 1891 cod1ftcation by the' 
colonial Natal LegIslative Councll of what they perceived to be 'traditional customary 
law'. but that In many cases bore very little relation to pre-colonial practice (Marks 
(ed). 1987:21-22). This was especially the case with regard to proper1¥ and other 
rights of Zulu women (cfWelsh. 1971:169). What codiflcation also did was to Impart 
'a r1gtdi1¥ to customary law which it had not had In its traditional context'. the polnt 
made by Dr Zulu In the KLA debate as well (Welsh. 1971: 171). 'The social base of 
traditional law' was constantly eroded through the demands of capitalism and the 
actions of the state. wb1le the codtfted laws were lnflex1ble and could not adapt to 
changtng circumstances. African women. In particular. 'suffered a deterioration In 
status as a result of the Code' (Welsh. 1971 :176). 
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Section 27, the only one the KLA decided to request the central government to repeal, 
dealt with the perpetual minority status in law of African women in Natal. Unless she 
was 'emancipated', 
'a Bantu female is deemed a perpetual minor ... and has no 
independent powers save as to her own person .. .' She is always under 
the guardianship of a man ... first under ... her father, or, if he should 
die or become incapacitated, the head of the kraal concerned. When 
she marries, her husband is her guardian; and if she becomes 
. dlvorced the guardianship reverts to her father ... If she becomes 
widowed, the guardianship is the head of her husband's kraal (who 
may be her eldest son if he is a major in law) (Horrell, 1968:3). 
'Emancipation' could occur if an unmarried, widowed or divorced woman, by Virtue of 
good character, education, thr1f1¥ habits, 'or any other good and sufficient reason', was 
freed by an order of the Bantu Commissioner's Court from the control of her guardian 
(Horrell, 1968:3). 
A motion was accepted In the KLA calling on the central government to repeal Section 
27, and to amend Section 226 of the Crim1nal Procedure Act (5611955), which would 
allow exemption from giVing evidence against thelr husbands, not only to women 
married under Christian rights but also to 'customary union' marriages (KLAD 9, 
1976:595-6). During that same session in 1976 the executive counc1l10r for Justice 
said women were to be employed at the same ranks and rates of pay as men in his 
department. Earller the education councillor had turned down such a suggestion on 
the grounds of insufficient funds (the Justlce department decision would only affect 32 
women at that Ume). However, what remains clear is that changes to the role of 
women, within KwaZulu, within Zulu social relations, and within the Inkatha 
movement. were seen and debated within the ideologtcalllmitations of 'tradition'. 
Inkatha's male leadership operated within the rlgtdtties of perceptions of gender roles 
within a clearly defined, and therefore rigid, idea of ethnicity. 
Some introductory remarks on the Youth Brigade are appropriate (for further deta1l 
see Teague, 1983; Mare and Hamllton, 1987). The Youth Brigade was fonned in 1976, 
but held its first conference only in 1978, when an eight-member committee under 
Musa Arnold Mkh1ze was elected. Mkhlze came from Evaton in the Transvaal. He said 
that Inkatha had to be promoted at universities 'to counter the influence of the South 
African Students Organization (SASO)' (Langner, 1983:153). SASO was the first 
speclflcally South African black consciousness organization to be fonned In 1969. It 
was banned by the state in 1977 (see DaVies et al, 1984:302-8), Langner noted that 
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from 1980 there had been moves to change the Youth Brigade into a 'youth corps': 
For the sake of dIscipline the children were dressed in uniforms and 
t1me was devoted to marching and the stngtng and shouting of 
Inkatha songs and slogans. The chlldren were also involved in 
commWl11y projects such as so11 preservation and gardening, and 
Buthelezl foresaw a situation 'where young people who have left 
school are going to have to spend a year or so working for the 
commWl11y in the rural areas' ... they would earn their keep and a 
'more permanent group' would get 'a modest salary' from Inkatha and 
the KwaZulu government (Langner, 1983:154, emphasis added). 
From this change in focus came the building of the Emandlenl-Matleng youth camp. 
As early as 1974 Buthelezl had envisaged a labour contribuUon during a 'compulsory 
year ••• slmllar to the one year during which White youths are compelled to do mllltary 
service' (KLAD 5, 1975: 141). The 'Youth Service Corps for Social Reconstruction' 
(YSC - the Emandlenl-Matleng camp) was established in January 1982. After the 19BO 
schools boycotts. ruthlessly repressed by Inkatha members in the name of Zulu 
parental d1aclpline (Kane Berman, 1982:156; Mare and Hamilton, 1987:185-9), 
Buthelezl called for 'well-dIsciplined and reglmented lmpls in every Inkatha region' 
(Sunday Post, 22 Jun SO). The Inkatha InsUtute drew up the curriculum for the YSC 
(McCaul, 1983:27). 'Developmenf was one of the moblllzlng slogans employed by 
Inkatha and the KLA. A multitude of activities were presented under the umbrella of 
'development', from gardening to involvement in profit-making through bottle-stores. 
In a rousing speech to the naUonal executive coriunlttee of the Youth Brigade (BS, 23 
Nov BO, quoted in Teague, 1983:68) Buthelezl not only referred to the seml-mllltary 
role that the Youth Brigade (or rather a 'Youth Service Corps'ln this case) was to play 
('I can envisage a camp in our rolling countryside where 10 000 youth wUl be 
mustered, dr1lllng. learning. teaching and being taught. disclpllnlng themselves to 
become fasbtoned steel for the struggle'), but also grandiose development projects ('I 
can see units of the Youth Service Corps constructing dams, building bridges, 
salvaging drought-stricken so11, introducing forms of life-saving technology, bulldlng 
schools, conductlng literacy classes .. ,'), 
Teague commented that she would conclude that the YSC 'has essenUally three alms': 
Firstly, on an Ideologlcallevel, It provides Inkatha with the 
opportun11y to inculcate members of the Youth Brigade with a strong 
sense of loyal1y and du1y towards the 'Zulu naUon' - and thereby 
Buthelezl and Inkatha. Secondly, It provides Inkatha with the means 
170 
of substantiaung Buthelezfs constant threat that Inkatha wUl 'pick up 
the gauntlet' thrown down by its enemies, lmaglned or otherwise. And 
thirdly, the 'social reconstruction' aspect - the tralnlng in rudimentary 
development skllls - is part of the recognition by Inkatha that In order 
to retain and attract support. it needs to become more Involved In 
'bread and butter' issues in the commun11;y (1983:72). 
It can be added that another lmportant function of the Youth Brigade and YSC was an 
attempt to absorb at least some of the thousands of young people who annually left. 
and still leave school with not the sllghtest chance of a job, and who formed such an 
lmportant and volaUle element In the near civil war in South Africa after 1976 (see 
Campbell, 1992: Lodge and Nasson, 1991). Schlemmer said in a 1V intemew that 
what was needed was a mass youth movement of the unemployed ('Midweek', 16 Jan 
85), whlle the head of the Inkathayouth affalrs section said in an interview that the 
Emandlen1-Matleng camp arose out of the unemployment crisis In KwaZulu (McCaul, 
1983:25). 
In 1976, In a KLA debate. the executive councUlor for commun11;y affairs admitted the 
problem of youth unemployment. Explaining a R700 000 item in his budget for youth 
camps, he said that 
These are actually places where the youths, who cause a disturbance 
in the commun11;y, are placed ... those youths who are undesirable or 
who are delinquents (KLAD 9. 1976:318). 
The existence of such large numbers of young people whose aspirations for jobs and 
secur11;y could not be met under the economic and poUtical system in South Africa was 
of grave concern to those interests who would lose most through the simultaneous 
destrucUon of the apartheid state and of the economy. The lnkatha movement 
attempted to mould these people into a political and mllitary weapon, under the 
d1sc1pllne of 'Zuluness' (see section three below), as did other polltical organisations. 
In a briefing paper deaUng with 'development and lnkatha's role'. secretary general 
Oscar Dhlomo spelt out very clearly what they had in mind. He and the Women's 
Brigade representative were on a vlsit to Israel where they discussed the formation of 
a Youth Service Corps, a large-scale, 'para-miUtary' project. with a camp 'for 
something llke 10 000 trainees'. Dhlomo's document continued: 
We need to discuss this IYSC) concept with people who have possibly 
been involved in miUtary tratntng camps and in small scale 
commun11;y-bound llght industries and semce industries. 
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· .. we would like to meet people who could offer guidance on: 
1. The use of military trainees on community service programmes. 
rural agrtc'ultural work and work in buUdlng infrastructure for 
development. 
2. Th~ requirements of attaining self-sufficiency in m1lltary tralnlng 
camps ••• 
5. The appropriate ratios of tra1n1ng to routine m1lltary exercises to 
leisUre in tra1n1ng programmes ••. 
6. The type and duration of specialized tra1n1ng and psychological 
preparation of leaders and officers in preparation for larger 
training camps ••• (Dhlomo. 1981 :8) 
The Youth Brigade was modelled on the Young Pioneers in Malawi and the Zambian 
Youth Service. Gibson Thula. then KwaZulu urban representative in the Transvaal. 
was sent to Zambia in 1976 to study the Youth Service system there (Bernstein. 
1977:135-6). Musa Mkh1zevtsited Malawi on a s1m1lar trip (Dally News. 27 Mar BO). 
Members were also being sent to the Coady Institute in Canada to give effect to the 
'development' aspect of the Youth Brigade's acUvtties - the Coady Institute also 
provided tralnlng for the setting up of an Inkatha Development Office (McCaul, 
1983:21). With the record that the Malawian Young Pioneers had gained for being 
'party thugs' and 'storm-troopers', this model could not have been less auspicious 
(McCaul, 1983:42). 
In 1979. at the Urne of the Inkatha delegation to London to meet the ANC - the meeting 
that led to the dramatic break In relations between the two movements (Mare. 1988)-
Beeld editor Ton V08loo said that Afrikaners and Zulus should talk: ' •.. If the 
Afrikaners and the Zulus. as the two biggest components In our patterns of peopl~. 
could make a compact. the road ahead would be lnftnltely easler' (Sunday Express. 
18 Nov 79). These sentiments had been expressed by Buthelez1 as well, and nowhere 
more clearly than during addresses to Afrikaans students. such as to the Afrlkaanse 
Studentebond (ASS). an arch-conservative student organiZation. The 'compact' that 
V08loo desired had been a de facto achievement through the contacts between the 
Inkatha Youth Srigade and the ASS. These moves. too, occurred Within a framework 
of ethnic poUtics. 
Whlle the formal relationship between the two parent bodles (the National Party and 
Inkatha) had been very strained at Urnes. the youth organisations managed to 
. cooperate In Joint structures over the years. University of Stellenbosch Students 
Representative Councll members and Inkatha members had discussions on several 
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occasions before the links were formalised through the establishment of the South 
Mrlcan Youth Foundation In 1981 - a 'think tank',ln 1980 ASB executive members 
Visited Ulundi. and Invited Inkatha Youth Brigade leaders to their conference, In 1984 
Youth Brigade organlser Ntwe Mafole received a standing ovation from ASB delegates 
at a meeting In Bloemfontein on South Mrlca's 'politlcal future unt1l the year 2000', 
During the same year, 1984, the Youth Brigade annual conference condemned 
NUSAS, Dlakonla (the Durban-based ecumenical organization), and others, and said 
that 'Inkatha's youth were aware that the struggle for liberation had been ,ong 
lnhlblted by White, coloured and Indian liberals who thought that they knew what was 
best for us'" (Survey, 1984: 12). The ldeological aftlnlty and cooperation of the various 
youth groups, such as Jeugkrag SA (Youth Power SA - a body 'aimed at countertng 
radicallsm from left and right') which planned to hold a Joint conference With 
Inkatha's Youth Brigade, no doubt facllltated other levels of contact between Inkatha 
and AfrIkaner leaders (pol1t1cal, cultural and economic). The contact. when extreme 
Intolerance of and antagonism to resistance organisations and Individuals 
characterised the Youth Brigade's other relations, gave a clear indication of the 
conservative role that was lntended and that was played by this branch of Inkatha. 
Inkathat • membership 
Inkatha's membership claims over the years of its existence never told the full story, 
and were open to question and could be disproved, even if just on the grounds of 
grossly Inconslstent claims. However, even if the exact figures could have been 
establlshed membership does, In the finaltnstance. not equal support nor the ablllty 
of an organisation to moblllse around issues. It was not the case for the ANC during 
the days of its legal existence In South Afrlca unt1l 1960 and it was not the case for 
Inkatha (as shown by its election support In KwaZulu-Natalln 1994, and Its frequent 
displays of mass support in the region at rall1es In the years leadlng up to the 
overthrow of the apartheid government). 
The claimed membership Increases by Inkatha were nothing if not spectacular. After a 
ten-year period of existence (1975-1985) It neatly clalmed to have achieved the 
one-mUllon member mark, or an average of 100 000 members per year (for further 
details and debates around membership, see Mare and Hamllton, 1987:70-73; 
Brewer, 1985, 1986; Southall, 1986; McCaul, 1983:7; Survey. various years; Inkatha 
Conference Reports and Memoranda. various years). Exaggerated and contradictory 
claims were made for membership totals and for the composltlon of its registered 
support. For example. in 1978 Chief Buthelezl claimed 150 000 members, but added 
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that for every member there were between 30 and 50 synipath1zers giVing true support 
of between four and seven mUllon people (Survey. 1978:28). an absurd clalm. Other 
examples are discussed in Mare and Hamilton ( 1987). 
What was the purpose of exaggerated claims? First. 'spectacular' totals and 
'phenomenal' growth were of tremendous importance to the movement and to those 
who supported a central, national role for Inkatha and for what It represented. The 
larger the organiZation, the more legitimacy for Its clalm to speak for 'the people'. 
What dlstlngUlsbed Inkatha from other bantustan-based parUes was, in effect. Its 
support. Its 'constituency', that term favoured by Inkatha's leaders. dlsttngulsbed It 
from being another 'Muzorewa option' - a reference to the Ul-fated attempt by the 
Rhodesian regtme to find a credible black face to forestall a take-over by the l1beration 
groups in ZImbabwe - an accusation sometimes levelled agalnst Inkatha. Here It was 
also not that important that Inkatba's support should be etbnlcally speclftc, as th~t 
was the perception for many conservative supporters of the basic units of pol1tical 
contestation and representatlon. 
Second, these figures were Important in the struggle for popular support against 
other, antagonistic organtzatlons. It Is quite true that there had never been a mass 
movement in South AfrIca that had been able to clalm a signed-up membersblp 
approaching one m1ll1on people. Most certa1nly the ANC bad never been able to 
acb1eve thls, even In Its legal heyday. Lodge wrote that the peak during the 19408 was 
only some 5500; it was no more than 7000 in 1951, but then reached a h1gh of 
100 000 by the end of the Defiance Campaign in 1953. However, Lodge concludes that 
in thls case too 'offietal membersblp figures do not accurately reflect the full extent of 
the ANC's lnfluence' (Lodge, 1983:75). 
The only contemporary comparison was With the United Democratlc Front. wblch 
clalmed to be more representative than Inkatha. and was certainly a national 
organlZatlon in a way that Inkatha never was. but which was composed of aftlllated 
organlZaUons. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) represented at 
the time of lts formation in November 1985 a paid-up membership of 400 000 
workers, organiZed into a democratic and disclpl1ned structure (LewIs and Randall, 
1985; Carrtm, 1986). The point to be made here Is that Inkatha's massive claimed 
membership bad to reflect. for Its supporters inside and outside the movement. not 
only an abWqr 'to dellver the goods', but also to dellver in opposiUon to counter-claims. 
However. despite the obViOUS reasons why Inkatha should have lnflated Its 
membership claims, and notwithstanding all the pressures that were appl1~ to 
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ensure. If not membership then at least obedience. Inkatha did undoubtedly have a 
large folloWing from its formation and to have tgnored that would have been to 
mlsJudge the consequences that its existence would have on attempts to construct a 
post-apartheid South Africa. The fallure properly to address Inkatha's support. its 
appeals. and its methods had much to do with the fallure of the ANC to win an 
election in the KZN province. 
What can be said about this membership? Why were people attracted to the movement 
for reasons other than short-term gain, the necessity of allegiance to survive in a 
hosUle enVironment. and other reasons, including Violence or the fear of retrlbution 
that mJght 'nudge' (Schlemmer, 1980:122) people lnto paytngat least ajolnlng fee or 
gtvlng other support to the movement? 
In this section I have shown that Inkatha functioned as a modem and modernlsing 
movement 10 many aspects of its structure and mode of operation, altering the nature 
of pol1tics 10 the region withln which it operated, for example through the manner in 
which it did use the structures of apartheid with a measure of success, and its steps to 
create ng10nal strengths and legitimacy for the claims to regional powers. At the same 
time it relled on chiefs for a large part of its organisational capacity: it central1sed 
authority under the president. Buthelezi. who carried much more than democratic 
approval but functioned as a symbol1c condensation 10 the mobilising strategy: it 
remalned 10 the bantustan and .ln the ethnic group (as It was intended to be at and 10 
Its formation); and it basically became the regional government through its exclusive 
domlnation. and near total overlap With. the KLA. 
Inkatha was intended to be, and served as the vehicle for ethnic mobilisation, a vehicle 
that was perceived lncreastngly to be 10 opposition not only to the central state. but to 
other organlsations opposing apartheid. Ethnic moblllsation served Its purpose in the 
extremely confrontational pol1tics that has characterised change in South Mrlca. 
175 
SECTION 3: 
ZULU NATION: 'BROTHERS BORN OF WARRIOR STOCK' 
Introduction 
In this sectlon I examine the speclftc and immediate case of ethnic mobilisatlon, that 
into the 'Zulu natlon', having sketched some of the necessary historlcal, politlcal and 
social background as well as relevant organisational factors relating to Inkatha. Here I 
wUl deal With the discourse of ethnic mob1l1satlon, drawing on the insights provlded 
by the approach presented in chapters two and three. This is an important case. To 
understand it may lndicate an approach to a South Africa in which divisions are . 
perceived to be resolvable, able to be accommodated. rather than as fixed, inherent 
and trans-historlcal: and it serves to lllustrate many of the more theoretical points 
made above. I wUl continue to refer. sometlmes in contrast, to other lnstances of 
ethnic or other types ofmobllisation (such as that of class or natlonalism). 
Wblle the focus is on South Africa, it Is clear by now that ethnic11y Is not a local or an 
Afrlcan phenomenon as Is sometimes Implied in local polltlcal debate - akJn to or 
synonymous With 'tJ1bal1sm' (which Is then seen as speclftcally black ·African'). Nor 
does the selectlon in this study of a Zulu ethnic socialidentl1y wish to imply that there 
are no other ethn1cltles nor to deny that several other poUtical mobilisatlons are. or 
could potentlally be. taking place in the country. 
Ethnic ~ups. and polltlcal mobllisatlon of ethnic sentiments, are to be found in all 
parts of the world. However. ultlmately we have to examlne the partlcular unfolding. 
artlculatlon. the speclftc 'miX' that constitutes each case, using the general tools that 
have been suggested. We have to examine the reasons why. and if. ethnic sentiments 
find fert1le ground in each speclftc case (why people are 'avallable' for ethnic 
mob1l1satlon, which is what the first part of this chapter has dealt With), and we have 
to see who the prime mob1l1sers are. and what interests are served. Such an exercise 
wUl also allow us to test the adequacy of the theoretlcal diSCUSSion. 
The many instances of ethnic group formation and of ethnic confl1ct show that there 
are large slmUarltles (or else useful comparisons that can add to our understanding) 
between them. The approach in this section will be to deal With the three elements of 
the deftnitlon developed from these slmllarltles in the previous section - cultural 
partlcularl1y: historlcal ortgln; and group boundarles. and to place these against the 
background provided by the contextuallsatlon in the first two sections of this chapter. 
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It Is. however. not possible. especially at this more concrete level of discussion. to 
separate the three elements neatly - they exist only in their interactlon (their 
artIculatlon) In composing an ethnic Identlt;y. and an ethnic group. also. as w1ll 
become clear. within the use being made of these elements within poUtlcally 
mobilising ethniclty. 
How does a study of the Inkatha movement add to our understanding of the operatlon 
of ethnic mobmsatlon? It provides a clear example of the use of a claimed cultural 
dlsUnctlveness: It illustrates how historlcallegttlmacy for the ethnic group Is 
presented In mobilisatton: It shows how the group Is pitched against other groups: It 
illustrates the polltlClsatlon of ethniclty which It attempts to organise within an 
exclusive organtsatlon (lnkatha has essentlally been 'organised Zuluness·. although 
changes In the 1990s w1ll be discussed): and. finally. It hlghllghts the centraUty of a 
single symbol. the person of chief Mangosuthu Buthelezl. to this case of ethnic 
mobilisatlon. something not found In all such groups. 
WhUe the example of Inkatha Is discussed to illustrate ethnic group formatton It 
should not be read as an argument that all varletles of ethnic Identlty that rely on an 
aspect or aspects of 'Zuluness' are to be found encapsulated In this movement (now 
the Inkatha Freedom Party - IFP). However. I do argue that It has been the most 
consistent. the most self-conscious and best pubUclsed version of ethnic mobilisatlon 
In South Mrtca In the latter half of the twentleth century (along With Afrikaner 
mobilisatlon In the first half of the twentleth century). It has left opponents with a 
distinct disadvantage In attempting to salvage an ethnic soclalldentlty uncoupled from 
Inkatha. as becomes clear when exam1n1ng the ANC response since 1990 (see. for 
example. Mare. 1994). Furthermore. It reinforces a most disturbing trend of 
generaUaed Intolerance to. and hence lack of understanding of. ethnic Identltles and 
other 8OClalldentltles. 
I am going to concentrate on the process of ethnic group formatton and definltlon. 
haVing dealt with some of the poUtlcal history and organlsatlonal structuring of the 
Inkatha movement In the previous two sectlons of this chapter (also see Mare and 
Hamllton. 1987: and Mzala. I 988:chapter 7. for a fuller account). However. a brlef 
overview Is necessary to perlodise stages In the process. now as they relate speclftcally 
to ethnic mobilisatlon. 
After that the diSCUSSion moves to the moblllstng strategtes. symbols. agents. 
structures. and practlces employed by Buthelezl and Inkatba. Many of these coincide 
with (such as the notlon ofnatlons With their own distinct historles). overlap (that 
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there are and should be separate regions/space within which nations can have thelr 
full existence). or were made ava1lable by the apartheid policy (such as the educational 
system In KwaZulu used with such vigour by lnkatha In its mobilising strategy). It is 
necessary to repeat that this study focuses prtmarUy on the first decade of Inkatha's 
existence. low until the mld-1980s. during which lnkatha·s consolidation took place. 
During this time its strategles were developed and confirmed. However. reference has 
been and will be made to the next five years as well. and a brtef overview is gtven to 
the changes In discourse and political practice after the formation of the Inkatha 
Freedom Party In December 1990. 
A brief periocUsatiOD 
From its formation In 1975 the leadership of the National Cultural Liberation 
Movement (lnkatha) relied very heavily for thelr project on the clout that ch1efs carried 
In rural areas. even though the chiefs had to be convtnced that the new movement was 
not going to pertpheralise them and ~lute thelr powers. However. In some ways a 
more lmportant event occurred nearly 20 years earlier when the young Buthelez1 
hlm8elf contentiously came to lead the Buthelez1 clan as chief. with government 
approval. 
When Buthelez1 decided to fight for the chieftaincy. he acknowledged the relative 
ideological clarity of an alternative path that had been available to him up to that 
point. The other path could have led through the ANC Youth League. of which he had 
been a member brtefly. to a legal career and articles with Communlst Party member 
and lawyer Rowley Arensteln. and continuation In what has always been the 
matnstream of Mrtcan nationalist politics In South Mrtca. It is not that he gave up 
either Arensteln or the political symbolism of the ANC. but the contradictions that 
have driven Inkatha. and the ethnic petty bourgeois Interests that the movement 
directly represents. Into an Increastngly conservative camp were etched Into his 
personal and organisational history at that time. Buthelez1 became an agent of 
admlnlstration and an element in ·the past' he was part of, and was reviving and 
recreating. 
Buthelez1's biographer, Temkin. wrote that It was hoped by 'many Zulu Intellectuals' 
during this tlme that Buthelez1 would become the 'premier' and the Zulu king the 
'rallying point' of the Zulu nation ( 1976:49, and above). With the choice that Buthelez1 
made In the 1950& his own political career started its parallel, and at times 
crts&-crosslng path with that charted by the state for AfrIcan politics. Both the 
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National party and Buthelezl, and later Inkatha, drew on the sediments of the past to 
help shape the present. 
The Ideas of the past shape and are shaped by the polltical practice of classes. The 
~emnants of the past were and are serving the aspirations of the present. whether it be 
a petty bourgeo1s1e that was attempting to assert itself (see Mare and Hamllton, 
1987:chapter siX), or the self-interest of established capital such as the sugar industry 
in Natal as was the case with the first Inkatha in the 19208 (see Cope, 1986, 1993: 
Marks, 1986): or, more recently, agricultural capital admitting to the failure of their 
own control measures and attempting new controls over the rural population (Mare 
and Hamllton. 1987a). Those ideas of the past are mediated through and given form 
in an ethnic soc1alidentity. which is then available to be employed for poUtical 
mob1l1sation. control and a spec1ftc polltlcal and 'moral' direction. 
The National Party also gave organisational and, in addltion, spatial form to its racist 
domination and class exploitation. It developed the paternalistic 'guardlani&m' of the 
pre-l948 eegregat10n period into apartheid. The blatant racism of this polley was to 
be coated with the idea of 'cultural nationalisms' and eventual 'independence' for the 
bantustan areas. modelled on what the Afrikaners said they had wanted for 
theDl8elves - an ethnic pride, an own 'homeland', and an own poUticalidentity - and 
presented. in the language of decolonlsation that was sweeping Africa during the 
19508. It was this poUey that placed ethnic mob1l1sation into an own poltt1cal arena 
ftrmly on the agenda for African 'ethnic entrepreneurs' or 'brokers' - it was the 
poUtics, and economics (advancing class interests behind an ethnic curtain), that 
would be allowed to flourish during the next four decades. 
In Natal chiefs and the Zulu royal house, as well as the mob1l1sing symbol that is 
called the 'Zulu nation' (a symbol that in itself needs to be unpacked into its 
constituent and changing parts), continued to be press-ganged into the service not 
only of the colonial, Union, and apartheid admin1strations, but also of African 
interests, both progressive and reactionary. This is what Buthelezi became part of in 
the 1950& - a broadly agreed-upon Zulu identity, agreed upon by both 'members' 
('Zulus', variously defined) and outsiders (by the apartheid state which had to find a 
basis ofleg1t1mation outside of eegregatlon, and by other non-Zulus). However, in the 
19508 this identity existed in a much looser form - it cornmtngled with an ANC-Ied 
national identity (with chief Albert Luthuli symboUstng that openness as both Zulu 
chief and last president of the ANC before it was banned in 1960). Attempts at the 
time, in the 1950&, to re-form Inkatha came to naught. maybe because of the strength 
of the national thrust then. 
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In the 19608 Buthelezl agonised over whether to take part In the new role envisaged 
for the Tribal Authorities he had already become part of In the 19508. In 1970, he 
came to head the pinnacle of the Promotion of Bantu-Self Government Act pyramid for 
the Zulus, the Zulu Territorial Authority. 
Initially two broad justlflcations for participation In state-created Institutions clashed 
(see section two, above, for a fuller discussion): on the one hand, that It was a selfless 
choice to prevent a stooge from being appointed (with a clear possibility that the royal 
house would have provlded such a person); on the other hand, that he was destined 
to lead a Zulu nation, In a position that owed nothing to the apartheid polley, over a 
polltical entity that pre-existed apartheid (and colonlal1sm), and a terrttory that 
appraxlmated In Its spread, if not In Its size, a 'kingdom' and state that dated back to 
the 18208 and 1830s. Over time, as his defeat of Zulu king Goodwlll Zwellth1n1 was 
consolldated, the latter justlflcation came to dominate, with additional positive clalms 
made for the strategy of 'working within the system and changtng It from Within'. 
Buthelezl refused the polltically-sulcldal route of 'Independence' for the KwaZulu 
'homeland'. Even the National Party, In Its attempt to ensure a future role for the 
Inkatha Freedom Party, In the early-1990s said that Inkatha contributed to the fallure 
of apartheid. There was a grtm irony, though. When king Zwellth1n1 and Buthelezl 
threatened secession and 'Independence for the 'Zulu kingdom', It came In January 
1994, when apartheid had already collapsed. and In the midst of extreme factional 
violence In the regton. 
In 1972 the Zululand Territorial Authorlt;y became the KwaZulu LegIslative Assembly. 
In 1975 Inkatha was formed as a purely Zulu movement. In 1977 KwaZulu entered 
the next stage In self-government. With Its powers now exceeding those of the 
second-tier provincial government. and based from 1984 In multi-mtWon Rand 
legtslative assembly bulld1ngs In the new capital, Ulund! (paid for through a 
re-allocation Within Its own meagre budget. which had to cover education. pensions, 
lnfrastructural development. etc). Inkatha. constitutionally - albeit wtth llttle success 
on the ground - welcomed all other African people Into membership under a changed 
constitution from 1979, a move that 1rr1tated the NP tremendously when It was 
mooted (see Inkatha. nd). Inkatha was so confident of Its role by that time that 
secretary general Slbusiso Bhengu 'said that It was hoped that Inkatha would be 
recogntsed as a llberation movement alongside such organisations such as the PAC 
and ANC or Instead of them' (Survey, 1977:36). 
Buthelezi's polltics In KwaZulu during the first eight years or so of the 19708 was 
dominated by two struggles: the first against state attempts to create an alternative 
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Zulu tradttfon using some chlefs, disgruntled traders, and With the king as central 
symboUc figure. Within this scheme an execut1ve role was envlsaged for the king as . 
was the removal of Buthelezl who was then perceived to be lmpertlnent in his reJect10n 
of 'independence'. The second. and not totally separate, struggle, was against 
opponents of Buthelezl's close llnks With state development agencles (which he wanted 
to control for ethnic class-format1on purposes) and his cooperat1on with big capital in 
the regton and in the rest of South Africa. They, this sect10n of the Zulu tradlng class. 
felt threatened by the economic lmpact of the alliance with big capital. and were 
disgnmtled by the mode of operat1on of the forerunner to the KwaZulu Development 
Corporat1on, the Bantu Investment Corporat1on (see, for example, Mare and Hamllton, 
1987:chapter 6; Mare, 1984). 
In hls attempts to mobiUse ethnlci~ and at the same time to modernise and 
incorporate potentlally opposing class Interests. Buthelezl presented a common 
strategy under the banner ofbulldlng 'the nat1on'. I have referred to Laclau's argument 
that the purpose of popultst (also ethnic popuUst) mobilisat1on Is in part to transform 
'all antagonisms into slmple dltIerence' (1977; also Mouffe, 1979: 196). Nun (see 
LARU, 1980: 17) said that' ••. the popuUst organlzat1on of the masses tends always I a 
generallsat10n with which Laclau disagreed in the debate, not wlshtng to attrlbute an 
essent1alllnk within popuUst interpe1lat1ons to the domlnant classes) to disorganlze 
the workers, in the sense that it decreases the sallency of class as the basis for 
collectiVe act1on'. This is how Buthe1ez1 expressed his own approach to class and 
other distlnctions Within nationalist (and ethnic) mobilisat1on: 
'(T,he bricks of black nat10nalism are many and vaned. There are 
ethnic groups, there are tribes. there are trade untons, drama 
SOCieties. black church groups, student organlsat1ons, cultural groups 
and many others' (quoted in Mare, 1978). 
In 1977 'Buthe1ezl said. more speclflcally. that: 
'Each occasion when a black man manages to be in a poslt1on to 
estabUsh any business is an auspicious occasion, not only for hlmself, 
but also for the ent1re black communt~ ... (strlktng) a blow for US 'in 
the Uberat10n struggle now being waged by blacks' (quoted in Mare. 
1984:28). 
Buthelez1 and Inkatha's hand was strengthened during thls early period of the 
existence of the movement through the support he gained for his polit1cal agenda from 
the African Nat10nal Congress. One powerful set of political symbols of mobilisat1on 
arose out of the shading of Inkatha into an internally revlved ANC. Colours, political 
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myth of oI1gln, some leadership figures, were all drawn from the ANC, especially as 1t 
had existed as a conservative branch in Natal durtng the period before 1ts banning (see 
Mare, 1988). Another set of symbols came from Zulu etbn1c1ty. 
There 18 a fundamental way, though, in which the two traditlons are entangled at the 
1deologlcallevel, at the level at which lnterpretation takes place, where lnterpe1latlons 
are ·prepared'. A central aspect of what Buthelez1 makes of the ANC traditlon was the 
'Zulu' character of many personallties in the ANC before 1960, and then, the other 
s1de of the coln, to decry the 'd1lutlon' of the Zulu and Mrlcan presence through the 
later 'non-rac1al' pollcy of the ANC. So, for example, In the Inkatha syllabus, Mdlull 
(1987) found that 
... the selection ofleaders (from the ANC) ... throws further Ught onto 
the slant of Ubuntu-botho. All the leaders who are selected are either 
Zulu-speaking Natallans or have strong connections with the Zulu 
royal famlly ... What 1s of particular sJgn1flcance about these 
leaders. ... , 18 the connection drawn between what they did or stood 
for and the actions of Inkatha anellor the KwaZulu government. 
Mdlull said that 'there 1s a huge gap (in the Inkatha vers10n ofres1stance history) 
between the 19608 and 1975', whlle the current ANC leadership 1s practically Ignored 
(only Mandela. Tambo and S1sulu, leaders with llnks with the ANC of 'the founding 
fathers', are referred to on occas1on). Inkatha's leaders presented the1r organtsation as 
a continuatlon of the ANC after a 15-year lull - 'Inkatha was founded In response to 
the polltlcal vacuum that had been created when the Mrlcan Natlonal Conwess and 
Pan Africanlst Congress were banned', and it was formed 'on the principles of the 
founding fathers of the ANC', said Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo (Swart 
lntervlewwlth Oscar Dhlomo, 1984). 
On one level it 18 quite accurate to refer to a 'Zulu' presence In the ANC: there were 
many Zulu-speaking leaders in the organisation who came from this part of South 
Mrtca. but It Is also true that they frequently showed a degree of Zulu chauvlnlsm and 
a tendency to form regional factions. Beall et al (1986:22) commented that whlle Dube 
had been the first president of the ANC, formed to coordinate national resistance to 
polltlcal exclusion and terrltorlal confinement of Africans, he was replaced In 1917 
and from 
that date ... untll his death In 1946 he created a regional base that 
stood In con1l1ct with the national African National Congress. H18 
Natal Native Congress left a legacy of tension that was only resolved 
with the election of chief Albert Luthuli as president of the regional 
(1951) and then of the national Congress (1952). 
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Buthelez1lgnored these cllfIlcult1es With the ANC tradit10n he presented and relied 
largely on an Incantat10n of names to stake his clalm (see, for example, speech quoted 
at length In Mare and Hamilton, 1987:219-20). 
The polltical role of Albert Luthull, presIdent of the ANC at the t1me of lts banning and 
also Zulu chief stripped of thls funct10n by the NP government. was essent1al as a llnk 
In the tradit10n created and presented by Inkatha. Frequent llnks were claimed by 
Buthelez1 With chiefLuthull, With his fam1ly and With his memory. However, It goes 
beyond that as when Inkatha clalmed that In 'a symbollc meeting between Chlef 
Luthull and the Hon. ChlefM.O. Buthe1ez11n the 19608, the herltage of the leadershlp 
of the Uberation ~e was passed on to the Hon. Chief Buthelez1' (lnkatha. 
1983:12). 
Buthelez1 pulled the varlous tradit10ns together In a speech made at the unveiling of 
the tombstone of H Selby Mslmang and hIs Wife. He first estabUshed hls own poslt1on 
In relation to Mslmang ('founder member of the banned African National Congres'), 
and then llnked the ANC of Mslmang and Inkatba: 
He was a llnk tOgether With Mr. Champlon between the old foundlng 
fathers of the African National Congress and the leadership of 
Inkatba. Mr. Mslmang's membership oflnkathajust1fled what I say 80 
often that Inkatha is structured on the ideals of the banned African 
National Congress as propounded In 1912 by the founding fathers. He 
was one of those foundlng fathers whose membership of Inkatha 
test1fled to the fact that It was not us In Inkatha who have deviated 
from those ldeals. The ldeals of the founding fathers who were 
descendants of black warriors were structured on the foundation of 
non-Violence and negotiat1ons .•. He saw us as formtng a continuum of 
those very ldeals ... We wUl not be lnfluenced away from those ldeals 
by any elltist cUque whatever they call themselves (85, 6 Apr 87). 
At the end of the 19708 the unequal balancing act. between a regtonal and 'Zulu 
nation' moblllsation, and a nat10nal Mrlcan nationalist mobilisation, was to change 
through a rupture of the relationship With the ANC, but also With the defeat of an 
autonomous, an alternative, 'traditional' poll tical posltion under the leadersbip of the 
king agalnBt Buthelez1 and Inkatha (the struggle that had carried the support of the 
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state and lts organs In the early-1970s). The 19805 saw an lndependent. from any 
major concern With national polltlcs and national pol1t1cal symbols, direction from 
Inkatba. Inkatha had defined itself outside of the mainstream of poUtical struggle - as 
that current was defined by 'the youth', by the ANC With lts strategies of armed 
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struggle. sanctions. ungovernability and seizing central state power. and by the United 
Democratic Front (UDF. formed in 1983) and the newly-formed Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (eOSATU.launched In 1985). the organisationally-loose alliance 
that became known as the 'Mass Democratic Movement'. 
For Inkatha the 1980s can be summarised as the period ofreglonal consolldation. It 
was character1aed by blatant and dangerous ethnic polltical mobilisation. by attempts 
at structurally Integrating the KwaZulu bantustan and the provincial administration. 
by the drawing up of blueprints for reglonal reform through the Buthelezl Commlsslon 
and the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba and forming alllances with conservative polltical and 
moneyed interests. and by deftnlng 'the enemy' ever clearer (see. for example. Mare. 
1991: Forsyth and Mare. 1992: on the Indaba see. for example. Mare. 1987. 1987a: 
Ardlngton. 1988: Dhlomo. 1987: Erwin. 1987: Louw and Krtek. 1987: Roberts and 
Howe (eels), 1987). 
The enemy. for Inkatha. was not only political opponents but also those who were not 
to be found for the speclflc version of polLtictsed ethn1c1ty propounded by the Inkatha 
leaderah1p and the Zulu klng. Castigating and threatening the traItors to the Zulu 
cause became a common theme during the 19808. In 1984 the klng said that 'some 
blacks in urban areas who want to disassociate themselves from their brothers and 
slsters in the rest of KwaZulu' should be 'cast out of our midst'. They were compared 
to witches 'preying on our humanness. preying on our Zuluness. bellttllng our past. 
and making us ashamed of our present' (City Press. 30 Sep 84). In 1986 Goodwlll 
warned at the main Shaka Day celebration: 
'I also say· this to you who are working with people and organtsaUons 
allen to the great Zulu people - If you do not return to where you 
belong to work for your people. never tmagtne that you wlll escape 
detectlon for long' (Natal Mercury, 25 Sep 86). 
On a national level Inkatha was being drawn increaslngly. from at least 1986. into the 
network of nefarious state-lnltiated or state-supported actiVities of which the details 
have only recently started com1ng to Ught. WhUe the Inkatha leadership was 
malntalnlng a rhetorical distance from the apartheid state, and most members were 
undoubtedly sincere in their rejection of apartheid. they were also being funded by the 
state (pollce. foreJgn affairs and military Intell1gence) and being integrated more tightly 
into being another functional element of the security network In the struggle against 
popular resistance and armed strurgle. This went beyond the de facto and de Jure 
integration demanded of any bantustan structure - the KwaZulu Pollce. for example, 
had always been headed by an SA Police officer. and to have' argued for the existence 
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of independent centres of power within South Africa was preposterous. The new 
thrust coincided with the appointment In 1987 of Jac Buchner as the Natal midlands 
chlef of the notorlous secwity pollee. Buchner. interrogator and involved in the 
creation of the Askarls ('turned' ANC operatives). took command of the KwaZulu 
Pollce in 1989 (see Mare. 1989: LRC. 1991). 
By the UJDe that FW de Klerk made hls historlc announcement on 2 February 1990. 
Inkatha and KwaZulu leaders were already engaged in formal consultation with the 
government. The talks centred on the relevance of their 'background group'·based 
federal proposal, encapsulated in the Indaba constltution, and on other 'obstacles in 
the way of negotlatlons' (including the release of Mandela and other politlcal 
prlsoners). 
Then, in December 1991, the latest chapter in the manipulatlon of ethniclty started 
when Buthelezl refused to attend the CODESA talks unless recognitlon was gtven to 
the special status of the 'Zulu natlon' through an invltatlon to king Goodwlll Zwelltblnl 
to participate as representatlve of seven-mllllon Zulus. Buthelezl's absence from 
natlonal talks at this cruclal UJDe in South Africa's hlstory, and the call for the Zulu 
klng's partiCipation slgnlfled the fallure of attempts to give a slgnlflcant natlonal 
presence to Inkatha and a retreat into the ethnic and reglonal fortress that Inkatha 
had so assiduously worked at during the 19808 - then as a 'stepping stone', now as a 
kraal behlnd a moat. Th~ next four years. from 1991 to 1994, was to see a steady 
increase in the vehemence with whlch the demand for a separate, ethnically-based 
future to be conceded to the reglon. was articulated (see Mare and Hamllton, 1994: 
Hamllton and Mare, 1994). These demands culmlnated In the threat of secession, the 
agreement on international mediation and the recognltlon of the 'Zulu kingdom', and 
the last-minute particlpatlon of the IFP In the electlons. 
The legacy of apartheid exists as much In the politlcal role It had attached to etbnlclty 
and cultural diverslty generally. as It exists In the poverty, relocatlon of vast numbers 
of people, deaths, llUteracy, and other Indicators of the depredations of that pollcy, 
committed on people In the name of 'separate development'. 'Independence' could be 
undone because, with a good measure of truth, It was a slelght of hand: the services 
provlded through the bantustan departments can become part of natlonal state 
structures or of ratlonalised and democratic regional governments; development 
projects can be undertaken to start a process of redistrlbutlon of life chances. 
However, the depth of etbnlc Identlficatlon and unscrupulous manipulation for 
polltlcal ends of such sentiments. wll1 be less easy to assess, contaln and wipe away, 
or to channel and be allowed to exist In a true politics of diverSity. Thls Is especlally 
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true if we examine how it permeated ideas, the transmission of ideas, structures, and 
informed the acUons of people over many years - because as a story it seemed to make 
some sense of the every-day world. 
That 'senae', for example, led to frequent clashes over scarce resources, clashes that 
were expressed in ethnic terms. One of the most pressing clalms has been that aver 
land - the obviousness lles in the allocation of 13% of the land in South Africa for 
occupaUon by the African populaUon. That 13% was then fragmented into ten 
bantustans. Through lnflux control and forced removals more than half of the 
country's African people were by the late-1970s located in the bantustans. The 
Surplus People Project documented many of the clashes that flowed from the polley 
(for example, SPP, 1983, vol 5: also TRAC, 1985). These clashes "were expressed in 
ethnic terms. because that Is the basis on which land allocaUons had been made, and 
borders drawn between people, the basis of sufficient JustlftcaUon. 
Cultural distinctiveness and a Zulu past 
De Wet Nel, quoted earller, referred to the pride that was said to dlsUngulsb the 
vartous African ethnic groups in South Africa for over a century. KIng Goodwill, in the 
case of 'the Zulus', expressed that conUnulty in the followlngway: 
The unity between the Prince of KwaPhlndangene, Prince Mangosuthu 
Buthelez1 and myself symbollse the unity of the naUon and what the 
Prince of KwaPhlndangene has said today about the genius of KIng 
Shaka and his statesmanship in founding a vast Zulu empire, Is a 
genius which I know is stlll at work in the hearts and mlnds of all 
Zulus (OS, 24 Sep 86). 
In Ooodwlll's concepUon, two of the elements in the deflnltion and legiUmaUon of 
ethniclty are brought together in mutual reinforcement: that of the existence of a 
dlst1nct group, and of the mobUtsaUon of the past to gtvlng credlblllty to that 80Clal 
idenUty. However, It goes beyond that in expressing a quasi-mystical element of 
'genius' spec1ftc to Zulu people - usually, in speeches, presented as a Zulu 'wisdom'. 
The first of the two domlnant sets of symbols of legitimation with which Inkatha 
functioned (referred to in the previous secUon), and the one that will concern me here, 
artses from the pre-colonial history of the region and the manner in which capltallsm 
" penetrated this part of south-east Africa, resting on the maintenance and exploltaUon -
through taxes and labour - of the AfrIcan homestead as productive unit (see JdfOuy, 
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1990). The second set comprtses those that are made available through the formation 
of the ANC In 1912 and Its pre-emlnence as the nationalllberation movement 
(discussed above). 
It Is reglonallsm. and more spec1flcally the lmmed1ate pr.e-colon1al and colonlal 
reglonally-dtst1nctlVe history that has made a population 'avallable' for ethnic 
mobWsatlon and ethnic confirmation in Natal (for a discussion of the outllnes of a 
strong reglonal1sm. see Beall et al, 1986). The uneven penetration and development of 
caplta1ism In southern Africa articulated with central1stng dynamics within 
pre-capltal1st socle1¥ (the Shakan kingdom and Its successors). How was this past 
used? 
What notion of history? 
It must be noted that Buthelez1's use of history (and he, through his speeches, has 
always done, and st1ll does, most of the histortcallnterpretation for Inkatha) Is 
multi-d1menslonal, but inter-related: first. there Is a history that gtves cred1bW1¥ to his 
personal role as 'condensation' of what It means to be 'Zulu' (that he Is In the royal 
llneage, that his forefathers served as 'prime mtntsters'); second, there is a htstory that 
Justlftes Involvement in apartheid structures, such as the bantustans (the argument 
goes that KwaZulu existed long before apartheid, and that his bantustan chtef 
m1n1stership is merely a confirmation of a post that he held in any case, within the 
Zulu nation - see the d1acussion above); third, there is a history that places the king at 
the head of a 'nation', of which he is the symbol and the persont1lcation; fourth, there 
Is the history of the subject members of the nation (mostly unproblematically taken as 
male) who participated in heroiC deeds. owed alleglance to a central authort1¥ figure, 
and who behaved in particular ways; and, finally, there is the history that concerns me 
most here, that of 'the past' and ortg1ns of an ethnic identi1¥ that serves the various 
contemporary purposes outlined above. and that Is present in each of the other 
dimensions of the use of htstory. 
In Buthelez1's presentation of this history the 'Zulu nation' was always already there, 
someth1ng that 'Zulus' were at least born Into, if not born with. It owed naught to 
apartheid (a white-designed system that was also based on the 'Zulu nation's' 
'tmagtned' existence, along with nine other Mrlcan 'nations'). If anyone should deny Its 
existence It was cause for volatile threats and strong language of condemnation. In a 
recent memorandum dellvered during the Visit to South Africa of Austral1an foreign 
affairs mintster Gareth Evans, Buthelezl said that '(l)n deal1ng with KwaZulu the 
South African government was deal1ng with a reality that history structured'. and that 
187 
the 'homeland framework' was Imposed 'on what was an existing Zulu nation' (SS, 12 
Jun 91. emphasis added). The phrase that Is frequently used. even more 80 In the 
early-l990s when the place of the 'Zulu nation' was being discussed In national 
change fora. is that this social and polltical unit 'has existed since time Immemorial'. 
A speclftc perception of history underlles the use of 'the past' withln Zulu ethnlc1ty. It 
can be simply summarised by saytng that 'history' is. In this case, an active agency 
that Intervenes In the present - to confirm. to teach, to trample - as well as 
'structurtng' the foundations of the present. 'History', furthermore, cannot be defied -
because it has already been it cannot be altered, 80 that what it has destined cannot be 
undone. It means that the 'Zulu nation cannot be wished away'. 
A very good, if slJghtly extreme example In the repeated use of the term 'history', Is a 
speech that Buthelezi gave on 8haka Day in 1988 (B8, 24 Sep 88). In this seven-page 
speech he used the notion of 'history' no less than 30 times. Zulus were a product of 
history, and participated with history to create a new South Africa: history taught. and 
sWl teaches; 'history tramples on tyranny and ... history moves to uphold Justice'; 
history has 'prepared a place for us': history Is 'guiding us' to a destiny; and 80 on. 
In a reveallng study aimed speclftcally at tracing the utlllsation of history 'as a source 
of pollticallegtUmation'. Paul Forsyth (1989) wrote that Buthelezi's use of history 
probably exceeded that of 'any other career polltician'. Whlle I would not make such 
emphatic clalms about the uniqueness of this speclftc case, it does draw attention to a 
speclftc context. namely that of self-conscIous ethnic mobilisation. As I have argued 
earller, it is the use of 'the past' that Is one of the deftnlng elements of ethnic 
mobilisation. Buthelezl stressed 'the Importance of Zulu history' to the present at a 
Shaka Day celebration in 1974 (quoted Forsyth, 1989:88): 
No people can wrestle successfully with the problems of the day, 
unless they have a past from which to draw tnsptration, to enable 
them to face the present and the future with confidence and forUtude. 
The other examples of South African pollticlans who have relled to such a large extent 
on history also come from attempts at ethnic group formation - Afrikaners, the 
pathetic attempts by pollticlans in the Ciskel to create and utlllse an own history (see 
Petres. 1987), and the more recent 'Boer' mobilisation (such as in and through. for 
example. the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweg1ng), come to mind. Forsyth notes that the 
Afrikaner interpretation of history served as a self-conscious model for Buthelezl's 
project - as did that group's economic achievements serve as a model to the class 
aspti-atlons of the 'Zulu' trading class (cfMare and Hamllton, 1987:116). 
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The Clskel example represents an extreme case in the recent history of attempts to 
invent a 'past'. ThIs bantustan was, after all, even in terms of the apartheid polley, an 
artlflcial unit and late creation, dividing the Xhosa ethnic group into the Transkel and 
the Ciskel. As Peires commented (1987: I): 'The Ciskelis unique among South African 
homelands in that it has absolutely no basis in any ethnic, cultural or IJnguistic fact 
whatsoever'. A 'Clskel nation had to be created from scratch'. This was attempted 
through finding 'holy shrines', ancestries 'worth boasting about', and the invocation of 
'fallen heroes ... to gtve Ciskei nationhood some sort qfttme-depth' (emphasis added). 
In the absence of the avaUab1l1ty of people to respond to something that had a basis in 
history 'Sebe chose an Ideology of "Clskelan nationalism", thus commltUng himself to 
the invention of a wholly novel and therefore bogus etbn1clt;y' (Petres, 1987:22). 
Buthelezl did not have the same extreme problems, for here a population was 
avallable, in the sense of havtng the degree of common vocabulary for the tmaglnlngs 
to which they were called. When he became chief executive officer of the Zulu 
Territorial AuthOrity (ZTA), the forerunner to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he 
described the event in terms of regaln1ng the power the 'Zulu nation' had lost through 
defeat by the British in the nineteenth century. His task was to restore 'pride' and 
'Zulu national consciousness' through leading the ZTA (quoted Forsyth, 1989:52), a 
phrase that later became a reference to a 'Zulu renaissance'. There was no doubt in 
his mind that such an entity as the 'Zulu nation' existed - it needed to be revealed 
again. A reading of the early KwaZulu LegIslative Assembly debates conflrms that the 
parUclpants - chiefs and other 'tribal authority' representatives· held the same 
overarching common-sensicalldea of a 'nation', if not necessarUy flll1ng It With the 
same content. 
Within 'the past' that Is used to conftnn a 'Zulu nation' the figure of Shaka looms 
large. Most of the relevant llneages, if not blologlcal (Shaka's brother, Dtngane, 
became king after Shaka's assassination) then polltical, are traced back to the 
"founding father' of the Zulu ethnic group. ThIs 'Shaka' (for It is the Image in 'the past' 
that matters) displays all the attributes that had somehow survived the past 170 years 
to find expression either in king Goodwtll. in Buthelezl, or in the 'nation'. This 'Shaka', 
of Buthelezl's Ideologlcal creation, 
that magnlftcent forefather of the Zulu nation, already saw the new 
South AfrIca as inevitable even whlle he was putting the Zulu 
KIngdom together. Before he died (in 1828) he had visions of 
aeroplanes flying in the air carrylng people, and he sent emissaries to 
go to Cape Town With Instructions to go to Britaln to see what there 
was to see and learn, so that the Zulu Kingdom could incorporate the 
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best there was in its own life ... I (Buthelezi) am not adding 
interpretations to historic events. I am telling it as it was. I trace my 
own ancestry back to the very founders of KwaZulu. From my 
mother's knee onwards I grew up being seeped (sic] in what it meant 
to be a Zulu and what Zuluness meant to a man and a woman (BS, 
18 Jan 92). 
Shaka features in this version, and in the many variations on the theme during Shaka 
Day s~es, not for historical accuracy or analys1B, but for what it adds to Buthelezl 
and his project as ethnic moblllser. Forsyth's study concludes that 'Buthelezl's 
appeals to a range of histories have been successful in poUtical tenna, not because of 
their inherent truth, but because of the skUls which he has shown in suiting his 
historical discourses to his poUtical purposes' (Forsyth, 1989:abstract). That is hoW 
ideology operates - by telUng a story which provldes a plausible explanation of what 
exists, what was. and what is desirable and possible (Therbom, 1980; and above). 
'Inherent truth' may have Uttle to do with it. What does matter is the receptlvlty of a 
population to these calls, the avallablllty of people to be so moblllsed. Avallablllty does 
not lmply passivlty, but dra~ attention to the historical spec1flc1ty and 
l!IOc1e>eeonomic conditions within which such a 'story' is told; avallablllty should also 
alert us to the reflexive aspect of identity formation, where the self becomes a 'reflexive 
project' always in the process of construction and reconstruction (see Giddens, 1990; 
Campbell, 1992:41-3,48; Campbell etal, 1993:4). 
In Natal and KwaZulu large numbers of people have Uved their Uves as Zulus, even if 
there should be several contents gtven to the notion (see Sitas. 1988). As Forsyth 
wrote, the appeals and interpretations of 'Zuluness' have been successful precisely 
'because they have used emotive appeals to the "nation" to appeal to a popular 
perception of Zulu ethnic identity which exists in Natal and KwaZulu' (1989: 197). 
The regional Zulu-speaking population has also, in many indMdual cases, lived a 
l!IOc1ally precarious and deprived existence where promises of materiallmprovement 
(or even the means of survlval) and soclal and indivldual worth as people have 
featured strongly in acceptance or rejection ofmoblllslng calls - or, more accurately, of 
organlsational calls as it is through membership of Inkatha that allegiance to the 'Zulu 
nation' was most directly measured. The tnltlal positlve appeal of the Inkatha 
movement was to people who accepted a aelf-deflnltion ofbelng 'Zulus', even if it 
existed as soclalidentlty and not in any moblllsed form (as indicated above, you could 
be a 'passive' member of Inkatha). It was formed as a 'Zulu' movement. Much of the 
appeal was, therefore, to the consoUdatlon of the 'Zulu nation'. For example, the first 
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Inkatha secretary general. professor Sibusiso ME Bengu. told a Labour party 
conference at the end of 1977 that the Inkatha strategy was 'to organtze the Africans of 
Zulu ortgln into a cultural unit. regaining whatever had been lost of their traditional 
values' (Star, 28 Dec 77). Jill Wentzel was told, in an interview with Inkatha's dr 
Nyembezi, that what was said when recruiting people was 'you have a fine leader in 
Buthelez1. You must support him. You must work for the Zulu first and then attract 
all for the good of the commun11¥' (1977:7). 
Buthelez1's frequent references to his origins and legitimacy with1n a specJflcally Zulu 
tradition no doubt appeal to many people who have maintained ltnks with the land 
and therefore, of necess11¥, with the system and ideological Justiftcation of 
chieftatnsh1p (an important part in the package of items that collectively constitute 
being ·Zulu·). The appeal to a ·Zulu tradition' is accompanied by memories of the 
warrior qualities of ·Zulu people', and the hiStory of resistance to British occupation of 
Natal and to Boer settlement of this part of South Africa (see below). The message is 
that this was a noble past that can be recalled. and striven for again. with pride. On a 
micro-level researchers recently found lltt1e evidence for such perceptions in the 
everyday-l1fe stories of respondents. What was present was a strong awareness of what 
was lost in economic and social terms by leaving a rather ideal1sed rural eJClstdlce. as 
well as the loss of personalised customs. no longer possible. or performed With 
diftlculty in the urban world (see Campbell et al, 1993). 
Inkatha clalmed total representation of what ·Zulu· was in the first number of years 
after lts formation in 1975. and remained the sole party in the bantustan government. 
The only internal (to the KLA) opposltion came from Inkatha members who stood as 
·independents' having lost Inkatha nominations before the bantustan elecUons. The 
people who were and are mobilising Zulus are also the people who control pensions. 
land allocaUon. education. who signed work-seekers permlts. approved bottle store 
licences. etc. It ls not clear whether such politics of patronage persists in the 
sUll-evolvtng relationship between centre and proVInce In the post-1994 South Africa. 
There were. therefore. both ·posltive' and 'negative' aspects to acceptance of the 
speclf1c version of an ethnic Identi1¥ into which Buthelez1 organises people, an ldenti1¥ 
that was given form in Inkatha. The former would be found in the pride, self-worth. 
solldarl1¥. and discovery of recogniUon that an illustrious past and speclftc culture can 
offer (and that may lie Within Inkatha but it may also reside with1n other mob1l1saUons 
and soclalldentiUes that have not taken organisational form); the latter came from an 
instrumental acceptance of such an Identity. or the spec1ftc Inkatha-approved and 
articulated version, due to material and polltical pressures (sometimes extremely 
violent) applied to large secUons of the regional populaUon. 
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Authority. or what is a Zulu? 
"Brothers born of warrior stock', Is how king Ooodwill Zwellth1n1 spoke of Zulus when 
he addressed "the Zulu nation and ... all South Afrtcans' In May 1991. Th1s speech 
drew together many themes In the polltical mobilisation of "Zulus'. It was not unique 
as there are clear patterns In the language and themes used by the speechwrtter(s) for 
Inkatha leaders. The king placed h1mself "aloof from polltics' and "above party 
polltics'; conflated KwaZulu, h1s person, and "my father'S people' ("I am the Zulu 
nation'); and also llnked the Issue of 'cultural weapons' to probably the most frequent 
character1stic atb1buted to Zuluness: 
The call to ban the bearing of cultural weapons by Zulus Is an tnsult 
to my manhood. It Is an Insult to the manhood of every Zulu man 
(OS, 26 May 91). 
The Idea of "manhood' permeates the vision of what the essence of Zuluness Is. That 
essence ls tied to men, and then to men as warriors, men as leaders, men as prtmary 
bearers of the domtnant aspects of what constitutes this ethnic Identity, men as 
carrytng the l1neage from Shaka to Buthelezl. The l1neage lsI however, a male l1neage 
where the role of women Is acknowledged only as bearers of men. As Cherryl Walker 
put It. "mothers are never motners of mothers'. Women are placed Within the warrior 
tradition. but then agatn as the bearers of warriors - women reproduce but are never 
themselves the product Within "the past': 
We the mothers of this part of South Mr1ca have In our Inner betngs, 
In our deep wisdom and In our very blood, the lessons that h1story 
has taught us. We are the mothers oj a great warrior nation ••• (lBS. 
20 May 90). 
said Buthelezt's wife at a Mothers' Day celebration at Ulundl. 
An essenUal element In this mascullne and h1erarchlcally-ordered View of "Zuluness' Is 
the InstituUon of ch1efsh1p (central also to other aspects. as discussed above). In one 
of the many boUerplated phrases used In the Buthelezl speeches he spoke of the 
ch1efs, including h1mself, as having a "depth of commltment. •• to each other as Zulu 
brothers born out of Zulu warrior stock', a commltment that could not be understood 
by those who call for the dlsbandlng of KwaZulu (BS, 13 Sep 90). In other words, the 
ch1ef are not just admlnlstraUve author1ty figures, or placed Within 'traditlon' - the 
aspects dealt With earlier - but "brothers' (men) and warriors. Elsewhere he had 
referred to the ch1efs as the p1llars on which the "Zulu naUon' stands. The ch1efs are 
also sancUoned by history: "You the Zulu AmakhosllchlefsJ know that history Uves on 
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through you', Buthelezi said (BS, 13 Sep 90). Buthelezi often refers to his own 
posiUon as chief. 
The KwaZulu Chiefs and Headmen Act ( 1974) made it clear that an important 
funcuon of chiefs conUnued to be the maintenance of control. An analysis of the tenor 
of debates in the KLA supports this view. Buthelez1 cUd not hesitate to use the Act 
against the rebellious chiefs Elphas Molefe and Mhlabunztma Maphumulo, who led 
anU-Inkatba moves in the late-1970s. Chief Maphumulo was assassinated some UMe 
after he bad Joined the ANCallgned Congress of TradlUonal Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA) in 1989. From Buthelezi's address to a meeting of KwaZulu chiefs in 
1989 lt was clear that he perceived this defecUon from the ranks of the pUant Zulu 
chiefs in a most serious Ught. and as an assault on the symbollc role of chiefs within 
the 'Zulu naUon'. Buthelez1 told the chiefs: 
We have come to close ranks and to rejoice in our unity and to tell 
Chief Maphumulo to go to hell. We must do what needs to be done .•. 
We have a duty to flush out anything that 10 any way undennlnes the 
unity and 80Udarlty of our people (quoted Survey, 1989/90:510). 
The theme of'traltor' to the mobll1sed socialldenUty, to ethnlcity mobilised, posed a 
threat here even more so as the chiefs were perceived to be central to a 'tradluon' of 
authority. 
The Indaba consUtuUon drawn up in 1986, and sUll referred to as reflecting an 
important perspective on reglonal government for Natal and KwaZulu as a unit. 
provided an important role for the chiefs - 'an indJgenous African lnsUtuUon of the 
people. In KwaZulu the very basls of our admlnistrauon' as Buthelezl described this 
anachronlsUc, inefficient and at Urnes corrupt extension of the Inkatba movement in 
1983 (see Mare and HamUton, 1987:88-92; and above). The Indaba proposals made 
provision for a 'Councll of Chiefs' (one of the envisaged 'Cultural Councils'), for 'tribal 
authority' to remain as a form of local government. and even for the existence of 'tribal 
pollce'. 
In the mld-l990s the Issue of the role of chiefs has again come to the fore, now 10 
relaUon to their posiUon withln a democraUc South Africa. Their position was referred 
to in the 'ConsUtuUonal Principles' (XlII) attached to the Interim ConsUtution which 
reads as follows: 
The lnsUtuUon, status and role of tracUtionalleadership, accordlng to 
indJgenous law, shall be recognised and appUed by the courts, subject 





legislaUon dealing speclftcally therewith (Bekker and Carpenter (eds), 
1994:217). 
In addiUon, as part of the agreement that ensured the IFP's parucpation In the Aprll 
1994 elecUon, the folloWing was added to consUtuUonal prlnclple XIII: 
Provislons In a provlnclal consUtution relaUng to the lnstituUon, role, 
authorlqt and status of a tradltional monarch shall be recognised and 
protected In the ConsUtuUon (Memorandum, 1994:addendum A). 
It 18 noteworthy that this clause 18 not llmlted to KZN, probably to safeguard the ANC 
from accusations from the Congress of Tradltional Leaders of South Africa 
(CONTRALESA) that It had favoured one set of'tradltions' above many others (see 
Dlken1, 1995). 
Chapter 11 of the Interim ConstituUon deals with 'Tradltional Authorlties' and 
provides a Wide, if at times vague, range of lnterventions to them. These lnclude the 
duqt on each provlnce "In which there are traditional authorlties and their 
communities' to estabUsh "a House of Tradltional Leaders', and provldes for a Councll 
of tradltional Leaders With advlSOry powers and the ab1ll1¥ to delay leglslation relevant 
to 'tradition' by 30 days (Bekker and Carpenter, 1994). 
There are severallmpUcations of the acceptance of 'traditional authorl1¥' and of the 
contentious role of chiefs Within the Interim Constitution and Within the discourses of 
all poUtical parties. I wt1l draw attention to only two here (see Mare, 1992, for a fuller 
dlscusslon of the lmpUcations of poUUcally recognising'tradltional authorlt¥'). The 
first 18 the weight that has been gtven to, and the continuing struggle around, the role 
of chiefs Within poUtical etlm1c mobilisation, especlally Within KZN: the second Is the 
manner In which 'traditional authOrl1¥' relnforces existing gender (and age) relations 
Within ethnic soclalldentities and ethnic mobUlsation. 
WhUe the Zulu king had been the central figure In ethnic moblllsation (see below) after 
the defeat of an lndependent political role for hlm during the 19708, his post-election 
decision to cast his lot With an ANC-llnked royal councll seemed to have gtven 
Buthelezl's strategy a major blow. However, what Buthelezl did was to shift his and 
the IFP's focus to the chiefs (the amakhosi), the majorl1¥ of whom stlll support thelr 
'traditional premier'. This move, and the declslons by the chiefs, especlally that of 
aftlrmlng Buthelez1's role as 'traditional prime mlnlster' and leader of the 
constitutionally-approved provlnclal House of Traditional Leaders, have effectively left 
the king powerless - unless he does a most 'untradlUonal' thing and appeals to the 
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Supreme Court. thereby admitting his powerlessness. Buthelezl has not been 
prevented from uslng the notions of the 'Zulu ktngdom', the tnstltutlon of the 'Zulu 
monarchy', and 'tradition' by this rupture With the king. While the battle rages, llterally 
and figuratively, around these anti-democratic elements With both the IFP and the 
ANC engagmg tn redet}nlng the elements, aspects of the transition to democracy tn 
South Africa are being held to ransom (see Mare. 1994: Mare and Hamllton, 1994). 
The struggle over Shaka Day celebrations (during 1994 and 1995) and who Is entitled 
to call for such events was part of the competition over the symbols of Zulu 
mobilisation, and wlll conUnue to be so. 
Accepting 'tradition' and 'traditional authorlt;y' not only affects democratic practice but 
also the position of women and gender relations generally. I argued earUer that ethnlc 
Identities and ethnlc mobilisation Is not gender neutral but is nearly always informed 
by gender relations of male domtnation. South Afrlca. and tn this case 'Zuluness', Is 
not exempt. The use made of 'tradition' within the negotlation process and the 
tnfluence that not only the IFP, and Buthelezl and the king had, but also 
CONTRALESA and elements within the ANC Itself, ensured that 'Incompatibles' -
'gender equallt;y and accommodating "tradition'" - were written Into the Interlm 
ConsUtution (Walker, 1994). 
One of the exceptions In this world of male and 'traditional' authorlt;y proved the 
general rule. In 1992 dr SlbongUe Zungu won a Durban Supreme Court battle to 
become the first female Zulu chief. Her husband, the previous chlef, had died In a car 
accident In 1989, after which relatives and male clan members started the battle to 
keep her out of the chlefshlp. This Included trying to 'marry' her to her husband's 
brother, call1ng on 'traditional practices', to ensure that he became chief: and argutng 
that It was '"entirely unknown among the Zulu people for a woman to be appointed as 
chlef of a tribe'" (Sunday Tribune, 5 Apr 92). Recently, In an address to Dlakonla in 
Durban this medlcal doctor chief said that 'tribal councUs and leaders should be 
recogntsed as legltlmate local government structures'. She said that 
democratically-elected local government structures would not work in rural areas In 
their present form (DaUy News, I Apr 95). She mlght be a woman chief, but she Is 
also undoubtedly a 'traditional' chief. 
The Inkatha Women's Brigade provides an Important illustration of the role of women 
generally Within Inkatha and within the 'Zulu nation'. Hasslm, in various papers on 
the role of women and of the Brigade, noted that the appeal Is directed at 'mothers', 
concerned about their chlldren 'In. the context of povert;y, tgnorance and disease': their 
chlldren and education; and their children in danger ofbelng attracted Into the ANC 
195 
fold (Hasslm. 1993). The Women's Bngade (WB). formed in 1977 and placed as 'one 
of the President's (Buthelez1's) own arms of activity' in 1980, confirmed women as 
'homemakers'. As former WB cha1rperson Abbie Mchunu said in 1985. '"there are 
special vIrtUes God gave us as women in order to be effective home-managers and 
mothers I.e. patience, tenderness of heart and inSight"' (quoted Hasstm. 1993). 
Hasslm notes, however. that there was a population (women) avaUable for this 
discourse: 
(T)he conservative discourse that emerges Within lnkatha has not 
merely been imposed by men from above. It Is a discourse produced 
out of a resonance of ideas of motherhood and famlly that are held by 
women themselves and which fit into their dally reality. 
Such a position Is not really surprising when the political role of the youth since 1976, 
and also in Natal. especially in the 1980s. is taken into account. Combined With 
extensive unemployment. the perception and creation of 'the youth' as a (prlvUeged) 
poUtical and aoc1al category. had shaken values and inStitutions such as famUy 
structures (see Campbell. 1992). 
Hass1m's point needs to remind us of the pertlnent comment by Bowman (1994:141). 
already referred to, that It Is not necessarily the interpellation that places the reader 
or Ustener 'Within the subject positions they proffer" but rather that '(t)hrough 
Identlftcat10n With the position set out in such discourse. the reader 18 carried out of 
the Isolation of indlvldual experlence into a collective phenomenon which the 
discourse articulates in national ( ethnic) terms'. Bowman argues. as I have through 
employing the term 'avallabWty' and drawing the dist1nctlon between social Identity 
Within 'indlvldual subject positions', on the one hand. and on the other mobWsed 
soclalldentities, that 'there Is already in play in the reader (and listener) an Identity 
which enables him or her to recogntze the approprlateness to personal experlence of 
subject positions Within a text' (1994: 141). The vocabulary for tmagtn1ng is already in 
place. Such an argument can go too far as well. At Urnes lnterpellatlons are part of the 
Ideological function. of 'soclallsation', of creating rather than just presenUng or call1ng 
upon subject positions. 
Buthelez1's Wife. Irene Thandek1la Buthelezl. called on women to act to restore and 
malntain not only the values of famlly and parental authorlty but also to act to 
safeguard Wider and youth-threatened admlnlstratlve authorlty: 
When bands of youth take it upon themselves to crush their local 
authorltles, whether they be Amakhosi or township personnel. say no 
and say no in such a way that the youth are stopped (lBS. 20 May 90). 
196 . 
Such a call would resonate with the lived experiences of many older people In Natal 
and KwaZulu during the 1980s and 1990s. Implicit Is the link between family and 
'political famlly'. the ethnic group with Its generational hierarchy. 
Other than the sanctioning of mal~domlnated gender relations. and a hierarchy of 
authori1¥ in whlch the chlefs stand ann01nted by tradition. there are many other 
elements explicit and impliCit In' the mobilisation of the Inkatha version of a Zulu 
ethnic group. These would include: obedience to the law: wisdom: bravery: patience, 
non-vlol~ce, and yet a fearful wrath if any of a number of insults are directed at 
KwaZulu, Zulus, the king. Buthelezl, etc: humantsm: and an approach to llfe with not 
a 'vestige of racism'. In a most fearsome speech in 1986 king Goodwlll pulled together 
many of these attributes to draw a clear line around the boundaries of the Zulu ethnic 
group, as It was being mobilised behind the leadership of Buthelezl and h1mself: 
Not only do Zulus have valour. not only are they indOmitable and not 
only are they prudent. but Zulus have a quall1¥ superior to any of 
these, as great as these qualities are. The final strength of our Zulu 
nation has always been wisdom. It Is wisdom that led our 1l1ustrtous 
Kings and their warriors to conquer and to incorporate. 
He then attacked the UDF. COSATU and the ANC for 'underming our national unl1¥ as 
a Zulu people'. repeating the frequent theme of the 19808 of 'conquering to 
incorporate' : 
I command you to ellmlnate from your midst all those disgusting 
usurpers of our dign11¥ without one shred of malice in your beings ... 
Go out my people. conquer ev1l, but never lose your humanl1¥ and 
never degrade the hwnanl1¥ of those you conquer. Rout them out only 
to make them one of us. Thrash them. if necessary. only to purge 
them into becoming better Zulus (OS, 16 Jun 86). 
Inkatha is 'the nation· 
The notion that a Zulu nation existed. and was being conflnned through restoring the 
past. through the leadership of Buthelez1. initially centred on the existence of the Zulu 
Territorial AuthOri1¥ (from 1970-72) and subsequently through the KLA. These were 
presented, as argued above. either as structures of aPartheid that could be used to 
overthrow the system. or as having an existence as acknowledgement of the 
r~awakenlng of the. Zulu nation. as the space within which the ethnic Identi1¥ could 
achieve fulfilment. 
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From 1975. however. the idea of a pre-existing ~ation was gtven additional organised 
form In the Inkatha movement - the bantustan was too fragtle a base from which to 
construct something Uke the nation. It does not mean. however. that KwaZulu was 
discarded as adminlstrative and even ideological form for the nation: rather. it was 
provided with a back-up which came to overlap with the KLA In nearly all respects. as 
was dIscussed above. 
Inkatha was first and foremost an example of poUticised ethnicity. The:. symbols served 
to mobUlse a 'constituency' (that favourite word of Chief Buthelezi) which found 
expression through branch and regtonal structures. women's and youth organisations. 
events. a variety ofmed1a. museums. styles of dress. education. etc (the aspects 
dIscussed earUer In this chapter). and in turn these symbols served to define the Zulu 
ethnic identity. that it at the same time supposedly simply reflected. 
It is through 'Zuluness' that the constituency was prtmarlly formed. The other side of 
the coln was that it was through membership of the organtsed constituency. Inkatha. 
that acceptance of 'Zuluness' was impUed. Furthermore. these appeals for people to 
remgn1ae themselves as 'Zulus' at times achieved their potency not only through the 
avallabWty of the past. but also through the existence of an enemy, real or created, 
agalnst which they were addressed. The 'other' helped, and st1ll helps. to define 'us' 
as the 'Zulu nation' (see above: and Norva!. 1992, 1994:120-1). 
The three major characteristics of an ethnic group are exempUfted by 'accepting' a 
Zulu identity (and. In this poUticlsed version. by belongtng to Inkatha). Cultural 
dJaUncUveness and a sense of an historical continulty are presented as inseparable 
(Bee the di8cusslon of 'the past' above). The former owes its legttimacy to the latter: 
and the 'past' is expressed in the present through cultural events. artifacts. modes of 
behavlour. nonns and memortals. 
The 'past' is both of the movement. and also a more generalised notion of nationhood 
that ortgtnated in the time of Shaka in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The 
movement's first constitution. therefore. claimed a continulty with the first Inkata 
under King Solomon In the 192Os. ustng it as a further stepping stone from the past to 
the present. The fact that a Zulu klng's name could be linked to it reinforced the Une 
being drawn. 
The choice of the name, Inkatha. furthermore. not only referred back to the ftrst such 
movement in the 19208, but drew on the symboUsm implled. Mzala describes the 
choice thus (1988: 117): 
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In choosing to revive Inkatha. Chief Buthelez1 was expl01ting a solemn 
symbol of un11¥ 1n Zulu culture. Among the most sacred articles of the 
Zulu. of which the king was a custodian. is the tnkatha. a sacred coU 
symbollstng the un11¥ of the people. the circular power of which is 
belleved to be able to round up all traitors and disaffected subjects 
and Join them together with the rest of the 'nation' In affection for the 
king. 
ThIs is how the tnkatha was described as part of the mace of the KLA (Mare and 
HarnUton. 1987:229, also 227, appendix 1): 
1. On top of the mace is a typical ZULU HUT, 'Indlu', to symbol1ze 
the birthplace of Zulu culture and custom and the close-knit Zulu 
farnUy on which the whole Zulu social structure 1s bullt. 
2. This hut stands ftrmly on the MYSTICAL COIL· 'Inkatha'. The 
grass In this mystical coli was plucked from the thatch at the 
doorways of all Zulu Chlefs' huts and 1s know to the Zulus as 
'Inkatha yokusonga lzwe·. This 1s to symboUze the coU's deep power 
to un1te and keep finn all the different tribes of the Zulu people. 
Each of the 285 strands around the coU represents one of the tribes 
composing the Zulu nation. 
It went further than that In rooting the organlsation strongly If not totally In 'tradltion' 
and In the regton. Chiefs were not only to be central In recrultment for Inkatha. but 
also as another symbol In the conttnul1¥ from the past (even though they lacked any 
real power In the movement). The lmportance of chiefs. furthermore, lay In the 
legttimacy that the past bestows on Buthelez1 withIn the ethnic group. Thelr, the 
ehlers', 'traditional' role confirms his own 'trad1tional' role: 
and 
I was the traditional Prime Mlnlster to my first cousin, King Cyprian 
for 16 years, long before there was any KwaZulu LegIslative Assembly 
(Sunday TrIbune. 06 Nov 83): 
I do not owe my political power to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 
or to Pretoria. King Shaka never owed his polltical emlnence to any 
colOnial power. The soUdar11¥ of the Zulu people was not dependent 
on white-created lnstitutions when they defeated the mlght of the 
British Army (Sunday Times. 16 Jan 83). 
The regular gatherings of the chiefs, under the leadership of Buthelezt as m1nlster In 
charge of 'authorl1¥ affairs' 1n the KwaZulu cablnet. also served as confirmatory events 
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of a Zulu past and an ethnic tradition. safeguarded only within Inkatha and under the 
leadership of Buthelezi. In 1990. for example. Buthelezi guided discussion by the 
chiefs through a 'Memorandum', in which he warned them that they were engaged in a 
war in which campaJgns were being launched against them through the youth. and 
through CON~ESA. Whlle this was a planning meeting it 8eIVed as an occasion for 
Buthelezl to r&a&8ure them of their future securl~ and to confirm their role within the 
'nation': 
We must. .. begin this meeting with a new determination starUng to 
burn wlthln us. It is a determination that must see us leave this 
meeting later on with an anger that rejects the many bad 
developments in our areas of responsibU1~. It is a determination to 
now be more decisive in our actions to rid us of these bad 
developments. And it must be a determination that gtves allegiance to 
our Zulu nation and all that our forefathers did to deliver this great 
nation to us and to history. It is a determination also to reaftlnn our 
layal~ to our King (BS, 23 Mar 90). 
All members of the 'Zulu nation' were seen by Buthelezi just after the formation of 
Inkatha. and much later by some of his lieutenants, as being members of Inkatha 
(above: and Klad 6, 1976: 134). This encompassing certa1n~ was maybe 
understandable in the early days oflnkatha's existence, in the absence of any clear 
opposition, both political and in terms of deftnlng a Zulu ethnicl~ outalde of Inkatha. 
The enemy, the 'other', was then most frequently represented as 'Indians', 'White 
liberals', 'Xh088B', and the central government. By the 1980s, however, in the presence 
of a growing internal, organised, alternative opposition to apartheid (the United 
Democratic Front was formed in 1983 and COSATU in 1985), the 'enemywlthin' also 
had to be exorcised. It was acknowledged that there were not only ethnic outsiders but 
traitors to the potentially inclusive tmagtned communl~ of all Zulu-speakers as well. 
Recently a first-hand account of the experience of'traltor' (fmbuka), was gtven by 
Duma kaNdlavu (1994), h1mselfa Zulu whose father had grawn up 'in the heart of 
Zululand', himself 'proud of my status as a full-fledged Zulu', unUl he left South Africa 
in 1977 to go into exile. He returned in the early-I99Os, and through a set of 
circumstances came into contact with Zulu hostel dwellers. After one meeting he was 
told by Humphrey Ndlovu, an Inkatha leader: 
'The problem with you, Gatshen1 (kaNdlovu), is that you are an 
1mbuka'. 
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An 1mbuka 1s a turncoat. a person who s1des with outs1ders, and in 
pre-colonlal times was punlshed by death. For one Zulu to call 
another Zulu an 1mbuka 1s a little steep (1994:21). 
This aspect of the changlng etlmic moblllsatlon of Inkatha. of Zulu trattors to the 
'Zulu natlon'. 1s lmportant in examlnlng the argument that violence withln the region 
(Natal) proves that etlmic1t¥ plays no role in violence in the rest of South Mrtca 
because here we have 'Zulus' fighting 'Zulus', and that we can adequately fall back 
onto an explanatlon based exclus1vely on conflict between politlcal parties (Inkatha 
and the ANC): the manlpulatlon of black agents by and partlclpatlon of a state-llnked 
'th1rd force'; that 1t 18 slmply a struggle over resources: or the extremely racist 
terminology of 'black-on-black' violence. Of course some of these factors and several 
others playa role in a complex and full explanatlon. However, to dismiss etlmic 
conflict on this basts 18 to miss the obviOUS dimension to mobilisatlon into the Zulu 
etlm1c group that allows for the many dissidents from the slngle, Inkatha-vers1on of 
what 1t means to be Zulu, to be labelled 'trattors' (amambuka). Moblllsed etlm1clt¥, 
espec1ally when under threat from alternatlve stories of everyday llfe, defines the 
boundaries ever more clearly. and rlgldly, thereby creating ever more diss1dents. 
KIng Goodwtll made clear on aeveral occas1ons during the past decade that these 
traitors exlated (such 88 in the speech quoted above). The task W88 to bring them into 
the fold through a 'Zulu rennalsance' or through chastlsement. KIng Goodwlll claimed 
that '(w)e have always rooted out Zulus who turn against Zulus and in so doing we 
have kept our honour. It does not shame the whole natlon when trattors emerge 
amongst us 88 a people'. The problem lies in allowlng the trattors to 'go about their 
hideous divlslve work unchecked'. It 1s clear from this whole speech, delivered in 
1986, that two evlls had to be dealt with: the one was that of Zulus who did not accept 
the noUon of'naUonhood' (or Zulu ethnlclt¥) propagated by Inkatha. and who did not 
respect 'my uncle, the Chief Mlnlster'. or the KwaZulu Government: the other was the 
organlsatlonal onslaught 'that comes from without to creep into our midst to do the 
hideous things that are now being done amongst you'. Against both these attacks 
Goodwlll called on true 'Zulus' to revenge the 1nsult against hlmself 88 symbol of 
'natlonal (Zulu) unlt¥'. 
This speech, dellvered on Soweto day, 16 June 1986, spelled out vividly that not only 
can there be no alternatlve organisatlons and 1deologies withln 'Zuludom', but unlt¥ in 
struggle lay through Inkatha (or through being 'Zulu'. as Goodwlll put 1t here) (see 
Mare and Hamllton, 1987:218-21, for an extended discuss10n of this 1dea). 
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In other words, closer examination of what has occurred in Natal and KwaZulu leaves 
us with a complexity that brtngs ethnic mobU1sation back into foreground of the 
piCture. As I have argued, the boundaries of an ethnic group are constantly changlng, 
being reinforced, or stgnlfled by a new central strand, a new articulating principle, in 
the mix of elements that make up the pubUc proffie of that identity, even in 
mobWsation. This has been the case with the Afrikaner ethnic group, where the 
boundaries of language and rellglon became inadequate. The redeflnltlon of an 
'Afrikaner' identlty (now often as 'Boer') depends in its extreme version on a new 
reUglon (that defines 'mud races' as not fully human), and a polltical myth of orlgln 
that is tled to a separate, rather than a dominant. poUtical area • ~ various guises the 
old Boer RepubUcs, the Vollcstaat, etc. This redeflnltlon is as much, if not more so, 
aimed at fellow 'Afrikaners' as at a wider population of more 'traditlonal' enemies. The 
same language as that expressed by king Goodwill • of traltors (verraai.ers) and 
lnfUtrators • also characterises that of the Afrikaans-speaking far right as it seeks to 
mobWse a new Afrikaner identity. 
MobWstn , the past 
Nationalism, unlike etlmicity,lDsists on poUtlcal sovereignty within national 
boundaries (as in the case of ethnic nationalism). But territory can also be used to 
draw spatial boundaries around an ethnic group. Inkatha and the KwaZulu 
'homeland' leadership have done this on many occasions, a few of which are examlned 
below. Furthermore, symboUc events also serve to either reinforce and confirm ethnic 
boundaries and 'the past', aneVor to invent traditions. 
Once Buthelezl and Inkatha gained control over the bantustan as poUtical and spatial 
construct. they tried to define it as haVing an existence beyond or alternate to that 
intended for it by apartheid. The alternative that was presented was as the home of 
the 'Zulu nation'. But in 1982, a threat to a large part of the new 'Zulu kingdom' was 
launched,lronlcally, by the National Party government. On 18 June 1982 
proclamations in the Government Gazette did away with the Legtslative Assembly in 
the KaNgwane bantustan and removed the Ingwavuma district in northern KwaZulu 
from the administrative control of the KLA. in preparation for moves to hand over 
these land areas, and the people in them. to the SwazUand state. It cau8ed a national 
and international outcry. Inkatha and the KLA took a central part in opposing the 
state moves and ultlmately won several court decisions on the technicalities of the 
proposed handover, overturnlng the decision. 
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There was considerable speculation as to the reasons for the deal at the Ume. Here it 
is suffic1ent to note that landlocked Swaziland would have benefited from access to a . 
potenuaI port at Kosi Bay: wh11e the National party govenunent would have shed 
responsibility for yet another ethnically-defined population, in the way that It had 
already done with several bantustans through giving 'lildependence', but in thls case 
with an added international dlmension as Swaziland was a full member of the 
'community of nations'. The govenunent'sJusUfication was, unsurprlstngly. that It was 
'putUng together what belonged together'. The deal would also have strengthened 
relations with a conservative partner, the Swazi govenunent. in combating ANC 
lnfUtration through Swaziland. 
An essential feature of the 'land' deal (actually a people deal) was the ethnic 
dlmension, not only from the side of the govenunent. but also from all others directly 
involved. Furthermore, appeals were made to historlcal clalms of previous polltical 
allegiance and to trlbute relationships during the ntneteenth century to 'prove' that the 
deal should either proceed or be aborted. The people llvtng in the Ingwavuma district 
are Thongs.. who bad paid tribute to Sbaka brlefly in the early-nineteenth century and 
later to Cetsbwayo. What is of greater interest though is the more recent history of 
ethnic fence Jumping. especially by Thonga men, responding to a labour market that 
they belleve Is more receptiVe to the idea of employing Zulus. The core Ideas of being 
Thonga. such as the language and status for women within the famlly, on the other 
band. are malntained by Thonga women (see above. and Webster, 1991). There was 
no clear ethnic llnk between the people here and either KwaZulu or SwazUand. 
Buthelezl and Inkatha were not interested In the relative fluidity of ethnic Identities In 
the region. but in trylng to show that even If these people were not 'true Zulus' then at 
least they bad bowed to the 'Zulu nation' in the past. the 'conquer to incorporate' 
approach that featured often during the 19808 In Buthelezl's and the klng's speeches. 
As proof of the Zulu presence Buthelezl sald that ~ Dlngane lay burled In the 
dlstrlct 'adding weight to the correctness of Zulu control' from Ulundi. At the end of 
May, 1982, he announced that a tombstone would be buUt to Dingane 'to emphasIZe 
the Zulu presence' (DSG/SARS, 1982: 10; KLAD 6. 1975:379). In famlllar fashion 
Buthelezl told the press conference that he would 
'not be at all surprlsed' If fighting between Zulus and Swazis broke 
out in mine compounds, townships and hostels In and near South 
Afrlcan urban areas (Rand DaUy MaU, 25 Jun 82). 
He told the Inkatha conference of that year that 
'Zulus had the same rlght to exist as any other national group. It was 
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lnsultlng to talk down to them when they were the largest national 
group - bigger that the white group. the Swazis or the Sothos - even 
though they did not want national sovereignty as spelled out by 
Pretoria' (quoted in DSG/SARS. 1982:15). 
What he bad done was to extend the symbols of Zulu ethnIclty, in tbia case through 
king Dtngane, to the territory of the Tembe-Thonga. thereby ideologically 
incorporating the people living there. 
The Inkatha movement said that membership Jumped from 400 ()()() to 750 ()()() in 
1982. Any increase could indeed have been due to the massive publiclty that 
Buthelezl, Inkatha. and the KLA received over the issue - most of it apparently 
perceived 88 positive. The movement'slmage was given a boost with the successful 
court action, which rested on crude doses of ethnic chauvtnlsm. While the dispute was 
in progress it alao allowed Inkatha to deploy its Youth Brigade in the dlstrict of 
Ingwavuma. and several accusations of intimidatory behavlour were made against 
them by the population of this remote part of Natal. 
Swazi'. bad prevlously served as 'the other' against whom Zulus had to guard. In 
1975 Buthelezl was already sugge&tlng that the border with Swaziland be patrolled by 
'Zulus' trained by the South Mrican Police (KLAD 6, 1975:577). In a revealing 
comparison he referred to a Sotho-speaking group in KwaZulu (see above): 
We are now placed in the same position as ... when ChiefMolefe held 
out; you know, in other words refused to conform to the Bantu 
Authorities Act and to become part and parcel of this Assembly 
because he aligns h1mselfwith the Basotho Qwaqwa (bantustan) in 
Witzleshoek (KLAD 6, 1975:380). 
In additlon to supporting ethnic appeals, the incorporatlon lssue, furthermore, 
allowed Buthelezl to engage in threats of vlolence, going 80 far as to say that 'if we had 
guns we would resist with guns' (DSG/SARS, 1982: 1 0). 
Other examples could be presented of the extension of ethnically-defined territory by 
Buthelezl, such as into the 80uth of Natal where the competition for people and land 
was with the Transkel, or into the north-eastern Orange Free State, with calls for 
broadcasts by Radio Zulu and the provlsion of Zulu-language schools in the reglon. 
Ulundi, the adminlstrative capital of KwaZulu, was bullt with the speclftc symbolic 
goal of re-establish1ng a geograpblcal and ideologtcal centre for the 'Zulu klngdom'. 
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Within the heartland of KwaZulu monuments and historical sites serve to define 
territory, both physical and symboUc. At each stage it had been Buthelezi and Inkatha 
who 'captured' the sites and the symboUsm. Resistance to Inkatha's appropriation has 
led to violence and death, such as at the University of Zululand in 1983 with the 
commemoration" of the death of Cetshwayo • a clash between students who were not 
wW.lng to let Inkatha on to the campus for this celebration and Buthelezt's insistence 
that he would not allow 'no-go' areas Within his territory (see Mare and Hamllton, 
1987:195-8). 
As is to be expected within the 'warrior tradition' battle sites feature prominently in 
the commemorations of a 'Zulu' past. In 1981, for example, Buthelezl announced the 
intention of the newly·formed KwaZulu Monuments Foundation to restore no fewer 
than 74 historic battlefields (Sunday Times, 23 Aug 81). 
At Ondlnl, near Ulundl the capital of KwaZulu, the royal residence of king Cetshwayo 
has been restored and a museum of Zulu culture constructed at a cost of RSOO 000. 
As Wright and Mazel noted (1991:59) in an article on museums in Natal and KwaZulu, 
' ••. history Is not a set of facts about the past but. rather, a set of Ideas about the past 
held in the present'. Museums, and other representations of the past are, therefore, 
Important in the use of the past to create group boundaries. Museums play an 
Impo~t part in shaping perceptions of 'shared experiences' • the comments in the 
VIsitors' book at Ondlnl show clearly that perceptions of group Identity for the Zulus 
are shared by members as well as by many outside observers. 
Wright and Mazel wrote of the museums at Ulundl that they fulfil several functions: 
first. they 'assert the legitimacy of KwaZulu as a poUtical entity', through portraying 
"the KwaZulu poUty as the "natural" successor state of the Zulu kingdom': second, the 
museums and their dlsplays 'assert the legltlmacy of the present KwaZulu leadership', 
both the klng (presented as the obviOUS successor in an unbroken llne from Shaka), 
and Buthelezl. presented as a 'natural' leader of Zulus and through connections With 
the royal famlly (1991:67·68). The authors commented that the dominant message of 
the dlsplays is of ' social d1sclpllne and order', to the exclUSion of struggle and dlsunity 
within and over what was to constitute a Zulu identity. 
The huts that had existed at the site where the museum Is presently situated had been 
burnt down by British troops after the defeat of Cetshwayo in 1879. At the 1983 
celebrations at Ondlnl during the 'Year of Cetshwayo' Buthelezi spoke of the growtng 
'Zulu unity of purpose' that was being 'exempllfled through the growth of Inkatha' 
(Sunday Tribune, 21 Aug 83). The KwaZulu Monuments Councll has also publlshed 
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several books on aspects of the Zulu people during this period such as one on the 
battle of Ulundi and another on king Cetshwayo. 
More recently Buthelezi cast ili:e net to include 'Zulus' even wider. throughout 
southern Africa. In a Shaka Day speech in 1991 (BS. 21 Sep 91) he referred to 
various 'Zulu' thrusts that produced united peoples - Soshangane 'took with h1m some 
thousand Zulu warriors who also conquered where they went. and who also united 
wherever they conquered' in Mozambique. In the same way he traced the un1fylng 
thrust into Zimbabwe and Zambia: 
All the Ndebele people lin Zimbabwe) know that they are one people 
with us. All the Shangane people lin Mozambique) know that they are 
one people with us. All the Angoni people (In Zambia) know that they 
are one people with us. 
Reports have claimed that Inkatha delegations have ventured beyond the borders of 
South Africa to 'recruit' and establish links with 'Zulus' in southern African countries 
(see. for example. New Natlon. 3 and 10 Apr 92). 
There are many examples of the events that have been created to re-affirm a Zulu past 
and present identity: Shaka Day. the recently reVived Reed Dance ceremonies. along 
With the creation of the Zulu Monuments Commlssion and the commemoration of 
such events as the battle of Isandlwana are but a few of these. As Patrick Wright wrote 
about the raising of the Mary Rose in Brita1n. 'There need ... be no essential 
discontinuity between past and present as long as the ceremonies of re-enactment are 
carried out and respected· (1985: 178). Paul Connerton noted that '(1)f there is such a 
thing as social memory ..... we are Ilk ely to find It In commemorative ceremonies .. : 
( 1989:4). 
Already in the 1950s Buthelezlinvolved himself in these confirmatory events. when he 
offered to organise the first Shaka Day in September 1954. Forsyth commented that 
while the ANC had wanted to 'establish an histOrical continuity between the alleged 
ideals of Shaka and those of the ANC·. Buthelezl benefited from the publ1c recognition 
and the presentation 'as traditionalist whose support and allegiance lay With the Zulu 
King' (1989:22). Buthelezl was. of course. already a chief at this stage. in the 
mld-1950s. In 1971 the ZTA appealed to the South African government to declare a 
Shaka Day hol1day in September - Buthelezl claimed that '"all the tribes lin Natal and 
Zululand) were under Shaka's authority and nobody had any doubts that he was the 
founder of the Zulu nation'" (quoted In Forsyth. 1989:56). In 1972 competition over 
organising of Shaka Day became part of the contest between Buthelezl and the king. 
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The KLA did. however. grant an amount of R9 000 to allow the king to stage Shaka 
Day 'as his late father Cyprian did in 1954' (KLAD I. 1972: 12). 
In 1974 the KLA requested that committees be set up to organtse Shaka Day 
celebraUons but preferably not to ask for money - 'It 18 a measure of patrtoUsm not to 
look to KwaZulu for ftmds' (KLAD 4. 1974:118). In 1975. however. it was announced 
that 'On 24.9.75 all and sundry in KwaZulu celebrated the King Shaka Day Publlc 
hollday for the first Unle, and celebrations at the main centres ... were subsidized from 
publlc funds..: (KLAD 5. 1975:290). 
By the 1980& the king had become a 1lnchpin in the belligerent etbnlc mobWsaUon 
that was taking place. Shaka Day speeches by Buthelezlln many cases lntroduced the 
king In glowtng terms. to be followed in a smooth textual conUnulty by exhortaUons 
from king Goodwl1l Zwellthln1 that would appear to have been wrltten by the same 
author, both expresslng threats against traitors. both Zulu and non-Zulu (see 
examples above). 
In 1994 the Shaka Day celebraUons became part. once more. of the struggle between 
Buthelezl and the IFP, on the one hand. and the king and the ANC. on the other. The 
king refwIed Buthelezl or any of his 'traditionalist' opponents permission to organise 
the celebrations. The essence of the con1l1ct was captured by the headllne to an article 
on the events: "Who's got the power? Shaka Day will tell' (Weekly Mall and Guardian. 
23 Sep 94). Buthelezl used the occasion to tell the several thousand people present 
that there was no place for an execuUve king in the regton (Sunday Ttmes. 25 Sep 
94),88 he had done more than two decades earl1er. Yet again the k1ng'slack of power 
was demonstrated when the main meeting went ahead. The 'Reed Dance' ceremony, a 
few days before Shaka Day, at which Buthelezl had for years lntroduced the klng, was 
held without Buthelezl's presence, but now with ANC-members accompanylng the king 
(as it was again In 1995). 
In October 1986 the South Mrican Broadcasting Corporation (SABel 1V service 
released a ten-part series called 'Shaka Zulu'. Publlc statements by people lnvolved in 
mobWslng Zulu etbnlc1ty mustrated the sensitivity of certaln aspects of the call to the 
'Zulu nation'. Even before the release of 'Shaka Zulu' several pronouncements had 
been made. Klng Goodwlll Zwel1thln1 stated that the '"founder of the Zulu nation'" 
(""from his Unle on. the Zulu looked upon their nation with pride .•. Itt) should be saved 
from a Eurocentrtc and white perspective and Judged 'In the context of African history 
as recounted by his people' (Sunday Times. 12 Oct 86). In the OffIcial Sowenir 
Brochure. produced by the SABC In glossy colour. the full statement by the king. 
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extracts from which were quoted In newspapers, was reproduced. The SABC wrote 
that ' •.. King Goodwlll not only gave Faure (the director) the go-ahead, but also 
bestowed upon the project the blessing of the Zulu royal house, as well as their full 
support and cooperation'. Buthelezi's mother became musical advlsor, until her death 
during the fllmlng of the series. 
Historians also Jolned the fray. Carolyn Hamllton wrote in the same newspaper that 
the 'Great Man' notion of history, propagated through the series and through Inkatha's 
discourse, 'is likely to produce passive actors in the present rather than active 
participants in the building of a new South Africa'. University of Natal historian John 
Wright said that '" ... lfhistory has shown us anything. it is that poUUcians use history 
to further their own ends, and Chief Buthelezlis a poUUclan not a historian"' (Natal . 
Mercury, 30 Sep 86). He was commenting on Buthelezl's Shaka Day speech of that 
year in which he described Shaka as in fact a 'walking human miracle'. 
In December 1986 John Wright and I wrote an article that was pubUshed in the Natal 
Sunday paper (Sunday TrIbune, 7 Dec 86), under the title 'The SpUce of Coincidence', 
deallng With the series as a poUUcal statement. We argued that ' ... confilctlng interest 
groups constantly raid the past for JustlftcaUon of their speclftc poUcies and practices', 
and that in this case the interests of the state, through the SABC, and Inkatha 
coincided. Buthelezl, through government-created 1nstltuUODS, had estabUshed 
hlmself as the 'chief interpreter of "Zululsm"'. Both the SABC and Inkatha were 
pro~ting an ideology which underpins the authority of the present 
KwaZulu leadership on two counts. 
FIrst. it portrays the history of the Zulu kingdom as the history of the 
Zulu royal famlly. The common people in the fUm dance. slDg, ftght. 
ululate, and grovel in the dust before their leaders, but they do not 
emerge as having a history of their own. 
Second, it portrays the Zulu kingdom as having been poUUcally and 
socially united. There is nothing in it about the deep poUUcal 
dlvlslons in Shaka's conquest state between the new Zulu leadership 
and the chiefdoms it had subordlnated. 
In fact. Buthelezi and the king went out of their way in the years after that &rUcle was 
Written to propagate the idea of 'conquering to incorporate', and the notion that unity 
was brought about in the past through conquest. 
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The overall effect of the series. we argued. was to re1nforce the 'ideological argument 
that the Zulu royal house is the unquestioned "traditional" ruler of all "Zulu" people 
today ••• It also reinforces the ideological assertion that. but for a few troublemaktng 
d.1ss1denta. all Zulu people today are united behind the KwaZulu leadershlp' - this 
statement has also been borne out repeatedly slnce then. 
Dr Oscar Dhlomo, then KwaZulu mlnlster of education and Inkatha secretary general, 
responded With an Inaccurate and ad hominem attack, offering no alternative 
information or analysis, except to deny our argument. Clearly the article had struck a 
very sensitive Ideological nerve, questioning as It did some of the basic premises of 
Inkatha's argument about Its legitimacy wlthln ethnic mob1l1sation. Thls 18 the only 
way In which the repeated responses, in speeches. in the KLA. and In newspapers. to 
questions about the legitimacy of the ideologlcal claims made by Buthelezl can be 
understood. 
That sensltivity has also been manifest In the reaction by Buthelezl to the publ1cation 
ofa book by an Intellectual wlthin the ANC. operatlngwlth the pseudonym Mzala 
(1988). Buthelez1 threatened dlstrlbutors. and even l1brarles. in South Africa With 
legal actlon if they even stocked the book. Mzala set out to explain the 'poUtical 
behaviour' of ch1ef Buthelezl through 'an attentive survey of hls poUtical past. from the 
time ofhls incorporation into the instltutlon of ch1eftalncy in 1953 .. : (1988:4). To 
detennlne what Buthelezl found offensive we need to undertake a slmllar 'attentive 
survey'. not. o~ of what Mzala wrote but also of the context. That context 18 the 
central role that Buthelezl occupies, largely self-created but reproduced extensively by 
others, within the myth of or1gln of the 'Zulu nation'. and its exlstence since 1975 
through and in the Inkatha movement. 
If that role 18 undermined, the whole house comes tumbUng down - at least as far as 
Buthelezl18 concerned. It is not only that he self-consc1ously manipulates history 
(although that Is also done - see below). He actually l1ves what he claims to be. The 
myth and the man (and hence the movement that he represents and personiftes In an 
unmedlated way) Is one; a speclftc 'hlstory' (or. more accurately, 'past') and Buthelezl 
Is one. Deny the one (or the way In which he has been constructed) and the other Is 
dented. 
Buthelezl has always been most sensttive to claims that poUtically he was the creation 
of apartheid - or that. at least. he was tolerated by the apartheid state whtle many 
other opponents of apartheid were prosecuted and bounded, Jalled or kllled. The 
second clalm Is that be owes his prOmlnent position as 'prime mlnlster to the Zulu 
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king' not to apartheid but to his common lineage With the royal house and With 
previous such 'prime mlnlsters'. He had no choice but to lead 'his' people. . 
Furthermore, he was leacUng them Within a ~rritory that was consolldated by Shaka. 
the 'Zulu kingdom', the point dealt With in detail earller. 
It is the manner in which Mza1a tackled these two central arguments, not as 
ideological constructions but as 'factually inaccurate (against another version, Mza1a's, 
that is 'correct'), that is the reason why this book threatened Buthelezt's polltical 
persona and became the object of his legally-mediated ire. 
Mza1a's book, Gatsha Buthelezl: chte! with a double agenda, is more about the man 
than about the movement that he leads. A few chapters do deal with the wider issues, 
but most of the book is directed at what Buthelezt makes of himself. In the 
introduction Mza1a gtves us a few clues as to why the book ellcited such a strong 
response: he refers to resistance to Bantu AuthOrities, and that it was 
••• not automatic that Gatsba should become chief of the Buthelezis ... 
Sbepstone latd the foundations of the role of chiefs in the present-day 
bantustan polley, almost a hundred years before the National Pany 
came into power and passed the Bantu AuthOrities Act of 1951 ... 
Those ch1efs who refused to co-operate with Shepstone's 
admlnlstrative hierarchy were simply deposed and new ones 
appotnted from the same tribe. This he did sklllfully, selecting from 
the ranks of the traditional chiefs themselves or their half-brothers, 
exploiting the extsttng rtvalry for positions among them (1988:27). 
Mza1a traces the various incorporations of chiefs into colonial, Union and apartheid 
admlnlstrations. He continues his onslaught. not against Buthelezi as such (at least 
not directly), but agatnst the institutionalisation of chieftainship - separating the good 
tradltionallsts from the bad: 
From 1927 onwards, no chief who held polltical views contrary to 
those of the government was confirmed in his position as 'chief by the 
Governor-General, irrespective of his hereditary right by Mrlcan . 
custom ( 1988:42). 
The author then enters into one of the areas where his analysis wanders Into the 
realm of justlftcation. This occurs when he explains ANC participation In the Natives 
Representative Councll (NRC), created in 1936. He does this on the basis that the 
question of whether the NRC 'could be used as an Instrument of struggle agatnst the 
government' could be answered not in the 'abstract but in practice'. How does he then 
210 
deal with Buthelezl's answer to the same dllenuna some years later? He argues 
(1988:46) that the tactics employed in 1936 carmot be transferred to a later context 
(leaving blmself open to S1mllar accusations of ahistorical 'traditions'); and that the 
bantustans confirmed the exclusion of Africans from central power (as though the 
°1936 Iegla1aUon providing for acMsory functions only did not do the same thlng); and 
that the NRC legislation "at least. •. recognised the stngIe nationallw of the Mrlcan 
people' (1988:50). aut the point he Is making Is clear - there Is a "polltically correct' 
way of doing thlngs. and then there Is the Buthelezl way. 
However, It ls not my p\ll'}X>se to take Issue here with Mza1a's analysls, interpretation 
and Juatlflcation. More to the point Is that he said that only government-approved 
chlefs were to be allowed to run the bantustans. Mza1a denied that any "genuine leader 
supported the Bantu Authorities Act' ( 1988:51), removtng from Buthelezl the approval 
he clalma from such people as chief Albert Luthull and Nelson Mandel&: and that "all 
chlef. who valued honour' were expected to follow Luthullln refustng to be "a servant 
of the raclst government' (1988:56). He seriously questioned Buthelezl'. opposition to 
the imposition of tribal authorities under the 1951 and 1959 Acts. Instead he argued 
that there was a long period of participation, albeit under pressure from the state at 
speclftc moments. both In fighting for his own chlefshlp and in proving his worth to 
the government. 
It Is chapter six. however. that strikes at the essence of Buthelez1's symbollc 
underplnnlngs: Mzala questions his claim to the title of "mntwana" (or prince) - he 
was not the son of a king: to the role of "premier' - as It was not an "hereditary title' as 
Buthelezl clalms; and he accuses Buthelez1 of being sllent about the role his 
great-grandfather Mnyamana played - "he betrayed Dlnlzulu (sic)' (1988:105); Mza1a 
claims that the founder of the "Buthelezl tribe' was a Sotho herbalist; and, ftnally, he 
argues that through placing hlmself effectively above the king, Buthelezllnverted Zulu 
history, and that thls state of affairs had been made posSlble through the untraditional 
powers conferred by the state through the bantustan system (1988:113). 
Mza1a. hlmself a Zulu, argued - oddly for a member of the ANC and SACP - for an 
untalnted tradition of Zuluness, whlle at the same time he struck at the core of 
Buthelezl's mobWsation of polltlclsed Zulu ethnlclW. His book and the arguments It 
contalned served to undermlne Buthelezl's version of "the past' as well as his role as 
symbollc centre. It did, however, operate within the same terrain as that chosen by 





Control through ideas and through force 
The 19708 and 1980s witnessed massive social dislocation and collapse In the 
provtnce and, especially, In the baOtustan, brought on by the ravages of apartheid and 
a changlng economy (espec1ally In agriculture with the aboUtlon of the labour-tenancy 
system wblch caused large-scale misery In Natal). The assault on the structures of 
apartheid through popular resistance did not spare Inkatha. The movement 
responded by taking control of as many areas of social Ufe as possible, a process 
already begun In the late-1970s. Such a strategy was not only reacUve, but also part of 
Inkatha's proacUve strategy of changlng the 'system from withln'. It called the areas 
wblch it controlled under the apartheid system 'Uberated zones', and attempted to 
Impose and create hegemony (In both senses of the word: l~dersblp with consent. 
and domlnatlon over subjects) under the banner of 'Zuluness' withln these areas. The 
various terrains that it conquered clearly 1llustrate the use being made ofInkatha's 
'Zulu traditions' In the struggle for polltlcal power. Two of these Involved educatlon 
and pollee, respectively. 
The educatlonal arena Is very powerful In soclaltstng IncUViduals Into speclftc 
identlties, as discussed. In the South African context. however, AfrIcan pupUs had 
shown great aceptlclsm about the education provided for them and, especially stnee 
1976, rejected Bantu Educatlon (apartheid education) with such vtgour that schooltng 
came to a halt for many hundreds of thousands of pupUs. Bantu Education could not 
fulfil any of the tasks that it set Itself: It did not train pupUs for (Inferior) employment 
(partly because unemployment was growing during the 19708); It did not soclaltse 
them Into a broad acceptance of the justness of the society In wblch they were to llve 
(where 'natlons' were to find the polltical ktngdom In 'homelands'); nor get them to 
accept moral and lnsUtutional disclpllne as correct and desirable. 
When the KLA was granted phase two self-governtng status In 1977 It set about 
'aboUshlng Bantu Education' (a clalm 1t made In 1978). and then Introduced what 
Inkatha spokespersons themselves called the 'Inkatha syllabus'. It was only later that 
the KwaZulu pollticlans became more sensltlve to the Impllcatlons of thls name, as 
protest mounted at what was, correctly, seen to be party-polltical propaganda. The 
syllabus was geared not only to pass on Information, hlstorlcal and clVic. but also to 
Interpellate the pupUs Into a speclftc belongtng to the Zulu ethnic group and accepting 
norms and values desirable to 'betng Zulu' and approved of by Inkatha. Respect. 
acceptance of authority (of various kinds), and disclpllne were central aspects of the 
syllabus. 
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An hour-long weekly period was to be devoted to the teaching of the syllabus and, 
wh1le not examinable, It was to be enforced through regular reports by the teachers to . 
school tnspectors (for background to the introduction of the syllabus, see Mare, 
198819). The teaching material made avatlable to teachers of'Inkatha' consisted of 
'documents l1ke the constitution, various pamphlets on the alms and pblloaophy of 
Inkatha. presidential addresses, and so on', said education mtnlster and Inkatha 
secretary general, Oscar Dhlomo (KLAD 16, 1979:346). The Inkatha Syllabus 
Commlttee said that they were Informed, In drawtng up the syllabus, by the problem 
that many adults seem to hold divergent views and beliefs about 
Inkatha for various reasons. These are passed on to the youth and 
cloud the youths' minds. It Is thus hoped that this syllabus together 
with Its guide will clear many doubts and thus create unflled ideas to 
match with the goals of Inkatha (lnkatha Syllabus Commlttee, 
1978:2, emphasis added). 
What were those 'un1fted Ideas', Bourdieu's 'controlled consensus' (1990:82)? Mdlull 
(1987) (a pseudonym for then University of Natal academic dr Blade Nzlmande), In his 
analysts of the Zulu texts written to guide the teachers, focused on some of the core 
Ideas. He pointed to the central position allocated to Buthelezl, not merely as chlef 
mtnlster. but as 'polltlcalleader of the Zulu'. 'Ukuhlonlpha' (respect) IS. he argued, the 
central theme of the syllabus. In summary, ukuhlonlpha 'sanctions superiority based 
on sex. age and soclal position and reproduces the whole set o( authoritarian and 
hierarchlcal relations found in Zulu society'. Respect o( youth for elders, o( women for 
men (in the words of the syllabus, 'The woman knows that she ts not equal to her 
husband'), of respect for all authority flgures, and respect (or the law, are all aspects 
of ukuhlonlpha that are stressed. 
On the concept of 'the nation' that Mdlull found In the syllabus, he comments that the 
'Ubuntu-botho (humanism) syllabus makes It very clear that Inkatha's aim Is not to 
destroy Zulu natlonaltsm in the struggle agatnst apartheid, but it is to moblllse this 
nationalism as a launching base' (1987:70). In fact. the syllabus based Its presentation 
on the premlss that the bulld1ng-blocks of South African SOCiety are ethnic groups - as 
was the case with the central government's apartheid poliey. This educational 
mob1l1satlon coinclded with the regtonal consolidation strategy that the movement was 
undertaktng. and personlfied the struggle for liberation in the figure o( Buthelezl. 
Mdlull (1987) concluded that the syllabus strengthened the 'three Ideologtcal pillars' of 
Inkatha's appeal In the region, namely 'the tradition of Shaka and other "great" Zulu 
kings' which Is continued in Inkatha; Inkatha 'as the continuation o( the early ANC'; 
and Inkatha as the 'embodiment of Zulu cultural traditions and values' ('UbuZulu' or 
'Zuluness'). 
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Natal had ln1tially been relatively Isolated from the turmoU In schools that started In 
Soweto In 1976. It was attributed by Inkatha leaders themselves and by outside 
commentators to the existence of the Inkatha movement. Buthelezl told a rally In 
Umlazlln 1977 that '(o)ur Zulu youth has shown consistent responsibll11y. They did 
not burn dawn our schools which we buUt ourselves and by which we ralse ourselves' 
(quoted Mare and Hamtlton, 1987:185). M1n1ster Oscar Dhlomo boasted In 1979 that 
'I haven't found any evidence of unrest relating to political factors' In KwaZulu schools. 
He claimed that this was the case because Bantu Education had been abolished In 
KwaZulu. 
The central government acknowledged the role that Inkatha was playing In controlllng 
school-based resistance agatnst apartheid by alloWIng KwaZulu educational personnel 
to become Inkatha members from as early as 1976. In 1977 a ctrcular from the 
Department of Education and Tralnlng told circutt Inspectors to allow prlndpals to 
hold Inkatha Youth Brigade meetings In schools. which Buthelezi said was because the 
movement had kept unrest out of the region (see Mare and Ham1lton. 1987:183). 
The need for discipline, spec1flcally through the Inkatha movement. was repeatedly 
llnked to an ethnic identity. both In the syllabus and in public pronouncements. In 
1980 Buthelez1 warned: 
Inkatha as such has proved beyond any doubt to be the best 
lnstrument to sort out the problems of discipline and also the 
problem oflack of patriotism ..• (T)he reason why that (schools 
unrest) has in fact not taken off came about as a result of this 
disc1pUne which Inkatha merely strengthens. In this region King 
Shaka was the first person to make us a disclpUned people. and 
through the various traumas we have encountered as a people and 
where we have been split apart. I think Inkatha has been that 
Instrument which sought to re-establish that diSCipline on which our 
nation operated at that time (KLAD 18, 1980:356). 
Shortly after this Warning, and after Buthelezl expressed understanding of the pUght 
of boycotting coloured and Indian scholars, a well-supported boycott took place In the 
KwaZulu-controlled KwaMashu township. Inlt1ally Buthelez1 took refuge in the 
scapegoattng of non-Zulus and blamed 'Xhosa' lawyers, 'foreign representatives', and 
so on (Mare and Ham1lton, 1987:185). He also claimed that the boycotts had been 
designed to 'dentgrate' him personally, frequently presented as a wrong to be avenged. 
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Buthelezl threatened extreme violence, which dld occur, now that the dlsctpUne of the 
educaUonal system ltaelfwas shown to be illusory. In their experience pupUs found 
the KwaZulu educaUon to'be llttle dlfferent from the old Bantu EducaUon. Buthelez1 
~ed that there was a 'total onslaught' against Inkatha. He warned that once the 
'pollUcal rUT-raft' had been IdenUfted "We will shake them and drive them out of our 
midst. and If they are not careful they may find that they run risks In what they do, 
one of which may be havtng their skulls cracked, as none of us can precl1ct what form 
the anger they raise takes'" (quoted Mare and Hamllton, 1987:186). 
ThIs early case of the d1sctpl1nary powers of Inkatha - mass meettngs were called and 
marching bands of Inkatha supporters assaulted adults and pupils - gave warntng of 
the violence that was to accompany regtonal consolldaUon (ethnic 'and admin1straUve) 
during the rest of the 1980s. Along with the other attempts to channel youth acUvity 
and anger, such as through the Youth Servlce Corps and the Youth Brigade (see 
above), the educational system was used to reach the whole school-going populaUon of 
KwaZulu. 
It was not only on the Ideol~ca11eve1, through the educaUonal system, that Inkatha 
tried to ensure control. The movement. through the KLA. also establlshed a regtonal 
pollce force. Control through education operated at more than the level of Ideas, as 
illustrated In KwaMashu In 1980. S1ml1arly, the pollee was not only there to enforce 
control, but was also placed within the Ideology of Zulu mobilisation. The formaUon of 
the KwaZulu pollce put Inkatha's warrior tradition In uniform. The movement had 
maintained a d1atance, at least overtly, from the SA Defence Force for many years 
during the 19708, but had not hesitated to demand and accept Its 'own' pollce force 
for KwaZulu. In 1975 the KLA requested that the central government be asked to 
hand over pollce power to the bantustan. Before that could happen the bantustan 
needed greater powers than those that KwaZulu had at the Unle. In 1978, when these 
powers were granted, Jeffrey Mtetwa. KwaZulu m1n1st.er of jusUce, said that the KLA 
' ... not only aimed at taking over the pollce but would also ask Pretoria to give m1l1tary 
tratntng to tribal regtments' (Natal Mercury, 12 May 78). 
This statement brtngs together the two most prominent aspects In Inkatha's direct and 
indirect organs of control (le, pollce and 'tribal regtments'). Chlefs, too, serve Within a 
broad 'law and order' front. In 1974, for example. the KLA passed Its own Zulu Chlefs 
and Headmen Act. repeaung In many details the segregauon and apartheid 
, governments' NaUve AdmlnlstraUon Act and Its amendments. The KwaZulu Act 
sUpulated that a ch1ef or headman 'shall be entitled ... to the loyalty, respect. support 
and obedience of every resident of the area for which he has been appointed'. It placed 
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chiefs and their assistants as local representatives of the KwaZulu government In law 
and order enforcement. unrest. prevention of the distribution of 'undesirable 
llterature·. and the prevention of 'unauthorised entry of any person Into his area' 
(Mare. 1982a). 
After 1980 the pollce In many districts came under KLA control. whlle the 
establishment of a 'security section' and camouflaged 'riot pollee' were envtsaged from 
early 011. What Is of relevanee here, however. Is the use made of tradition In the 
pollctng of the African inhabitants of KwaZulu and Natal (Mare. 1989). In the 
establlshment of a pollee foree mention was made of the schools unrest In KwaMashu. 
It was not often that Buthelezl acknowledged the ex1Btenee and operation of "Zulu 
regtmenta' or 'amabutho·. In 1980. however. he was drlven to do so In reaction to a 
newspaper report on the operation of 'mobs' during the KwaMashu schools boycotts. 
Buthelezl just1tled the presence of reg1ments (the 'mobs' referred to In the press 
reports) and the sUcks they carried as 'part and parcel of the Zulu national grouping. 
and the formation of reg1ments •...• Is part and parcel of Zulu tradition'. He said that 
the king bad reglments as did several of the chiefs (KLAD 19. 1980:662). 'Regtments .. 
he added. 'always march around and they also do some chanting at the same time. 
That Is how they operate'. 
Buthelezl tpld the KLA that a pollee force was needed 10 the same way that a Zulu man 
was naked Without a fighting sUck. '(I)f it came to the push we would clean them up 
before breakfast'. he said of 'any pipsqueak' who spoke against the Zulus (KLAD 19. 
1980:411-7). A member of the KLA suggested that to make 'every Zulu ••. a pollceman 
of sorts is part of our effort of ensuring law and order In the country. That is our 
traditional way ofpollctng the country •. : (KLAD 20. 1980:763). 
Buthelezl. who was also KwaZulu mlnlster of pollee. called the KwaZulu Pollee 'my 
first bastion of defenee against anything and everybody that mounts threats against the 
democracy which alone can set us free'. He addressed them as follows: 
You now belong to the KwaZulu Pollce Force and I want you to 1nfuse 
Into our Pollce Foree the sterllng character and the great courage 
which has made the Zulu nation one of the great nations of the world. 
RIght from the beg1nn1ng of time for KwaZulu. we disUngulshed 
ourselves as human beings. powerful as warriors and Wise as 
pbllosophers With an Ubuntu-Botho (humanism) approach to human 
problems .•. (T)here Is a vast strength of Zuluness 10 the society 










An examlnat10n of the discourses employed around"educat1on. as well as policlng (of 
which a few examples have been presented). shows clearly how both relate to ethn1clty 
as exempllfted In Inkatha. and "how the two aspects Interact - If educat10n falls In 
establlshlng the 'un1fled Ideas' then the pollce are there to ensure that "traltors' do not 
threaten the political existence of Inkatha. the vehicle for those Ideas. Such a threat 
was perceived In the working class which provided the potent1al for organlslng a 
stratum of society that cuts across both poltttctsed ethnic and raclallsed organlsat1ons. 
Discip1tntng the Working class 
In a survey of union members undertaken by Eddie Webster In 1975. only 19% named 
Buthelezl as a leader 'present or past' who could 'Improve the posIt1on of African 
workers (Albert Luthull, Natal-based president of the ANC before Its banning. 
obtained 44% and Nelson Mandela. jalled ANC leader, 10%). However, Webster noted 
that 87% saw Buthelezl 'as their leader' (Webster, 1987:29). It Is not clear to what 
extent thls reflected an acceptance of a speclftcally 'Zulu' polit1cal context. on the one 
hand. In comparison with past leaders who could help workers, on the other (and 
then It 18 Dot clear why Luthull was perceived by so many to have been able to advance 
worker Interests). Was It an acknowledgement that the only avenue for open politics. 
without Intense harassment. was bantustan political activitY? It must also be noted 
that Buthelezl was percelved at the time by a large range of lnfluential actors as a 
trouble-maker - local capital. the state. and conservat1ve trade unions all accused hlm 
of radlcallsm. No doubt thls. along With the support he then received from the ANC's 
exiled leadership. would have affected his standing as a symbol of resistance to the 
apartheid regtme. 
Two years before the survey was undertaken workers. living In mJgrant hostels In 
Durban, had called In the Zulu king to mediate on their behalf with management at 
the Corobrlck plant at one of the first strikes In the wave of Industrial unrest that 
occurred In Natal In 1973. Buthelezl and hls KwaZulu government benefited from the 
petty-bourgeois radlcallsm of then KwaZulu counclllor for communlty development. 
Barney Dladla. who became somewhat of a firebrand In the labour field. Dladla was 
soon afterwards to be axed by Buthelezl for opposing his economlc plans for the 
advancement of certain trading Interests and for the support base he (Dladla) was 
consolidating In the working class In the region. As was to be the case with the first 
secretary general of Inkatha. SME Bengu. who had benefited from the post-1976 youth 
radlcallsm. Buthelezl could not afford social power bases that lay beyond the 
ostensibly non-class and ethnic politics he was engaged In. and that threatened his 
centrality In KwaZulu and then Inkatha. 
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Whlle Buthelezl remained consistent in his support for the legal recognition of trade 
unions for African workers, Inkatha simultaneously brought the conservative 1nfiuence 
of the ideology of'Zuluness' into the field of labour. It was not that much of a problem 
whUe the unions in the region were struggling to survive after a union revival following 
the 1973 strikes (see Friedman. 1987). The unions were weak and concentrated on 
factory-Door strength In the 19708 rather than on political opposition to the state. In 
addition they had a regional base In Natal which demanded senslt1Vl1¥ to the powerful 
politics of Inkatha. and to lts successful mobll1saUon of Zulus-speaking people. It was 
argued from withln the unions that workers could be members of both organisations 
as they catered for d1fferent spheres of life. On two fronts, therefore, the unions were 
avolding confrontation, a poslUon respected by both sides. 
This stand-ofJ was to change drastically with the political direction followed by 
Inkatha In the 19808, and also with developments withln the union movement ltself. 
Inkatha had held the dream that unions would In fact joln the movement 
(consUtutional provlslon was made for such an eventuallt¥. even if the envisaged 
repreaentatioo was mlnor), but the relationshlp became one of deep susplclon, as was 
the case with all mobll1sation:that fell outside of Inkatha's control. on the one side, 
and all politics that was percelved to be part of 'the system'. from the other. From the 
end of the 1970& Inkatha leaders were hinting at moving lnto the labour field. but then 
lnto a labour fleld percelved in terms of essential harmony between capital and labour 
- hardly surpr1slng when Inkatha had already lnvested heaVily In the growth of trading 
and other enterprises as a movement. and when it offered compliant labour to 
lnternaUonallnvestors (see Mare and HamUton, 1987:chapter 6). 
Analysts have argued that an uneasy coexistence between Inkatha and the Federation 
of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) could exist. with each organisation stating 
that dual membership was possible (Morrls. 1986: Mare and HamUton. 1987). 
FOSATU was formed In 1979, with only about 20 000 p81d-up members. and 
lncluded a block of unions from Natal which had been organised under the wnbrella 
of the Trade Union Advisory Coordlnaung Counc1l (see. for example. Baskin. 1991). 
However. with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) In 1985 the possibll1t¥ of dual allegiances disappeared. FOSATU was 
absorbed lnto the newly-formed Congress. 
Inkatha had never been able to get any respectable union to aftlllate to it and with the 
COSATU launch. at the end of 1985. the possibll1t¥ disappeared. It moved ahead with 
its .own plans to establish a union. the United Workers Union of SA. UWUSA was 
launched on May Day 1986 at the same venue that COSATU had chosen six months 
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earUer (Sw-vey, 1986 (vol 2):242-3). With a great deal of show Buthelezilanded in a 
heUcopter in the rugby stadium, wh1le supporters carried a coffin with the name of the 
COSATU president wrltten on It. Buthelezl defined UWUSA as being in opposition to 
the ANC and COSATU. It set choices of exclusiVe allegiance before the regional 
working class when It defined COSATU Into the then-banned ANC camp. The same 
exclusivity bad not Informed COSATU, with some workers llvtng in the 
violence-wracked hostels (lnkatha strongholds on the east Rand in what Is now 
Gauteng) admltUng to dual membership and support - COSA TU for their needs as 
workers and Inkatha as representatlon of their et1Ul1c identities. What Is noteworthy Is 
that any workers would have dared entertain dual allegiance in such a violently 
polarlaed situation as pertained on the Witwatersrand in the early-l990s. no matter 
how brlefly unUl such dual allegiance became divided loyaltles (see Segal, 1991). 
Here I will refer to only three examples of the manner In wblch Inkatha has brought 
et1Ul1city Into the labour field - two from mlning and the third from agriculture. In the 
field of labour recrultment 'Zulu tradition' continued to playa role, as It did in the 
19108 (see Marks, 1986:33-34) and 1920s (see Cope, 1986:322, 1993:209). Buthelezi 
maintained a close relatlonsblp with the mlnlng Industry In South Mrlca during the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. His deal1ngs, because the major mines are 
malnly situated in the Transvaal and Orange Free State (except for coal In Natal), had 
largely been through the recru1t1ng organlsatlon of the Chamber of Mines, The 
Employment Bureau of Mrlca (TEBA). In November 1981 Buthelezl'dedlcated' the 
new adm1nlatr~Uve bullding of TEBA In Ulundi. The need to recrult mine labour 
locally, Ie in South Mrlca. had been forced on the Industry by a number of factors, 
Including the llberatlon of Mozambique. In 1974 only 22% of the mines'labour force 
came from South Mrlca. wh1le by 1981 a full 60% were recrulted within the country 
(see, for example, James, 1992:53: Crush et al, 1991:127-9). Labour was also 
becomtng avallable through growing unemployment within South Mrlca (Crush et al, 
1991:130). 
It Is notlceable that a larger proportlon of Zulu workers on the mines than any other 
ethnic group had previously been employed In agriculture, probably due to the 
phasing out of the labour-tenancy system that had predomlnated In Natal (Crush et al, 
1891:130). WllmotJames noted that '(t)n the 19805, the homeland of KwaZulu .... , 
became the third most important area of expanslon for recruiting agencies ... In the 
1980s ..... social conditlons •.. favoured expansion ofrecrulttng' (1992:65). By 1989 
the region was supplying close to 40 000 workers to the gold mines, nearly double 
what It had been in 1985 (James, 1992:65). 
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Buthelezl. in his support for mine recruitment. felt 'that both sk1l1s and 'the disclpUne 
of labour' were being transferred. and remlnlsced about a personal visit to a mine: 
'I have thought of It. that such work ~Ituatlons with their heavy 
demands on disclpllne and endurance are a far better tralnlng ground 
than any of the so-called guerl1la camps outside the country. in 
making us men among men' (quoted in Gordon. 1982:30). 
Gordon's article Is entitled "The people of heaven: a warrlor race enters the industrial 
environment'. Both the Utle and the selected quotation serve as forthright statements 
on the mascullne 'world of work'. Cherryl Walker's excellent article on 'Gender and the 
migrant labour system' illustrates 'the past' of this particular perception. in the form 
that It has taken in southern AfrIca (1990). She showed how the pre-capltallst 
'organisation of gender' (based on the authorlty of men and male 'traditional 
authorlty') articulated with colonial and Union of South Mrlcan capltallst and state 
perceptions and demands. This commonality of interests confined the debate to 'who 
should control the women - chlefs. the state, or husbands' (1990: 181). 
The (1982) article by Dennis Gordon on the recruitment of Zulu-speakers for the 
mines. in the Chamber of MInes Journal Mining Survey, offers further fasclnating 
gUmpaes into the manner in whlch ethnlclty was used as late as the 1980s to attract 
labour. Buthelezl was descrlbed as 'Chlef Mlnlster of the partially self-governing state 
of KwaZulu •.• also a Prlnce of the Zulu Royal Famlly, leader of the Inkatha 
movement. .. and one of AfrIca's most influential voiCes'. Bill Larkan, dlstrlct manager 
of TEBA. was described as havlng a 'deep commltment to the Zulu nation'. sharing a 
Christian commltment with chief Buthelezl and even being called upon to open a 
KwaZulu cabinet meetingWlth prayer; Trevor Nel, in charge ofTEBA operaUons south 
of the Thukela. 'believes that the tradlUonal dlsc1pUne to whlch rural Zulus are sUll 
subjected through the tribal structure of chlefs and headmen fits men for work on the 
MInes'; whlle TEBA's Nongoma representative 'appeals to the hlghly-developed Zulu 
sense of humour by broadcasting facetious remarks as he travels the seasonally dusty 
or muddy roads' (Gordon. 1982). In 1982 TEBA announced that It was to sponsor a 
newspaper for 70 000 KwaZulu schoolchlldren. 
In 1987 the longest mlnlng strike in South AfrIca's hlstory. involvlng the largest 
number of workers (about 250 000). took place over wage demands (eg Survey. 
1987/88:678). ThIrty-three of the 99 coal and gold mines were lnvolved and some 
50 000 workers were dlSmlssed. Two weeks before the strike was settled, on 13 
August. Buthelezl addressed the "TEBA 75th AnnIversary Gala Dinner' (BS. 13 Aug 





because it is the recruiting agency which takes people from their homes to the mines 
where they can do that which their Wisdom tells them they should do'. He also warned 
against "(t)hose in the labOur movements who use trade unionism for political 
purposes •• : This warning came a year after Inkatha had formed its own union 
(UwuSAl. which was subsequently shown to have been funded by the Securlt¥ Police 
(Mare. 1991a). 
The second m1n1ng example Involves the king who. in 1986. had been brought into the 
fray to counter the organising success of the National Union of Mineworkers. a 
COSATU aftlllate. in what was considered to be the heartland of the new 'Zulu 
kingdom'. namely northern Natal and Zululand. The king had by now become an 
etJecUve extenslon of the project of regional ethnic mobilisation. a far cry from the 
time in 1973 when he was reprimanded by Buthelez1 for taking up hostel-clwell1ng 
migrant workers' grievances. Ooodwill addressed a gathering that included mine 
managers. a South African cabinet mlnister. and chiefs and their councillors. The 
occasion was the opening of Zululand Anthracite Colliery. He clalmed. as usual. to 
'rise above politics' and then sharply criticised National Union of Mineworkers (HUM) 
and COSATU officials for undenn1nlng the 'free enterprise system'. He then warned 
some miners who made 'a habit' of insulting Buthelez1 that they should desist. King 
Goodw1ll appealed to the same soclalidentit¥ as Buthelez1 did in his address to 
KwaZulu Police in early-I987. when he reminded colliery workers: 
We come from a warrior race and we know that true power gtves 
gentleness to those who have it where gentleness is demanded ••• It Is 
my hope that people who work in this colliery will conduct themselves 
With dlgn1t¥ .•• We do not discrtmlnate against other Blacks who come 
to work here because KwaZulu 15 part of South Africa. They are our 
brothers. But they must behave themselves and respect Black 
leadership of this region (OS. 23 May 86). 
A few days after the klng's speech NUM members at Hlobane Colliery in the area who 
had been on strike over management action against the union were attacked by 
UWUSA members. supported by mlne management and allegedly also by an outside 
group of Inkatha supporters. At least II people died during the violence and many 
were injured. 
The third example involves farmers and Inkatha. A phrase 'that Hemson used in his 
1979 study of dockworkers In Durban to describe the manner in which management 
tried to control these migrant workers could as easUy be applied to what happened in 
the Ngotahe diStrict of northern Natal: 
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Only In the more distant reserves did chiefly authority and the 
command of lndunas carry any social weIght. Employers hoped to 
carry this ideologtcal baggage over to the workplace under the 
1mmed1ate direction of management (1979:419). 
It was In the agricultural district of Ngotshe that Inkatha most clearly brought In Its 
tradition of control through ethnicity. In August 1986 the Ngotshe Cooperation 
Agreement was signed between some farmers In the Ngotshe district In northern 
Natal. and Inkatha - on behalf of agricultural workers "and AfrIcan 'squatters' on 
white-owned farms In the district. The agreement allowed Inkatha unprecedented 
access to farm workers. notoriOUsly inaccessible to union organisers; It also 
relntroduced chiefs who had been evicted from white-owned land. to 'restore the 
d1sc1pUnary structures of the Zulu hierarchy In our district'. as 1)aart van Rensburg. 
cha1rperson of the Ngotshe Cooperation Committee. told king Goodw1l1 Zwel1th1n1 
(quoted In Mare and HamUton. 1987a). 
The Ngotshe district had several problems to deal with In the mtd-1980s: It was 
situated on the border with Swaziland and It was perceived as one of the transit 
routes for ANC guerr1llas from Mozambique; a number of 'labour farms' exist In the 
d1str1ct. owned by absentee landlords and inhabited by seasonal workers (Van 
Rensburg told the Farmer's Weeldy (10 Mar 86) that such labour farms were 'units 
with no d1sc1pUne' and that 'the Intention of the agreement Is to repair the disciplinary 
structure'); chiefs had previously been evicted from the area. probably because 
farmers could not then. under less threatening conditions. countenance 'dual 
authority' - their own arising from ownership of land. and that of 'tradition' of the 
chiefs; and white farmers felt threatened by the moves by COSATU to organtse farm 
workers (moves that have continued to prove more of a threat than an actuallty). 
Amongst a range of objectives, such as development. improving education. and 
guaranteeing security for farm workers and labour-farm occupants. 'safeguardlng the 
traditional Zulu way of llfe' also featured. The k1ng. who attended the slgnlng 
ceremony and who was centrally Involved In launching the agreement. spoke of the 
unity of the two largest 'ethnic groups' (Afrikaners and Zulus) In the country. The 
parallels With the 19208 and I 930s are worth pointing to again (see. for example. 
Cope. 1993:205-12). 
In meetlngs prior to the agreement Van Rensburg told the k1ng. In relation to the 
evicted chiefs. that '(1)t Is our slncere wish to restore the disc1pllnary structures of the 
Zulu hierarchy In our distrlct. .. ·; and later he said that '(o)ur aim Is now to return the 
ch1efs to their ortgtnal place of residence With their fam1l1es where they w1ll once more 
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form the nucleus of the area and maintain disclpllne'. The coincidence of Interests 
between Inkatha and the farmers around discipllne through 'tradition' was complete. " 
Cope writes that In 1930, 
(t)he Chairman of the Ngogo Farmers' Association at Newcastle lin 
northern Natal) mtght equally have been speaking on behalf of tribal 
authorities when he complained of the tendency among youths to 
'defy their parents' •.. : so too when he painted an idyllic picture of the 
'olden days' when chiefs and homestead heads were 'respected and 
obeyed by everyone in the kraal' (1993:208). 
In Richmond In the late-1980s, several years later the scene of months of violent 
clashes between Inkatha and ANC supporters, attempts were made to repl1cate the 
Ngotshe agreement. Once more the participants were white farmers and Inkatha. The 
Richmond Regional Development Association argued that 
-We should discuss With the leaders In these tribal areas some form of 
accord which would prevent the Influx of irresponsible trade union 
movements Iread COSATU) that would break down the present 
predomlnantly good relations which exist on most farms and to 
encourage the tribal authorities and farm labour to Join the Inkatha 
Movement which Is private enterprise orientated rather than the trade 
unlons which are not' (quoted In Mare and Hamtlton, 1987a). 
With the extremely conservative and disclpltnlng role that Inkatha and Its leaders and 
union (UWUSA) played in the mtd·1980s it made sense that dr Jan van der Horst. 
chairperson of the gtant Old Mutual group should have said in an interview: 
I recently saw Chief Buthelez1. We talked very openly. To my mlnd our 
future l1es In that direction, because we are dealing With a Chrlstian, 
we are dealing With a man who has Western habits, and who believes 
In "certatn Western things such as private enterprise, the business of 
ownership. and 80 OD. Chief Buthelez1ls the leader of a most 
lmportant tribe (Leadership South Africa, 5(6), 1986). 
It Is In that mixture of modernising and 'tribal' that Buthelezl had most to offer 
capitalists In the regton. What threatened him, In his mobll1sation of ethniclty Within a 
context of SOClal decay and what appeared to be a revolutionary onslaught. also 
threatened them. Their solutions were, however, not always the same. It was during 
this period that some people from the South Mrican business world also started 
haVIng contact With the ANC. 
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I and the king • condensation of it all 
The total representation of the 'Zulu nation' was essential to the Inkatha project. Wh1le 
the 1973 strikes had given an indication of the strength of mass action, the more 
tmmedlat.e concern of the KwaZulu bantustan leaders during the first half of the 
1970& had been the many attempts by state bodles (espec1ally security and 
information) to dislodge Buthelezi and to form a more pliable leadership aroWld the 
Zulu king. It was reasoned that Buthelezi did not serve the essential purpose of taking 
KwaZulu to 'independence', and that an alternative repository of 'tradition', king 
Goodwill Zwelithlnl, was avaUable. The parties formed in opposition to Buthelez1 and 
to Inkatha used names such as the Inala Party (named after one of the k1ng's 
reg1ments and also one of his residences) and Shaka's Spear - both trytng to capture 
ethnic symbols in their fight against another ethnic project. that of Buthelez1 and then 
ofInkatha (from 1975). and finding an ally in yet another ethnic project. that of the 
National Party government. 
Central state agents also fOWld sufficient numbers of an ethnic petty bourgeo1sie 
cUsgruntled With the llne pushed by Butheleziin the early-1970s, to attempt to Wlseat 
Buthelez1. The economic direction he represented, and hence the benefits offered by 
him. lay through an alllance With monopoly capital and control of stat.e-creat.ed 
'development' agencles - what was known as 'white' capital. His largely urban 
opponents felt that he was l1ftlng the protective ethnic curtain that apartheid had 
thrown aroWld their class aspirations just too much. In the struggle. however, 
Buthelez1 bad already side-llned the king into a position from where he was later to 
function. enthusiastically, as symbolic figurehead of the 'Zulu nation'. He intended to 
control the monarch through the patronage that the KLA could dispense. He bad bad 
the constitution, proposed by the central state in 1972, altered to reflect the 
supra-pollUca1 posltion he wanted for the king. 
Despite the appearance of loyalty to an extensiVe 'traditional' role played out In the 
Assembly. that allegtance was stmply one of a variety of contested posstblllties. 
Buthelez1 was wl1llng to grant the paraphernalia but not the power to the king. In 
1974, in the example referred to earlier. Buthelezl told the KLA that king Goodwill. as 
the 'Klng of 4 1/4 mllllon Zulus in South Africa' deserved the expenditure of R300 000 
on a palace, and that '(l)f the Zulus want a monarchy they must pay for it' (KLAD 4, 
1974:360). Matters came to a head in the late-1970s With a threat from Buthelezi that 
the 'nation' could possibly even do Without its own royalty (KLAD 17, 1979:662). 
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The king showed equal enthusiasm In accepting the patronage made available through 
the KLA. By 1982 the king had no fewer than three palaces (by 1994 there were seven 
(Mare. 1994:24)) and many other trappings of his 'tradltional' position. and was part 
of the poUtical project of Inkatha. The new role that he had within a consoUdating 
Zuluneas was displayed In the struggle against the Incorporation of the Ingwavuma 
c::Uatrlct lnto Swaz1land discussed above. The net of Zuluness had to be cast as wide as 
possible. 
Th1s18 h~ journalist Louis du Bulsson descrlbed 'KwaZulu 1982 Buthelez1's Year' 
(Pace, DeclJan 1983): 
1982 also saw the Zulu monarch. King Ooodw1ll ZweUthlnl, step 
more visibly Into pubUc Ufe. For the first time In his ten-year reign. 
King Goodwlll shared the poUtical platform and the pubUc Umellght 
with Chief Oatsha Buthelez1. At the height of the Ingwavuma affair, he 
addres8ed mass meetings allover his kingdom. culminating In a 
massive ImblzO (meeting) at Nongoma attended by 20 000 Zulus. 
Two days later the king was In Pretorla. d1scusstng the Ingwavuma 
affair with the Prime Mlnlster. Mr P.W. Botha. and members of his 
cablnet. He returned triumphantly havtng extracted from the 
Oovernment an undertaking to reconsider the move after consultation 
With the Zulu people. 
King Goodwlll was greeted with crles of Usutu when he returned - a 
royal greeting which had faded with the decline of the Zulu monarchy 
after the defeat of King Cetshwayo a century ago. but which suddenly 
took a new meantng In the stormy days of Ingwavuma. .• 
It is reveallng to note some of the other appearances of the king. since the ethnic 
revival of 1982. after haVIng been kept constitutionally and poUtically on the perlphery 
by Buthe1ez1 durtng the first decade or so of the exlstence of KwaZulu. In 1986 king 
GoodwUI made two well-pubUcised pubUc appearances. At one he announced the 
meeting to launch UWUSA as a counter to COSATU and added his voice to the call for 
Zulu attendance. and the second was a Soweto Day (June 16) 'Address to the Zulu 
Nation' at Nongoma. During the latter he called for the 'purging" of Zulu communlties 
of the UDF, the ANC and COSATU. He also appealed for a restoration of'Zuluness', to 
counter the 'allen values' that had entered 'the largest population group In the whole 
country' (OS, 16 Jun 86). 
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There were two central elements to the function of the king from 1982 unUl 1994. The 
first was to give symbolic coherence to, and to give orders in the name of the "Zulu 
nation'; and the second was to give legitimacy to the centrality of Buthe1ezl as politlcal 
representatlve of the same "natlon'. Such functlons are somewhat different to those 
noted by Andrles Wessels for the Brit1sh royal house. Wessels argues that '(t)he Royal 
family holds the attentlon of the modern public because the instltutlon of the 
monarchy or perhaps ~e idea of monarchy, answers a universal desire for the 
personlflcatlon of the heroic' (1994:21). This idea differs much from the South African 
(Zulu) case. where there Is little heroic in the present use made of a weak royal figure 
(personally and politlcally), where two confilcting politlcal sides (both the IFP and the 
ANC) agree on just one tblng. and that is that the other side manipulates or 
manipulated him as symbol Withln ethnic moblllsatlon. 
Let me present one of many possible examples of how this constructlon works. The 
event is one of the 'King Shaka Day' celebrations in 1991, held in this case in Eshowe 
in Zululand on the 24th September. Buthelezi here introduced the king to the 
assembled KwaZulu, consular, reUglous, royal and other d1gn1tar1es, and to the 'sons 
and daughters of Africa'. Before that he had presented a history of the achievements of 
Sbaka and the kings after him. Buthelezt said: 
Whenever I have to stand up to introduce His Majes1y the King of the 
Zulu on these formal cultural occasions, I bum With a deep aense of 
pride. It is when one focuses on His Majesty representing the unity of 
the ~ple In his person, and when you focus on His Majes1y 
summing up Zulu history in his person, that you are confronted With 
an overwhelmlng sense of who the Zulu people actually are. What 
makes It so spec1alis that most of the Zulu Kings are forbears to both 
of us (SouthNHcan Update, 3(9), September 1991), 
Buthe1ezl then llnked his message to the negotlating process, but from Withln 
politlc1scd Zuluness, argutng that a un1fled Zuluness will ensure a "new South Africa'. 
The king then responded and sald that each place he vlsited conftrmed for him 'who 
we are' • Eshowe itself "really is the domain of the Zulu people', haVing been the site of 
kings Mpande's palace, Cetshwayo's birthplace, Oingane's kraal, place of residence of 
Dlnuzulu, and so on. The king confirmed Buthelez1's call that the 'real power of the 
Zulus is In their unity, in their purpose and in their collectlve voice which says yea or 
nay and then yea or nay it will be' • the last phrase carrylng some irony in the JJght of 
his own previous and subsequent vac1llaUons. He afDnned that Zulus are a 'warrior 
natlon', fashioned by history, but said that such 'warrior blood' strengthens 'not our 
226 
ann only ... (but also) our resolve to do good and our resolve to be gentle. and our 
resolve to spread power based on discussion and consensus'. 
Goodwill functioned prtmar1ly as a symbol rather than as a major actor for several 
reasons: first. because he was a threat to the Buthelezl project that depended on a 
past within wblch the king Is a central element - Buthelezlls cousin becau8e the king 
Is king. and Buthelezlls prlme mlnlster because there Is a royal Uneage. as Is 
illustrated by the following excerpt from a Zwellthlnl speech: 
I today want to thank my uncle. the Prlnce of KwaPblndangene Prlnce 
Mangosuthu Buthelezl. for what he Is doing to bring about Black 
unl~ ••• My people. I know my uncle and he and I represent the 
lnd1vlslblll~ of the natlon ... Put first thlngs first and trust the hlstory 
that first created the great Zulu natlon and then went on to create the 
great Zulu emplre and then went further on to take that whlch It 
created and make It a force for the estabUshment of a new South 
Africa (OS. 25 Sep 89). 
More recently. since the spllt between klng and premier. Buthelezl has untangled the 
king. as he bad in the 19708. from the instttution of the monarchy. 
Second. because he drew the boundaries of excluslon and inclusion of the Zulu ethnlc 
group very clearly - those who accepted hlm accepted Zuluness: 'History has put me 
where I am and all Zulu hlstory demands that I make the unl~ of my people my very 
first prlorlty' (OS, 25 Sep 89). 
Third, he provlded the legltimatlon for an alternatlve entl~ that could llve on after 
apartheid. lnto a regional future - the Zulu kingdom. Many speeches in the late-l980s 
stressed a Zulu contrlbutlon to natlonal change, with the emphasis on cultural and 
'natlonal' dlversl~. King Ooodwlll told a 1990 Shaka Day gathering that "I am always 
very proud when I think of the extent to which the Zulu natlon has been there at every 
twist and tum ofhlstory to play Its role In shaping the new South Mrlca..: (OS, 23 
Sep90). 
Despite the centraU~ of the symbollc roles that he has played since the early-1980s It 
Is clear. however, that he could not be allowed to be a polltlcally actlve leader with an 
e~ectlve autonomous power base. That role was only possible through his uncle and 
'prlme mlnlster' (as It Is now, since 1994. through the reconstituted "royal councU'). 
Buthelezl, llke the king. clalms the attrlbutes that are deemed to be part of being 
'Zulu'. However. unllke the king. he has always been placed in an executlve leadershlp 
role. So. for example, he told the Inkatha Youth Brigade that 'I come from a very long 
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line of dist1ngU1shed Zulu generals which goes 11gh.t back to the great King Shaka 
h1mself (85, 22 Aug 87). The unqual11led nature of this claim suggests that it is 
'natural' that he should lead as a general. In the same manner he clalms a conUnulty 
of office, as prlme mlnlster. The king affirmed this vlew when he frequently referred to 
Buthelezl as a warrior or as located Within the Une of Zulu warriors, and as prlme 
mtnlster. 
Bourdleu's notlon of'lmmaterlal forms of capital· cultural, symbollc, and soclal - as 
well as a materlal and economic form and that With varlous levels of dlfftculty it is 
possible to convert one of these forms Into the other' (Calhoun, 1993:69, emphasis 
added: also Bourdleu, 1984), may gtve us an insight into the oper~tlons of Buthelezl's 
use of the symbols of culture and the symbols of 'the past'. What he, in effect. does is 
to convert or transfer status capital between different tlme and social frames· from 
'traditlon' (that is only partly located In the past. and is only partly based on an 
unbroken contlnulty), into the contemporary, the world of moblllsatlon for purposes 
of power. "TracIltlon' is also, by both Buthelez1 and the king, converted into status and 
wealth (it is their due, outside of any notion of haVing earned it through anything but 
symbollc'service'). 
The use of ' the past' has sometlmes necessitated the blatant alteratlon of research 
findings in order to malntaln an untalnted version. In 1984, for example, a copy of the 
revised draft. of the text of the KwaZulu Monuments Councll publlcatlon FIght Us In 
the Open (Laband, 1985) was submitted for comment to dr Oscar Dhlomo, then 
KwaZulu mlnlster of educatlon and culture and Inkatha secretary general. Dhlomo 
responded by pointing to two obJectlons to the text. both of them involvlng 'Prime 
Minlster (to Cetshwayo) Mnyamana Buthelezl', Mangosuthu Buthelez1's 
great-grandfather and an essentlalllnk in the prominent polltlcal role Buthelezl claims 
Within the 'Zulu natlon'. As one of Buthelez1's approved biographers wrote: 
This same Mnyamana. C~hwayo's prlme mlnlster, was the 
great-grandfather of Gatsha Buthelez1, and it was largely owtng to hlm 
that the royal line in Zululand was preserved as a un1fylng force in the 
history of the Zulu people ... as Mnyamana brought exceptlonal 
diplomacy and strategy to bear In preservlng the Klngdom of 
Zululand, so in more recent years has his great-grandson had to 
follow a slm1lar course (Temkin. 1976: 11). 
~e first objection Dhlomo raised was to Cetshwayo's narrative, as recorded, which 
'gives the impression', wrote Dhlomo, 'that Prime Mlnlster Mnyamana Buthelezl 
dellvered the KIng (Cetshwayo, in 1879) to Sir Garnet Wolseley', Dhlomo said that the 
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impression 'Is clearly unacceptable as It will cause a lot of con1l1ct among the Zulus'. 
He continued: 
"You will surely understand that many Zulu people who will read the 
manuscript will not appreciate the sclentiftc fact that this Is a mere 
record of the testimony of historlcal witnesses. They will take the 
tesUmony as gospel truth' (quoted in Forsyth, 1989:appendix B). 
The editors obJJged, and Laband's book (1985:37) does not contain those llnes. 
The second objection was to evidence taken down that some warriors fighting against 
the British In 1879 complained of poor generalship by Mnyamana. Laband quallfled 
the evidence by saying. In the or1g1nal: 'Whatever the truth In these accusation •. :. 
However. this was not enough and Dhlomo wrote that 'ThIs allegation will also have 
serious implications'. It too was removed. Whether there was evidence for these 
suggestions or whether these were simply perceptions did not matter to Dhlomo. 'The 
past' Is most often not about accuracy or historical credib1l1ty. but about function in 
the present. 'More important than the past Itself. therefore. Is its bearing upon cultural 
atutudes In the present'. saldO"Edward Said (1994:18). 
'Kfn,do.- and regional base 
In her study of the uprlslng by Bambatha and his followers In Natal In 1906. Shula 
Marks wrote of a short period of resistance against the centralis1ng authority of 
colonialism: 
In the fortres&-l1ke mountains and forests of Nkandla. on the 
southern border of Zululand. he I Bambatha) began to bulld up an 
army of reslBtance. •. In the Nkandla. Bambatha. Joined by a number 
of prominent ehlefs. conducted guer1lla warfare against the white 
troops for nearly a month, making use of (Zulu klng] Dinuzulu's 
name as h1B authOrity and ustng also the war-cry and war-badge of 
the Zulu kings (Marks. 1970:xv-xv1). 
Nearly nine decades later the rejection of a central authority Is continuing. Within that 
resistance Zulu ethnlc1ty continues to play the major role In mob1l1sation. A 
newspaper article captured some of the continuities: 
'Wherever there Is a Zulu. he or she must be made aware that the 
ftnal expression of Zulu respect for my own leadershlp and my own 
llne of descent must be expressed In Zulu national pride in the way 
people vote in elections and referendums: he (Buthelez1) sald. 
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'If we fa1l1n mak1ng the people aware of what has taken place In the 
past and what is happening now, the ANC w1ll finally succeed In 
smashing Zulu pride In who we are and where we come from.' 
Whatever else happened. reglonalism would be entrenched as 
lmportant in the new South Mrtca. Dr Buthelez1 maintained (Dally 
News. 24 Mar 92). 
These two extracts. and the warning by Michael Massing, writing in 1987. of the 
'Savlmbi option'. encapsulated probable future scenarios for the poUticiaed ethnic11¥ 
of Buthelezl and his followers (Massing. 1987:22). Events since 1987. when Massing 
wrote. have largely removed, from the South Mrtcan context. the extremes of what 
Jonas SaVlmbi ach1eved in Angola: there Is no longer the direct support from the 
South African state for either SaVlmbl or Buthelez1; the USA would never consider the 
aid that it gave SaVlmbl to be suppUed to the IFP in the case of KZN revolt: the 
southern African context bas changed; democratlc electlons within South Africa. no 
matter how flawed. have set in place mechanisms to be used in resolVing differences. 
thereby remOYtng much of the sympathy Buthelezl would previously have enjoyed in 
relatlon to the apartheid state. 
However. a struggle over reglonal power has been fought in a brutal and bloody 
fashion during the decade since 1985. This struggle has continued on a dally basis 
since the April 1994 election. often with slmllar Violence and bitter recr1m1natlons. 
The legacy of that struggle. in the context of continuing intense leadership antagonism, 
wlll (at the m1cr~level) prove to be very difficult. if not lmposs1ble. to resolve. 
Apparently the least problematic aspect was the inevitable reglonalisatlon of a future 
South Africa • all parties at CODESA ascribed to some form of reglonaUsm, even 
though the" Inkatha Freedom Party, the Freedom Front and the Democratic Party were 
the strongest advocates of federalism or even confederalism. The NP tempered Its calls 
as the process unfolded. It was also ineVitable that such a system as was established 
under the Interlm ConsUtution would serve as the vehicle through which Buthelezl 
would attempt. as far as was possible. to create the 'Indaba KwaZulu/Natal' enVisaged 
and so Vigorously pursued in 1986 and 1987. The reglonalisatlon that bas been 
created bas not solved the question of the amount of power that the nine new 
provinces would have, under the Interim Constltutlon or within the new coDSUtutlon 
in the process of being drafted since early-I 995. That bas essentially been the issue of 
contestatlon since 1990 (Mare, 1994a). 
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If open political competition - marked by the right and the abl11ty to hold meetings, to 
d1ssem1nate ideas, to organise, and to differ - was to accompany such 
decentraUsatlon, it would allow both nationally-directed polltlcs and various strands 
of 'Zuluness', and ethnlc and other identities within a common arena to dilute the 
exclusive cla1ms of Inkatha. Twenty percent of the regtonal population (raclallsed as 
Whites, Indians, and a small number of coloureds) Is tmmed1ately excluded from 
potent1al membership of the Zulu ethnic identity, before a stngle shot had been Bred 
over clalmB to a stngle cultural or polltlcal allegtance of those who llve In Natal. 
'Zuluness', as with any ethnic appeal, is both inclusive and slmultaneously exclusive. 
However, there was always the real1ty as well as the potential, and even probabl11ty -
taking into consideration the extreme ideological claims to exclusive representation by 
Buthelezi and Inkatha within the construct of the 'Zulu nation' on the one hand. and a 
history of antl-democratlc practice and abuse of the prlnclple of democratic resolution 
of dtfferences from all positions on the polltlcal spectrum. on the other - of another 
version of decentraUsation in Natal and KwaZulu. This KwaZulu-Natal, if the reflection 
of support (or rather the lack of total or overwhelming support) for Butheleziln the 
elections was In any way close to accurate, will mean that only ongoing destablllsation 
will allow contlnued effective (if undemocratic) control. This situation has not been 
just of Inkatha's making. Polltlcal contestation in the regton has had llttle history of 
democratic procedures or acceptance of results and decisions. The intolerance, as 
well as need for settlement (even if reconcl11atlon seems very far oft) of the scars of 
murders. disruption. eviction. and so on, will make resolution extremely d1ftlcult, even 
under conditions when the k1lllngs have stopped. 
This sltuaUon has meant that the structures set up under apartheid in KwaZulu will 
contlnue to hold sway. Those structures, including chlefship and a regtonal pollce 
force. conslstlng In large part of the present KwaZulu pollee, were bullt up during the 
1980a with an assault in mind - whether to lead it or repel it is at issue. but probably 
both. Control over both these institutions, therefore. becomes of primary lmportance. 
whether by the ANC or by the IFP. 'Tradltlon' has remalned the anU-democratic 
battleground in the 19908 (see Mare, 1992: 1994), a 'tradition' that Is seated Within 
the regton (whether the province or the 'kingdom') and Within the polltlcised ethnlc 
construct of 'the Zulu nation'. Inkatha was active in constructing its version of an 
ethnlc1sed regton from its formation, but especially during the 198Os. A dellberate 
decislon had been taken by the Inkatha central commlttee to consolldate regtonally 
(Forsyth and Mare, 1992: Mare, 1993: and above). 
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Researcher Colleen McCaul found. in interviews she conducted in 1983. that the total 
overlap between the bantustan and the ethniC project was by design. She was told by 
Inkatha regional organlser DaVid Masomi that each KwaZulu cabinet m1n1ster was a 
'project captain'. but '" ... tt·s not just a project as seen through the eyes of Pretoria. It's 
a project which Is accepted as a starttng point. llterally. to ach1eve the alms and 
objectives oflnkatha"' (McCaul. 1983:14). Another Inkatha offictal attached to the 
Inkatha InsUtute (itself funded in part by the KwaZulu government). told McCaul that 
..,nkatha llves on the KwaZulu government. It supplles a base. a platform for Inkatha 
to operate in a deprived community. It cannot survive on membership fees alone"'. 
Confronted from 1990 with an unbanned ANC the ethnic mobilisation strand within 
the Inkatha strategy has. if anything. increased. Buthelezl and other Inkatha leaders . 
took the eJrtreme step of l1nklng even such discredited or controverstalinsUtutions as 
the bantuatan (KwaZulu in this case). migrant labour single-sex hostels. and chiefs' 
authority. to the "Zulu nation'. Consolldatlon against a new enemy was called for. As 
the king said graphically in 1990: 
Sadly. traglcally even. there are some in South Africa who just do not 
understand the deptl.1 of commltment of Zulu to Zulu. They do not 
understand that when you insult one Zulu. you insult every Zulu. 
They do not understand that when you insult KwaZulu as such. every 
Zulu ts tnsulted and every Zulu worthy of the name wlll stand up and 
say enough is enough (as. 23 Sep 90). 
When the ANC and COSATU called for the dismantllng of KwaZulu as a political 
structure and the scrapping of the KwaZulu poUee foree. in a campaign that included 
newspaper advertisemen,ts to which the king was responding in the speech quoted 
above. Buthelez1 tmmediately reacted by saytng that It was an attack on the 'Zulu 
nation' and on the king. He claimed that all Zulus were aflronted: 
I hope that the Zulu people whatever their poUtical aftUlations wlll 
real1se that the ANC campaJgn of vtllftcation Is no longer just agalnst 
me and Inkatha but also against the Zulu people as Zulu people .•. 
KwaZulu ls not a construct of apartheid and this ls known even by a 
primary school chlld who knows the outline of Zulu hlstory (8S. 9 
Aug 90). 
The ANC and COSATU had made a blunder In Its selective appeal for the 
dlsbandment of the bantustans during the negotiations process. It appeared that the 
good relations with coup leader general Bantu Holomlsa. governtng the Transkel 
(whlch served as the ANC's 'Uberated zone' during this period). and ~th some other 
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bantustan leaders, exempted them from the ANCts attack directed at these 
fundamental pillars of apartheid. The bantustans were only formally disbanded when 
the loterim consUtuUon came into effect. In the meantime Buthelezi and the king were 
lo a poslUon to present the ANCts move as selecUve moral1ty. opportunlst poUtics, and 
an attack on the 'Zulu nation'. 
Group boundaries are deflned and confirmed by the acUons and atUtudes of 
'outslders'. The existence of an 'other' displaying hostll1ty accentuates ldenUUes 
(espec1ally lo lts poUUcally mobilised form). Hostel dwellers intervlewed lo 1990-91 
confirmed this process: 
'I only started Jolnlng Inkatha last year because of the Violence. 
Otherwise I wasn't interested. I Joined because they said if you were a 
Zulu, you were Inkatha. •. All Zulus who Uve in the hostel were 
classlfted as Inkatha and were killed' (quoted in Segal, 1991:23). 
In this case the lntervlewee had no problem With being a Zulu Without being a member 
of Inkatha. until the decision was forced on him. This is slm1lar to the space that 
Buthelezlleft all Zulu-speakers when Inkatha was formed in 1975, and he said that 
there could be acUve and passive members. It was only later that the choice was 
forced upon every Zulu-speaker by Inkatha. 
Several ofthoae interviewed lo Segal's study did, however. deny that the Violence was 
organlsaUonally-Unlted at all, but that it was ethnic con1l1ct that broke out on the 
Wltwatersrand In 1990 - between Xhosas and Zulus. Segal commented: 
What we have Witnessed In the current Violence ls thus the 
crystall1saUon, and comtng to the fore, at a point of crisis, of one 
particular set of coexisting ldentities. In this instance, It is the 
underlying ethnic fault lines which have become manifest (1991 :27). 
In May 1991 a SA Hostel Dwellers Association was launched lo Natal. This move 
followed the call by the ANC and clVic organisaUons that the government's agreement 
to start the process of both upgrading hostels and as far as possible converting them 
loto famlly units be implemented. The hostels had once more come under fire during 
the Violence whlch, on the east Rand, centrally involved hostel residents who were lo 
many cases Zulus and/or lnkatha supporters. The launch was attended by 'a chanting 
crowd of spear-Wielding Zulus', who were told by KwaZulu cabinet minister BV 
Ndlovu that 'the ANC was seeking confrontaUon With Zulu people by call1ng for the 
end to the system' of male mtgrancy (Dally News, 23 May 91 ). 
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Slmllarly Inkatha has used the formation of the ANC-allgned Congress of Traditional 
Leaders of SA (CONTRALESA) to conftnn that it served as the defender of Zulu 
tradltionalleadership - the chiefs. In 1990 Buthelez1 warned the amakhost of 
KwaZulu that an onslaught would be launch~ agatnst them. They had to use tradition 
and thelr role as heads of tribal courts to restst the attacks. He raised the possibility 
of formtng age groups ('It Is In age groups that earUer Zulu Reglments were 
organlsed .•• Let those who are free to be mobilised as moving task forces for the 
defence of the people be mobilised'), and asked that there be a 'KwaZulu answer to 
tayt-tayt poUtics. Let there be the old dances and the old songs which lnsplred courage 
and valour In the hearts of the warriors of the past' (SS, 4 May 92). The defence of 
Inkatha'. version of Zuluness was, not surprislngly, sUll a mascullne cultural 
enterprise, both In terms of the agents and the methods appealed to. 
As argued earUer, Inkatha was, In part. formed to secure the regtonal base that was 
essentialln the Inkatha strategy of working 'In the system', as a platform to launch 
Into national poUtics. It was formed to secure the base through poUtical structures 
and agents, and through the Ideology of the 'Zulu nation'. In the early days of the 
existence of Inkatha that regtonal base was a fairly unproblematic part of Its strategy. 
In the second phase, during the 1980s, regtonal consoUdation was seen as a defensive 
step towards a national role. With the De Klerk government and the revltallsation of 
the prospect of strong regtonal government ('Indaba'-style), it seemed that the Inkatha 
rhetoric about evolutionary change was to be given a large boost. However, the costs of 
working wlthln the system, and the extremes of cooperation with and integration Into 
the apartheid state structures to defend privlleges and power that had become 
lnextrlcably tied to the bantustan and to poUticlsed ethniclty, were waiting to be 
exposed and counted. That moment arrived with the on-going revelations of the extent 
that Inkatha had become part of a 'counter-insurgencY strategy. This Involvement 
went beyond even the 'normal' Integration demanded of participants In apartheid 
(such as poUctng of regional populations and general deflection of discontent away 
from the central state). Inkatha had chosen to cooperate with the most Vicious agents 
With1n the "total strategy' set In place by PW Botha (see Mare, 1991). 
It Is lronlc, In retrospect. that the 200 Inkatha members selected to be trained In 
CapriViln northern Namibia. should have been there when Journaltst Michael Massing 
was In South Mrica. lntervlewtng Buthelezl. Masstng described Buthelezt's 
anti-communism, 'tribal appeals to soUdify his ethnic and regtonal bases', his travels 
to and warm relationship With free enterprise-supporting western Europe, USA and 
Israel, and the way In which Inkatha members were being armed. Massing 'was struck 
by Its growtng slmllar1ties to UNITA' (1987). It seems that the National party 
government was also struck by the potential offered by the slmllarttles. 
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The third phase. dating from the unbanning of the ANC. and even more 80 from the 
expoe6a of Inkatha tnvolvement with Military IntelUgence and the SAP's secur11y pollce. 
marked the acceptance by Buthelez1 and his advisers that regional consolldation. and 
with It extreme ethnic consolldation. had to become an end In itself. The mobll1sation 
~f the 'Zulu nation'. to a certain extent. had to cut the tie with what was now (since 
1991) the Inkatha Freedom party (lFP). It did this for two reasons: the IFP. as a par1y 
open to all 'races', and asplrlng to national relevance, could not claim to be 
representing the 'Zulu nation' without alienating non-Zulus. The National party Itself 
had to undergo a long process of conversion to escape the restrictions of being the 
polltically-orga»lsed form of Mrlkaner etbn1clty and exclusively-white power. The 
second reason 18 that for wider mobll1satlon, ostensibly of the Zulu ethnic Identi1y 
without politically organised form, the king had to be brought to centre stage. ThIs 
return to the 1975 position was not possible through Inkatha when It was clear on a 
wide scale since 1983 that It represented only some of the Zulu-speakers. 
Why Is a 'Zulu renatssance', beyond Inkatha but withln KwaZulu. necessary to this 
project of regional consolldation In Its various phases, even after the elections? There 
are several reaaons: It 18 a mobll1stng Ideology that does not threaten the class 
Interests and aspirations of the petty capitaUst leadership and support of Inkatha; It 
gave and gtves greater legttlmacy to the strategy of working through 'tribal' structures, 
80 necessary for control and organising at a local level, and for armed assault: It 
bolsters the chlefs Ideologically in a situation where they have llttle material basis of 
author11y other than naked repression or corrupt manipulation of favours: It allows 
Buthelezl (and the king, until mld-I994) to offer a supposedly d1sc1pUned 
'constituency': It 18 essent1al to the task of malntalnlng a regtonal base to have clout in 
a future federal South Africa; It Is an essential aspect of the personallegttlmation of 
Buthelezl (and of the king, if Zwel1thln1 or another occupant of the throne could be 
brought back tnto the fold). As can be seen each of these open out Into a separate 
range of symbols and Inventions. What they all had and have In common though Is to 
advance the polltical power of, 1n1tlally. the Inkatha movement as the organised form 
of Zulu ethn1c11y. and now a 'Zulu nation' to be consolldated under Buthelez1, and 
with the structures and agents that had served 80 well under the bantustan order. 
My argument should not be read as though the mobilisers of ethnicl1y during the 
19708 and 1980& merely 'SWitched on' or 'created', out of nothing, a Zulu ethnic 
identity. That was certalnly not the case. The soc1alldentity was there, located In a 
~egtonal history of consolldation, conquest and colonlal1sm, but not as a politically 
mobilised and organisationally exclusive group, nor with a defined set of symbols and 
attributes. Bowman's ( 1994) argument in quallfylng Benedict Anderson's claims about 
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the central role of the print media in creating the natlonalist tmagtned communlty. 1s 
relevant here: 
The reader does not. ...• 'find' a natlonal1dentlty through lmagln1ng a 
s1multanelty of thousands (or mllllons) of others who are reading the 
same text at the same time. Instead a natlonalldentlty Is constltuted 
by discovering a set of concerns he or she 'recogntzes' as hls or her 
own within a text or texts (1994:141. emphases added). 
The task of mass mobilisatlon was speclfic in Its forms under the very new conditlons 
of 19708 industrlallsed apartheid South Africa. The soclal disruptlon of apartheid. 
and the stmultaneous creatlon and favourlng of ethnlc polltlcs and etbnlc enclaves. 
ultimately allowed free rein to those who were wlll1ng to participate in the structures 
Without rocking the boat too much. In KwaZulu, as in all the bantustans, those who 
benefited most from the 'etbnlc curtains'. were the traders and a new petty bourgeoisie 
in the top echelons of the civU service. 
The IFP. the elections and ethnic moblUsatioD 
A brlef comment on the strategy followed by Inkatha and, more speclftcally. by 
Buthelez1. indicates that the dlrectlon of the past two decades was followed into the 
199OsAfor fuller dlscusslon see Mare and Hamllton, 1994: Hamllton and Mare, 1994: 
Mare. 1995: Harber and Ludman (eds), 1994: Friedman and Atkinson (eds). 1994). 
The announ~ent of the unbannlng by president FW de Klerk of resistance polltlcal 
organlsatlons on 2 February 1990 came at a most inopportune time for Inkatha. A 
delay of several years duratlon before the government formally engaged in dlscusslons 
around the Indaba constltutlon had ended less than a year earller. High-powered 
delegatlons from Inkatha and the government had been meeting in 1989 to dlscuss the 
relevance of this document. the culmlnation of Inkatha's attempts to forge a reglonal 
structure that was envisaged as having the potentlal to be the first state in a future 
federal South Africa (see, for example, debate In Roberts and How.e (eds); also Forsyth 
and Mare, 1992). The February 1990 address changed that. apparently lrrevocably. 
Negotlatlons about South Africa's future had now shifted to natlonal solutlons, 
acceptable to parties that had a much Wlder constltuency than that of Inkatha. 
At the end of 1991 the new negotlating forum, reflecting the changed,polltlcal context. 
met. The Conventlon for a Democratlc South Afrlca (eODESA) recon~ened in May 
1992, without . Buthe1ezl but With the IFP. The 'tradltlonal prlme mlnlster' to the Zulu 
236 
king did not attend In protest againSt the refusal of full participatory rights to the Zulu 
monarchy. The stop-start formal process continued until the lead-up to the elecUons, . 
set for 27 AprU 1994. In June 1993 the IFP also Withdrew in protest at the setting of 
the elecUon date through the controversial 'sufficient consensus' rullng. The IFP 
argued that what It amounted to was that the ANC and the NP unfalrly constituted 
'sufficient consensus' Within the negoUatlng forum, excluding the party. 
What Buthelezl's approach was durlng this period, With the staunch support of king 
Goodwtll, was to argue for a special posItlon for the 'Zulu klngdom', baaed on 'the 
past' of a package around the noUon of 'tradlUon'. Within the discourse of'tradlUon' 
there were aeveral elements: the king as symbol of the unity and the conUDulty of the 
Zulu 'naUon': a 'kingdom'. over the precise borders ofwhlcb there was some dispute: 
a 'prlme mlnlster' (Buthelezl): a government (the KLA was now being 'laundered' of Its 
apartheid llnks and presented as the government of the Zulu people): and amakhosi 
(see Mare and Hamllton, 1994). 
Historlan Jeff Guy commented on the use being made of hlstory Wlthln the clalms to a 
legttlmacy-bestow1ng past. in this case on the borders of the 'klngclom': 
Zulu naUonallsts Wlll emphasize the expanslonlst mUltary aspects. 
Those supporting a more broadly based South Africanlsm w1ll 
emphasize the restricted side of Zulu rule, and the dlvlslons wlthln 
the kingdom. In fact It is my feellng that these complex. but 
emoUonally charged, historical debates are being raised at this 
moment not to make the past clearer, but to make the present more 
obscure (Sunday TrtbWle, 20 Feb 1994, emphasis added). 
Wblle the effect might have been to make 'the present more obscure', as a further 
compUcaUng factor in the extremely tense and Violent transiUonal period, that was not 
Buthelez1's intention. I have argued that the purpose is to present a 'past' that cannot 
be challenged, towards whlch all ethnlc mob1l1sers strive. Buthelezl's call for the 
restoraUon of a 'Zulu kingdom' was to appeal to the common-sense of the subjects (in 
both senses of the word) of this kingdom. to posit the 'kingdom' as the ~bol of what 
is good, what exists, and what is possible (Therbom, 1980), wlthln the 'Zulu naUon'. 
It was appropriate that king GoodWlll should issue the most extreme version of 
recogniUon of the 'klngclom', when in early-l994 he called for the posslble secession of 
the regton. IntemaUonal mediaUon was called for, but aborted: a meeUng took place 
in a game reserve to attempt to resolve the Issue of the IFP's parUclpaUon (which had 
now again been Unked to the position of Buthelez1 and the klng): and parUclpaUon 
was gained a week before voung took place. . 
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At the Skukuza game reserve meeting on 8 April 1994 the ANC offered Zwellth1nl 
most of what Buthelez1 had made of the kings role within 'the past' (the ANC wrote of 
'the lnstltutlon of the Royal House of kwaZulu and its royal head, Hls Majesty the 
K1ng'). However, the ANC's agreement did not enVisage any executive powers either 
(except those constitutionally provlded 'together with the Royal Court. as determined 
by Zulu custom and tradition', which might have been an early indication that the ANC 
had taken control of this institution). The king would exercise 'ceremonial and 
traditional powers', open the provlnclallegtslature, and would have 'his dIgnlty 
restored'. There were two lmportant exceptions to the relatIVe powerlessness, namely 
the 'authority to instal all chiefs', and to adjudicate In cases of dispute over succession 
of chiefs (ANC, 1994), both very lmportant as already argued. 
The k1ng's 'presentation' to this Skukuza meeting makes for interesting reading in the 
Ught of events that were to follow a few months later (aS, 8 Apr 94). He stressed that 
it was not bis person that was important. but the 'institution of the Monarchy'; he 
referred to Buthelez1 as his cousin and 'Prime Mlnl8ter'; and attacked CONTRALESA 
leader Phathek1le HolOmlsa and ANC leaders for 'lnsulttng' him: 
A Zulu KIng is not just another black leader who should be 
approachable by just anybody. When your lieutenants either sought to 
see me themselves, or sought an audience with me for you IMandelaJ, 
they did not understand that the way to the Monarch has necessarUy 
to go through the protocol of making arrangements through my Prime 
Minlster, the Prince of KwaPhlndangene IButheleziJ. 
The protocol route demanded by the king here was the same as that voiced by 
Buthelezl and KZN premier Dr Frank Mdlalose a few months later around the 
Invitation lssued to president Mandela to attend Shaka Day celebrations, but now 
rejected by the king and by the ANC. 
The ANe's offer to Buthelezi and the klng was spumed. One reason may well have 
been that the offer that the movement made was too speclftc, for when the IFP did 
enter the elections it was on the basis of a much less detaUed document 
(Memorandum, 1994) which simply stated: 
The underSigned parties (IFP/KwaZulu government, ANC and the SA 
govemment/NPJ agree to recognise and protect the lnstitutlon. status 
and role of the constitutional position of the King of the Zulu and the 
Kingdom of KwaZulu. which institutions shall be provlded for In the 
Provincial Constitution of KwaZulu/Natallmmediately after the 
holding of the said elections; 
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and, lmportantly, referred all 'outstanding Issues with respect of the King of the 
Zulus ... (to) international mediation which will commence as soon as possible after 
the said elections'. 
After the election the king. open to a new set of lnfiuences, agreed to a new 'Royal 
CouncU·. wblch represented the interests largely of the ANC. This councU rejected 
Buthelezl as 'traditional prlme mlnlster', clalmed control over the c1uds. and asked 
that both the monarchy and chiefs be paid through Pretorla (in the 8 Apr1l document 
the ANC had itself suggested that the king be paid through the provincial government). 
Buthelezl. and the chiefs (whose overwhelming maJorl1¥ support he stlll has). again 
hinted that while they support the 'institution of the Monarchy'. they feel that the king. 
because of his advisers. had betrayed the Institution. 
The details are not at Issue in this study. What is lmportant is that once again there 
was. and remalns, intense contestation over what content there should be to polltically 
mobilised Identities. and what (and. therefore. whose) 'past' should serve to 1~t1mate 
these Identities and the poUtical (and gendered) power that Is at stake. There has not 
been a relaxation of debate around Identities. On the contrary. elements wlthln the 
ANC seem to be figbUng the battle with equal rtgldi1¥ and vigour. Under such 
conditions Violence has not abated (Mare. 1995a). 
Conclusion 
What are the lmpUcations of the material presented as well as the argument In this 
chapter? There are several major points, both general and of speclftc relevance: the 
materlal serves to illustrate the poUtical mobWsation of a soclalldenti1¥. namely 
ethnlcl1¥: this mobilisation has only been successful to the extent that it resonated 
wlth an existing soclalldenti1¥. For many thousands of people in the r~on such 
mobilisation meant being 'carried out of the Isolation of indlvldual experlence into a 
collectiVe phenomenon which the discourse articulates in national (or ethnic) terms' 
(Bowman. 1994: 141). The domtnant 'tradition' with which Inkatha operated Is that of 
Zulu ethnlcl1¥ (an ethnic popul1sm) which depended in content (at least in part). 
structures and agents on the apartheid system (without Wishing to argue that Inkatha 
supported the apartheid system). The regional poUtical direction (even If It be to 
demand representation in a central authorl1¥ for a 'Zulu nation'. and not slmply 
semi-independence in the Natal-KwaZulu region) to which Inkatha leaders have 
committed the movement. also increasingly depended on the same consolldation of an 
ethnic and regtonal base. 
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Historically the two elements of the 'Zulu' tradition have been there to be manipulated 
by UIl8Crupulous leaders in order to consolidate regional power. What John Saul 
(1979) has called 'certain historically resonant Ideologtes' were present. The choice. or 
post facto Justlftcat10n of a strategy of 'working within the system'. when the system Is 
apartheid. reinforced that tradition. It was also reinforced by the clear fallure of an 
alternaUve tradlUon wlthin Inkatba. symbolised through reference to the ANC's 
'foundlng fathers' and aimed at naUonal popular poliUcalintelVenUon. to make any 
lmpact - a fallure mustrated by the reglonaJ/ethnic membership of Inkatba. and the 
break With the ANC (albeit a 'mission in exile' as Inkatha called the movement) that 
occurred in 1979/80, as well as by the 1994 electlon results. 
The ethnic excluslvlsm of Buthelezl and other Inkatha leadership had led to what 
amounted to a 'racially' excluslve posltlon at the same time. They argued that It Is not 
possible for people of other 'races' to understand either the culture or pllgbt of Zulus 
or of black Africans generally. In 1987 one of the Inkatha leaders involved in the 
confllct in Pietennarltzburg attacked the UDF in the folowtng terms: "The worst Is that 
the UDF has a diverse membership, whereas Inkatha has only black people lie 
Africans) as Its members. The UDF just doesn't care what Is happenlng in the 
townah1ps', said Ben Jele (Natal Wttness, 17 Aug 87). The same sentiments had been 
expressed about the ANC in the KwaZulu LegislatlVe Assembly, many years before. 
Recently chalrperson of the Inkatha Youth Brigade. Musa Zondi. responded to an 
article by Durban lawyer. Peter Rutsch. on the manner in which amakhosl had been 
incorporated into structures of control: 
••• he dlsplayed very clearly the usual arrogance of some 'know-all' 
whltes who apparently even in thts day and age have not satlsfted 
their appetltles to tnsult and belittle African culture, whlch in any 
case. Is to them mere 'kaftlr culture whlch Is not clvlllsed enough' to 
warrant any respect by them (Dally News, 23 Jan 95). 
The "tradlUons' made use of by Inkatha served both to mobWse and to control. They 
moblllaeclinto the Inkatha movement as the organtsauonal representatlon of 'Zulu' 
and of 'natlonall1beratlon'; they mobll1sed into structures of control; they'mobWsed 
agalnst opposlUon from within and from Without (to consolidate against class 
opponents. and to crush internal dissent as was the case with the klng and With other 
defectors); they mobWsed into a 'constltuency' that was then offered as a bargalnlng 
pawn in naUonal power play (eg at CODESA); they mobWsed to adv~ce directly 
speclflc class interests (such as the 8fgresslve pro-capltallst stance of Inkatha). 
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The presence of the past in this region of South Africa owes much to a speclftc set of 
symbols and history of resistance, but It also owes to the manner in which the 
apartheid pollcy had frozen and distorted th~ past. This duality has meant that the 
modem manipulators of an ethnic and regional past simultaneously landed up with 
the essentially diVisive aspects of pol1tlC1sed etbntC1ty in South Africa. In their 'attempt 
to establish conunutty with a suttable historlcal past' and to provide social cohesion 
through 'conventions of behaviour', Inkatha leaders were slmultaneously saddled with 
what the apartheid state had made of history in the country. The state's soc1al cement 
was polltlC1sed ethn1city. It was also that for Buthelezl and those around him. 
In the media. from social commentators and academtcs, in the common-sense of 
publ1c th1nk1ng. the idea of etbntcity as a basic and largely fixed pol1tica1identity ltves 
on. The 'Zulu' case serves to reinforce thIs perceptlon, whether these be popularly 
held or reflect the views of power holders and upholders. In the December 1987 
judgment in the case of Mangosuthu Gathsha Buthelezt us Dents Becket and Saga 
Press (642/87), for example, where Buthelezl sued the Frontline magazine for 
defamatlon (a case he won) Justice Howard found that . 
some allowance must surely be made for the fact that much of his 
(Buthe1ezl's) rhetoric (the 'be1l1cose passages' threatentng violence to 
people who, for example muddled his name) is designed to appeal to 
the instincts of the warrior nation he leads, the overriding object 
being the pol1tl~y important one of preserving his constituency 
(emphasis added). 
The discussion of the content and method of constitutlon of a pol1Ucal version of the 
'Zulu naUon' supports the argument that etbntC1ty should not be pol1Ucally prlv1leged, 
for it Is in freezing a changlng, 'created' and contested ldentlty, that con1l1ct l1es. 
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CBAPTERFIVE 
AN APPROACH TO DIVERSITY 
Introduction 
There Is nothlng mysUcal and holy about ethnic ldenUUes • they are 80Clal 
construcUons. and. therefore. demand analysis. exposure and demysUflcaUon as Is the 
case With any social phenomenon. The central theme of this thesiS Is the dlsUDcUon 
between ethnlcl~ as flexible and reflexive soclalldentl~. in flux and always in process 
of being constructed and reconstructed. and ethnlcl~ as rtgtdly defined and 
embedded Within Its poUtlcally mobl1lsed form. The same approach and dlsUDction 
could be appUed to other soclalldentltles that lend themselves to mobllisation as well. 
The case study effectively illustrates the latter aspect. 
Giddens (1992:20) argued that the 
••• refiexlvl~ of modernl~ has to be d1stlngulshed from the reflexive 
monltorlng of action intrlnslc to all human actlvl~. Modernlty's 
refiexlvl~ refers to the suscepUbU1~ of most aspects of soclal actlvl~. 
and material relations With nature. to chronlc revislon in the llght of 
new infonnaUon or knOWledge. 
'Chronlc revision' may be something in which to revel. such as noted by Eva Hoffman 
in her engrossing story of her own slow integraUon lnto American llfe In the 1960& 
and 19708. She dlscusses ldenU~ formatlon durtng the 19608. a process from which 
she herself felt allenated. as follows: 
The more I come to know about America. the more I have the d1zzytng 
sensaUon that I am a quantum part1cle trylng to locate myself Within a 
swirl of atoms. How much UIDe and energy I'll have to spend just 
clalmlng an ordinary place for myself1 And how much more ftgw1ng 
out what that place mlght be. where on earth I rnlgbt find a suitable 
spot that feels like It's mine. and from which I can calmly observe the 
world. 'There are no such places anymore.' my fellow student informs 
me. "This Is a 8Ocle~ in which you are who you thlnk you are. Nobody 
gives you your ldenti~ here. you have to reinvent yourself every day.' 
He Is right. I suspect. but I can't figure out how this Is done. YouJust 
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say what you are and everyone believes you? That seems like a 
confidence trick to me. and not one I think I can pull off. St1ll. 
somehow. invent myself I must. But how do I choose from identlty 
optlons avallable all around me? I feel. once again. as I did when 
facing those ten brands of toothpaste· faint from excess. paralyzed by 
choice (Hoffman. 1989:160). 
Hoffman. c::Us-located at age 13 from Poland to Canada, Jewish but with no 
commitment to what it means in terms of rituals and expectatlons. finds herself 
searcblng for an identity in the USA of the 1960s with this extreme fluidity amongst 
the youth generation of the t1rne. and she does it in a second language. finding herself 
'lost in translation': 'I've come at the wrong moment. for in the midst of all this 
swlrllng and fragmenting movement. the very notlon of outside and inside is as quaint 
as the NeoplatonlC model of the universe' (1989: 196). She remarks that her age cohort 
in the USA managed to avoid the strictures of place and positlon. usually brought 
about. for example. through marriage and career. for longer than most. trying to 
redefine both identitles and social relatlons. However. the full range of opportunitles 
for. and offered by 'revlslon· •. Jlre neither welcomed nor avallable to all (as Hoffman's 
own alienation from the identltarlan fluidity indicates). Scott Lash also noted the 
limits of reflexiVity ••. Here I shall argue first that modem subjectlVity 
should be understood as only capable of subsuming a llmlted amount 
of content under the reflexive self. That is. that there is an excess of 
'Dux'. 'contingency'. 'dlfTerence·. 'complexity'. that cannot be subsumed 
under the reflexive subject. The impllcatlon of this is that 
contradiCtion and contingency are far more characteristic of the 
predicament of the contemporary self than any of the above theorists 
I Giddens. Beck. etc) of reflexiVity will allow (1993:3-4. emphasis 
added). 
In the case of ethnicity, discussed here, the moblllsatlon. and responses to such 
moblllsatlon. of this identlty restricts the degree of identitarlan chOice frequently 
available. Eva Hoffman's friend's 'nobody gives you your identity here' is not true for 
many people in a world of confiictual and moblllsed identitles. 
The reflexive process means that ·(s)elf-idenUty •••.• is not something that is just 
gtven •.•.• but something that has to be routinely created and sustalned in the reflexive 
aCtiVities of the indiVidual' (Giddens, 1992:52). Even maintenance of a soclalidenuty 
is a reflexive process, even though it feels as if the 'choice' is made only once. 
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Arguing for the (quaWled) fiutdi1y of identl1y formation. or identi1y as reflexive 
process. does not imply an attempt to deny the potency of such association with social 
identities. nor an essential aspect of contlnul1y that gives a measure of certaln1y. On 
the contrary, I have argued that 1t 1s the strength of ethnic 1dentities that makes them 
such 'obVious' material to which moblllsers can resort In this conclus1on I wish to 
suggest ways in which to construct an approach to ethniclqr that could potentially 
avo1d the extremes of 1dentitarlan confilct, especially withln South Africa. The essence 
of the argument Ues in the separation between poUtic1sed ethnic1ty and ethnlclty as 
soclal1dentiqr. and attempts to strengthen the latter and weaken the former. It Is the 
former that denies, or attempts to deny, ~e reflexive process: that freezes 1dentity by 
gtvlng 1t the blessing of 'the past': that denies optlons: that creates the fear of the 
threatening other. 
In their perceptlve analysl8 of ethnic consciousness among Basotho miners, and the 
manner in which the making of ethniclty is not only part of the project of employers, 
but also of the miners themselves, Guy and Thabane (1988) wrote that: 
(T)he existence of ethnic prejudice, rivalry and Violence amo~t 
Africans 18 one fact of Southern African llfe • and to analyse 1t in the 
hope of explalnlng 1t. 1s a prerequis1te to gaining greater control over 
It. 
The suggestions in this thesis must be read In that light. as pointers to the way in 
which to conceptuallse ethnlclty • a soclal1dentlty that shapes people's behaViour 
through the way that they (we) interpret the world around us. What I did in the second 
and third chapters was to clarlfy the concepts to be used In this thesis, especlally that 
of ethniclqr. In addition the essentlal dlstlnction between ethnicl1y as story of everyday 
Ufe, and ethnlclty mobUlsed was introduced and then employed. Those clarlftcat10ns 
and distinctions are necessary to developing a theory of a democratlc poUtlcs that 18 
relevant to recognltlon of dltference • 'explalnlng It' Is indeed, in Guy and ~e's 
words, 'a prerequtste to galnlng greater control over It'. Ethnlcity can meet real needs 
of securlqr, or It can tip 1nsecur1qr into excluslvlst mobUlsation and fuel antagoniStic 
organlsatlonal forms and vlolence. It can express soclal and cultural variety wlthln a 
larger commonall1y, or It can serve to demarcate Insular social grouptngs fearful of 
their personal and group existence. However, ethnicl1y Is but one of several powerful 
soclalldentities that fulfll such roles. and should not be uniquely elevated wlthln the 
debate around a poUtlcs of dlvers1ty. Much of my argument has a wider valldlqr. 
Ethnic soclalldentitles and ethnic group consciousness have now been tled 
inextriCably to Violence in South Mrtca (as In many cases elsewhere). From the racism 
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of colonial conquest and slavery, and the years of raclalised segregation in the 'Union' 
of South Africa. to the 'sacred history' of the Afrikaner volk With its clalms to a 
God-given mission in Africa. to the Vicious consequences of the Implementation of a 
polley based on separation (apartheid), poUtically moblllsed and represslvely enforced 
'group polltics' has meant Violence in struggles for political and economic power. 
There has been very llttle chance to de-emphasise ethnic group or raclallsed 
consclousness in the polltical field. Such a de-emphasis need not - in fact. should not -
entall the denlal of cultural varle1y, ethnic consciousness, or the need for a range of 
soclalidentities to find recognition (such as through reUgtous tolerance). but to shift 
these lnto a democratic pracUce Within the relationships that consUtute society as a 
whole (an encompassing soclal structure. capable of acknowledgtng and welcoming 
varte1y - 'that lmpossible object' (Laclau. 1990:89-92)). 
Such an approach wt1l demand enormous change in approach to the issue of social 
identiUes. and not slmply a gllb commltment to a stngle 'nation'. 'a united democratic 
South Africa'. 'non-sexism'. the 'rainbow nation'. or 'many cultures' (see Mare, 1 995a). 
The problem of etbnlcl1y. which involves the manner in which It has been mobilised 
for confilctual pollUcs. 18 not gOing to be solved through a centrallsed parllament 
palUdng leglslat1on. or through a concern for 'tradiUons' - whether justlfted from Withln 
the apparently contradictory frameworks of post-modernism or of an ahistorlcal 
Mrican1sm. Nelther wlllit be solved through denial of the phenomenon. or a bellef that 
once 'apartheid has been abollshed' such confilct wt1l also disappear. The latter may 
be necessary. but is certalnly not sufficient. 
The example (dlacussed in chapter four) of labelllng people as 'traltors'in the process 
of pollUcal mobWsaUon, people who would otherWise meet every requlrement of 
shared ethnlc soclalldenU1;Y except polltical allegiance, illustrates the intolerance of 
varte1y and change. 
In KwaZulu-Natal, for example, It wtll have to be recognlsed, and accepted. that there 
Is not. and cannot be. a stngle or even poLLttcaUy domlnant version of being Zulu. cast 
in false clarl1;y and stngular rlgtdi1;y. The varle1;y of biographical, as well as 
movement-llnked, stories of Zuluness must be brought to the fore. VarlaUons of a 
common, and proud, Zulu ethnic soclalldenU1;y, expressed Withln trade unions, 
squatter settlements, local cultural groups, cholrs and mUSic groups. schools. 
re1Jgtous movements, and 80 on, should collectively and in dlalogue, define what that 
IdenU1;y Is at the end of the twenUeth century. 
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In the rest of this concluding chapter I will pull together some of the Ideas explicitly 
referred to or implicit In the discussion and presentation of material above. and then 
suggest pointers to a way forward. First. I return to the Issue of politlclsed ethnlclty. 
its relationship to strattficatlon through which It Is often reinforced. and the political 
answer offered through the 'natlon-bullding' approach; second. the alternatives. 
located within a more fluld approach to social Identities Is examined. The suggestions 
contained In this chapter cannot possibly be developed adequately In this thesis. but 
they can be located In the arguments above and referred to the case study material. 
and are being and wtll be extended In future work. 
Politicised etbnicity 
In this thesis I have argued for the theoretical. emp1r1cal and practical separation of 
ethniclty as social identity from ethnicity as pol1t1cal mobilisation. manipulation and 
fanning of deeply-felt sentiments. In the previous chapter a specific discourse of such 
mobilisation and the organisational vehicle was examined In some detail and some of 
the effects and implications h1gbllgbted. The first point. then. is to insist that ethnic 
groups are not constitutionally rewarded for their group Identity. in the same way that 
no other social identity is. nor should be. so rewarded. Obviously. ethnic group 
membership should not be the grounds for political discrtm1natlon either. 
The ethnic social identities held by individuals should. however. be visibly protected 
in a bUl of rights that bases itself on Individual rights and freedoms. Rel1gtous groups. 
language groups. and so on. are not rewarded with a special group political 
dispensation. other than the right of Individuals to practice. assoclate and to be 
protected in these areas. Wby. therefore. should an equlvalent identity· ethniclty • 
claim such reward? Only because. for some politicians. ethniclty serves within an 
avaUable mobillstng strategy of conSiderable strength. which also tends to hide class 
and gender divisions that mtght otherwise derail the projects of such cultural brokers 
and entrepreneurs; and because ethnic political recognition has been Internationally 
privileged within the model for constituting the 'politlcal' within a world system. 
namely the nation-state. 
Campbell (1992:5) points out in her study of the behaviour of South Mrican township 
youth. that '(t)he starting point of the project was that Individuals were faced with a 
range of possible behaviours in their everyday lives. The choices the Individuals would 
make from this range would be influenced by his or her group membership'. There 
are. thus. 'choices of behaviour avatlable to subjects' (Campbell. 1992:6. emphasis 
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added). In times of rapid social change 'Individuals w1ll be faced With the task of 
reconstruct1ng or refashioning existing recipes (for llvlngJ' (Campbell, 1992:51). 
However, I would add, individuals Will also be faced With the option of consolidating 
ex1stlng or new certainties in times of social crlsis (see Hayes and Mare. 1992). 
These cholces are shaped by perceptiDns of appropriateness which, in the case of 
poUticlsed ethnlClty, are to a very large extent formed Within the publlc arena. by 
pubUc c:llacoursea of mobWsatlon - local, natlonal and lnternational. In other words, if 
the soclal conditions, the relationships of power and access to resources have been 
defined, or are definable In terms of ethnlcity, ethnic mobWsation ls likely to occur 
and wtll serve as the ldeological grounding for appropriate behaviour: what exists, 
what ls good, and what ls possible Will be read against the background of the ethnic 
story - In this case a publlc story because the resources are publlc resources. In the 
study of8OClalldentities ofa number of people in Umlazl (Campbell et al. 1993) the 
ethnic ldentlty resources at lssue were perceived to reside in the 'personal' sphere 
(even though they were shared aspects of a socia1ldentity), and their loss or 
conttnuaUon were part of a personal story of soclal relatlons, Within biographies (or 
btographtcal accounts or experlences of soctalldentlties). 
The strength of ethniClty lles in the density of articulation of elements of the soclal 
ldenUty. each With lts own common-sense legitimation (the range of shared cultural 
attrlbutes such as language: a shared 'past' that cannot be dented because It has been: 
and the perception from Within and confirmed from Without. of group boundarles 
amongst other groups). The common-sense of cultural elements lncluded in the 
moblllsatton (because they are part of everyday llfe). such as agreement on a 'past', on 
'tradiUon'. on the obvious group boundaries against others slmllarly defined as ethnic, 
but the other ethnic, stressing dltrerence rather than commonallty of 'type' of ldenUty 
(whether these be territorlal, language, religion, common oppresslon or 
dlscrlmlnaUon, or any comblnation of these), all serve to strengthen tbls soclal 
ldenUty. In other words. the confllctual percepUon Is that 'our language' ls under 
threat. rather than 'our language' is valued in the same way that language ls valued 
Within other slmllar soclal groups. 
The existence ofpolltlclsed ethnicity in this country, as there has been and remains In 
many parts of the world, wtll continue to bedevil the best intentlons of alternatlVe 
construcUons of soclal reallty. Cultural Variety, in Us polt.tfctsedJorm, has in addiUon 
come to fall under a broad lntolerance of the pollUcal opponent. the pollUcal other. An 
essenUal step towards resolVing confl1ct in which ethniclty moUvates lmmedlate 
behavlour and. in which ethniclty is presented as essentially pol1ticalls that It wtll have 
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to be 'sensitively and self-consciously depollt1cised in as many areas as possible and 
severed from the arena of compet1tion for resources, prlvUege. power and rights In 
future transformation' (Mare. 1987). I argued this position In 1987ln connection with 
the Indaba proposals that were constructed on notions of rewarding ethnictt¥ defined 
euphemistically as 'background groups'. The Indaba cOnstitution not only took ethnic 
groups as a valid political construct. but then prlvUeged ethnic groups within the 
proposed constitution. 
The Indaba constitution with its powerful second house. with its racialised and ethnic 
representation, remained the model that was referred to by both the Natlonal Part¥ 
and Inkatha Freedom Part¥ at negot1ations in the early·l990s • the NP because of the 
enormous dlftlcult¥ it had In shaking off its past of group-based political structurtng. 
and the IFP because 'group' and, especially, regional solutions would allow it a say 
beyond its clear absence of national strength. The NP,lronlcally, gradually had to 
distance itself from the excesses of ethnlc division during the negotiations. because as 
a political party it had the potential of Wider mobUlsation (especially amongst coloured 
people). The Inkatha Freedom Part¥, on the other hand, continued to exist essentially 
as an ethnic party (albeit on national platforms) through a reglonallsed ethnic 
appendage (the 'Zulu kingdom') (see Hamllton and Mare, 1994). 
In an article In the Afi1kaans..language Sunday paper Rapport, professor Wlllem de 
Klerk of RAU wrote an article under the heading 'Bring so bymelauu wat bymelauu 
hoorf (13 May 90). He was referring to a slogan used by the first apartheid prime 
m1nister, dr OF Malan • 'Bring together that which belongs together out of inner 
conviction'. Malan's call was for the continued mob1llsation of an Afrikaner ethnic 
group to consolidate political (and economic) power. De Klerk wanted to gtve new 
content to this slogan· 'Kultureel sal etnisttett altyd sprmglewendlg bly. maar as 'n 
prlrnire polttleke magsfnstrument Is dtt morsdood' ('Culturally ethnlcit¥ w1ll always 
remain very much alive, but as a primary politicallnstrument of power it 18 stone 
dead'). He was clearly being prescripUve rather than descriptive, for ethniclt¥ as a 
'primary Instrument of political power' remains allve In South Mrlca as Indlcated In 
the case study above. However, what he proposed Is to be taken serlously • the 
depoliticisation of ethniclt¥. as first step. The next step is. of course, to ensure that the 
economic, and other relations within the country are structured In such a way that 
ethnlc mobilisation is deprived of Its pol1tlCistng spark: where ethnic mobilisation is 
not perceived as the situationally appropriate response. 
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Polltfd8ed etIuaIcftJI and .ocfal .trat{ftcatfDn: 
Poltttctsed ethniclty arlses. in large part. out of frustrated economic and poUtical goals 
and out of soclalinsecurlty more generally. such as durlng times of rapid soclal and 
poUtical change. Not only Is the task in each case to examlne how a population Is 
available for an ethnic response to material dlscrtmlnation (such as in the Inkatha 
case study). but also to examine whose goals are frustrated and whose ambitions 
advanced through ethnic mobilisation. The factors that make a population available 
for ethnic Identl1J formation (to be historically located). on the one hand. and the 
lmmed1ate sparks that gtve a confl1ctual edge and makes available the poUticlsatlon of 
ethnlcl1J. on the other. are not the same. However. to instst on such a clear dlstinction 
may. in many cases. have more of a necessary analytical value ~ an actual cllstance. 
In other words. the mobilisatory gathering together of the elements that constitute 
ethnicl1J thrlves on tension and confl1ct. on crisiS and exclusion. on exploitation and 
discrlmlnation. or on tnsensltive centralisation (whether poUtical. admlnlstraUve. or 
Ideologlcal). 
However. It Is notJUBt the avallability of ethniclty for mobWsatory purposes that 
concerns me. Ethnic IdenUftcation does sometimes serve as the basis of. or 
JuaUftcatlon for dlscr1mlnatory treatment. Therefore. the issue of redresslng 
straUftcat10n based on socially constructed groups remalns one of the strongest 
arguments for formal recognition of 'groups'. of a range of descriptions. Social 
Identities. in thls case ethniclty.lt Is argued, need to be poUticlsed and gtven 'special' 
reoognltion Wlthln democratic representation to overcome dlscrlmlnation and 
straUftcat1on. Some of the most extreme versions of each in the cases of ethniclty. 
class and gender have been. respectiVely. ethnic-nationallst separatism and eecesslon. 
the 'dlctatorshlp of the proletariat'. and gender quotas in parUamentary 
representation. Aftlrmatlve action Is another much-debated response that not only 
alms to correct group dlscrtmlnation. but is necessarlly based. at least In the 
medlum-term. on a recognition of groups (see. for example. the essay by Charles 
Taylor. in Gutman (ed). 1992:40). 
The debate around tbls Issue can be and is often located in the tenslon between the 
individual as basis of poUtical (democratic) practice through the notion of cltlzenship 
(and the development of the Idea of the 'individual'). on the one hand. and. on the 
other. dlscrlmlnation agalnst social groups (on the basis of class. gender. etbnlcity. 
'race'. rellglon). Is the recognition of individual I1ghts lnsufDclent to prevent or correct 
a range of exploitative or dlSCrlmlnatory practices? Does the notion of the cltlzen (or 
'even of the Indlvldual) carry within It the seeds of discrlmlnation. or at the very least 
of lnsensttivl~ 
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The organised campalgns and demands of these social groups. such as through trade 
unions and the fem1n1st movement in its many forms. as well as the collapse of the 
previous certaintles of Universal values and beliefs (so that we exist withln one aspect 
of the conditlon of what has now been broadly called post-modemlsm). have been the 
major contributing factors within an effective challenge to the seemJ.ng common-sense 
of equallV through citizenship. The ideas presented below. through referring 
spec1flcally to two authors. can only touch on this extensively-debated subject. 
Tom Bottomore (1993) raised the distlnction between 'democracy as ~ of 
government' and 'democracy in societY to illustrate the l1m1tatlons of liberal 
democracy to solve the problems of class strat1fled societles. Arule PhUllps. slm1larly. 
dissects the fallacy of the gender 'neutrality' of the notlons of Citizenship and of the 
lndlvldual (1991). PhUllps stated her position. and that held by Bottomore. as follows: 
Democracy cannot stand above sexual (and classl difference but has 
to be reconceptual1zed with difference ftrmly 10 mind. One obvious 
Implicatlon is that democracy must deal With us not just as 
lndlvlduals but groups (1991 :149). 
Neither of these authors argue that the gains of the vote. based on citizenship. should 
be dented and Ignored. and PhUllps admits that the 'vision of a desirable future is 10 
fact unfashionably androgynous ... But it is one thing to wish for this future and quite 
another to wish" differences away' (1991: 151). However. both authors polnt to the 
Inadequacy of democratlc poliCies based on equal Citizenship unless other corrective 
measures are taken at the same tlme. 
There are two responses to the dilemma Ident1fled by the authors. Bottomore sees the 
solution lying 10 the d1rection of changes In society 10 general (or 'socletal poliey'. the 
term he borrows from Ferge (1979)): Phillips in incorporating ~groups' into formal 
political processes - through the 'practlces of what is known as consociatlonal 
democracy •• : (1991:153). 
Bottomore (1993) argues for the separation of the processes of democracy as ~ of 
government (where equallty of citizenship serves as the unit of particlpatlon. say in 
electlons). and democracy Within society (where the inequalltles of class shape l1fe 
chances and affect the apparent equality of cltizenship). Here. in a book first 
published in 1979. he draws attention to the '"progressive" feature of capitallsm·. 
namely of seeing 'the human betng as a citizen - as a member of a community 
endowed With equal civl1 and political rights'. However. Bottomore contrasts that With 
the 'development of social classes on the basis of Industrial capltallsm' (1993: 12. 13). 
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In a later essay, that responds to the optimism ofTH Marshall's 1949 contribution on 
'CitiZenship and social class', Bottomore uses Marshall's useful distinction between, . 
and comments on the uneven development of three aspects of Citizenship, namely the 
clvll, polltlcal and social rights that It came to encompass (Marshall and Bottomore, 
1992:90), as his own starting point (also see Bottomore, 1993:26-27). Bottomore 
notes the slow growth of both civil and pol1tlcal rights (in many west European 
countries adult franchise was only achieved well into the twentieth century), but takes 
speclflc lssue with soctalrights, which potent1ally most fundamentally aiJect the 
soc1etallnequalltles estabUshed by class (and also by discrtmlnatlon agalnst other 
groups) (Bottomore, 1993:27: 1992:91). 
This is not the place to enter in any depth into the debates around CitiZenship, other 
than to acknowledge that the detail of what I suggest as a possible approach to 
accommodating ethnlcl1¥ is partly to be located within this debate. Further, we must 
note that Bottomore. without giVing a clear answer (his last chapter Is entitled 'A kind 
of conclU8lon'), admits that while 'the confilct between classes and clase-based parties 
st1ll plays a leading role as a prlncipal source of pollcles intended to llmlt or extend 
the scope of human rights' (which In Bottomore's argument encompasses all the rights 
TH Marshall noted as lncluded wlthln the notion of citiZenship), 
It is clear that in the late twentieth century other kinds of inequalltles 
besides those of class - .between rich and poor countries, between the 
sexes, between ethnic groups - have become more sallent than they 
were, even if in some cases they can be related, 10 part. to the 
lnequalltles engendered by capltaIlsm (Bottomore, 1992:89). 
Their sallence can In large measure be ascribed to the struggles of new soc1al 
movements and the demands for a much Wider notion of democracy than that 
struggled for wlthln class organlsatlons and perspectives, whether It be of the 
bourgeoisie or of the working class, or within notions of the equall1¥ of 10dividual 
voters. 
Here is a clear acceptance of the need to go beyond the 'equall1¥' of 10dividuals lmplled 
by the notion of clttzenship as conferring poltttcal rights. The argument Is that 
inequalltles (materlal or of power) cannot be solved under 'equallty' ofindlvldual 
Citizenship, because It is group inequallty that Is at Issue (of women, classes, ethnic 
groups, 'races'). Bottomore (1992:70-71) noted how the 'New Right'ls degradlngthe 
rights won within clttzenship over the centurles, especially the social rlghts that 
provlded TH Marshall with so much optimism after World War II, the period of the 
growth of the welfare state. Is It. however, the correct response to introduce group 
251 
entitlement or 'quotas' into democracy? Even those who seem to argue for such a 
position, such as Ph11l1ps, agree that such a measure should be temporary 
( 1991: 153-4), and that It does not resolve the dlftlculty of dec1d1ng which 'groups' 
deserve such favourable treatment (for example, 1991:155) or on what basts. but that 
at the same time these problems should not stand in the way of 'argutng for sexual (or 
any other kind of) equallty' (1991 : 154). 
Bobbio (1987:4) refers to Carlo RosseU's conunents in the 19208 on Uberal and 
soclallst democracy and, whlle rejecting the crude dlsttnctlon Rossell drew between 
the two. concludes that '(m)ore lasttng •... , Is the conclusion he drew from bis analysis, 
namely. that Marxists had insuffiCiently addressed the problem of individual 
autonomy. essent1al to Uberallsm. Whllst Marxism correctly regarded social and 
economic reform as necessary precondltlons for the liberation of the proletariat. this 
in itself dld not guarantee the clvU Uberties of individuals after the revolution'. As Ron 
Aronson wrote: 
The fact 18 that free elect1ons, free discUSSion. the protection of civU 
rights and civU Uberties - the political components of the 
bourgeoilHiemocrat1c or liberal herltage - are vital accomplishments 
of all humanity, and not just a facade for conceallng class power 
(1991:15. emphasis added). 
I would argue that the answer rather l1es: 
IJ First. in relnst1tutlng, malntalnlng and extending the full rtghts under citizensbip 
(see Bottomore. 1992:72), and certainly not gtving up on the gains of democratic 
struggles ewer centuries. including the not1on of the free. and equal, indlvidual; 
IJ Second. in disentangUng, as far as is possible, the dltJerent loci of discr1m1natlon -
some are materlal. to be addressed through extendlng the social rtghts of citizen-
shlp; others are ideological, and cannot be altered through the legal process but 
have to be tackled over a long period and in a range of ways; 
IJ Third, in extending and protecting aspects of clvU soc1ety which alter not only 
status perceptions but also the power relat10ns Within society (for example. educa-
tional content that neither Ignores, nor 'freezes' cultural dlverslty into the exot1c at-
tributed to the other. but stresses difference as well as change and flexlbWty. and 
that notes interact10n between what appears to be closed particularities (see Said. 
1994:21; Hall. 1992); protects and extends the civU right of free association. for 
here lies the capacity to ensure societal equality - through pressure group act1v1t1es 
of women's organisat1ons. trade unions. and even ethnic associat1ons. Here the 
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problem of which groups need special attention can be resolved lo a democratic 
way (also see Aronson, 1991: 17); 
o Fourth. through malntalnlng proportlonal·representation voting as it ensures and 
allows speclftc lnterests representation within parUament: 
o FIfth. In extending levels of declslon·maklng 'downwards' so that 'local' (more spe. 
clftc) lnterests can have an effect lo both allowtng for and reflecting diversity. 
·NatIon-buJJdlng' the CULSWer?: 
The soclal organisation that has most often been burdened with, and cla1med for 
itself. the task of bullding an over·arching SOCial Identity In South Africa ls the 
'national Uberation movement', now the unbanned ANC and majority party In the 
Government of National Unity. I argue that such a poUtical hegemonlstng project is not 
where the solution to a poUtics of diversity lies, or not only from where we should 
await solutions to the problem of apparently lnevitable societal fragmentation. Rather. 
the most important tasks Ue In developing elvU society In Its broadest sense (as noted 
In polnt three lmmediately above), alloWing and bulldlng structures and lnteractions 
between people that are not lmmediately related to centralised state authority and 
power. but that can reinforce the perception and experience that routes and structures 
of lnftuence have been created, and that issues that relate to soclalidentiUes are being 
responded to In a meanlngful way. 
However, it 1s. and wUl not be an easy task. Unity within 'the struggle' had both a 
positiVe and a negative dimension. Aronson noted that '(t)o the degree that the tron lid 
imposed by the apartheid state has been lifted, the shared resistance to repression 
can no longer serve to unite people', but that one of the greatest achievements of the 
anti·apartheid organisations 'was slmply staying united' (1991 :7). On the negatiVe 
side. With the centralisation of repression In the raclal. class and gender exclusivity of 
the apartheid state. the ideological representation of opposition and rejection was 
frequently shaped as an unproblematic mtrror image of that state, a reslstance that 
had to be defined only In Its 'obvious' opposition to what was lnternationally 
recognlsed as evtl. alloWing Uttle dissent and lndependence In "the struggle'. A clear 
case In polOt has been the perception of the purpose of the organisation of women that 
prevalled at times. namely as a necessary adjunct to the primary. and separable. task 
of national Uberation (see. for example, Hasstm, 1991). Furthermore, a high level of 
lntolerance that also marked the period before the elections continues to mark the 
post·apartheid period (see Rapport. 4 Dec 94; Sunday TrIbune. 4 Dec 94. for reports 
on an extensive study commissioned by the Institute for Democratic Alternatives for 
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South Africa: see Muller and Cloete's (1993) discussion of this issue in relat10n to 
intellectuals). How then to deal With the post-apartheid fragmentat1on, or the 
continuaUon of the apartheid divlsions. as the old I1gldit1es collapse? 
Wblle arguing for the legitimate growth of organlsat1ons and representat10n of 
interests In the spheres outside of a 'single mind' I am not implying that these are in 
some way apollUca1. On the contrary, it is to argue for the legitimat10n of a range of 
activlt1es directed towards power and representat10n of ideas and demands (but 
outside of formal protect1on of selected 'minor1t1es' and 'groups') Within the pollt1ca1 
rtgbts of ctttzenshtp. 
Vall (l989:1x) Introduced the book he edited on tribalism In southern Africa with an 
anecdote set In Malawi. He referred to the post-independence (1964) polley of 
'bulldlng the nat1on' and the way in which this had 'evaporated' within four years. Are 
we to repeat th1a 'polltically correct' approach unquestionlngly in South Africa? What 
do we mean by'nation-bullding'? There are divergent Views of what it might entail, but 
here I wtsb to focus on 'nation-building' as the Ideological construction of a nat10nal 
Ident11¥, conterminous with the total cit1zensblp of the nat1on-state. an over-archlng 
IdenU1¥ that either encompasses or supercedes other soclalidenUt1es at the polltical 
level (for a more extended discussion of 'nation-bullding', see Mare, 1995a). 
The most publlc advocacy of nation-building in South Africa bas been the energetic 
efforts of The ~tan editor Af!J!!ey Klaaste. The most thorough discusslon of the 
notion of 'nat1on-bullding' in South AfrIca has been that by Unlversl1¥ of Stellenbosch's 
professor Johan Degenaar (nd, 1991). 
Degenaar argues for an approach that distlngUlshes between what he calls 'Nat1on 
One' (or 'the concept of a nation based on the congruence of culture and power, of 
people and state') (nd, 1991 :2), where the most extreme version lay in Nazi Germany -
he quotes Hitler as having said that '(p)ol1Ucs have to cease in the national famUy'; and 
'Nation Two', referring to 'a multi-cultural situation In which the nation Is constituted 
by a common 10yal1¥ to a transcendent factor with regard to a particular ethnic 
culture' (nd, 1991 :7). 
Within approaches to the 'convergence of people and power' (Nat1on One) in South 
Afr1ca. Degenaar recognises four positions, depending on how many 'nations' are 
perceived to constitute the poll1¥ in the country: mult1-naUons, four-nations, 
two-nations, and one-nation theses (nd, 1991 :3). Degenaar argues that through the 
stated congruence between culture and power (whether It be'the excluslvlsm of 
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Afrikaner power or of Klaaste's version of 'nation-building), and within the 
'multi-cultural situation within South Africa, Nation One disquallfles Itself by 
excluding cltizens' (nd, 1991 :6). In other worcis' within this approach either the 
poUtical rights of some Citizens are curtailed, or some people are excluded from 
cltt.zenshlp (as was the case under apartheid). Although there are signs of such an 
approach in South Africa (the curtallment of the rights of clt1Zenshlp, In that 
llmltations are placed on aspects of individual rights, for example In a hierarchy of the 
previously dlacr1mlnated against. and against the 'ractally' privileged), these are likely 
to remain mlnor tendencies In the medium-term. 
Under the Nation Two approach Oegenaar provides four Unes to the question of a 
"transcendent culture' which can produce a 'transcendent nation': common, 
modernisation, soclallst and democratic cultures. He deftnes 'culture' rather loosely, 
In thls text. as 'the form ofUCe or the llfe-style ofa community' (nd, 1991:7), but we 
can read It as relevant to ethnlclty as used In thls thesis. Later he does discuss culture 
as being open to other lnfluences. 
A 'common culture' Is dangerous, according to Oegenaar, because there Is the 
tendency for a domlnant culture within a multi-cultural society to be lmpoaed as the 
transcendent culture, or to claim that a 'shared constltution' constitutes the nation -
he ralses a problem slmllar to that discussed above when he noted: 
The myth of a constitutional naUon (whlch protects Indivldual rights) 
does not. however, solve the problem of confUct between cultures In 
the same society. Competition on certaln Issues between communal 
cultures can be destructive of the Ideal of a constltutional nation, a 
state-nation or a clvlc state (nd, 1991 :8). 
The 'constitutional nation' approach seems to overlap with the suggestion that a 
'modernls8Uon culture' wlll transcend 'folk cultures' through the '"estabUshment of an 
anonymous.lmpersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomlzed Individuals"' 
(Degenaar, nd, 1991 :8, quoting Ernest Gellner). Thls approach also leaves the 
problem of what wlll happen to existing cultures, especially with the clear fallure of the 
Idea that modernisation overcomes divisive social groupings (see argument In chapter 
two). 
The same holds for the 'SOClallst culture view' where 'the working class' (or, even more 
speclflcally, the black working class) Is argued, 'through their objective Interests', to 
'have the Interests of all clt1Zens at heart' (nd, 1991 :9). In the South AfrIcan context 
Degenaar draws most directly on NevUle Alexander's Writing (1985) to illustrate thls 
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argument. Alexander does aclmowledge the d1fficuUy of both transcending and 
recognlslng cultural diversity. A redefinition of the relationship between sociaUsm and 
democracy. rejecting the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. or a necessary dominance of 
'working class culture'. is offered by Aronson (1991). referred to above. in his 
ai-gument that 'out ,of a commitment to the most democratic possible settlement. the 
issue of soc1al1sm's relevance will pose Itself all over again. and in a new way' 
(1991 :18). He. Aronson. does not offer clarity in this article on what It will mean. but 
argues that 'mf we are not sure precisely what it means. the mean1ng of democratic 
soc1allsm will have to be debated. created. described. and explored. in theory and 
practice' (1991 :20). 
Finally, the 'democratic culture View', which Degenaar writes is a 'theory of democracy 
according to which the democratisation of soclety by the state creates a loyalty to the 
state which can form the basis of nationhood' (nd, 1991:10). The deftnltion of 
democracy With which Degenaar works in this essay Is, I would argue (and see above), 
inadequate. It Is a deflnition that Is based nearly excluslvely on poUtical rights, With a 
reference to a blll of rights. However. he does say that what is necessary Within the 
process of creating the poUtical form of democracy is 'the need for the value 
infrastructure of democracy. Of prime importance in this context Is the cultiVation of a 
culture of tolerance of differences' (nd. 1991: 11; also see Bobbl0. 1987, and his 
argument for acceptance of the democrat1c 'rules of the game'). Degenaar selects 
'plurallst democracy' as that most suited to coplng With the demands of 
'nation-bullding', and then questions 'whether the concept of nation Is in any way the 
appropriate concept to use in this connection' (nd. 1991:12). He continues. and I 
would go some way With his argument: 
In one sense we can still speak of nation as the congruence of culture 
and power, but now culture has shifted from a communal culture to a 
democratic culture which has. as one of its main characterlstics. the 
accommodation of various communal cultures but limits them In 
terms oj the principles oj democracy. 
Pluralist democracy exposes the absolutist claim of the nationallst 
View of nation as a congruence of communal culture and power. The 
task cd democracy Is precisely to depoltticse communal culture in 
the sense that this culture does not claim sovereignty, that Is. the 
absolute power of the state. but relatiVises Itself on behalf of the 
constitution (emphases added). 
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It Is exactly the 'depoUtlc1slng of communal culture' that has been argued for here. 
However, It Is more than 'mutual respect' that Is necessary to ensure that ethniclty 
does not become the obvious form for poUtical competition and competition for 
matertal resources. It Is not sufficient. as Oegenaar writes, to claim that 'democracy 
can accommodate common Citizenship as well as communal Identities' (nd, 1991:14). 
and that '(1)nstead of the unity of a nation we should aim for the diversity of a 
democratic culture' (nd. 1991: 15). I have referred to PhllUps, who takes this Issue 
seriously as It manifests Itself In social straWlcation and h1ghly unequal power 
relations, and suggested a possible solutlon. Oegenaar's references to the ANC's 
apparent inflexible oppositional approach to ethniclty Is also beUed by more recent 
events, as well as by earUer positions (such as that argued for by Mzala. 1988, 
discussed In chapter four), which indicates either a cynical use of ethniclty under 
certain c1rcumstances, or a muddled approach that carrtes Its own dangers In the 
unexplored contradictions of unstated partial recognition (where the basis for 
selection Is not clear and debated). 
Patrlck Wrtgbt. too, Issued a warning against a process of creating a coherent national 
Identity, through excluslVlty, from the top: 
Let there Indeed be a greater expression of cultural partlcular1ty In 
this eoclety, but let It be artlculated according to democratic 
prlnclples and let It therefore also reflect a truly heterogeneous 
socfety rather than the unitary Image of a prtvtleged national Identity 
which bas been raised to the level of exclusive and normative essence 
(1985:255, emphasis orlglnal). 
ThIs struggle. for It Is not an event that arrtved 10 South AfrIca with the first elections, 
cannot only, or even predominantly, be waged by poUtical parties or the 'national 
llberatlon movement'. These organisations operate too directly 10 the field where 
poUtlc1sed ethniclty competes for space. rewards and members, and themselves often 
fall1oto the trap of countertng ethnic politics with ethnic poUtlcs. It Is too easy,1n the 
absence of a coherent pollcy on cultural diversity and with the collapse of the Wl1fYlng 
factor of 'the naUon' or, more commonly. 'the people', a construction that had been 
clearly and largely defined In Its opposition to an apartheid state, to conflate and 
denigrate poUtical organlsaUons either With an alternative ethnic IdenUty (the ANC Is 
Xhosa) or with an antagonism to, for example, a 'Zulu' IdenUty. That Is not a 
democracy of diverSity. 
Unless the values and goals and structures that were offered as alternatives to the 
apartheid state and system had been, and continue to be. clearly defined in their own 
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terms, whlch are not homogeneous, then they are In great danger of collapslng along 
With their reason for existence, apartheid Itself. An Interesttng parallel Is offered here . 
by the intense and at times emotional debate around 'cultural' (as In the narrower 
deftnltlon as art1st1c production) diversity, In part triggered by ANC actiVist Albie 
Sachs' call withln South Mrlca in February 1990 'that our members should be banned 
from saying that culture Is a weapon of struggle' for a perlod of five years (Sachs, 
1990:19; see De Kok and Press (eds), 1990, for contrlbutlons to the debate; for earller 
discussions on 'culture' see Campschreur and Olvendal (eds), 1989). Revlst1ng the 
'Sachs debate' may also give Indications of the potential stult1ftcatlon of the 
'obvlousness of the struggle' on artistic production, a llmltation referred to here in 
relation to the nation-buDding project. 
Renata Salecl wrote In connection with the collapse ofYugoslavla. that '(p)ast Ideology 
(in that country) had never used the concept of pluralism of oplnlons, Ideas or 
Interests; rather It had clung to the notion of unity at any prlce' (1993:208). However, 
this was not to last. and there came 
... a point where elements, which had unt1l then formed an Ideological 
structure. now achleved independence and began to function as 
'8oattng slgnlflers' aWaltlng new articulation. 
The new slgniflers could be an intolerance based on central power (the 
'Reconstruction and Development Programme' functions as this for some people in 
South AfrIca), or 'the nation' (especially Oegenaar's Nation One) enforced by a 
centrallsed state, or on vlolently confl1ctual ethnlclties. 
Journal1st Carmel Rlckard, In 1991, warned agatnst the 'ANC's Insistence on unity' 
that 'might be weakenlng It as a unlfylng force'. She referred to Dr OF Malan's call on 
an AfrIkaner ethnic Identity in the election of 1948 that placed the National Party in 
power and launched thls country Into the misery of apartheid for the next forty years, 
and commented that 'Malan's vlctory shows the danger of not havtng a polley which 
takes Into account those people who rally to the call of the volk' (Weekly MaU, 30 May 
91). One cannot slmply deny the Importance and effect of polltlclsed ethniclty because 
It runs counter to plans for national unity. Sensltivlty has to be shown towards those 
elements of cultural diverSity and the celebration of the past that could funCtion In 
ethnic moblllsatlon, at the same tlme guardlng as far as Is posslble aga1nst their 
manipulation into rtgtd polltlcal mobllisation. Do we deny culturally partlcu1arlst 
museums and 'ethnic' art a place in society If they acknowledge diverSity, to take a 
concrete example? Do we allow (and that means 'tolerate') poUtical parties to organise 
on the basts of ethnic groups? My argument has been that ethniclty should not be 
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privileged. but neither should it be granted a special status through prosecution or 
den1al. 
Robin Blackburn (1991). in a different context and concerned largely with economic 
planning. but with relevance to the broad principles di-awn here. presented an 
argument that central planning 'lacking general criteria. would necessarily foster 
lnterests of a spuriously "natural" character. such as those based on national or ethnic 
categories'. He later comments that '(w)hat is lmpUed 18 not a slngle mind Ito meet 
"soclal need and pubUc good") but institutions that wUl encourage a meetJ.ng of minds· 
( 1991 :208). A closed centralised system. also on the level of soc1alldentltles. 
presented as the obvious greatest good. does not bode well for the eradicatlon of 
poUtlc1sed ethnlcit¥. Rather. without the necessary instltutlons that w1ll open debate 
on diverslt¥. and organlsatlonal activlt¥ to support communal claims. and the space to 
engage in both general cultural and more spec11lc ethnic ldentltarlan confirmaUon. 
such centralisaUon w1ll foster divisions. There are enough conservatlve interests. both 
natlonallyand internatlonally. to gtve support to the 'Savtmbi opUon' (even Knot in its 
extensively miUtartsed form) not to feed it through providing the fuel of an unfounded. 
at this stage, and morally correct natlonalldenUt¥. 
Our task 18 to show that ethnic dtversit¥ can. at appropriate (te non-poUtlcally 
prescribed) levels be accommodated - in language poUcy, educaUonal systems. 
cultural recogniUon - museums, festivals. the media - and 80 forth. What is necessary 
i8 that various levels of rights be acknowledged and catered for: first. individual rights 
that are not only protected through common and equal citizenship and participaUon 
in formal poUUcal processes (such as casting a vote). but that are contained in a bill of 
rights. utiUslng and protecting the advances gatned through Uberal democracy: 
second, 'afDl1atlon' rights that allow the vartet¥ of 80clalldenUUes that provide the 
stories for our 80clal Uves to exist. flOurish. and change (tow not be frozen through the 
rtgldlUes of mobWsaUon): third. collective rights that allow and protect an organised 
response to discrtmlnaUon and exploitation (such as has been debated and granted to 
trade unions recently) (what Bottomore (1993). Bottomore and Marshall (1992). and 
PhllUpa (1991) argued for) (I thank Art Sltas for suggesttng this summary ordertng of 
the material). 
259 
Alternative group identities and 
alternatives to group identities 
It Is not suftlclent to say that ethnicity should not be rewarded pollt1cally. The range of 
alternatiVe group .ident1t1es and organisatlons that reflect other lnterests that are 
available need to be strengthened, with the self-conscious purpose of removtng 
etbnlclty as the (only) 'obvious' presence at this level of social representat1on. For 
example. women's organisat1ons, trade unlons. churches, sports bodles. and also local 
level democrat1c structures around housing. services. educat1on. all need to be drawn 
lnto the democratlc process. Secondly. the apparent clarlty of the presentaUon of 
group Ident1t1es needs to be unravelled into a 'complex pollt1cs 10fferlDgJ dlfferent and 
cbanglng posslblllt1es for alllances. affiliations and Ident1t1es ... • (Pettman. 1992:157)., 
Ironically. the defeat of apartheid may present us With (and has already given evidence 
00 contlnutng, or herald new flxed divisions, lncludlng those of ethniclty. Rachel 
Holmes (1993) pertlnently warned against the approach that argues for immutable 
cultural differences. 10 her case 10 the context of a discussion of presentat10ns of 
sexuallty 10 the Wlnnle Mandela kidnap trial: 
The homophobia of tlie Wlnnle Mandela Trlal should serve as a t1mely 
remlnder of the need to constantly challenge apartheid's logical fallure 
of fixed Ident1ties locked lnto unchangeable power relat1ons ... Such an 
argument (of an unhistorlcal claim of the absence of homosexuality 
from pre-colonlal 'black culture') can only be sustained by suggesting 
that It ls meantngful to talk of a hegemonic black culture or white 
culture. thus erasing the plurality of cultural forms existing 10 South 
Africa. an historlcal plurality which apartheid has constantly sought 
to repress and deny. Th~ Idea of colour-cod1ng sexuallty ls as 
ludicrous as the not1on of separate development Itself. It Is not 
homosexuality. but the insistence on fixed homelands of 'essential· 
singular racial and sexualldentlty which causes violence, sexual 
policing and the subsequent alienatlon of sexual plurality from the 
democratic process ( 1993: 14: see also the recent. 1995, attack on 
homo-sexuality by president Robert Mugabe, and his denial of such 
relat10nships Withln AfrIcan SOCiety: on an Afrlcan essent1allsm. see 
contrlbut1ons 10 Lemelle and Kelley (eds), 1991). 
Simllarly Edward Said (1994:xx1ll) has warned against the view of hermetically 
separated cultural spheres (nat1onal and ethnic. as well as 'racial'): 
In our Wish to make ourselves heard, we tend very often to forget that 
the world Is a crowded place. and that if everyone were to losist on 
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the radical purity or priority of one's own voice, all we would have 
would be the awful din of Wlendlng strife, and a bloody poUtical mess, 
the true horror of which is beginning to be perceptible here and there 
in the re-emergence of racist politics In Europe, the cacophony of 
debates over poUtical correctness and identity poUtics In the United 
States and -••. - the lntolerance of religlous prejudice and illusionary 
promises of Blsmarck1an despotism .... 
Within the argument I have advanced It Is easy to see how a s1mllar 'insistence on the 
fixed homelands' of ethnic identity, within the process of mobilisation, 'causes 
violence, (ethnic) poUclng, and the subsequent aUenatlon of (cultural) pluraUty from 
the democratic process'. Pettman ( 1992: 126) wrote that: 
Recognls1ng dl1ference without recognising aftlnlty or connections 
across category boWldarles can Wldermlne opportunities for alllances 
and for inclusive claim which may be necessary to effect stgnUlcant 
change ••• 
Cultures are not set. separated, or bOWlded by Impenetrable borders. 
The impact of lndustrlal1sation and urbanisation, the 
commodlflcatlon of relations, the dl1ferentiallncorporation of 
dl1ferent groups Within the labour market and the penetration of the 
lnstltutions of the state at all levels of civic culture, have placed people 
into C?mplex relations wl:th each other. 
DUrerence, as a prtnclple, can be dangerous to a poUtics of tolerance. DUrerence as a 
principle. that carries rewards, is a recipe for 'tlx1ng" what should be fluid. Harvey 
(1992:345), too, obllquely noted this danger: 'reproduction oj the social and symbolic 
order through the exploration of dlfTerence and "otherness" is all too evident in the 
cUmate ofpostmodernism' (emphasis added). Rather, we should simultaneously allow 
'hybrldlty' (Salman Rushdie and Stuart Hall's term. see Hall, 1992:310-4; and see 
Laclau, 1990) and change. 
Mary C Waters, after studying United States census returns and following these up 
with lntervlews, commented: 
••. people's belUif that ractal or ethnic categories are biologlcal, fixed 
attrtbutes of indlviduals does have an lnfluence on their ethnic 
identities. This popular understanding of ethn1ctty means that people 
behave as if It were an objective fact even when their own etbnlclty Is 
highly symbollc, This belle! that etbnlclty Is biologically based acts as 
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a constraint on the ethnic choices of some Americans. but there is 
nonetheless a range of latitude available in deciding how to identify 
oneself and whether to do so in ethnic terms (1990:18. emphasis 
ortglDal). 
Her study displays the great flexlblllty and the choices that are made in a society 
where ethnlcity may very well be the basis of discrtmlnation, but is not often a matter 
of life and death. Such flux occurs even when people were not themselves conscious 
that they were making a range of selections in employing ethnic identities. The choices 
became apparent in the recounting of ethnic identities in the interviews Waters 
conducted. 
This point needs to be expanded upon. Patrick Wright (1985:26), in the stlmulating 
book I have referred to already, wrote of the task of exam1nlng British conservative 
glortftcation of ·Uvtng in old countrY: 
Ifwe are to consider this Conservative nation carefully, It must surely 
be With a view to discovering other possible articulations of cultural 
parttcularlty, articulations which are respectful of the heterogeneity of 
contemporary society and also capable of maktng a coherent 
poltttcal principle of difference (emphasis added). 
He captures here two desirable movements within society: the first is to acknowledge 
the need for and make ·a coherent poUtical princlple of difference', whlle the second 
argues agatnst a 'priv1leged national Identity' which does not allow varlety. I have 
argued, through positing a dlfference between ethnic social Identities (Wrlgbt's 
'cultural particularlty') and the (frequently cynical) poUtical manipulation of such 
ethnic identities, that 'respect' Ues in removlng ethnic identities from poUtical reward 
and competition, and opening identities to change and contestation. The ·coherence' of 
a ·poUtical principle of dlfference' cannot Ue in relfylng difference, but in allowing 
difference the freedom for both expression and for change. 
Salman Rushdie, in a British Channel 4 television programme entitled 'Fin de Sieele: 
the end ofhlstory? (a five-part series shown between 28 January and 3 June 1992), 
With Stuart Hall and French phllosopher Alaln Flnklelkraut. said that he did not 
·accept any notion of pure cultures ... I did not experience the West only when I came to 
Britain'. Rushdie asked that we 'celebrate' the notion of·culturallmpurlty', and noted 
that the new only came from 'fusion and hybridisation'. 
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However, on the other hand, on this tight-rope it also demands a simultaneous 
commitment Within the field of the 'national' - the field that demands a level of poUtical 
coherence, the field of competition for resources - that ethnicity be 'taken seriously'. 
The celebration of 'Impure cultures' should not bUDd us to the fact that there are 
Cwrerent impurlties, and that most often people Uve With the perceptions of clear 
boundaries enclosing 'pure' and recognisable dlfference • the perceptions of 'biological' 
identities that Waters (1990) found. This is espec1al1y Important in the areas where 
cultural resources are at stake (the obvious being language, education, relJg1on), and 
where regional (and hence potentially ethnic or raciallsed) allocation of material 
welfare is decided· I have argued that ethnicity can easily be linked to region, to 
territory, where the effects of uneven development are felt and are open to 
(mls)lntefpret8tion lnto the ethnic field. After all, uneven development is a soclal 
phenomenon expressed on the regional plane Ut lnvolves people and their conditions 
of life). In South Africa the regional plane was for decades shaped in raciallsed and 
ethnlc terms (see Mare, 1995: Roblnson. 1990). The sedlmentation of place-bound 
identity was confirmed or laid during thls period, leaving the most unexpected 
continuities into a democratic South Mrlca. 
The direction of a solution? 
It is esaentlal that a clear response to ethnic diversity in South Africa be arttculated. It 
cannot be left simply to the parttclpants in the political field of constitution WrlUng. 
That field 18 already partly tainted for construcUve discussions of dlfference (certalnly 
that of ethnlclty, and even possibly that of class), and the exclusive or predominant 
location of such discussion there presupposes that the solution must be struggled for 
10 the realm of formal national poUtics. That is precisely what apartheid had made of 
ethnlclty, and that 18 where Inkatha leadership st1lllocates the struggle over 
'Zuluness'. At present there is Uttle sign that any coherent response 18 being 
fonnulated, or even that debate is being lnltiated. There are many slgna of the 
continuation of political confllct that directly and indirectly relates to dlfference, and 
not only around the Violence that in part flows from ethnicl1;y as crudely mobllised as 
10 KwaZulu-Natal. The issues of 'tradition' and 'traditional authority' 10 several 
provlnces, regional powers, border disputes, the oolkstaat, coloured, Nama and 
Grlqua identity, are just some of the tensiOns that exist. 
What Is 'cultural parttcular11;y ... articulated accordlng to democratic principles' 
'(Wrtght. 1985:255): what is a 'principle of diversity' that is not confilctual? Years after 
these conunents Patrick Wright again referred to this dUenuna. this time 10 a review of 
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Mordecai Rlehler's book on Quebec separatism: 
(Rlehler's story) ... provides a timely account of the foilles of trying to 
conjure polit1cs out of cultural roots. 
He has no alt.ernat1ve scenarios to offer Quebec, and readers will 
search his book in vain for thoughts on how democrat1c polit1cs might 
arrive at a more adequate accommodat1on of national and cultural 
diversity (Wright. 1992). 
I have already suggested several answers, abeit tentat1vely, for in this field little 
certalnty l8 posslble. Let me, in conclusion, pull them together. I do not for one 
moment wlsh to dlmlnlsh the probably insurmountable, at least in the short- and 
medium-term, obstacles Within the contemporary world marked by violently 
con1l1ctual parUcularlt1es, of 'enclave communit1es', In Stuart Hall's vivid descript10n 
In the televislon programme referred to above. In a way my argument Is addressed in 
the first place to South Africa. a society In violent. but nonetheless hopeful, soclal 
translt1on. reflecting both lnherited and new rtgldit1es, but also a large degree of flux 
and posslbll1ty. 
C The first 18 to maintain the distlnct10n between polit1clsed etbniclty and etbnlc so-
clalldent1t1es. Wblle those two are conflated in analysts. in the media. and in policy 
and const1tut1on-maklng there l8 no prospect of resolving confllct. With the near-ex-
elusive presentat10n In polit1cal thinking and contestat1on. in the media. and in 
every-day common-sense, of etbnlcity only 88 polltlcalident1ty comes an tmage of 
uncbangeabll1ty. of lnOextbll1ty and of exclusivity. 
As argued above. this approach of ma1ntalnlng a distinct10n between the two fields of 
the operation of ident1t1es depends on the continuous extension of democracy and the 
rights of cltlzensblp. 88 encompassing political. civil and social rlgbts. Bottomore 
located hls discussion of democracy specifically Within the conIDcts and constraints of 
class society. However. in referring to the work of Joseph Scbumpeter on democracy, 
he made a comment that has direct bearing on my argument here: 
What Scbumpeter (In his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy ) 
called the 'classical doctrine' of democracy ... conceives democracy 88 
a historical movement which alms constantly to extend the area 
Within which members of a society can govern themselves by 
participating fully and freely in the regulation of thelr collect1ve llfe 
( 1993:18). 
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To once more refer to the Hall. Rushdle. Flnklelkraut debate. they called for 'sharlng 
the world through public space'. through democracy. a space where dialogue takes 
place. where 'people quarrel. coll1de with each other .. :. a dialogue that Is 'unafraid'; a 
dialogue where all that Is excluded Is 'inCitement' (read. In my words. the excluston of 
crude antagon1Btlc politlclsatlon and rtgldlflcation of group Identities). Amy Gutman, 
In her discussion of the Issue of lim1ts on 'the legttlmate demands for political 
recogn1t1on ofparUcular cultures' (1992:5) and l1m1ts on free speech. suggested the 
need to d1stlngu1sh between 'toleration' and 'respect': 
Toleration extends to the widerst range of views, so long as they stop 
short of threats and other direct and discernible hanns to 
ind1v1duals. Respect Is far more dlscr1m1nattng. Although we need not 
agree with a position to respect it. we must understand It as reflecting 
a moral point ofvtew ... A multicultural soclety Is bound to include a 
wide range of such moral disagreements (as on legalizing abortion). 
which offers us the opportunity to defend our views before morally 
serious people with whom we disagree and thereby learn from our 
differences. In this way, we can make a virtue out of the necessity of 
our moral disagreements (1992:22). 
I argue that whlle acknowledg1ng that discrlmlnatlon and exploitation can be related to 
structural and group dynamics. this cannot be resolved through incorporating groups 
Into constitutional politics. Such prlvlleged political access freezes the deflnltlons of 
group identity propagated by the most powerful. and of the moment. 
IJ The second answer lies In extending the solidarities caused by. and addressing the 
material straUfication and practices of domination and exploitation assoc1ated with 
structural and structured divisions withln soclety. especially those of gender. class. 
ethnlcUY, and of 'race'. These solidarities must be debated and opposed Wlthln ~ 
etal movements that have an Identity and a space that Is not encompassed by the 
formal political processes, even though they wt11 most frequently be directed at 
those processes. The 'green' movement Is a very good case In polnt. where there 
have been few cases of succesful 'green' parties, but a large measure of success In 
flghttng environmental Issues and introducing environmental concerns Into formal 
political processes (Germany serves as an example). 
It is In addressing the structural hortzontallnterests In society, prtmarUy those of 
class, gender and 'race', and making that the fundamental task (overcoming class 
exploltatlon. poverty.lnequality, gender domination, and 'race' dtscrlmlnation). and 
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organtslng and appealing to people around the profound injustices of apartheid and 
the economic system It protected and advanced, and their aboUtion, that a way beyond 
the strength of ethniclty Ues. 
These tssues have a reality, even if they cannot compete With ethntclty as a mobilising 
package. and should not try to do so. When demands and commltments are made for 
certatn proportions of representatives to be women, this does not arise out of a 
gendered Identity but out of the straUfled position occupied by women in soctety. 
Stmllarly, class Identity (despite the attempts to advance a 'working class culture') 
does not ring with the same clarity as 'the past' in etbn1c mobilisation, does not exist 
pr1marlly on the symboUc level of cultural signs, Is shaped as a collectivity in the 
hidden (albelt brutally real) connection of labour. Nonetheless, the inequaUties, 
anti-<iemocratic practices and exclusions of a class-structured, a capltallst soclety, 
serve as a powerful rallylng point across the ethnic divide. In the case of 'race' It ls not 
as easy to draw the distinction between resistance to exploitation and poUticisation of 
Identity. The proxlmlty of 'race' to ethntc poUtical mobilisation has been noted. For 
this reason "race' may well serve to rtgldify the types of Identities that need to be 
dlluted. A corrective poUey based on unexam1ned notions of "race' contalns dangers of 
mirroring the old (apartheid) order, while class dlvlslons With1n raclaltsed and ethnic 
collect1v1ties introduce new and fundamental fissures that have to be noted lo analysts. 
o Third, flexibility, "lmpurity' and 'hybridlty' must be lotroduced loto the way lo 
which the poUtics of diversity Is approached. For example, lo a small way the man-
ner 10 which hlstory is taught. as representing contesting loterpretations, can 
weaken the rIgld loterpretation of "the past' or confllcts between d11I'erent rIgld 
"pasts'. Thus, something as obvious as a gender-sensitive reconstruction of hlstort-
cal processes and events shows that the apparent clarities of most 'history' hide a 
multitude of exclusions of people and power relations, most often of the role of 
women and the domination of men over women. In tum, tbls approach, as dis-
cussed in chapter three, introduces fractures into the apparent 80Udity of ethnic (or 
'ractal') mobilisatory discourses. 
When It comes to the use made of history and the essence of a sense of orlgln to shape 
and motivate for an ethnic group Identity, the task of responding to this phenomenon 
Is equally dlftlcult. Great sensitivity wtll have to be shown in 'expanding' a 
nationally-propagated history - disseminated through the media. through education, 
through the practice of statecraft - a sensitivity that does not allow for a new 'truth'. If! 
can once again refer to Patrick Wright: 
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Far from being somehow 'behind' the present, the past exists as an 
accomplished presence In pubUc understanding. In this sense It Is 
written Into present social reality. not Just 1mpl1cit1y as residue, 
precedent or custom and practice, but expl1cit1y as itself - as History, 
National Heritage and Tradition (1985:142). 
He refers to attempts to separate history as an intellectual process ('- the endeavour to 
estabUsh the truth of earlier events -') from 'the past' ('a more mythical complex 
inherent in the present as a "created ideology with a purpose"'); to the task of cutting 
'thro~ the ideological mists of the "past" and in this way contribute to changing the 
political agenda of the present'. 
Wright suggests that there are pointers as to how this might be undertaken. For 
example. 'the "past" has been substantially rearranged so that it now contains a wider 
acknowledgement of. for instance. women and the working class' (1985: 142). Through 
such expansion of 'the past' other groups (social identities) can be gtven a presence 
that is wider than ethnic particularity, or etlm1city can be made more complex by 
looking at the class, age and gender divisions within that identity. The story is 
multi-layered. Criticism of 'the past' should, however. not be detrimental to 'everyday 
historical consciousness· of stories. memory and vernacular interpretations ... • 
(Wright. 1985: 143). that form an essential part of social Ufe. 
Furthermore. it is not possible (appealing as it mtght be) s1mply to offer an alternative 
to the 'wrong' history presented in the ethnic 'past'. Wrlgbt warns against such 
treatment of 'national (ethnic in our case) traditions and institutions as if they were 
merely contested items in a claim over inheritance. They have no such stngularity and 
come with whole phUosophies of history attached' (1985: 155. emphasis added; see 
my discussion of Mzala. 1988. above). Edward Said wrote that: 
What matters a great deal more than the stable identity kept current 
in offiCial discourse is the contestatory force of an Interpretative 
method whose mater1alis the disparate. but intertwined and 
Interdependent. and above all. overlapping streams of historical 
experience (1994:378). 
I argued for the complex interaction of the past. of cultural uniqueness. and of group 
boundaries in coming to an understanding of ethnicity. To tackle one aspect is to 
sever one head of the dragon. and. to continue with the metaphor. it is to Ignore the 
environment In which the dragon has thrived. 
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In line with the argument put forward In chapter three It Is essent1al to recognise that 
as llttle as there is homogeneity within soclalident1t1es. there is as Uttle justiftcat10n in 
acting as though each indiVidual 
•.. simply (falls) into one deftnltlon or another: more typically in 
poUtics. each of us ruts through a number of identit1es. forming and 
reformlng tentaUve alllances that may not surviVe the issue at hand. 
And just as well. for one common thread that llnks sexism. racism. 
naUonaJism and reUglous bigOtry 18 the deflnlng of self and others by 
a stngle characteristic and belng able to see nothing more .•• The 
notion that our poUtics (or our social Uves) can slmply reflect one of 
our Identities seems implausible in the extreme (Phllllps. 1991 :155). 
IJ Fourth. as many arenas as possible for the non-confilctual expression of diversity 
must be created. Education is at the centre of creating such space. the space of the 
democratic 'bazaar'. With its jostling. quarreUng and collisions: With its hubbub of 
many voices. It has to be a poUtics of interacUve diversity. and not a poUtics of sin-
gularity. or of a new conformlty and rlgldity. albeit expressed in more encom~ 
Ing terms than those of apartheid. As Amanda Gouws writes: 
The more our soclety clatms to be gender- and race-blind. the more 
the issues of slmllarlty and difference wt1l plague us ... We wlll have to 
learn to deal With the diVides. to understand and honour the safe 
spaces and to come to grips with our own racist and sexist selves. But 
most of all we have to teach each other about our different ways and 
our difl'erent oppressions (Gouws. 1993:69). 
The same issue is addressed in a d1fferent context but in a s1mllar way by Amy 
Gutman (1992:3): • ••• it is hard to find a democratic society these days that is not the 
site of some slgnlftcant controversy over whether and how its publlc lnstltutions 
should better recognize the identities of cultural and disadvantaged minorities'. She 
makes the point that it refers not only to minorit1es. but also to women. However. the 
recognition is not just of diversity. as though each exists in a distlnct cultural cocoon. 
but of the porous boundaries and myriad interactions and lnfluences between people 
in their personal as well as socialidentltles. 
Said. once again. argued that 'we are mixed in with one another in ways that most 
national systems of education have not dreamed of. He concludes that '(t)o match 
knowledge in the arts and sciences with these integrative reallties Is. I beUeve. the 







A concern With the destructive consequences of the multipUcity of mobU1sed Identities 
In the wake of the collapse of several meta-narratives shapes Ernesto Lac1au's (1993) 
argument for a new unlversal to overcome the antagonistic particularlties of the 
post-modern world. In the lntroductory essay to a collection he edited (Laciau (ed), 
1994:~5) he repeats thls call when he refers to "the question of the relation between 
prollferation of particularlsms and decline of unlversal values'. Raising thls question 
does not mean a return of 
.•. the Idea of a subject whlch. In Its own particularlty. Incarnates the 
unlversal as such· as, for Instance, the 'unlversal class' In Marx • 
(whlch) Is deftnltely on the wane. And, In actual fact. there Is llttle to 
regret In that loss. The notion of a subject that Is, by Itself, pure and 
unlversal human essence, Is profoundly anti-democratic and can only 
be accompanied by a disrespect for all forms of particularism. Does 
thls mean that the only alternative Is a particularlsm whlch 
disregards all unlversal values and opens the way to various klnds of 
xenophobic excluslvlsm? That this is a real possibility is conVincing 
enough, ••• But I do not tblnk that these are the only alternatives. For 
the very emergence of hlghly partlcularlstic identities means that the 
particular groups wl11 have to coexist With other groups In larger 
communlties. and tbls coexistence wUl be impossible without the 
assertion qf values that transcend the ldenttttes of all of them. .• a 
universality that Is the very result oj parttcularlsm. It is. In thls 
sense, far more democratic •.. clearly, it is somethlng worth tlgbUng 
for (emphasis added). 
What Laclau suggests is that the transcending values wUllle In deflnlng the 
relationshlp between particularlsms and 'larger communlties', and groundtng that 
relationshlp In 'rights'. 
What are these larger communlUes. what are the partlcular1sms we speak of. and what 
is that (democratic) relationshlp? The particular answers are to be found In specific 
contexts. but the start would be to accept the framework wltbln whlch the these 
questions are asked. I have also argued that the ethnlc particularism is an articulation 
of aspects (such as class and gender and age) that could be identities themselves at 
appropriate, and at times lnapproprlate moments. 
o Flnally. to bring these varlous approaches together In the field of polltical contest· 
ation requires an organising principle that lles in citizensblp (and the civll, political 
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and soclal rights implied by this notion) and democracy. 'Democracy', as should be 
clear, needs to be defined in its broad sense as the manner of facilltatlng decision-
making following the so-called 'rules of the game' (see Bobbio, 1987) based on the 
noUon of ciUzensh1p, leading to an ever-widening sphere of control over one's own 
Ufe. It la through the Ideal of the equality conferred by citizenship, with Its three 
component parts of civil, pollUcal and soc1al I1gbts, that the p&rUclpants of the 
democraUc process are In the first instance defined. It Is through the rtgbts of clU-
zenshlp that the freedom of group association within soclety should be ensured; 
that the struggle towards the widest level of parUcipaUon should take place; that the 
tolerance for dlssenUDg posIUons and cWIerence should be protected and culU-
vated; that discrtmlnaUon and exploItation be countered; and that untversal and in-
teracUve characterisUcs be cherished as well as that which Is exclUSive, 'own', and 
deftn1ng. Democracy, in this case, does not equal just a vote, but a voice; a voice in 
dialogue, receiving and being received with respect. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
With Peter HQteg's MIss Smllla I must conclude on this subject: 
Tell us, they'll come and say to me. So we may understand and close 
the case. They're wrong. It's only what you do not understand that you 
can come to a conclusion about. There wtll be no conclusion 
( 1994:410). 
It Is not a conceit but an acknowledgement that the complexity of the subject matter 
does not allow a conclusion to what Is a process of socta1interacUon. struggle and 
change, a permanent debate. 
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